VII. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Background

Aid of up to U.S. $1 billion a year has been central to the economic reform program of President Chiluba. As the country's largest source of foreign exchange, aid accounts for some 70 percent of gross domestic product. A decline in the production of copper, which in previous years accounted for more than 95 percent of export earnings (a fall only partially compensated by a rise on world prices), has created a growing dependency on aid. In 1992, at the height of donor goodwill, Zambia received $1.2 billion in non-emergency aid, three times the average in Africa, as well as $400 million in emergency aid. In 1996 the aid pledged was just $800 million, down a third from the 1992 figure.

The differences between the 1992 and 1996 figures are the result of Zambia's increasing aid needs being met with tougher conditions set by the international donor community. At the heart of the debate on the role of aid in economic reconstruction are issues of good governance, accountability and democratic practice.

As Zambia's model transition to democracy and restructuring of the economy earned it economic kudos, the Zambian government's default on its earlier democratic commitments was met with a consensus that progress on governance issues was fundamental to further and continued support. From mid-1996, donors started cutting back bilateral aid resulting in a donor freeze which specifically targeted the crucial balance of payments support. While different conditions linking aid to good governance are set by different countries in accordance with their foreign policy standards, for the most part, the Western donors agreed that Zambia had not met the set standards-hence, the conditionalities set for balance of payments support. For the multilateral lenders, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the benchmarks are more narrowly defined in terms of economic performance.

Good governance criteria for continued donor support were emphasized at the World Bank's Consultative Group meeting for Zambia in Bournemouth in the United Kingdom in December 1995. There was general consensus that aid for 1996 would be available provided that the Zambian government maintained momentum in its economic reform program and achieved tangible progress on governance.213

Throughout 1996, as the government showed little inclination to follow up on the commitments made at Bournemouth, donors began to cut back aid. On March 25, Norway suspended its balance of payments support, expressing concern about the Zambian government's good governance record. In the following months, the European Union countries followed. The Constitutional Amendment Act of May 1996 was a major reason for the imposition of the aid freeze: the radical amendment was considered a departure from good governance, which for many donor countries is a condition for aid. Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United States cut aid. Britain withheld UK 10 million pounds because of violations of good governance norms. Denmark suspended debt relief of 40 million Danish Krona. The United States, through U.S.A.I.D., cut its aid package by more than ten percent ($2.5 million). The U.S. government reduced bilateral assistance for the 1996 fiscal year by almost $2 million, from $19,024,000 to $17,500,000.

The European Union collectively did not take the lead, as the member states were divided in approach. But a convergence of views grew through 1996, with the exception of Ireland, whose diplomatic mission in Lusaka did not take a forceful stand on linking human rights recognitions with continued aid. In May 1996, the E.U. issued a demarche over the Constitutional Amendment Act. This was followed on September 28 by demarches to both the government and the opposition urging them to enter into "intensive dialogue." The E.U. presidency issued a declaration to Zambia in October calling on all sides to maintain the "highest standards" in the forthcoming elections.

E.U. aid gave Europe considerable leverage for pressing for reforms. Since the signing of the 1991 National Indicative Program (NIP) between the E.U. and Zambia, the total pledged funding from all sources under the Lome IV treaty (NIP IV) amounted to 352.63 million ECU. In 1995 16.8 million ECU was provided for Zambia's Structural Adjustment Program, including National Indicative Program-funded balance of payments support.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiatives were generally frail. Most SADC countries, with the exceptions of Malawi and Tanzania, expressed dismay at the political developments in Zambia through diplomatic or presidential channels. But South African President Nelson Mandela, who had asked that the matter be dealt with bilaterally and privately, invited President Chiluba to Pretoria in August 25 to discuss the situation in Zambia. They met again on November 12 in an eleventh hour attempt by President Mandela, in his capacity as SADC chairman, to mediate a compromise before the election. He told Chiluba that the "elections would lack credibility" if Kaunda was not allowed to run for presidential office and asked President Chiluba to delay the election. President Chiluba agreed to find a way to do so. President Mandela dispatched South African Judge Richard Goldstone toLusaka on November 14, four days before the election, as his special envoy to confer with the Electoral Commission and convince them that elections needed to be postponed: either by a commission announcement or by the declaration of a state of emergency.214 President Chiluba replied to a fax sent him by President Mandela two days before the election: "Mr President, we thank you for your genuine concerns and wish to assure you the elections will proceed peacefully. Our commitment to democracy and good governance are irrevocable."215

The high-profile international election monitoring of the 1991 election was not repeated in the 1996 election. Notably absent were the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute, two U.S. organizations that had monitored the previous election. No European country sent official observers either. However, Western donors did provide funding for local NGOs and election monitoring groups to observe the elections.

Two Consultative Group meetings, scheduled for December 1996 and March 1997, were deferred, presumably with the purpose of putting further pressure on the Zambian government to reform. The decision to lift the aid freeze would be agreed upon at a consultation meeting. On April 25, 1997, at the Zambian government's request, a pre-Consultative Group meeting with the donors was held in London. The Zambian government presented itself as having made considerable progress on governance and economic reform. On the basis of that meeting, the donors agreed to convene the next Consultative Group meeting in Paris on July 10-11 1997 at which time they would decide whether the aid freeze would be lifted or continued.

At the pre-Consultative Group meeting in London in April, on behalf of the U.K., the director of the Africa Division of the Overseas Development Administration for the United Kingdom, Peter Freeman, explained that "The ability of the U.K. to provide new balance of payments support for 1997 was limited."216 Thus, owing to the limitations of the current fiscal year, the U.K. would likely not have the finances necessary even if the bilateral donor nations were to agree, at the Consultative Group meeting in July, to continue sending aid to Zambia. The U.K.'s statement was echoed in Denmark's speech which followed it at the pre-Consultative meeting; it can be inferred from the lack of disagreement that the U.K. spoke on behalf of many donor nations when it referred to the fiscal improbability of aid to Zambia for 1997.

In London, the World Bank expressed its intention to continue aid when decisions are made at the Consultative Group meeting in Paris. Speaking for the World Bank, Country Director for Zambia Phyllis Pomerantz explained that the World Bank's principal concern was economic management: "It is the political part of the governance agenda that the Bank's Articles of Agreement precluded the Bank from pursuing."217 While the World Bank is ready to commit to giving aid to Zambia because it has determined that it is in financial need, it remains hesitant to either give exact figures or go ahead with the financial support without the agreement and support of bilateral donors. In October 1996, the World Bank released its balance of payments support without full backing from the bilateral donors, a move which caused tension and unhappiness from various contributing nations. Owing to this previous experience, the World Bank remains reluctant to commit on 1997 economic assistance to Zambia. In an interview with Human Rights Watch/Africa, John Todd, the Country Economist for the Southern Africa Department in the World Bank, said:

Due to the fact that the Consultative Group meeting on Zambia will not occur until July 10-11, 1997, there are no concrete figures at this time. Discussions with the Zambians of what needs to be pledged and what will be pledged are currently happening. In these discussions, factors such as the copper numbers and the events of this year are being analyzed.

Overall, a rough estimate for what is potentially available from the World Bank in aid for 1997 is $120 million-in comparison to last year's $140-150 million-providing all loan criteria have been met.

These are all very rough estimates since these figures are presently being discussed and calculated (including what the Zambian government will say they need in aid).218

At the pre-Consultative meeting, Country Director for Zambia Pomerantz clarified that within the World Bank, "As regards Balance of Payments support, there were two pending (second) tranche releases of adjustment operations: one (ERIP) for U.S. $70 million and another one (ESAC II) for U.S. $45 million,"219 neither of which were seen as fully committed. Owing to the lack of committment by the bilateral donor nations, it remains an open question how the World Bank will proceed after the July Consultative Group meeting in Paris.

Similarly, during the pre-Consultative meeting, on behalf of the International Monetary Fund, Assistant Director of the Africa Department, Reinold van Til, explained that its financial negotiations with Zambia would be contingent upon both the World Bank and the agreement of the bilateral donors.220

International Reaction to the Elections, Human Rights Conditions and the Political Impasse

In the days immediately following the elections, a former vice-president of the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT), Isaac Zimba, who had resigned six months earlier to enter politics, told a news conference packed with MMD cadres and state security officers that ZIMT had been paid to declare the elections fraudulent by the British High Commission and the Japanese, United States, and Swedish embassies. Zimba said that these embassies together with UNIP president Kenneth Kaunda were linked to a plot to sponsor three monitoring groups, ZIMT, FODEP and the CCC to declare the elections not free and fair.221

The response of donors was incredulity. The British High Commission challenged Zimba to substantiate his "bizarre accusations." Deputy High Commissioner Barrie Jones said his mission had not provided any bilateral funding for NGO monitoring.222

Adding grist to the mill, Patriotic Rescue Monitors (Paremo) demanded that Britain, the United States, Japan, and Sweden publicly state whether or not they had been involved in activities aimed at unseating the government.Chairman of Paremo Sidney Muchela said that Paremo had proof that some of the embassies were meddling in Zambia's affairs, but did not disclose the nature of the evidence.223

Japan called the allegations "malicious." "Japan categorically denies the allegations made against Japanese embassy staff. . . as they are totally baseless, a mere fabrication and a very malicious attempt to defame our good name in Zambia," the Japanese embassy said in a statement. "Such malevolent, irresponsible allegations may discourage the goodwill of our embassy staff and in turn influence the decline of the mutual friendship and cooperation currently existing between Japan and Zambia," it added.224

The Swedish embassy, which funded election monitoring groups, denied it was part of a plot to discredit the polls. "Linking Sweden to any kind of political plot or accusing her of doctoring monitoring reports is absurd. There are no malevolent intentions behind any of the Swedish. . .projects."225

The United States denied any involvement.226 A statement from the U.S. embassy in Lusaka stated: "The U.S. embassy regrets that false allegations about an imaginary election conspiracy continue to be publicized. We encourage Zambia to focus its energies on the challenges of development and democratization that lie ahead."227

Within a week of the election, the Zambian government had clamped down on election monitoring groups, in particular those who called the elections not free and fair. The NGOs-the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC), AFRONET and the Zambian Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT)-were raided and searched, documents seized, and the leadership briefly detained. They were charged with receiving funding from foreign sources. In the months since the election these issues have persisted. President Chiluba has taken particular issue with the donor community for supporting these groups he sees as opposed to him. He has classified NGOs into "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" categories: in essence, those that are funded by the donors and those that are not.

In a post-election diplomatic cold shoulder, President Chiluba's December 2 press conference to announce his new twenty-five-member cabinet was, according to the independent media, "visibly shunned by members of the diplomatic corps."228 President Chiluba expressed regret that he was unable to appoint loyal members of the MMD to his cabinet due to donor pressure and objections. "It's a burden on me," he said. He was unable to appoint MMD National Chairman Sikota Wina, his wife Princess Nakatindi, and former Foreign Affairs Minister Vernon Mwaanga, who stepped down from government amid drug-trafficking charges from other members of the cabinet and from donors.229

Reaction to the election result was mixed. In a declaration by the presidency, the E.U. said it regretted the country's elections because they were not held on a basis acceptable to all parties and urged the government and itsopponents to resolve their differences peacefully. The E.U. said it was "concerned that the absence of political consensus might result in a further decline in the previous standards of governance," and urged all parties to avoid confrontation and engage in dialogue to resolve their differences peacefully. It noted that the elections had been held in a peaceful and orderly manner.230 The central and eastern European countries associated with the European Union and the associated countries Cyprus and Malta aligned themselves with the declaration.231

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) commended Zambians for holding peaceful, free, and fair elections. The SADC executive secretary, Kaire Mbuende, in a letter of congratulations assured President Chiluba of his highest regard and consideration. 232

The United States said it regretted Kaunda's exclusion from the election and the legislation by which Chiluba's government had "limited the rights of the Zambian people to chose their leaders freely." The U.S. embassy in Lusaka added a statement which urged the "government of Zambia to begin demonstrating, at the earliest opportunity, a strengthened commitment to political and economic reform processes that have been underway since 1991."233

The Japanese embassy in Lusaka expressed regret that the elections did not accommodate all political competitors. Embassy Counselor Etakayaki Miyashita said that while it was not the intention of the Japanese government to intervene in internal matters, the political misunderstanding between the government and opposition parties raised concern, "It is our hope that a peaceful solution to the current confusion will be found soon."234

A month after the election, on December 19, when President Chiluba received credentials from the new ambassadors of Sweden, China and the South African high commissioner to Zambia, he used the occasion to again accuse some NGOs of serving foreign interests and warned that "non-indigenous" NGOs were potential grounds for mercenary operations in Zambia.

Swedish ambassador Kristina Svensson congratulated President Chiluba on his re-election and thanked him for voting for Sweden as one of the new members of the United Nations Security Council. She commented that her own country's development had proved to them the importance of a strong civil society and particularly the importance of a strong and independent NGOs. 235 The Chinese ambassador, Wang Yunxiang, hailed the Zambian government for supporting the peace process in the region. He said that the government had worked tirelessly to improve the economy and identify a political system that suited Zambians. President Chiluba said China was a genuine friend and had not abandoned Zambia at any time.236

American ambassador Arlene Render took a strong stand against the Chiluba government, calling for change and the implementation of democratic values in society. In her speech when she presented her credentials in early 1997, Arlene Render announced,

Political stability is essential to economic viability. The building blocks of political stability were put into place in 1991 with your election in the first multi-party democratic election. Maintaining a democracy is a continuous growth process. Freedom of expression, tolerance of differences, respect for the principle of inclusion and the rule of law are pillars of the democratic base. Often these pillars are attacked from one quarter or another, but under no circumstances must we allow the pillars to fall. As an African-American, I know first hand why these pillars must never be allowed to fall. It was the courts and my government's commitment to respect the rulings of its institutions that made it possible for me to stand here today.237

Making a link between struggles for rights in the U.S. and in Zambia, Arlene Render celebrated the contribution of Martin Luther King Jr. to the creation of the "pillars of democracy" in the United States. Making an address at a reception at her residence in February, Ambassador Render said that Zambia had faced down many challenges to its freedom and that democratic pillars were just as important to Zambians as they are for Americans: "The sixties happened because America had a strong civil society. A vibrant, challenging, strong civil society should not be seen as a threat but as an engine and balancing force for change or transformation. Zambia's civil society should be embraced."238

However, the American emphasis on rights recognitions was taken amiss by Zambian government officials. Minister Without Portfolio Michael Sata accused the United States government of hostility toward the Zambian government and of taking a hard-line stance despite the country being considered a yardstick for democracy in Africa.239 "You have treated us with utmost hostility for the past few years, through your undeclared sanctions," said Sata. He said that if the government had not acted with tact, an uprising could have occurred in the country." But U.S. Ambassador Render and a visiting State Department deputy director for Southern Africa said that Washington would be unrelenting in its demand for good governance in Lusaka, which the U.S. saw as inseparable with economic performance.240

The next day, Sata said he had no apology to make and did not regret his verbal attacks of the U.S. because "there was a need for frank and open dialogue on all issues pertaining to relations between Zambia and her cooperating partners, such as the U.S." He added it was wrong for the U.S. to prevail over other countries to deny aid to Zambia over perceived bad governance. Sata contended that Zambia had met all the political and economic benchmarks.241

The new Swedish ambassador to Zambia, Kristina Svensson, also underlined her government's continued concern about human rights practice during a speech she gave at a ceremony of signing an extension of an agreement on development between Sweden and Zambia on February 13, 1997. Ambassador Svensson stated that:242

As newly appointed ambassador, and with a personal background as a member of the Swedish Parliament, I naturally take a deep interest in issues of democracy and human rights. For me personally, and indeed for my government, it is of primary importance to contribute to the promotion of civil rights, Good Governance, democratic procedures and all other aspects which characterize as the pluralistic and open society.

However, while rights violations were less visible than before, a number of developments provoked response from the donors. In particular, the Zambian government's attempted introduction of the Media Council Bill drew sharp criticism. The Irish embassy chargé d'affaires, Brendan Rogers, said that the government should ensure that the draft bill was discussed with all stakeholders before it became law.243 In previous months, the Irish government had not taken a firm position on rights recognitions.

The Times of Zambia ran a story on April 14, "Political Strides Cheer Envoy," which said that the Swedish ambassador considered Zambia to have done well, but that the proposed Media Council Bill would go against this. "Good governance is one of the conditions attached to aid, especially the balance of payment [sic] support. But the Media Council Bill is a clear violation of this condition. The Bill will stifle the media. As one of the major donors we welcome the establishment of a permanent Human Rights Commission and the new Anti-Corruption Commission team, but we are definitely opposed to the Media Council Bill. The government should just put it in a drawer and forget about it."

Pressure was unrelenting, and the government was forced to back down by suspending consideration of the bill. Vice-President Godfrey Miyanda assured the Norwegian ambassador, Jon Lomey, that his government would not implement the media council legislation without consulting the media. The Zambian government would first get the feelings of journalists before tabling the bill, he said.244

At the pre-Consultative meeting held in London on April 25, many international participants expressed their concern for the future of human rights in Zambia. Specifically, concerned donor nations seemed to focus on the importance of both good governance and progress. While many nations praised Zambia for implementing reforms such as the creation of the Human Rights Commission (HRC), they went on to assert that unless such reforms were actively followed up, they would amount to little more than rhetoric. For example, speaking on behalf of Germany, the desk officer for Zambia and Southern Africa at the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Marita Steinke, began by expressing appreciation for the steps being taken by the Government of Zambia to facilitate an international dialogue, but continued to insist that "Work was not completed simply by passing a Human Rights Act. The work must start afterwards and must be supported by the political will to act and political actions following it." Similarly, on behalf of Sweden, the head of the Southern African Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anders Mollander, expressed the need for strong institutions to bolster a framework within the Zambian government in order to "welcome continued practical measures aimed at the creation of a truly democratic culture in Zambia." Speaking for Japan, First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in London Shinji Urabayashi noted his country's concern for thelack of dialogue between the ruling government and the opposition parties and expressed that it would continue to pay careful attention to Zambia's support of its newly-implemented reforms.

Human Rights and Economic Assistance

Throughout the period leading up to the pre-Consultative Group meeting in London on April 25, relations with the donor community were strained. The Zambian government requested the meeting in a bid to present itself as having made considerable progress on its governance and economic programs. Donor reactions were mixed about whether the freeze on aid would be lifted.

The Japanese embassy had earlier stated: "Our donor aid towards balance of payment [sic] will largely depend on how the government resolves the current political crisis. As of now I don't think it is urgent for us to dispatch any money to this government," said Japanese Counselor Etakayaki Miyashita.245 He added: "We want to reduce poverty and illiteracy in Africa but as regards Zambia we have to wait until the government renews its commitment to the democratization process."246

In early December, the Zambian opposition sent a message to the Paris Club dissuading donors from recognizing the elections, which they said were fraudulent and rigged.247

On December 9, the German embassy announced that it had cut part of its bilateral aid to Zambia in protest against the political impasse. An announcement stated: "We were supposed to release about $38 million as aid allocation to Zambia. Unfortunately, we have acted on our reservations expressed earlier this year regarding the constitution and as such we are only releasing $21 million, for ongoing projects." The German decision was the first response by a donor country to the November election.

In mid-February, the Swedish ambassador said that Sweden would not resume its balance of payments support until the country reviewed its initiative in upholding good governance.248

On March 4, Finance Minister Penza informed parliament that the IMF, following a mid-term review of Zambia's performance under Enhanced Structural Adjustment (ESAF), would grant Zambia $14 million. Penza said that the favorable outcome was an indication that Zambia was on course with the implementation of its economic recovery program. He said that the decision would pave the way for Zambia to formalize the 1996 agreement with the Paris Club for a 67 percent reduction in external debt service obligations.249 Penza attributed the success of the economic program to reduced inflation levels of 35 percent in 1996.250 Zambia had been given the money because it had met the benchmarks set for its economic recovery program, said Penza. IMF Resident Representative inZambia Elwaleed Taha said the money, for balance of payments support, was released following successful completion of the first year of the three year ESAF program.251

On March 13, the European Union, through the European Commission, granted Zambia 183 million ECU ($ 200 million) to be paid over the next five years. Fifty-four percent of the funds would be spent on development, twenty-four percent on education, training, and health reform, and fifteen percent would be used for balance of payments support.252 Athanassios Theodorakis, deputy director for development representing the European Commission, with Zambia Finance Minister Penza, signed the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for cooperation under the second protocol of the Fourth Lome Convention between the Republic of Zambia and the European Union. Representatives of the E.U. member states and diplomatic corps were present.253

The 15 percent balance of payments support allocation was presented by the state-run Zambian newspapers as indicative of E.U. resumption of this aspect of the aid package. The Times of Zambia reported that the E.U. had given Zambia "a staggering K270 billion ($200 million) grant of which a substantial amount will be channeled towards the balance of payment [sic] support. The agreement . . . signifies the resumption of the balance of payment [sic] support which most donors withheld during the run-up to the last general elections as a condition for good and democratic governance."254

In an interview with Human Rights Watch/Africa, Brian Kelly, desk officer for Zambia at the European Commission, said that the signing of the development cooperation package had been taken by the Zambian newspapers as a resumption of balance of payments support. However, this support would not be released yet; it was meant to spread over a five-year period, to be paid at a later stage. The amount had to be included now as part of NIP otherwise the budget allocation would not have been made. If there is resumption of balance of payments, this will first be discussed with the member states. Only after consultation will the Commission take a decision on resuming this support. Agreements would need be made under NIP, which is the framework of cooperation.255

On March 14, German ambassador Dr. Peter Schmidt said that his government was still studying the democratic situation before making a commitment on its bilateral support ties. "We have continued assisting with project aid and debt relief at the Paris Club but no funding has been budgeted for this year's bilateral aid. We are still closely monitoring the country's record." 0

The issue of the aid freeze remained a focus of bilateral relations and a source of tension. On April 15, the Times of Zambia ran an article headlined, "Sweden drops aid conditions", which said that there had been a policy shift on aid conditions.

This prompted an immediate press release:

The Embassy wishes to correct the wrong impression given by today's headlines in the Times of Zambia that "Sweden drops aid conditions." None of the statements in yesterday's interview could possibly have formed a basis of such an interpretation. Sweden is currently reviewing its Africa policy at a more equal relationship between partners- therefore the new name: "Partnership Africa." This is an effort undertaken by the Swedish government by the end of this year. The document is still being worked on and concrete proposals are not yet known. In the process extensive consultations with African counterparts are taking place, culminating in a conference in Stockholm June 28-30, 1997. In Sweden's bilateral relations to Zambia, levels of assistance are still pegged to the development of the economic reform program and to the progress in the area of good governance. It is envisaged that further consultations will take place with the Zambian government in the very near future.1

Two days later, on April 17, The Post ran a story with the headline, "Sweden maintains aid conditions."

The April 25 meeting in London with the donors, with its purpose of restoring normal aid flows, was met with different expectations. The deputy German ambassador, Axel Ziedler, said that the meeting might not pave the way for the resumption of aid, but it would present an opportunity for Western governments to listen to Zambia's case. The Swedish embassy said that Sweden's relations with Zambia depended on the implementation of economic reforms and progress in the area of good governance." Finance Minister Penza commented: "I think the outcome of the meeting will be very positive."2

Following the meeting, which the World Bank and IMF also attended, donors said that they were willing to discuss renewed aid after preliminary talks with the Zambian government had been held. "Most delegates said they were prepared to have a Consultative Group meeting," said deputy German Ambassador Axel Ziedler. The CG meeting had been deferred twice in the past six months. While conceding that the meeting was an important first step to normalizing relations, diplomats said that their governments were still concerned about governance issues.

On May 2, the Norwegian ambassador, Jon Lomay, said that Norway had budgeted $40 million for bilateral aid to Zambia, but this did not include balance of payments support. He said $20 million would be used on project support while the remaining amount would be used on special projects, which included strengthening of the democratic process.3 Norway was still concerned about the implementation of good governance and would continue to monitor the situation closely. "We feel there is a need for major political parties to come together and create rules which will be acceptable to all players. We are also concerned about the way the media issue is being handled.. What we would like to see is the media and the government opening up dialogue and jointly agreeing on the media's self regulation and not government regulation," said Ambassador Lomay. "While there is considerable satisfaction with the economic reform program and the privatization of the copper industry, this is not to say everything has gone as we, the donors would have liked."4

Ambassador Lomoy announced on May 27 that Norway decided to continue project aid to Zambia, continuing to withhold the balance of payments support program in order to encourage reform. "We commend the government for establishing a human rights commission and for assurances that it will not control the media, but this does not mean we are satisfied in all areas," explained Ambassador Lomoy. The Norwegian government froze project aid in 1996 to protest the constitutional changes that barred certain candidates from participating in the general elections.5

According to an article in The Times of Zambia in May, Britain was to resume balance of payments support. British High Commission First Secretary, Commercial and Consular Affairs, Roger Clark was quoted as saying, "Balance of payments support was withheld on the grounds of governance issues. But we have been encouraged by recent developments in the area of good governance in Zambia."6 However, according to a more recent interview with Julian Chandler of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Britain's position had not changed, and "full balance of payments resumption remains dependent on further meaningful progress by the Zambian government in good governance."7

Similarly, Sweden reiterated on June 6 that it also decided to withhold balance of payments support in order to encourage reform. According to Kristina Svensson, Swedish ambassador to Zambia, "My country Sweden is supporting a political dialogue because in a democracy all parties must give their contribution to peaceful and prosperous development of the nation. When we see this dialogue taking place, we will consider to release our balance of payment [sic] support."8

The Importance of Conditionality

The international donor community would squander much of the leverage it has available to convince the Chiluba government to improve its human rights performance, if it were to suspend conditionality for balance of payments support in the immediate or short-term. The pressure applied thus far has generated some positive response, but serious and deep-seated problems remain. Lifting the aid freeze before real change has been effected would remove the incentive toward further, sustainable improvement. The continued strategic and targeted use of this dimension of the aid package to ensure compliance is of critical importance.

The essential question to ask about Zambia's human rights record is whether real change has occurred; or whether the change is illusory. Are the changes structural? Are they substantive? Are the visible, albeit slight, improvements liable to be reversed, and, most importantly, are they sustainable? Has there been a demonstrated change in the government's attitude toward civil society and the opposition as well as a wide range of other institutions that are crucial to democratic development and consolidation? The speeches by all major donor representatives at the April 25 pre-Consultative meeting were laced with grave doubts that this was the case.

This report, which examines human rights in Zambia since the November 1996 elections, finds that there has been scanty improvements in the human rights record. In many cases, there is an apparent correlation between international pressures and internal changes, and actions such as the aid freeze have made a difference. Lifting it before substantive change has occurred would close the door on concrete improvements and open up the possibility of regression.

The human rights situation remains far from acceptable. Human rights violations have continued. In contrast to the past, these attacks have not been directed against high profile opposition and civil society leaders. Instead, they have been aimed at people who do not make the headlines. Judicial independence is fragile; the political opposition is hamstrung; the media continues to be hounded and journalists jailed; the highly controversial Media Bill has been suspended, but not withdrawn; and threats and criminal charges against the NGO sector continue.

More importantly, the government has avoided addressing the root cause of the human rights problem. Not only is there no meaningful dialogue with the opposition or national discourse with all of the country's people, there has also been no talk of addressing the Constitutional Amendment Act of 1996 and creating a more consensual approach to constitutional reform. The amendment's highly discriminatory provisions largely stripped the November election of meaning. Based on a deeply flawed premise, the election delivered was deeply flawed. At the time, the international donor community was sufficiently affronted by this development to reach a consensus to suspend balance of payments support. At this point, it would be inconceivable for this aid freeze to be lifted unconditionally since no real changes have taken place in Zambia to date.

The Zambian government is acutely cognizant of its human rights image and has in recent months devoted considerable time and resources to rebutting domestic and international criticism. The briefing paper submitted to the international donor community in advance of the London April 25 pre-Consultative Group meeting and Minister Penza's speech at that meeting illustrated a shift away from the government's previous unwillingness to discuss human rights issues to an acknowledgment, albeit muted, of its international obligations to uphold internationally recognized rights, particularly civil and political rights.

Pressure has generated some positive response from the Zambian government, although domestic critics and the political opposition continue to face human rights abuse. A very clear awareness of the international concern over its human rights practices has informed its presentations to donor governments. The continued connection of support, especially balance of payments support, to clear and firm progress toward benchmarks on democratic and human rights progress should provide a further incentive to see through the reforms promised but not implemented and to reverse the proposals to further restrict fundamental rights-like the Media Bill-that have been temporarily shelved in the face of domestic and international protest.

The call to the donor community is therefore to continue to use political conditionality and withhold bilateral and multilateral aid to ensure the linkage of economic assistance to respect for human rights and the rule of law. If the aid freeze is hastily lifted, the Chiluba government may find it too easy to ignore both domestic and international demands for democratic and human rights reforms. Political conditionality should, however, be strategically calibrated to progressively reward progress toward clearly specified benchmarks. In particular, economic assistance should be conditioned on the achievement of greater tolerance for a vigorous but loyal political opposition, civil society, rule of law and democratic accountability. These, in turn, require a free press, an independent judiciary, a credible electoral system and competitive elections whose results are acceptable to all parties.