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THE DECEMBER PRISON TRANSFERS

Excessive and Indiscriminate Force During the Prison Transfers

The December prison incursions dramatically reversed explicit government policy-provoking speculation that the military was behind the decision to rush the F-type prisons into service.26 Justice Minister Hikmet Sami Turk had made an explicit commitment on December 8: "It is clear that the F-type prisons will not be opened for service for at least six months. During this period we are ready to take into consideration the sensitivities of public opinion, the criticisms of the F-type prisons and the constructive suggestions of professional organizations.... Our aim is to open the F-type prisons only after ensuring that they are brought to a state in conformity with human rights in every way."27 It is difficult to square this undertaking with the carnage that followed only eleven days later and the haste with which prisoners were transferred to F-type prisons that were not prepared to receive them. For example, at Sincan F-Type Prison, there was not a proper water supply, and prisoners were obliged to drink water with clay particles in it. Even as of this writing, there is no regulation in place to provide for the administration of the prisons.

On December 19, despite public pronouncements that the transfers to F-type prisons would not happen for six months or more, gendarmes entered twenty prisons with demolition equipment and automatic weapons and transferred more than a thousand prisoners to F-type prisons. The transfer operation resulted in heavy loss of life: it appears that thirty prisoners in seven of the twenty prisons were killed or subsequently died from injuries they sustained during the transfer. Two gendarmes died; one was killed by a gunshot at Canakkale Prison, the other apparently from smoke inhalation at Umraniye.

The exact circumstances in which so many deaths occurred have not yet been clarified. No detailed account of the fatalities has been provided either by the Justice or Interior Ministry. Official statements have presented the operation, in general terms, as one in which every effort was taken to preserve life in the face of gunfire from resisting prisoners. For example, in a press statement on December 24, Justice Minister Hikmet Sami Turk stated, "This operation, which was well planned by the gendarmes and the security forces, is above praise, because it was carried out with care and concern based on high respect for human life."28 Most prisoners died, the government claims, because they burned themselves in protest, while others were unavoidably killed because they were presenting an armed threat to the gendarmerie.29

Lawyers and prisoners' relatives interviewed by Human Rights Watch relayed accounts that differ significantly from the government's description of events. They describe an unprovoked attack by heavily armed soldiers who used unwarranted violence, firing on prisoners indiscriminately with lethal ammunition and apparently targeting and killing some unarmed prisoners. Some accounts (see below) suggest that gendarmes may have caused some of the fires by pouring flammable liquids or powders in areas where the prisoners were gathered, and igniting them.

The cause of death is not known in all cases, because the prosecution service has not yet released the full autopsy reports. An Interior Ministry briefing given on December 23 (before the final death toll emerged) stated that sixteen prisoners immolated themselves and security forces killed ten prisoners who were resisting with arms.30 Accordingto a briefing prepared by the Istanbul branch of the Human Rights Association, the largest number of deaths among prisoners was from gunshot wounds, followed by burning. Blows with blunt instruments may have been a factor in some deaths.31 Two prisoners appear to have died as a result of inhaling smoke or gas.32

The U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides a guide for how firearms and other weapons should be used during such operations. The principles require that officials resort to force or firearms only when they have no other choice, that they should exercise restraint and act in proportion to their legitimate objective. Officers must, under all circumstances, "minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life." (Principle 5).

In response to a nonviolent prisoner protest-that is, widespread hunger strikes-the authorities decided to send troops into the prisons in order to transfer the prisoners. Once the decision had been made to intervene using force, the authorities should have called on law enforcement professionals with experience in handling such a potentially hazardous situation with due regard for law and respect for human life. Due to the gendarmerie's well-established and very bad track record in dealing with prisoner unrest-having killed twenty-seven prisoners in similar incursions between 1995 and 199933-Human Rights Watch has urged on more than one occasion that the Justice Ministry not use gendarmes to intervene in prison crises or for transfers. The Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Parliament, which investigated the killing of ten prisoners at Ankara Closed Prison in September 1999, also expressed the view that "gendarmes, in view of their training, and the psychological and social dimension of the task in question, are clearly unsuitable for intervention is such situations."34 Similarly, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture has urged the Turkish government to use gendarmerie only as a last resort. In such cases, "The CPT recommends that ... the intervention take place in the presence of an authority which is fully independent of both the gendarmerie and the prison and charged with observing and subsequently reporting upon the carrying out of the intervention. The presence of such an authority will both have a dissuasive effect on anyone minded to ill treat prisoners and enable unfounded allegations of ill-treatment to be refuted in a convincing manner."35

Unfortunately, no such independent authority was present during the December 2000 intervention, in spite of the fact that, according to the Interior Minister, these operations had been planned for more than a year.36 On the contrary, even those authorities that had a clear duty to supervise the operation appear to have been kept well awayfrom the scene. The prison prosecutor is the representative of the judiciary inside the prison and is responsible for all issues of legal process. Eren Keskin, a lawyer and president of the Istanbul branch of the HRA, told Human Rights Watch that she was in the office of the Istanbul Public Prosecutor during telephone conversations between the prosecutor and the prosecutors of Umraniye and Bayrampasa Prisons on December 20. From these telephone calls, she said she learned that neither prosecutor was granted access to the scene of the prison operation and therefore that they had no direct information on developments at the prisons. The media also reported, apparently based on official sources, that the prosecutor at Bayrampasa did not arrive at the gates of the prison until four hours after the operation had begun,37 and that the operation was being run by the gendarmerie, rather than judicial or prison, authorities.38

U.N. Principle 10 on the Use of Force and Firearms requires that security forces should give "clear warning of their intent to use firearms." The pre-dawn timing of the intervention suggests that it was planned as a raid relying on the element of surprise. Far from being warned of the use of force, some prisoners at Bayrampasa and Umraniye Prisons describe being awakened by explosions, though prisoners in other prisons did describe warnings in the form of calls to surrender.

When Sema Karatas visited her husband Mustafa Karatas at Edirne F-type prison, he told her that he woke up to gendarmes shouting "This is an operation, surrender!" He described how the prisoners offered to surrender to the prosecutor, but the soldiers responded with, "There's no more prosecutor now, we are the prosecutor." When the prisoners asked to talk to the governor, the gendarmes jeered that they were the governor, and even the Justice Minister.39

The U.N. Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms encourage the deployment of a range of "non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate situations."40 "Their use should be carefully evaluated in order to minimize the risk of endangering uninvolved persons," and the use of such weapons should be carefully controlled.41 During the operation, ostensibly non-lethal methods were used, including what prisoners reported as concussion, tear gas, and pepper gas grenades, and a grenade containing some form of gas that incapacitated by making muscles tense uncontrollably. Although tear gas and pepper gas are generally not lethal when used in certain circumstances (such as for street riots), they can be fatal when used in enclosed spaces.42 The Istanbul HRA cited gas as a possible cause of the deaths of Nilufer Alcan at Bayrampasa Closed Prison and Unsal Gedik at Umraniye Prison.43

Lethal weapons were also widely used during the prison operation. According to the Istanbul HRA report, bullet wounds were the cause of death of at least eight prisoners. Prisoners' accounts suggest that a large amount of lethal ammunition was used in apparently indiscriminate shootings, even in the early stages of the operation. Such accounts were particularly common from Bayrampasa Closed Prison where most of the deaths by gunshot wounds occurred. According to Bilal and Fevziye Kaya, their son Mustafa Kaya reported being woken up at Bayrampasa by shooting. He told them that his ward was "raked" with gunfire.44 According to Ali Dogan, his daughter Deniz Dogan, held at Umraniye Prison, stated that she awoke to explosions and bullets "like rain."45 According to Ali Esmer, his brotherSuha Esmer said that gendarmes entered his ward at Bayrampasa prison from the roof and began to shoot right and left without warning.46

An Istanbul lawyer relayed to Human Rights Watch an account given by his client, transferred from Bayrampasa Prison, who said that the operation began with sudden gunfire and grenades from the corridor running alongside the ward, and that the gunshots wounds were sustained in the first minutes of the operation.

Murat Ordekci, who was shot dead at Bayrampasa Prison, may have been the victim of a deliberate killing. Mustafa Karatas's account, according to his wife Sema Karatas, was that prisoners driven from Bayrampasa's C-12 ward by gas, smoke, and flames, fled into an exercise yard where gendarmes shot at them. It was his impression that gendarmes were mainly aiming for prisoners' legs, but nevertheless he saw Murat Ordekci, who was unarmed, shot through the head.

The circumstances of the death of Ahmet Ibili at Umraniye Closed Prison suggest that this may also have been a deliberate killing. Justice Minister Hikmet Sami Turk stated that a prisoner, later identified at Ahmet Ibili, had immolated himself and that gendarmes had then shot him as he walked towards them.47

The Commentary on article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (on which the Basic Principles are based) states: "The use of firearms is considered an extreme measure. Every effort should be made to exclude the use of firearms, especially against children. In general, firearms should not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender. In every instance in which a firearm is discharged, a report should be made promptly to the competent authorities." The critical issue is to what extent the prisoners presented a threat to the gendarmes. A gendarmerie colonel, speaking at an Interior Ministry briefing on December 23, 2000 stated that "Although weapons were not being used [by the security forces], convicted and remanded prisoners used Kalashnikovs, shotguns, pistols, grenades, and home-made pipe-bombs against the security forces." One gendarme, Nurettin Kurt, died of a high velocity gunshot wound at Umraniye Prison. Human Rights Watch is not aware that any further information has emerged concerning the weapon which killed him and whether he was killed by prisoners' or gendarmes' gunfire.

One of the prisoners with whom Human Rights Watch spoke did not deny that prisoners had resisted the security forces, but said that the weapons used were darts and slingshots, not firearms. There were newspaper reports that a Kalashnikov (AK-47) automatic weapon was used by prisoners at Bayrampasa and recovered after the operation. However, no gendarmes were reported to have been wounded by such a weapon, and a display of recovered weapons on December 21 included pistols but no automatic weapons.48 The Parliamentary Human Rights Commission had been skeptical about a similar claim made after the operation at Ankara Closed Prison in September 1999.49

Several prisoners died of burns during the December prison operation. Two bodies were burned beyond recognition, and one of these was buried without having been conclusively identified. Prisoners' own accounts indicate that some of their fellow prisoners did in fact set themselves on fire as a protest against the operation, and this is corroborated by video footage circulated by the Interior Ministry on December 21. But several prisoners also reported to their families that gendarmes poured flammable powders or liquids into the wards. According to Gulnaz Bayram, her daughter Nazli Bayram, who was in Bayrampasa Prison, told her that "a white powder came in, and then there was a big explosion behind us. This lit the powder. There was nothing you could do-just run this way and that."50 According to Hasan Celik, his son Seyhan Celik, who was in Bayrampasa Prison, reported, "They sprayed a chemical material, a liquid, which caught fire after they tipped it in."51 According to Bilal and Fevziye Kaya, their son Mustafa Kaya who was transferred from Bayrampasa to Edirne F-type prison, told them, "The gendarmes opened a hole in the roof and threw in gas grenades, and poured some chemical liquid through and set light to it."52

U.N. Principle 22 on the Use of Force and Firearms provides that officers prepare a detailed report whenever they use firearms. If there are fatalities, they must submit the report to administrative and judicial bodies so that they can proceed to a thorough investigation. Scrupulous record keeping would be of vital importance in clarifying why so many lives were lost in those seven prisons on December 19. Full reporting followed up by meticulous forensic investigation could confirm or rebut the allegations of disproportionate and indiscriminate use of lethal violence. But there is no precedent for this. There were four previous fatal incursions, mainly by gendarmes, between 1995 and 1999.53 Human Rights Watch is not aware that the gendarmerie produced any detailed account of how ammunition was used, or how fatalities occurred in any of those incidents.

Past experience of delay, perfunctory investigation, corruption or loss of evidence, and extreme difficulty in opening legal proceedings related to the killing of prisoners following previous incursions inspire little confidence that internal gendarmerie reports on the operation will even be made public or that independent inquiries will be initiated by or allowed by the government. To date, no gendarme or official has been punished for the killings and injuries in those operations. For example, in its investigation into the deaths of ten prisoners at Ankara's Ulucanlar Closed Prison on September 26, 1999, the Parliamentary Human Rights commission reported that some officials had been reluctant to cooperate or even refused to cooperate with its investigation or to supply evidence, that Justice and Interior Ministry officials had not been frank in their disclosures, that autopsies had not been properly carried out, and that evidence had disappeared and, in the case of the "recovered" Kalashnikov automatic weapon, possibly created. The Commission concluded that excessive force had been used and also noted injuries that indicated that the prisoners were beaten after capture. Lawyers who attempted to bring legal action against prison staff for their part in the deaths and injuries of prisoners were blocked by the office of the Ankara governor. The Ankara governor's office also tried to block the prosecution of gendarmes, but this was successfully challenged in the courts. However, in the curious indictment finally produced in December 2000, the prosecutor charged gendarmerie officers with unlawful killing, but urged their acquittal on the grounds that they were acting in self-defense and the pursuit of their duty.54

It is imperative that all evidence that may assist in the reconstruction of events in Turkish prisons on December 19, 2000 be preserved untainted. Human Rights Watch was concerned to learn from the lawyer Selcuk Kozaagac that prisoners' clothing, which would provide much information about the direction and range of gunshots, as well as the use of flammable materials, has disappeared. In view of the history of corrupt or missing evidence in parallel cases, and the difficulty in securing prosecutions, much less convictions, in similar violent interventions by gendarmes, it may not be possible to rely on the state prosecution service to carry out an effective investigation and, where appropriate, prosecute members of the security forces. Human Rights Watch therefore calls on the Turkish government to establish an independent commission of investigation into the deaths that occurred during the December intervention, along the lines recommended by the U.N. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (Principle 11). The commission should be composed of persons recognized for their expertise, impartiality, and independence. It should be fully resourced, with powers to summon and protect witnesses, and demand information from official bodies. Where the commission uncovers evidence indicating that individuals are responsible for killing or wounding through the negligent or careless use of force or firearms, or for carrying out deliberate killings, or where superior officers have given orders that resulted in such conduct, such evidence must be submitted to the prosecution service in order that those individuals or superior officers can be brought to justice. The findings of the Commission should be made public without delay.

Allegations of Ill-treatment, Torture, and Sexual Assault During the Prison Transfers

Prisoners who were transferred to F-type prisons during the December operation reported widespread beatings by gendarmes and, in some cases, torture. The CPT stated55 that it had received "numerous and consistent allegations" that prisoners had been beaten by gendarmes after removal from the prison wards, and stated that in some cases the committee had gathered medical evidence consistent with the allegations.56

Sami Yilmaz, who was transferred from Bartin to Sincan F-type Prison, described what happened after he was captured by gendarmes:

They took us into the prison garden, stripped us of our clothes and valuables, including rings, and hit us on the head and back with truncheons. While this was happening we saw the other prisoners, still face down in the mud, even though six hours had passed since the operation began. Because my head was bloody, they put me in an ambulance. They also brought two other prisoners. The doctor tried to stop the bleeding but the gendarmes traveling with us intervened saying "Don't foul your hands with the blood of these people." When the doctor said that he must carry on with treating us, the gendarmes started to beat us there in the ambulance. They continued to beat us as we arrived at the hospital. Because I could stand I was walked to the special lock-up ward. My hands were handcuffed behind my back and the gendarmes pushed me down a flight of stairs. At the bottom there were two others waiting. One of them hit me in the face with his fist.They both kicked me. My eyes were so swollen that I could only see out of the corner of one of them. There were fellow prisoners unconscious on the floor. I sat down next to them and the gendarmes struck my head against the wall, and I lost consciousness.57

Because the gendarme had lost the key, Bulbul was left for the night in tight handcuffs that caused his hands to swell and turn blue.58

The beating and humiliation continued the next day, on the journey to Sincan F-type Prison. Sami Yilmaz and the other prisoners were still sick from the effects of the gas used in the operations and one of Sami Yilmaz's companions said that he needed to vomit. "We asked for water, and for him to be allowed out to vomit. We even offered to get them money. The gendarmes refused, and when [the prisoner] finally vomited, they shouted `Don't filthy up the floor or we will make you lick it up.'" Sami Yilmaz stated that uniformed gendarmes and a plain-clothes officer interrogated him after arrival at Sincan F-type Prison. While interrogating him about the political structures within Bartin Prison, they stripped him and beat him on the buttocks with a truncheon. Human Rights Watch spoke to relatives of seventeen prisoners who separately reported being beaten during transit and/or on arrival at F-type prisons. Several prisoners, male and female, also told their families that they were sexually assaulted. One female prisoner told her brother that gendarmes had beaten her with a truncheon, kicked her between the legs, and squeezed her breast. At one point, according to his account, gendarmes attempted to remove her trousers while their colleagues stood around jeering and shouting at other prisoners and taunted them to intervene.

One prisoner informed his lawyer, Gulizar Tuncer, that after being removed from Istanbul's Umraniye Prison he was taken to Kandira F-Type Prison. On arrival on 20 December he was taken to a room where he was stripped naked and interrogated for approximately 45 minutes by gendarmes who subjected him to falaka (beating on the soles of the feet), beatings, and anal rape with a truncheon. He was put in a cell with two other prisoners, one of whom had broken ribs. When a doctor came to examine this prisoner during the night, the prisoner told the doctor what had happened and asked to be examined. The doctor dismissed his request, saying, "We will see." The prisoner told his lawyer that he wrote two separate petitions to the prison administration requesting a medical examination. His lawyer also made an application on her client's behalf. Forensic Medicine Institute doctors only examined the prisoner twenty-five days after the alleged assault, and the lawyer has not received the report.59 Seven other male prisoners also made a formal complaint that they had been anally raped by gendarmes with truncheons during the transfer.60

Prison staff appear to have neglected their own standard prison procedures for conducting thorough medical examinations of all new prisoners, and thus did not document medical evidence of ill-treatment that had occurred during the transfer. Some prisoners reported having received no medical examination upon arrival at the new prison; others described medical examinations that were perfunctory at best. Mehmet Bekaroglu, a member of the Turkish parliament for Rize and a former prison psychiatrist, serves on the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission. He has taken an energetic interest in the current crisis and, as a member of the Turkish Medical Association, was particularly vigilant in investigating the medical problems of the prisoners:

As far as I can tell, there are absolutely no prisoners without burns, bruises, and cuts, which they say that they got on the way to and on admittance into the F-type prisons. But no forensic medical examination wascarried out, even though I urged this repeatedly. I spoke to the doctor at Sincan F-Type Prison when I visited and said, "It is your responsibility to record all the injuries of admitted prisoners. Have you done this?" He confessed that this had not been done.

The Justice Ministry was slow to respond to allegations of ill-treatment and did not appoint his own inspectors to look into allegations of ill-treatment until January 2, almost two weeks after the violence took place. To date, no information had emerged concerning their findings.

In fact, during the first month following the transfer, almost the only medical information to reach the public regarding the condition of prisoners transferred to the F-type prisons was the long lists of injuries pieced together by the Human Rights Association from interview notes provided by lawyers and relatives, and the few released prisoners. The following handwritten notes of December 25, 2000, which the Ankara branch of the HRA passed to Human Rights Watch, and what police confiscated from their offices are a typical example. It concerns prisoners at Ankara's Sincan Prison:

Ahmet Bakir (according to the account given by his mother Sevgi Bakir)
In three person cell. Bruises on face. Broken arm. Stitches on leg. Cannot stand. Tortured constantly. On 65th day of death fast. (Brought from Ceyhan Prison).

Faruk Dere (according to the account given by his father Zeki Dere)
In three person cell with Mehmet Kaynak and Hakan Elma. Lung problems arising from intense gas exposure. Difficulty talking. Wounds on his mouth. Bruises on jaw and eyebrow. On 16th day of unlimited hunger-strike. Other friends also on hunger-strike. Beaten twice a day, morning and evening. Sometimes stripped and beaten. No access to yard. No heating. Cannot get out of bed. Beaten by specially trained gendarmes. If they use too much electricity they will be charged for it. Beaten for 40 minutes on arrival at prison.

Yakup Inan (according to the account given by his elder brother Serdar Inan)
In three person cell with Haydar Aycicek and Hasan Dagli. On the 57th day of death fast. Has lost 20-25 kilograms. Mouth and lips smashed. 8 stitches in site of blow on forehead. Wound on left side of back, right side bruised black where he was beaten with a chain. Ribs may be broken. Has difficulty drawing breath. Loss of memory. (Was brought from Ceyhan Prison). Wants a doctor from Turkish Medical Association. Deteriorating. ...

Arif Bademli and Hasan Bademli (from their father Mustafa Bademli)
They came from Ceyhan Prison. They are both staying in the same three person cell. Arif's arm is broken, his eye bruised. Stitches in his head. Wounds all over his body. He came to the visit in his hospital gown. Arif has just begun a death fast, Hasan is on the 61st day. Stitches in his head. Arif's condition is bad. Not even bandaged. Every day they are brought down for roll call and beaten.

When police found this list during a search at the Ankara branch of the HRA, it was not used as the basis for an official investigation into ill-treatment, but used instead as the basis for charges against officials of the branch for "supporting an armed organization." They are currently on trial at Ankara State Security Court. (See below for additional details on government efforts to silence NGO monitoring of the prison crisis.)

The Ankara Medical Association was permitted to examine prisoners in the Sincan F-type Prison on three occasions between January 3 and January 17. Its report on these examinations61 is consistent with the accounts given by prisoners:

Almost all [prisoners at Sincan F-type Prison] had cuts, particularly in the head area and above the hair-line, a large percentage of which had not been sutured but which had begun to heal or turn into scar tissue; bruises and abrasions on extremities and trunk, soft tissue damage and associated pain; also lesions on the wrist and numbness of the hands associated with prolonged tight handcuffing; a large number also had eye injuries resulting from trauma, including sclerotic hemorrhage which was beginning to be reabsorbed ... examinations showed that 25 convicted and remand prisoners had untreated fractures of ribs and extremities (particularly fingers), while eleven had burns in various parts of their bodies... One convicted prisoner who was interviewed said that he had been anally raped with a truncheon.

Access to prisons by the Turkish Medical Association branches was withdrawn following the publication of their critical findings.

26 The operation was carried out by gendarmerie, a military force which carries out police duties under the authority of the Interior Ministry. The gendarmerie are commanded by generals who are part of military general staff, and the gendarmerie supreme commander is a member of the National Security Council. Its duties include policing rural areas, guarding frontiers and perimeter security for prisons. In such duties, the gendarmerie is under the authority of the Interior Ministry. Gendarmerie personnel consists largely of young men carrying out their military service.

27 Anatolia Agency, December 8, 2000.

28 Hurriyet (Liberation) December 25, 2000.

29 Anatolia Agency, December 20, 2001.

30 Radikal, December 24, 2000.

31 Istanbul Human Rights Association, 19 Aralik Katliam Raporu (December 19 Massacre Report), January 6, 2001.

32 The CPT stated that "information gathered during the [December 2000/January 2001] visit suggest that the methods employed by the security forces were not in all cases proportional to the difficulties faced. In particular, the delegation has grave doubts regarding the manner in which the intervention took place vis-a-vis the female dormitory C1 at Istanbul Prison and Detention House (Bayrampasa). Six of the 27 women in that dormitory died and many of the others suffered burns and/or other injuries. The delegation interviewed several of the women who were held in dormitory C1 as well as other prisoners who witnessed parts of the intervention against that dormitory. According to the accounts received, the occupants of dormitory C1 did not offer violent resistance, but merely shut themselves in their dormitory; it is alleged that the women were nevertheless bombarded with gas grenades and other devices for several hours and shot at from time to time and that, at around 12.00 am, the top floor of the dormitory was set on fire as a result of the action being taken by the security forces. It is also alleged that the security forces were immediately told that prisoners were being burned on the top floor but failed to take prompt action to put out the fire, despite having the means (water hoses) to do so."

33 Human Rights Watch, "Small Group Isolation in Turkish Prisons: An Avoidable Disaster," A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 12 no. 8 (D), May 2000; Human Rights Watch, "Turkey: Human Rights and the European Union Accession Partnership," A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 12, no. 10 (D), September 2000.

34 Turkish Parliament Human Rights Commission, 26 Eylul 1999 Ulucanlar Cezaevi Raporu (26 September 1999 Ulucanlar Prison Report), June 2000.

35 Report to the Turkish Government on the visit to Turkey from 5 to 17 October 1997 (CPT/Inf (99) 2 [EN] - Publication Date: February 23, 1999).

36 Hurriyet (Liberation), December 20, 2000.

37 Milliyet (Nationhood), December 20, 2000.

38 Radikal, December 20, 2000.

39 Human Rights Watch interview with Sema Karatas, Istanbul, January 2, 2001.

40 U.N. Principles on the Use of Force and Firearm, Principle 2.

41 Ibid., Principle 3.

42 Howard Hu, MD, MPH; Jonathan Fine, MD; Paul Epstein, MD, MPH; Karl Kelsey, MD, MOH; Preston Reynolds, MD, PhD; Bailus Walker, PhD, MPH, "Tear Gas: Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?," Journal of the American Medical Association, August 4, 1989, vol. 262, no. 5.

43 Istanbul Human Rights Association, 19 Aralik Katliam Raporu (December 19 Massacre Report), January 6, 2001.

44 Human Rights Watch interview with Bilal and Fevziye Kaya, Istanbul, January 3, 2001.

45 Human Rights Watch interview with Ali Dogan, Istanbul, January 2, 2001.

46 Human Rights Watch interview with Ali Esmer, Istanbul, January 3, 2001.

47 Radikal, December 20, 2000.

48 See Radikal, December 22, 2000.

49 "The commanders who directed the operation [at Ulucanlar Prison] stated that intense gunfire had been directed from inside [the ward] and that they had opened fire in response to this. Also, it was stated that three prisoners had been killed by their fellow prisoners who had fired on them with a shotgun. Searches subsequent to the operation uncovered 1 Kalashnikov type automatic weapon (AK-47), 7 pistols, 1 shotgun. However, there are some doubts concerning the shotgun and automatic weapon. Firstly, the automatic weapon was not found in the first search...; if the said automatic weapon had been used by the prisoners, security force members would surely have been wounded with this weapon. Whereas wounded security force members were shot with pistol ammunition. Again, if a shotgun was used and a prisoner shot his three friends with this weapon, why did they not fire on the security forces with the shotgun?" 26 September 1999 Ulucanlar Prison Report, Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Commission, June 2000.

50 Human Rights Watch interview with Gulnaz Bayram Istanbul, January 3, 2001.

51 Human Rights Watch interview with Hasan Celik, Istanbul, January 3, 2001.

52 Human Rights Watch interview with Bilal and Fevziye Kaya, Istanbul,
January 3, 2001.

53 Three prisoners were beaten to death by security forces at Buca Prison, near Izmir,
in September 1995; four prisoners died of beatings at Umraniye Prison in Istanbul in January 1996; ten prisoners were beaten to death during an incursion into Diyarbakir Prison in September 1996; ten prisoners were killed at Ankara Closed Prison in September 1999.

54 Indictment, Ankara Public Prosecutor's Office, Investigation No: 2000/5435, December 25, 2000.

55 CPT, preliminary observations on its December 2000/January 2001 visit to Turkey (www.cpt.coe.int/en/press/20010316en.htm, March 30, 2001).

56 The bulletin of the Human Rights Foundation of February 1, 2001, states that the Ministry of Justice responded to the Ankara Medical Association's report. According to the Ministry's reply, all 346 prisoners who were injured during transfer to Sincan F-type Prison were treated, with seventeen in the hospital and thirty-five in the prison infirmary. Fifteen prisoners refused treatment and a transfer to the hospital in protest against body-searches carried out by the gendarmerie. All prisoners on hunger strike had been provided with sugar, salt, and vitamin B1. Initial problems with the water supply and heating had been resolved. The prisoners who, according to Article 16 of the Anti-Terror Law had to be held in single or three-person cells did not suffer from isolation. Each day they could go out into the fresh air between 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. On four days of the week they could see their lawyers after 3.30 p.m. and on Fridays they could meet for the whole day. Relatives could visit once a week. The cells were above European and U.N. standards. The counts of the prisoners had to be carried out on the ground floor of the cell. Those prisoners who refused to come down were warned, and then physically brought downstairs, but were not ill-treated. The Ministry's statement concluded with the observation that the Ankara Medical Association's report employed expressions in their statement "similar to those of the terrorist organizations."

57 Human Rights Watch interview with Sami Yilmaz, Ankara, January 5, 2001.

58 The CPT reported, in its preliminary observations on its December 2000/January 2001 visit to Turkey, that "Many complaints were heard about the manner in which prisoners were transferred and, in particular, that they were very tightly handcuffed throughout the journey.... Further, despite the fact that several weeks had elapsed since the interventions, many prisoners were found to bear marks on their wrists fully consistent with the allegations made of excessively tight handcuffing."

59 Telephone interview with lawyer Gulizar Tuncer, March 28, 2001.

60 Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Information Note-17:Death Fast in Prisons, January 8, 2001.

61 Available on the website of the Ankara Medical Association, www.ato.org.tr/guncel/25012001.html, published January 25, 2001.

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