TURKISH GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO STOP TORTURE

Under the DYP/SHP Coalition Government, 1991-1995

Between 1991 and 1995, the coalition government consisting of the True Path Party (DoTMru Yol Partisi-DYP) and its junior partner, the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkç2 Parti-SHP), attempted in fits and starts to address human rights issues, including torture and maltreatment of detainees.36 The coalition wasgenerally split between the DYP, which usually favored a hard-line approach, and the SHP, which tried to pay more attention to issues of democratization and human rights.

Shortly after taking office, on November 25, 1991, then Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel (who become president of the republic after the death of former President Turgut Özal in April 1993), announced to the Turkish parliament that, "Torture is a crime against humanity; it is our duty to put an end to it."37 In June 1992, the Turkish government issued a pamphlet entitled, "Human Rights in Turkey: A Record of Improvement," that stated that,

Human rights organizations, national and foreign, have for long insisted that the most serious violation of human rights, torture, was widespread and used systematically in police stations....Whilst not reaching levels claimed, this degrading and inadmissible practice has not been totally eliminated.38

Prime Minister Demirel also appointed a State Minister Responsible for Human Rights, Mehmet Karaman. On November 22, 1991, he, along with then Justice Minister Seyfi Oktay and the former president of the Human Rights Association of Turkey, Nevzat Helvac2, visited EskiÕehir Prison after receiving allegations of mistreatment of prisoners. Oktay ordered the prison closed.39

In both 1991 and 1992, the General Security Directorate of the Interior Ministry sent circulars to all security forces concerning proper methods of conducting interrogations titled, respectively, "Regulations on Interrogation and Taking of Statements" and "Code of Practice for Remand into Custody." 40 In November 1992, the parliament approved Law No. 3842 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure, (CMUK). Though it did not reduce periods of detention for security detainees and exempted them from many due process protections, one of its most important articles that was applicable to all detainees was the prohibition of interrogation methods that constitute torture and the inadmissibility as evidence of testimony taken under such conditions (CMUK 135/a). On February 13, 1995, then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller sent a circular to the Ministry of the Interior basically reiterating what had already been passed into law as CMUK 135/a, including an order to police to remove "torture instruments" from police stations if any existed. In a letter to Barbara Paul Robinson, head of the New York City Bar Association, Ambassador to the United States Nuzhet Kandemir stated that,

The Prime Minister, through an ordinance addressed to the Ministry of the Interior dated February 13, 1995, commanded that the following measures be taken in order to abolish any practice of ill-treatment during the pre-detention period (interrogatory) in conformity with international implementation:

a). police observe all legal practices and permissible periods of detention;

b). no detainee be mistreated, no matter what the crime and European and American methods will be used to obtain information from the detainee;

c). a medical examination be carried out as required by a Health Ministry circular dated December 27, 1993;

d). detainees' meeting with their attorneys be carried out in accordance with the law;

e). police stations be inspected for torture instruments and that such instruments (if any are found) be removed;

f). all detainees be registered;

g). detainees' cells be sufficiently large and sanitary;

h). legal action be taken immediately against any policeman or other law enforcement officer who engages in maltreatment of detainees;

i). to insure full implementation of the directive, that police stations under the control of the governor and head of the security directorate be inspected continually and that the results of such inspections be sent to the Ministry of the Interior.41

According to Kandemir, the Ministry of the Interior sent a letter dated February 16, 1995, to all governors and police and gendarmerie commands to carry out the prime minister's directive. In addition, Ambassador Kandemir stated that the Ministry of Health issued two circulars dated February 9, 1993, and January 25, 1995, that called on doctors performing pre/post detention medical reports to do so in a more detailed manner.

The Turkish government has also instituted human rights training courses. According to the Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C., human rights courses have been included in the curriculum as a separate course at police schools and academies.42 A new course book reflecting the changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK) brought about by Law No. 3842, Human Rights: Suspect Rights and Police Authority, Instruction Book for Police Academies, has been introduced for use in the above mentioned courses.43 In addition, human rights courses conducted by the Foreign Ministry are given to local administrators and police officials and a training course in human rights was instituted for armed forces personnel.44

Finally, on July 24, 1995, the Turkish Parliament passed fifteen amendments to Turkey's 1982 constitution. This action increased some freedoms, such as allowing students and academics to join political parties and permitting trade unions to work with political parties. Also, the preamble was changed to delete favorable references to the September 12, 1980 military coup. But these amendments dealt with broader democratization, not issues of police abuse and chronic human rights violations such as torture.

Why DYP/SHP Efforts Failed to End Torture

These efforts, however, were largely unsuccessful for several reasons, the three most important being concern about the increased threat posed by the PKK, the belief that a "tough" approach was needed, and a concomitantdisinclination to prosecute police using such methods. The steps that the government did take to address human rights issues either were crafted in such a way as to not directly affect torture and abuse by security forces, such as exempting cases before state security courts from many of the due process protections offered by Law No. 3842 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK), or had little force behind them-in spite of their importance on paper-because security forces knew that they could break the rules with only minimal fear of prosecution. 45 In November 1993, the U.N. Committee against Torture commented that, "There is an obvious discrepancy between, on the one hand, the measures taken and the intentions expressed by the authorities with regard to action to combat torture, and on the other, the practice followed in the premises of the Ministry of the Interior."46 In its December 1996 "Public Statement on Turkey, the CPT commented that,

Some progress has been made. The Turkish authorities have issued a multitude of instructions and circulars; further, training programs and human rights educations strategies have been devised. However, the translation of words into deeds is proving to be a highly protracted process....if given full effect in practice, those instructions would represent a turning point in respect for human rights in Turkey. Regrettably, it is clear from the information gathered by the Committee in the course of subsequent visits to Turkey that those instructions are not being fully complied with; in fact, little more than lip service is being paid to them."47

As has been cited earlier, the U.S. State Department's 1996 Country Report stated that the lack of prosecution of police for serious offenses such as torture and summary execution had created a "climate of impunity."

A vicious circle has thus arisen. Abusive police are generally not prosecuted, and if they are, trials last long periods, police are usually not remanded into custody, and sentences, when meted out, are light. In turn this gives the impression to security forces that their "tough methods" are tolerated and a blind eye will be turned to all but their worst manifestations. As a result, security forces become increasingly autonomous, making it even harder to bring them under control and punish their abusive behavior.

The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT) has determined that between September 12, 1980, and September 12, 1995, 445 individuals died in prison or in detention as a result of torture or police abuse.48 The majority of those were security detainees. Between 1991 and September 12, 1995, 124 individuals died in police custody or in prison: 1991, twenty-one; 1992, eighteen; 1993, thirty-six; 1994, thirty-five; 1995 until September 12, fourteen.

But the number of police charged with torture or maltreatment of suspects is relatively small, even in cases where a death is involved. According to the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT), courts, prosecution offices, or other authorized bodies accepted torture as the official cause of death in only seventy of the 419 cases where, according to the HRFT, a detainee or prisoner died while under torture.49 Where cases were opened regardingthese deaths, only twenty-six ended in convictions; another thirty cases are still underway. In an additional six cases, courts accepted the fact that the individual died of torture, but acquitted security officers for lack of evidence.

According to Turkish government figures for 1995, 210 cases were opened for torture or police abuse under Articles 243 and 245 of the criminal code out of 547 complaints, of which there were fifteen convictions and twenty-eight acquittals.50 In 1994, the Turkish government reported that 419 cases were opened for police abuse and torture, ending in thirty-nine acquittals and fifteen convictions.51 These figures are for all suspects and prisoners, not just security detainees.52

When sentences or fines are meted out, they are usually relatively lenient. In one case in 1996, two police officers convicted under Article 243 for beating and maltreating a twelve-year-old child were given a fine of TL750,000, about eight US dollars at the time.53 In its 1996 "Public Statement on Turkey," the CPT commented that, "Similarly, when cases are brought to court, it is of crucial importance that suitable penalties are imposed in the event of ill-treatment being proven. In this connection, the CPT believes that the Turkish authorities would be well-advised closely to analyze judgments in recent years involving convictions under Article 243 (obtaining confessions by torture or inhuman treatment) and 245 (ill-treatment inflicted by law enforcement officials) of the Criminal Code to ascertain whether the courts' decisions in the cases concerned correspond to the seriousness of the offenses involved."54

Trials often drag on, even when there is large public outcry and press attention to bring wrong doers to justice. The case of Metin Göktepe, a journalist for the now defunct Istanbul daily Evrensel who died in police custody in Istanbul in January 1996, indicates the difficulty of prosecuting police even when there appears to be an abundance of evidence indicating malfeasance. Initially the prosecutor in the case stated that GÅktepe had been released and died in a nearby park, while then Istanbul Security Director Orhan TaÕanlar denied that the journalist had even been detained by police.55 In fact, GÅktepe was detained at noon on January 8, 1996 in Istanbul while covering a funeral of prisoners reportedly beaten to death during prison unrest. Other reporters witnessed his detention and other detainees reported speaking to him. Police detained roughly 1,000 individuals and held them a sport center turned into a temporary holding facility. GÅktepe's body was discovered roughly eight hours later at a snack bar near the sports facility. An autopsy indicated that GÅktepe died of internal bleeding to the brain and body due to blows.

In April 1996, after the Council of State (Dan2Õtay) had approved the Provincial Administrative Council's prosecution decision, forty-eight policemen were charged in connection with the murder of GÅktepe or for beatings that allegedly took place during the operation in which GÅktepe was detained: eleven for the actual murder and the others for maltreatment or misuse of authority.56 However, none of them were remanded into custody, and the court hearing the case has been in session only twice. The trial was scheduled to begin on July 18, 1996, but for security reasons the case was transferred to a court in Ayd2n, a province on the Aegean south of Izmir. When the court in Ayd2n held its first session on October 18, 1996, none of the defendants appeared because of a prior arrangement.57 After the first hearing, the Ayd2n prosecutor asked that the case be moved for security reasons to Afyon, about two hundred kilometers east of Ayd2n: apparently the court building was surrounded by schools, and the prosecutor feared "provocations". That request was approved, and a second hearing was set for November 29, 1996; unfortunately, that hearing was canceled because the case files were "delayed in the mail." A second hearing was held in Afyon on February 6, 1997, and again none of the accused police officers participated. The next hearing is scheduled for April 11, 1997. In January 1997, it was reported that the eleven police officers charged with the murder of GÅktepe were reinstated and appointed to the Istanbul Police Personnel Directorate after having been temporarily suspended.58 Later, Interior Minister Meral AkÕener reportedly reversed this decision.

Another obstacle to the prosecution of police, especially in the nine provinces presently under a state of emergency decree, is the Temporary Law on the Procedure for Investigation of Civil Servants [Memurin Muhakemat2 Hakk2nda Kanunu Muvakkat), which stems from 1913, during the Ottoman period. Under this law, the administrative superior of a civil servant alleged to have committed malfeasance while carrying out his duty must conduct an investigation and give its approval before the case can be referred to a prosecutor or the administrative courts forfurther legal actions.59 Usually, the case is referred to the Provincial Administration Council (Il Idare Kurulu), which is chaired by the state-appointed governor of the province. Under Article 13 of the law, "Unless the order for prosecution is given for crimes committed according to Article 1, the state prosecutors themselves cannot conduct an investigation." Decree No. 285, which was passed on July 14, 1987 to institute the state of emergency still in effect in nine provinces in southeastern Turkey, also recognizes the jurisdiction of the 1913 law: "The Security forces under his command [Emergency Rule Governor] shall be subject to the Law on the Procedure for Investigation of Civil Servants [Memurin Muhakemat2 Hakk2nda Kanunu Muvakkat) for acts performed in the course of their duties."

While Provincial Administrative Councils outside of the emergency rule region sometimes give their approval for further prosecution, they add another barrier to quick prosecution of abusive police. In the emergency rule area, presently nine provinces in southeast Turkey, approval by the Emergency Rule Governor is rarely given, thus preventing any prosecution.

Without punishment, abusive police eventually rise to leadership and training positions, creating a reinforcing pattern of approval for such behavior. Nurhan Varl2, a former police officer who wrote a book on police life titled, Recollections of a Suspect Policeman (Sak2ncal2 Polisin Hat2ralar2) stated in a recent interview that,

Those who became a police commander before 1970 and were accused of several things today have risen to the rank of security director (their names became involved in such activities as murder, torture, hiding terrorists, but somehow they managed to save themselves without any punishment). These are the people who are giving the tests to those who enter the police profession. These high-ranking individuals who sit on the exam boards, of course, help those kids who share their ideological convictions pass the exams. Those poor kids who pass the exams and become policemen have to be in the service of this ideology. These days it is impossible to find smart, reasonable policemen who are committed to Atatürk and his reforms.60

A retired security director, Muzaffer Özbayrak, echoed these comments,

When the good staff members left a gap was formed....The training of the police is totally inadequate. How is training conducted in the police academies and who gives it? These people's attitude towards social issues is clear. In the proceedings of the courts of September 12 and in the State Security Courts you come across the names of these people leading the police. But these people, in spite of the fact that their names have been involved in certain events, have risen to high-ranking posts....It might be a deterrent if the proper legal proceedings were started against police involved in violent actions, but just the opposite happens: they have constantly been rewarded.61

In its research, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey has uncovered several examples of police officers who actually advanced in their careers after allegations of torture or misconduct. In 1993, Naci Parmaks2z was appointed the governor of Adana province; while serving as the security director of Adana province, he prevented the investigation of a torture case alleged to have taken place in October 1987 in spite of a direct order given by then Minister of the Interior Abdulkadir Aksu. The torture victim applied to the European Human Rights Commission, and Turkey eventually acceded to a friendly settlement. Another case is that of Mehmethan TokuÕ. In March 1995,he was removed from his post as security director in the Gazi quarter of Istanbul, after police shot and killed seventeen demonstrators. In November 1982, TokuÕ was sentenced to two months, fifteen days in prison for torturing two individuals in August 1975. In 1989, he was acquitted of torturing to death a woman detained on theft charges because of lack of evidence. He was also prosecuted for shooting and wounding a student in the back and killing an individual by hitting him with a police car. TokuÕ was reduced in rank for the last two actions.62

The GÅktepe case also highlights this pattern. Despite allegations of wrong-doing by then Istanbul Security Director Orhan TaÕanlar-including recommendations by Interior Ministry investigators that a disciplinary investigation be opened against him-in April 1996 he was transferred and promoted to the post of governor of Bursa province. That same month, the respected Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet reported that then Interior Minister Teoman ànásan rejected calls by Interior Ministry investigators to open an investigation into TaÕanlar.63

The name of Orhan TaÕanlar also figured prominently in the torture allegations of one of the individuals Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interviewed for this report. The policeman, "Kemal," reported that he was detained and tortured while Orhan TaÕanlar served as security director of the province. In fact, TaÕanlar, along with other top officers of his command, cursed Kemal just before he was taken away to be tortured. According to Kemal, "All the top provincial security directorate officers were there, including TaÕanlar. They were cursing me, I cursed them back. I was taken out blindfolded, directly to the torture room."64

The lack of prosecution for police abuse and the resulting sense of impunity has created an environment where police officials not only feel justified in actions that violate the law, but believe that they are fully supported by the public. The increasing violence of the conflict in southeastern Turkey between government security forces and the PKK-in which both sides committed serious abuses-colored all government efforts to end human rights abuses and institute reform in the criminal justice system. Turgut Kazan, president of the Istanbul Bar Association, told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki that,

You can't stop torture by just changing the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK). Under the circumstances, when you have a terror threat, people will support steps to end terror. I don't have public backing to stop this....The Justice Minister and State Minister for Human Rights have come out very strongly against torture, but the Minister of the Interior has used people's fear of the violence and the PKK to act the way it wants. People are afraid, angry, become prejudiced, all ofthese things boil down to the fact that if the government would take a strong position against torture or the police that practice such methods, these practices would lose support. 65

Ercan KarakaÕ, a former culture minister who resigned in mid-1995 to protest the lack of progress on a democratization initiative that included constitutional amendments, added that, "All other parties think this is only a problem of violence....It is a vicious circle. It is a security issue as long as only the security forces deal with it by force alone. It can't be solved this way. It is not only this problem. All dimensions must be worked on."66 M. Sad2k AvundukluoTMlu, a DYP deputy who chaired a parliamentary commission on so-called "actor unknown" death squad style murders, told us that, "We know there are shortcomings. We are looking at these shortcomings, but we should deal with terror."67 As the CPT noted in its December 1996 public statement, "...The CPT has made it clear that it abhors terrorism....[it] has also emphasized that the response to terrorism must never be allowed to degenerate into acts of torture or other forms of ill-treatment by law enforcement officials."68

Mehmet A-ar, then General Director of Security, told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki:

Talk to ordinary people in the streets. Some organized institutions don't reflect ordinary opinion in the streets. It is an intellectual disease-they're disconnected from the people. They are acting as spokesmen for illegal organizations. There is a debate going on in Turkey-people are supporting the police....People from abroad come and tell us their opinions. They should talk to people all over Turkey.69

In July 1995, at a police academy graduation ceremony, ATMar told the graduates that, "while my police officers and soldiers become martyrs, they have no right to mention human rights."70 A-ar later resigned his post and successfully ran for parliament in December 1995 on the DYP party ticket; he became Justice and then Interior Minister, but resigned in November 1996 in the wake of the Susurluk scandal.71

In June 1995, Istanbul Security Director Necdet Menzir openly attacked then State Minister Responsible for Human Rights Algan HacaloTMlu (CHP) for his criticism of police misconduct. 72 In April 1995, then Justice Minister Mehmet MoTMultay (CHP) acknowledged that extrajudicial killings by the police do take place in Turkey; that same month HacaloTMlu criticized a house raid in which police appear to have executed three suspects, stating that, "thisis an extrajudicial killing."73 In June 1995, at a funeral for a slain police officer, Menzir directed the following criticism at HacaloTMlu: "Today in this country there are those who go abroad and talk about extrajudicial killings, and they still can remain in their positions of power....In our country there are a few atheists who have hidden themselves behind the mask of secularism. There are people who want to lead our country astray. There are separatists in this country. In this country there are communists who use Atatürk."74 Although there were calls to remove Menzir, government spokesman Y2ld2r2m Aktuna (DYP) said that he did not know if Necdet Menzir would stay in his position as Istanbul security director, but added that by law civil servants were not allowed to make political statements.75

The "climate of impunity" makes it difficult for civilian authorities to control the security forces. This situation has been acknowledged by both the U.N. and the CHP, the junior partner in a coalition government in power from 1991-95. The U.N. Committee against Torture in its report on Turkey commented that, "In this connection, efforts should be made to prevent certain departments within the Ministry of the Interior in particular from becoming, as it were, a State within a State and appearing to escape control by senior authorities."76

At the end of September 1995, the junior coalition partner in the former Çiller government, the Republican People's Party (CHP), issued a report on Turkey's security forces that basically reached the same conclusion as the U.N. regarding the autonomy of security forces.77 It called for cutting links between the General Staff and internal security matters, stopping the appointment of individuals with police backgrounds to provincial governorships and individuals with military backgrounds to ministries and other important public bodies. It stated that,

The soldiers have not completely left the issue of our internal security to the civilian authorities. This semi-militarized understanding of internal security is the most important hindrance to democratization and the development of civilian authority. Civil authorities and the parliament do not have complete control or oversight of the country's internal security bodies or intelligence services....Especially in the period after [the military coup of] 1980, the following values, which increased and grew stronger, appeared in the internal security apparatus: militarist or para-military beliefs, a police-state concept, criticism of the concept of a state based on the rule of law, of democratization, of civilian authority, and of human rights...right and extreme rightist tendencies in politics...and a professional arrogance...within the state mechanism, a second state, directed through unwritten, special laws."78

The report made the following recommendations:

* in as short a time as possible get the internal security apparatus under civilian control;

* appoint a politician as Interior Minister who has a strong personal authority, unquestionable adherence to democracy and civilian authority, and the understanding of a state based on the rule of law. Such an individual would be able to get the General Security Directorate and the Gendarmerie General Command under control;

* appoint as General Security Director a governor who believes in civilian authority, a state based on the rule of law, and democracy.79

Adnan Ekmen (CHP), who served as State Minister for Human Rights in the CHP/DYP government, openly complained about his inability to conduct an investigation in southeastern Turkey, even about the fear of his staff in their interaction with military and security forces in the region:

Personnel from this ministry wishing to conduct investigations or gather material from time to time suffer insults from the authorities in the emergency rule region....[there] you can't ask a police director or a military authority, "What is this event?" We couldn't speak with the authorities concerning the events at Gáçlákonak; we could only speak with citizens subjected to the event. I explained this situation to the then Interior Minister. In spite of the Interior Minister taking action, we still couldn't get real information. Not only were we not helped, we were stopped.80

Ekmen even acknowledged that a group from his ministry had wanted to pay a courtesy call on the battalion commander in Yuksekova, Hakkari province, but were insulted: "Our group which had wanted to investigate the event was insulted. The ministry's personnel has become scared of investigating any incidents because all they got from the other side [security forces] was insults."81 Then head of the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission, Sabri Yavuz (CHP), told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki that, "The Prime Minister told the police to get rid of torture instruments-no reaction from the police. Our commission had made the proposal for a police control commission...We need and want more oversight."82

The role of the public prosecutor vis-a-vis the police also indicates the increased strength and autonomy of the latter. While the law gives public prosecutors far-reaching authority to supervise police during an investigation, they seem to make little use of this power, especially in cases of security detainees. While this is not illegal, it removes an important oversight mechanism. Under article 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK), the prosecutor has the authority to conduct investigations on his own initiative or through the police. The article states that, "All police authorities and personnel must immediately inform the state prosecutor of measures taken regarding cases and detained persons under their control and must follow all the legal orders of the prosecutor." The prosecutor also has the right to demand from the police, "every type of information."

Lawyers familiar with cases before state security courts with whom Human Rights Watch/Helsinki spoke stated that prosecutors often rubber stamp police actions, such as regarding periods of detention, and allow them to take the lead in investigations. Ercan Kanar, a lawyer who takes many cases before state security courts, complained that,

The prosecutor is often passive. Police should only collect the information, the prosecutor should conduct the investigation. The police demand a certain number of days for a person to be held, and even though by law the prosecutor can object or alter their request, he rarely does. After the police bring the person to the prosecutor, he asks questions from the suspect mostly based on the police statement. 83

Another lawyer with whom we spoke told us that, "I was detained once at a demonstration with some other lawyers. Since only a prosecutor can take a statement from a lawyer, the police called the prosecutor, who told him to release us. But after the policeman objected and said there was an outstanding case against me, the prosecutor relented and I was held. After, when I talked with the prosecutor, he told me, `Why do you get involved with these demonstrations. Police beat people up everywhere."84

Many security detainees Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interviewed also stated that prosecutors often ignored their claims of abuse during interrogation. One detainee who reported being badly tortured after having been detained in the emergency rule area told us that, "I told what had happened to the prosecutor. But he only said, `You will listen to my questions." 85 While prosecutors under the "Temporary Law on the Procedure for Investigation of Civil Servants" cannot directly bring cases against police, it is their duty to report cases of abuse to the administrative superior of the officers in question. As the CPT noted in its December 1996 "Public Statement on Turkey," "On countless occasions over the last seven years...the Committee has received allegations that detained persons did complain about treatment received at the hands of police when brought before a public prosecutor, but that the latter displayed no interest in the matter. The CPT has itself detected, amongst some of the public prosecutors whom it has met, a tendency to seek to defend the police rather than to view objectively the matter under consideration."86

New Initiative by the Welfare/DYP Coalition Government, November 1996-March 1997

In October 1996, the present Welfare/DYP coalition government of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, which came to power at the end of June 1996, announced a plan to reduce detention periods for security detainees. In November 1996 it submitted a bill to parliament dropping top detention periods from thirty days to ten.87 On March 6, 1997, the parliament of Turkey passed this bill into law in a slightly altered form and amended the "Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK)" and "Law on State Security Courts." 88As foreseen in the bill, the law resulted inthe reduction of maximum detention periods for security detainees in the state of emergency region from thirty days to ten, and from fifteen days to seven elsewhere. It also reduced maximum detention periods for collective criminal offenses not under the jurisdiction of state security courts, i.e. non-political offenses committed by three or more people, from eight days to seven. Shortly thereafter, President Suleyman Demirel signed the law.

The government also announced other efforts to improve human rights and end torture. On November 29, 1996, the Ministry of Interior announced that its officials would conduct surprise inspections of police stations to determine if the treatment of detainees corresponded with established procedures.89 On December 5, 1996, at a press conference in London, Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller announced that, "Our government has decided to take a series of measures in order to totally eliminate in practice the crime of torture, which as a matter of fact is forbidden by our laws....We courageously take up the Committee's [CPT] findings and if they prove true, we identify the responsible and punish them." 90 Mrs. Çiller also announced that she would make public the CPT report of December 1996. Two months later, it was announced that the Justice and Interior Ministries were working on a "Judicial Police Project" whereby police officers would work directly under public prosecutors to provide more oversight.91 Finally, On March 10, 1997, Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller announced that, "Our governors and police directors will not permit a single act in prisons and police stations against our laws and our international commitments" and stated that Turkey would take steps to end torture and other human rights abuses. As part of that program, the Foreign Minister announced-among other things-that a committee at the level of under secretary would be created to monitor implementation of human rights improvement efforts. It is still too early to determine, however, what the outcome is of any of these actions.

In February 1997, the Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet reported that 54,273 individuals in 14,374 cases had been tried at the Diyarbakir State Security Court between 1994-1996, inclusive. In that same three year period, 11,216 individuals were tried under Article 169, "aid and comfort"to the PKK, and 4886 under Article 168, "membership in an illegal organization", i.e. the PKK. Of the 54,273 on trial, 2192 individuals were convicted, and 4896 people were acquitted. Of all of Turkey's state security courts, Diyarbakir has the most cases on its docket. See, Enver SeviÕ, "Gáneydo-ulu DGM'lik," Cumhuriyet Hafta, February 7, 1997.

In its report, the United Nations Committee Against Torture reported-based on Turkish government figures-that between 1 November 1992 and 1 December 1992, 8,613 individuals had been detained, of which 1,991 were held in pre-trial detention and 6,622 were released. This figure represents all detainees, however, not just those detained by the anti-terror police. See Report of the Committee against Torture, p. 9.

Investigators from the Interior Ministry carried out the preliminary investigation. In February 1996, the Turkish Parliament launched a commission to investigate the killing; in May 1996, the commission ceased its activity because the case had been sent to the court.

The Council of State (Dan2Õtay) is the highest administrative court and usually functions in an appellate capacity. It also serves as a court of conflict to solve problems of venue, competence, and conjunction.

There were also other allegations of malfeasance against TaÕanlar. In testimony before the parliamentary commission investigating the GÅktepe murder, Metin KuÕat, one of the policemen on duty during the incident who was later questioned by police, alleged that a lawyer acting as a middleman for TaÕanlar suggested that he "take the fall" for the death. He reportedly told the commission that, "After I signed my statement a lawyer who works for the security directorate, Ilhami Yelekçi came to me. He said that he had just come from TaÕanlar and that a number of people would definitely pay the price, but that if two or three people were to take responsibility they could flee abroad and in this way save the others." KuÕat recanted an earlier incriminating statement: "I have no connection or information about this case. The statements were completely contrived. When I was called to the "Law and Order" section to give a statement and asked for a lawyer I was really cursed by Chief Commissioner Turan. In the interrogation room I was hit by Chief Commission Turan and a police office Zübeyir." Other police officers who gave statements to the parliamentary commission stated that they had given earlier statements to police investigators under duress, often without reading what they signed.

See also "Polisten TaÕanlar'a ciddi suçlama," Cumhuriyet Hafta, August 16, 1996.

In general, HacaloTMlu was an outspoken critic of human rights abuses; when the DYP/CHP coalition split in September 1995, he criticized Prime Minister Çiller's True Path Party (DYP): "I don't think a right-wing policy can run this office. Main-stream rightist parties have made every effort to block human rights. Someone from DYP coming to this office would be a contradiction to its very nature." See, Asl2 Ayd2ntaÕbaÕ, "Yorgun bakan2n házná," Yeni Yázy2l. Istanbul, October 10, 1995.

The report also raised the issue of links between security forces and extreme right-wing groups. See the following section.

In January 1996, there was a shooting at Gáçlákonak in Ô2rnak province in which eleven individuals were killed while riding in a mini-bus. Security forces blamed the PKK; local human rights groups and HADEP, the pro-Kurdish party, attributed the attack to security forces.