publications

The UNDP/Kenyan Government

Displaced Persons Program: 1993-1995

The Kenya Program

Following pressure from international donors about the ethnic violence in Kenya, the government agreed in 1993 to cooperate with the U.N. to initiate a program to return the internally displaced to their homes.  In May 1993, a U.N. Disaster Management Team traveled freely through the Rift Valley Province and met with a wide range of people, including the displaced, the local administration and NGOs and church groups.50  The U.N. team concluded that conditions were far worse and the numbers of persons displaced far greater than the government acknowledged and recommended to the government that urgent action was needed.  The report noted that the displaced population had been living in:

appalling conditions for up to one and a half years, with irregular supplies of food; no adequate shelter; no access to schooling for the children and only occasional access to basic health facilities...people who had trusted in the Government’s assurances that security had been reestablished had returned home to face sudden death at the hands of their former neighbors.51

The mission also enabled the U.N. team to assess the needs of the population.  Those needs were found to be not so much for short-term humanitarian relief, but rather those aspects of the situation which the NGOs and churches providing assistance to the displaced felt they could not handle alone.  The main problems revolved around security, registration, land-tenure problems, and long-term development goals.  According to UNDP:

the U.N. team agreed that these problems could not be solved by the population alone, supported by the NGOs and church communities, but required the participation of the local and national administration.  Without a commitment by the government to ensure safety, to clearly condemn ethnic violence, to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict and to foster long-term development there could be no prospect of return for the majority of the displaced persons nor lasting solutions to the crises that had occurred in 1992.  These conclusions were shared by the persons consulted on the ground including the Roman Catholic Bishop of Nakuru and Eldoret, who urged the U.N. team to involve the government in the search for solutions, stressing that the U.N. was better placed to raise this issue than others.52

The team concluded that there was a need for the U.N. to play a positive role in addressing this “ongoing national emergency” by sending technical teams to develop strategies and programs.  The report rightly cautioned that such efforts had to be accompanied by a government commitment at the highest levels to create the conditions conducive to reconciliation, reintegration and enhanced security.53  Following a meeting with the president, to present the findings of the report, the government agreed to the creation of a program along the lines that had been recommended. 

The selection of UNDP as the implementing agency for the Kenya program in 1993 was indicative of the trend towards broadening UNDP’s traditional development mandate to encompass more emergency-type situations with national development implications.  Such a role utilizes UNDP’s well-established expertise in development-oriented issues, while requiring it to develop additional capacities, particularly in the relief assistance, human rights and protection areas.54

In October 1993, UNDP and the Kenyan government announced a joint “Programme for Displaced Persons,” which proposed a $20 million plan for reconciliation and resettlement.55  The commencement of the UNDP/ Kenyan government program coincided with concerns expressed by Kenya’s donors about the ethnic violence.  At a Consultative Group meeting on aid to Kenya held in Paris on November 22 and 23, 1993, the chairman’s closing statement mentioned that “bilateral donors were disturbed by the ethnic clashes [and]...underlined the paramount importance of strengthened Government action to defuse the underlying tensions and deal with unrest through evenhanded application of the law.”

The UNDP program in Kenya was intended to reintegrate the people who had been displaced by the “ethnic” violence since 1991, estimated by UNDP at the time of the report at about 255,000 (and by 1994, at 260,000): with children accounting for as much as 75 percent of that population and female-headed households comprising an estimated 40 percent.56  The stated objective of the program was “the reintegration of displaced populations into local communities, prevention of renewed tensions and promotion of the process of reconciliation.”57

The Rogge Reports

Specific proposals for action were developed in a report written by UNDP consultant John Rogge known as the “Rogge Report” (the first of two).58  On the basis of this report, the UNDP/Government of Kenya program was developed and approved by the government towards the end of the year.  The 1993 Rogge report provided a well-written synopsis of the situation.  It identified three basic groups of displaced.  First, were those who had returned and were in the process of rehabilitating their homes and farms.  Second, were those who were commuting to their farms to cultivate, but were not able or willing to return because of the perception or experience of continued insecurity.  Third, were those who would probably never be able to return to the land they were driven off, either because the remaining residents were emphatic about never allowing any other ethnic group to reclaim their land or because they were squatters with no legal claim to return.  In some areas, this land was left abandoned, uncultivated and unoccupied.  In others, farms were illegally occupied by remaining residents either for cultivation or grazing livestock.

More importantly, the Rogge report correctly identified both the short-term and long-term needs for successful reintegration.  In the immediate short-term, the report called for food, shelter and agricultural materials to be provided as well as the establishment of a revolving credit scheme to provide capital for cash crop farming or small scale business.  In the medium-term, it recommended that more general development initiatives needed to be undertaken that benefitted entire communities regardless of status, including rehabilitation of destroyed institutions such as schools and health centers, while linking these initiatives to efforts such as reconciliation seminars, skills and employment training, and regularization of the land tenure system.  For long-term reintegration, the report underscored that protection and security issues were paramount for the success of the program as was the need to address development issues, most notably land registration and tenure security.  In cases where return to one’s land was unlikely to materialize, lasting alternative arrangements were called for.  The report noted that “no single partner has the capacity to single-handedly deal with the complex issues being faced,”59 and called for a partnership of UNDP, the government and the local NGOs/churches.  An overall duration of two years for short-term activities was envisioned and a five-year program for medium-term activities.60

The program, on the basis of the Rogge report, soon got under way under the auspices of UNDP’s Nairobi-based Project Implementation Unit.  The program focused on the worst hit areas in three provinces: Western Province (Bungoma and Mt. Elgon Districts); Nyanza Province (Kisumu District); and the Rift Valley Province (Elgeyo-Maraquet, Nakuru, Nandi, Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu Districts).61  Program assistance was administered through the funding of quick impact activities, known as “quips,” which are rapid, low budget interventions targeted at the most urgent needs identified by the communities.  These small grants are usually aimed at the transition phase from emergency relief into rehabilitation.  The Rogge report identified key areas where program support for quips was needed including relief, agriculture and shelter assistance; income generating activities; capacity building for local institutions; programs to support women and women-headed households; rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure; and strengthening of civil and land registration.62  UNDP noted:

Besides the immediate relief element, projects will be supported which are developmental, promote self-reliance and are ultimately locally sustainable. Quips will be limited in time (three to six months) and by the ceiling of funds available per project...Quips can be submitted by communities, committees, NGOs, churches, and also government departments; they should be the result of dialogue based on well defined needs expressed by the communities themselves who should be actively involved at all stages.63 

A year later, in August 1994, John Rogge returned to Kenya to examine the work in progress: to assess its effectiveness, to identify residual needs for relief and rehabilitation, to identify mechanisms to tackle the root causes of the clashes, and to establish sustainable development activities.64  He had a five-week contract during which time he revisited the clash-affected areas.65  The report’s assessment of the situation was upbeat about prospects for return and the government’s commitment to the process.  The 1994 report concluded that major incidents of violence had decreased and security had continued to improve.  On the whole, the report found that cultivation had revived in the clash areas.  This improvement was credited to a turnaround within the government.  The report stated:

Although the majimbo debate continues to be actively promoted by certain figures, there has nevertheless been a pronounced and increased effort at all levels of government to reduce tensions and address the question of finding durable solutions to the problems of the displaced and other clash-affected persons.  It is therefore disappointing that a few key figures continue to deflect attention from progress that is being made.  At most district and divisional administration levels, there have been complete changes in personnel over the past year, and the administrative officers were seen to be committed to the resolution of conflict in their areas.  Cooperation between local administration and the Displaced Persons Program (DPP) is very encouraging.66

The report also acknowledged that in some places the situation was still variable and that threats and harassment continued.  The report listed some eight areas where people were still not able to return to their homes, including in Uasin Gishu District (the Kipkaren valley and parts of Turbo and Burnt Forest); parts of South Nandi district; Trans Nzoia district (the eastern slopes of Mt. Elgon); Nakuru district (Olenguruone division and Maela camp);  and Kericho district (Thessalia mission).

 

Although the second Rogge report refrained from publishing many statistics, the report estimated that about one-third of the affected population had returned, and that in western Kenya a much larger proportion (close to half) were in a critical stage of transition.67  In some areas, the return was complete, and in others, people still commuted to their land in the day and slept at market centers at night.  The report noted that a greater proportion of displaced Kalenjins appeared to have returned.  The main reasons cited for not returning were insecurity or fear of violence, lack of materials to rebuild destroyed homes, and dependency on relief distributions.68   The report estimated that of the displaced, some 20 percent would probably never be able to return to their land without “circumspect and realistic political intervention.”69

 

The major recommendation of the 1994 Rogge report in no uncertain terms was that UNDP needed to move away from short-term relief assistance and “quip” projects, and move toward meeting the medium and long-term needs of the displaced.  Noting that UNDP had been concentrating on food distributions and agricultural inputs, the report identified the need for sustainable projects such as credit schemes for small businesses and agricultural extension services, and employment and job training programs.  For long-term reintegration and reconciliation prospects, the Rogge report stressed that UNDP had to tackle the problems associated with land tenure.  The report read:

A completely unresolved question, and which is clearly one [of] the major contributing factors to the clashes, is that of land tenure and the issue of obtaining title to land.  Delays in surveying, failure to provide land titles, irregularities in the district land titles offices, misappropriation of funds and misallocation of plots by administrations of cooperative land holding societies, and an array of other ambiguities caused by sub-divisions of plots, non-formal (traditional) sales and/or exchanges of land, have together produced widespread uncertainty and contradiction over land ownership and rights to use land.  This situation has been flagrantly exploited by the forces which incited the clashes.  While the problems of land tenure irregularities and land titles acquisition are clearly a responsibility of the GOK [Government of Kenya], unless the specific problems and ambiguities in clash-areas are adequately addressed, the risk of renewed conflict remains.  The DPP’s [Displaced Persons Program] role in this regard must be to monitor ongoing problems and ambiguities and attempt to bring together the respective protagonists with local administrations.70

The Rogge report concluded with optimistic anticipation that with adequate donor funding:

there is no reason why the DPP [Displaced Persons Program] could not achieve its objectives within two years and be in a position to wind-up its operation.  The critical assumption that must be made in this scenario is that there will be no further ethnic violence and that the GOK [Government of Kenya] intensifies its commitment to addressing and eradicating the root causes of the violence.71




50In March-April 1993, a U.N. Disaster Management Team received reports of continued suffering among populations displaced through ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley despite the denial by the government of any significant problem.  The U.N. team decided to consider whether the experience previously acquired through a drought alleviation program could be applied to the search for solutions to the ethnic violence in the Rift Valley.  According to UNDP, the U.N. team hoped to build on the good-will, methodology, and team work that had developed with the local administrations, NGOs, community groups and donors through the drought program.  The delegation consisted of David Whaley, UNDP; Vicent O’Reilly, UNICEF; Else Larsen, WFP; Steve Oti, WHO; G. Guebre-Christos, UNHCR; Don Ferguson and Robert Palmer, U.N. Volunteers assigned to the Emergency Relief Unit through DHA operating under the responsibility of the U.N. Disaster Management Team.  See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.1.

51U.N. Disaster Management Team, Mission to the Affected Areas of Western Kenya Affected by the Ethnic Clashes, May 1993, p.1-2.

52See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.1-2.

53Ibid.

54Other UNDP involvement with the reintegration of internally displaced populations has occurred in Cambodia, Central America, Mozambique and the Horn of Africa.

55Government of Kenya/UNDP, Programme Document: Programme for Displaced Persons, Inter-Agency Joint Programming, October 26, 1993.

56John Rogge,”The Internally Displaced Population in Nyanza, Western and Rift Valley Province: A Needs Assessment and a Program Proposal for Rehabilitation,” UNDP, September 1993, part 3(3.8).

57“Programme for Displaced Persons and Communities Affected by the Ethnic Violence,” UNDP, February 1994.

58John Rogge,”The Internally Displaced Population in Nyanza, Western and Rift Valley Province: A Needs Assessment and a Program Proposal for Rehabilitation,” UNDP, September 1993 [hereafter Rogge Report I, UNDP, September 1993].

59Ibid., Executive Summary, para.14.

60Ibid.

61Government of Kenya/UNDP, Programme Document: Programme for Displaced Persons, Inter-Agency Joint Programming, October 26, 1993, p.18.

62Rogge Report I, UNDP, September, p.29.

63UNDP,”Programme for Displaced Persons and Communities Affected by Ethnic Violence,” Nairobi, February 1994, p.6.

64John Rogge,”From Relief to Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation: Developments and Prospects for Internally Displaced Populations in Western and Rift Valley Provinces,” UNDP, September 1994 [hereafter Rogge Report II, UNDP, September 1994]; and presentation by David Whaley, former UNDP Resident Representative to Kenya, contained in the minutes of the third Excom meeting, Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, September 8, 1994.

65UNDP states that Mr. Rogge spent well over three weeks in the clash areas.  See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.2.  The minutes of the third Excom meeting, Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, September 8, 1994, cite Mr. Rogge as saying he spent twelve days in the field.

66Rogge Report II, UNDP, September 1994, Executive Summary, para.2.

67Ibid. para.4 and 5.

68Ibid.; and presentation by John Rogge, UNDP consultant, contained in minutes of the third Excom meeting, Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, September 8, 1994.

69Rogge Report II, UNDP, September 1994, Executive Summary, para 6.

70Ibid., para.21.

71Ibid., para.25.