January 1997 Vol. 9, No. 2 (D)

RUSSIA / CHECHNYA

A LEGACY OF ABUSE

SUMMARY 2

BACKGROUND 4

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 5

MISSING PERSONS, THOSE FORCIBLY DETAINED, AND EXCHANGES 6

Detentions by Russian Forces 7

Detentions by Chechen Forces 9

Amnesty 10

TORTURE IN DETENTION 11

By Russian Forces 11

At PAP-I 12

Khankala 13

Samashki and Piatigorsk 16

By the Chechen Side 17

MINES AND DEMINING 17

ACCOUNTABILITY 20

By the Russian Side 20

By the Chechen Side 22

Amnesty 22

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN POST-WAR CHECHNYA 22

Post-war Summary Executions 23

The Chechnya Criminal Code 23

SUMMARY

On Monday, January 27, the people of Chechnya will hold presidential and parliamentary elections, the first since the brutal war ended there last fall. These elections mark the beginning of a new era for Chechnya after twenty months of war and destruction. However, many issues remain unresolved and continue to present an obstacle to establishing long-term respect for human rights and the rule of law. By some accounts, more than 1,400 Chechens and 1,000 Russian servicemen remain missing, yet the Russian parliament has thus far failed to adopt an acceptable amnesty that would release those still forcibly detained by both sides; bartering for individuals continues in spite of an "all for all" prisoner exchange envisaged in the Khasavyurt agreements. Mass graves contain unidentified bodies. Land mines pose a constant threat to civilians. And the complete failure to hold accountable those responsible for crimes against civilians deepens an already profound Chechen mistrust of the Russian government, sets an ugly precedent for the immunity of the military in both Russian and Chechen societies, and serves to perpetuate the notion that humanitarian law guarantees are nothing but a myth.

Tensions between Russia and Chechnya are likely to remain for years to come, especially because the Khasavyurt agreements, which ended the war, did not resolve the question of Chechnya's legal status, but postponed a decision until December 31, 2001. Many of the issues that led to the war will remain great sources of potential conflict.

In addition to resolving the issues related to the war, the new government of Chechnya will be faced with the challenge of creating state institutions that protect the rights of all its citizens. Beyond the war legacy, Chechnya must establish civil rights protections in law and practice. Yet the current criminal code of Chechnya, adopted by the government, contains many provisions sanctioning cruel and unusual punishment and seriously curtailing freedom of expression and opinion.

At this moment of transition, it is incumbent upon both the Russian government and the new government of Chechnya to show good faith by clarifying the whereabouts of those still missing, by adopting an amnesty that will allow those forcibly detained to go home, and by taking concrete steps to hold those responsible for laws of war violations accountable for their crimes. Without a willingness to respect international commitments, there is little hope that the most difficult issues of Chechnya's status can be resolved without again resorting to violence.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges:

The Russian Duma:

C to adopt an amnesty within the guidelines set out in Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions, article 6.1. Such an amnesty would provide for the release of those forcibly detained by both sides and would exclude those who committed grave breaches of humanitarian law;

The Russian government:

C to reinvigorate the process of investigating and prosecuting, in full compliance with international law, those responsible for gross humanitarian law violations, especially indiscriminate shelling, targeting civilians, torture, and using civilians as human shields;

C to cooperate fully with the Chechnya Procuracy in order to investigate and prosecute the 342 cases of crimes allegedly commited throughout the war by Russian soldiers which it has compiled and include the Chechnya Procuracy in the investigation of these and other cases;

C in compliance with the Khasavyurt agreements and Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions, unilaterally and unconditionally to release all Chechen prisoners held for their alleged participation in rebel activities;

C to provide sincere cooperation in the search for Chechens held in custody for their alleged participation in rebel activities by, among other things, indicating on lists of Chechens in custody the exact dates of arrest and convictions; and

C to fulfill its obligation detailed in the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly Opinion No. 193 (1996), point 7 (vii): "those found responsible for human rights violations will be brought to justice -notably in relation to events in Chechnya."

The Chechnya government:

C in compliance with the Khasavyurt agreements and Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions, unilaterally and unconditionally to release all Russian servicemen forcibly detained;

C to thoroughly investigate, and prosecute, in full compliance with international law, individuals responsible for grave breaches of humanitarian law, especially summary executions and hostage-taking;

C to revise the criminal code to eliminate the death penalty and corporal punishment, and to bring it into full compliance with the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, especially in such areas as the right to freedom of conscience, the right to privacy, and the presumption of innocence; and

C to provide extraordinary security for the Russian federal procuracy and other officials who travel to Chechnya to cooperate in the investigation of war-related crimes.

We further urge:

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

-Assistance Group in Grozny:

C to condemn in public and private the practice of hostage-taking and using detainees for bargaining purposes; and seek satisfactory responses from the Chechen command on cases as they come to light;

C to insist that both sides unilaterally release all prisoners and hostages as a matter of principle and not based on reciprocity;

C to contract a team of forensic experts, including, if necessary, international experts, to assist Russian state forensic experts in exhuming mass graves and identifying the contents;

C as a matter of priority, to travel extensively in northern Chechnya to examine claims of political persecution against those who opposed the Dudayev independence movement and the current government;

C as a matter of priority, to call on the Chechen side to be responsive to the security needs of non-Chechens in Chechnya;

C to initiate a visit by mine removal experts, if necessary, international experts, to work with the OSCE's Joint Commission to conduct a comprehensive survey of mines locations;

C to produce a mines awareness brochure and distribute it widely throughout Chechnya in Russian and Chechen translation, especially in rural areas; and

The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights:

C to conduct training seminars for the Chechen Procuracy and Ministry of the Interior (MVD) on police recruitment, focusing on the importance of screening out police recruits who were formerly combatants and who violatedhumanitarian law; on civil rights and law enforcement; and on international human rights instruments (including the Helsinki Final Act, U.N. conventions, European conventions, and their application in post-war Chechnya. Such seminars should envisage in situ follow up by ODIHR or other OSCE bodies.

The U.S. government:

C to incorporate the need for accountability and the mechanisms for accountability in the agenda for U.S.-funded judicial reform projects in Russia;

C to seek guarantees on the release of Chechen prisoners and accountability in the preparation for the March summit meeting between President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki takes no position on the question of Chechnya's independence. Our sole concern lies with the protection of civilians and respect for human rights and humanitarian law. We refer to the area as Chechnya, rather than the Chechen Republic or the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, as a matter of principle to avoid the issue of Chechnya's sovereignty.