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VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Introduction

Even given the confusing, chaotic, and sometimes lawless context of Tajikistan, the state exerts direct and indirect pressure on journalists, editors, and media outlets to curtail freedom of expression. It does so through straightforward intimidation, politically motivated libel suits, and informal "counselling" to editors as to media content. It also manipulates licensing procedures, controls printing contracts between independent outlets and the state-run printing press, and uses accreditation for foreign journalists as a lever of control. These methods have been successful in sowing fear in many; four journalists declined speaking with Human Rights Watch because they said they feared the consequences, and others spoke with us only on condition of strict anonymity.

Although Tajikistan's obligations under international and domestic law would preclude state censorship, international covenants ratified by Tajikistan and the constitution unequivocally forbid state censorship, and although it is not a systematic practice, in reality pre-publication censorship occurs, as documented in this report. As in general journalists choose not to use the courts to defend themselves and stay away from issues sensitive to the authorities, self-censorship prevents large-scale pre-publication censorship from occurring, while those incidents which do occur most often go unreported.

Tajikistan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998. The ICCPR's article 19 states: Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference; Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. The Constitution of Tajikistan upholds freedom of expression and bans censorship: Every person is guaranteed freedom of speech, publishing, and the right to use means of mass information. State censorship and prosecution for criticism is prohibited. The list of information constituting a state secret is specified by law.

Other laws governing the media in Tajikistan protect media freedoms. These include the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic on December 14, 1990, and the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting, adopted on December 14, 1996. The environment in which journalists operate-an overall lack of law and order- renders the legislation ineffectual. Media workers in general consider it disadvantageous or even dangerous to use the courts to defend their rights, as the judiciary is not independent. Under the terms of the 1997 General Agreement, amendments are to be made to current media legislation to bring them into greater conformity with international protections, although at the time of writing there were no signs that such steps had been initiated.

The government of Tajikistan maintains that certain restrictions on freedom of expression are necessary to protect development, security, and other interests. Many state officials and even Tajik journalists themselves hold the view that unrestricted freedom of expression in part spurred the civil war in 1992,52 and that coverage of sensitive topics, such as the negative consequences of the war, must necessarily be limited in order to preserve national security interests and stability.53 Although this view is not strictly state policy, in practice, due to the various curbs on the media described in this report, including censorship and an uncontrolled culture of violence and impunity, little serious discussion of the negative impact of the civil war appears in the press.

The government's top leadership is also very sensitive to its domestic image: insulting or slandering the president can result in prison sentences of two to five years.54 In May 1998, the Majlisi Oli unanimously adopted a law "on the defense of the honor and dignity of the president," which allowed only President Rakhmonov to use the title "president"; heads of enterprises and organizations were required to employ another designation. The law also set out high fines and prison sentences for those convicted of insulting or slandering the president, including terms of up to three years, and stipulated that those agencies guilty of repeatedly publishing or distributing slanderous material about the president were subject to closure.55 Following international protest, nonetheless, President Rakhmonov vetoed the law, stating that "sufficient provisions were contained under the criminal code."56 Journalists, while expressing outrage at the proposed law, also pointed out ironically that in practice criticism of the president is taboo given stringent self-censorship and "the law of the automatic," as opposed to civic law and order. "We haven't been able to criticize the president for the past six years," said one journalist, "what's the big deal, now they've just put it on paper."57

The government is also concerned about its reputation abroad, and regularly claims that the international press reflects a point of view that is either inflammatory or damaging to the country's image.58 The Russian press, for example, is regularly criticized by the government for biased reporting and disinformation, and several Russian journalists have had their accreditation revoked as a consequence. At the same time, despite widespread skepticism among the general population about Moscow's ultimate political and strategic goals in the country and region, the Russian and other foreign media are generally considered to be the most informative and comprehensive in Tajikistan.59

Moral standards are also a preoccupation of the state: on August 19, 1999, for example, the editors-in-chief of more than ten newspapers were summoned to a meeting convened by the head of the parliamentary committee on international relations and culture. Committee Chairman Ibrohim Usmonov told the editors that the content of their newspapers did not meet the needs of their readership, and expressed regret that the content focused on violence, cruelty, and war. The editors, he noted, had forgotten their duty to cultivate higher human values and promote the national dignity of Tajiks.60 And in March 1998, the Dushanbe papers Kurier Tajikistan and Digest Press were severely criticized by President Rakhmonov during a Majlisi Oli (parliament) session for "often publishing pornographic photographs and other material," content that does not "correspond to the Tajik mentality."61

52 A description of how both government and opposition use of the television airwaves contributed to hostilities at the outset of civil conflict is contained in Muhabbat Khodjibaeva, "Television and the Tajik Conflict," Central Asia Monitor, no. 1, 1999. 53 As an example, Saiohat Ne'matova, an official from the presidential administration, stated at a round table on freedom of expression sponsored by the U.S. Information Service: "In some ways too much freedom of expression led to the war. We witnessed the war, and now we must be careful not to return to that. For example, we reported on state television about the deaths of journalists in connection with the conflict, but then we received phone calls stating that this information was negative and too depressing, thus, we stopped." The round table was held in Dushanbe on June 16, 1998. 54 Article 137, Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan. 55 Law on the Dignity and Honor of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, May 21, 1998. 56 Human Rights Watch interviews with local journalists, Dushanbe, June 1998; "The President of Tajikistan Inviolable," Victoria Panfilova, Nezavisimaia gazeta (Moscow), May 29, 1998. 57 Human Rights Watch interviews with local journalists, Dushanbe, June 1998. 58 At the May 1999 parliament session, for example, President Rakhmanov remonstrated Radio Liberty, the BBC, and the Iranian Sadoi Khuroson for unobjective and overly negative coverage and warned that this type of reporting represented a tendency to "sell out to outside powers." Local journalists are also vulnerable in this regard. For example, Abufattokh Vokhidov, in 1995 editor-in-chief of Posukh (The Answer), was in that year fired soon after he made unflattering comments about the government in an interview with Voice of America (VOA). 59 There are currently between 8,000 and 9,000 Russian Border Force guards in addition to the Russian army's 201st Motorized Rifle Division in Tajikistan, ample reason, according to many observers, to conclude that the Russian media is not entirely objective. As recently as April 1999, the Tajik and Russian governments signed a treaty allowing Russia to establish a military base in Tajikistan on the sites where its units are currently stationed. The two governments also signed a Declaration on Allied Interaction, and seven intergovernmental cooperation agreements. Russian news agencies, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 3, no. 75, part I, April 19, 1999; ITAR-TASS, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline vol. 2, no. 62, part I, March 31, 1998. Certain Russian media do on occasion overdramatize the military situation in Tajikistan. As an example, in May 1998, when government and UTO troops clashed on the eastern outskirts of Dushanbe, some Russian agencies reported that the television tower had been occupied by opposition forces, and that there was full-scale fighting in downtown Dushanbe. The first allegation was patently false, while the second was a misrepresentation. See also "Censorship." 60 Asia-Plus Blits, no. 158, August 20, 1999. 61 Asia-Plus Blits, no. 85, March 28-31, 1998. A typical Digest issue may contain articles on intimate relationships - these often accompanied by mildly provocative photographs-television listings, advertisements, poetry, and some news briefs capted from a local news agency. The Russian bul'varnaia pressa (yellow or tabloid press) can be easily found throughout Dushanbe.

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