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Missed Opportunities: An Assessment of the UNDP Program

“Time has healed the wounds, not UNDP”

—Former UNDP employee, Nakuru, August 8, 1996

UNDP deserves credit for a initiating a program, for creating a national forum for dialogue, providing relief assistance to the displaced, and serving as a calming intermediary in a tense situation which assisted thousands of Kenyans to return to their homes.  These achievements should in no way be discounted, and Human Rights Watch/Africa recognizes the contributions of this program that facilitated reintegration.  However, the Displaced Persons Program in Kenya was not without its shortcomings.  The UNDP resident representative to Kenya, Frederick Lyons, has pointed out:

Look at the experience as a whole.  Twelve million dollars were spent eventually and that figure corresponds with the 170,000 to 180,000 resettled.  It is a big sum of money.  Not everything was done in the best possible way, but we have learned from the process.  We played a positive role in building bridges between the communities, the donors and the local and national government.  That success is reflected in what happened.  Things have calmed down.  It is easy to be pessimistic—but if you look at the glass as half full, we did make a difference.  UNDP served as a useful conduit and managed as a facilitator at a time when tensions were high.125

While UNDP cannot be held responsible for the Kenyan government’s recalcitrance, it does bear some responsibility for the thousands who remain displaced today.  There are a number of identifiable factors that could have strengthened UNDP’s contribution.  UNDP did not put into place a working agreement with the government setting out basic operating conditions for the program.  UNDP misread the situation and did not put into place mechanisms to guard against government abuse.  UNDP did not prioritize data collection.  In the context of forced dispersals by the government, the absence of a monitoring and reporting function meant that there was no sustained follow-up or means of identifying those displaced who were expelled from identifiable camp-like situations.  UNDP also did not play a vigorous and outspoken advocacy and protection role to protect the displaced against human rights abuses.  UNDP was silent on the need for accountability, and too ready to accept and to propound arguments that only a few officials were involved as an alternative to confronting the government’s betrayal of the very premise of its program.  Its program did not support and strengthen the local NGO community.  As a result of these omissions and the government’s obstruction, UNDP was forced to end the program prematurely without addressing the long-term solutions, including land reform, leaving thousands abandoned.  An examination of these factors, if acted on by UNDP, may avoid the same errors from being repeated in programs elsewhere.

What was required in Kenya was a UNDP program that moved from emergency relief to durable solutions: a program that blended immediate assistance and protection needs with long-term rehabilitation and development strategies.  UNDP should have coordinated the relief assistance side with the NGOs already providing aid on the ground, while concentrating primarily on addressing the fundamental political and human rights impediments that needed to be removed to ensure a successful transition to full reintegration.  Working within a highly volatile situation where accusations of government involvement were rife, UNDP also needed to distance itself somewhat from the government and play a watchdog role to prevent and address government abuses against the displaced.  Although ultimate responsibility for returning the displaced to their land lay with the Kenyan government, one of UNDP’s roles should have been that of an advocate for the displaced to press for conditions conducive to return.    

UNDP proceeded as if all that was necessary was to provide relief supplies to allow people to return to rebuild their homes and cultivate their land, while doing nothing more than acknowledging the causes of the displacement—and the attendant violations that needed addressing.  An international humanitarian worker who worked with the displaced said:

this program seemed to be modeled on a similar program done in 1992 for drought and famine victims.  Not only did we think that program had failed because it was a bed of corruption, but here you had a situation where the government had created and benefitted from the violence.  Anyone could have told you that this was not going to be the same as reintegrating drought victims.126

Various UNDP documents on the displaced program for Kenya acknowledge and recognize this fact, citing the importance of addressing a variety of human rights, rule of law, protection, and development issues.  But ultimately these critical factors were neglected in the implementation phase of the program.  Throughout, UNDP remained highly involved in the emergency relief end of things—along with the NGO and church groups—but never seriously took on the protection or development roles for which it was best equipped, both as the lead agency in this case, and as a part of the larger U.N. organization with expertise in these areas upon which it should have drawn.

 

The 1994 (second) Rogge report, which was issued at the mid-point of the program, contributed to the misleading impression that things were going better than they actually were and that reintegration was proceeding at a brisk pace with government blessings.  Many in the local NGO community believe that the second Rogge report missed the opportunity for UNDP to reassess its direction at a critical time when it could have made a difference.  Ernest Murimi of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission believes that “in the second report, Rogge rushed.  He seemed to have preconceived ideas about what was happening.  He also threw out the figures of those resettled without consultation.  Those numbers did not reflect what we were seeing on the ground.  By 1994, UNDP had become an arm of the government.”127  Donors also expressed concerns that the Rogge report lacked a detailed assessment of UNDP itself and that the report’s recommendations were not feasible because of a lack of capacity within the UNDP.  Had the 1994 Rogge report sounded a stronger warning about the problems in the program at that time, it is possible that could have underscored to UNDP what it needed to do at a time when it could have made a difference.

The manner in which UNDP implemented the Kenyan program had several detrimental effects.  First, the UNDP program allowed the government to deflect international criticism of its ongoing policies of ethnic discrimination and to obtain donor and investment funding on the grounds that it was reintegrating the displaced (all the while continuing to obstruct reintegration and institutionalize the new land distribution through manipulation of the land registry).  Throughout the program, the Kenyan government consistently used the UNDP program as a basis for asserting to the international community that the situation had normalized, while continuing to pursue its policy of ethnic persecution.  Instead of mobilizing sustained multilateral pressure on the Kenyan government by raising ongoing concerns with donors, UNDP’s approach was instrumental in contributing to the impression that all was going well with reintegration.  At a London Investors’ Conference in November 1994, the reason cited by bilateral and multilateral donors for why a successful meeting could be held on investment in Kenya was the government’s improvement in the handling of communities affected by the ethnic violence.128  In the closing statement of the Consultative Group meeting of Kenya’s donors on December 15 and 16, 1994, the chair noted that there had been “positive developments” with respect to ethnic tensions and human rights issues.129

Second, the UNDP program spent an enormous amount of money, which in retrospect, might have been used more effectively had it been applied differently.  Although the proposed budget for the program was initially U.S.$20 million, eventually only some U.S.$12 million was raised.130  In addition to a UNDP revolving fund of U.S. $800,000, donor assistance to UNDP for the program was pledged by, among others, the governments of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom (U.K.), the U.S., and the European Union (E.U.).  Appeals were made to the international community, but donors were slow to respond, privately citing reservations about the Kenyan government’s commitment to ending the clashes.  Similarly, church and local relief organizations working with the displaced, while welcoming the efforts begun by UNDP, expressed strong misgivings about the government’s commitment.  UNDP never managed to raise the full amount it had anticipated from donors.  Later, as the program floundered, some donors who had previously committed funding withheld their pledges.131  Ultimately, when the program ended in September 1995, UNDP had to return some money to donors.132

Third, UNDP’s long-term contribution to addressing the issues raised by the ethnic violence and the displacement is questionable.  The UNDP displaced persons program left a Kenya that is as easily able to explode with ethnic violence in the future as it did in the early 1990s—if that suits the government.  An examination of the situation of the displaced in Kenya today differs very little from the situation described in the second Rogge report of 1994.  While there are thousands who have returned to their land in some areas, there are still thousands who farm on their land in the day and sleep elsewhere at night, fearing reprisals if they return to their land.  There are thousands of others who cannot return to their land at all because of anticipated or actual violence or because their land has been illegally occupied, sold or transferred.  There are still thousands more who have become urban slum dwellers.  The grievances that allowed for the manipulation of ethnic tensions have not been addressed, nor have the justice and land issues that are key to finding sustainable solutions.

Fourth, UNDP’s silence in the face of continued discrimination against the displaced allowed the government to continue to consolidate its political gains by allowing its supporters to “legalize” and profit from their ill-gotten gains.  Even today, land throughout the clash areas continues to be illegally occupied or officially transferred into the possession of Kalenjin and Maasai owners who acquired the land through violence, with the knowledge of local government officials.  Fraudulent land sales and transfers have been countenanced by local government officials, and no steps have ever been taken by the national government to reverse the illegal land transactions that transpired since the ethnic clashes.  The displaced who seek redress for the illegal occupation or transfer of their land from local government officials are sent futilely from one office to the next until they are finally forced to give up.

Lastly, UNDP’s credibility, independence and impartiality were damaged by this program.  The displaced, the NGOs working with them and donors, strongly feel that UNDP colluded with the Kenyan government at the cost of the protection and welfare of the displaced.  While UNDP can be credited for coordinating a national program, for bringing together all the actors involved, and even providing relief and assistance that allowed some to return to their land, the program failed to address the fundamental issues critical for long-term development.  UNDP failed to create a registration system that would have allowed for sustained monitoring of the displaced; it did not set out explicit terms of agreement with the government as a condition of the program which protected the rights of the displaced; UNDP was reticent to criticize the government’s human rights abuses against the displaced or to address the justice and accountability issues arising from the violations; it did not put enough pressure on the Kenyan government to ensure adequate protection to the displaced; it did not support and strengthen the local NGO community; and it failed to address the long-term solutions, such as the underlying tensions of land distribution.  UNDP’s silence and inaction on these issues greatly damaged its credibility in the eyes of many Kenyans.

A Well-Conceptualized Program

It is commendable that UNDP initiated and created a program to address a situation of internal displacement which was receiving virtually no international assistance.  The preparatory stages of the project were consultative with input drawn from other U.N. agencies; the approach to secure the government’s agreement for the program was successful; and the strong program document drafted by John Rogge in 1993 set the stage for a program that could have had far-reaching consequences for resolving the Kenyan situation. 

Once the approval for the project had been secured from the government, UNDP’s stated approach was to create a program that incorporated the input of the displaced, the NGO community and the government, to address the relief, protection and reconciliation needs of the displaced. According to UNDP:

The U.N. program was based on the principle of the community finding its own way back to harmony and coexistence and the value of locally initiated rehabilitation and development activities.  It fully recognized the important role of churches and NGOs in the provision of relief, based on their acceptance by the communities and their critical input to the process of reconciliation.  On the other hand, the U.N. program also recognized the need for the government to address the issues of security, access, registration and longer term problem—though preferably discreet—donor support and informal monitoring through the United Nations.133

No Terms of Agreement with Government

One of the major omissions of the UNDP Displaced Persons Program, identified primarily by the UNDP staff who worked on the program, was that there was no firm agreement signed with the Kenyan government.  Government involvement in the program was critical to its success.  At no time during the UNDP program in Kenya was there any program document that spelled out the responsibilities of the Kenyan government and bound it to taking certain actions.  A former UNDP staff member said: 

There should have been a clear contract with the Kenyan government.  But there was not for a number of reasons.  From the perspective of UNDP at the central level [New York], this was a confusing and strange project to deal with because this was something new for UNDP.  A program that dealt with relief to rehabilitation is not something that UNDP does often.  Then, we were also dealing with a volatile situation inside the country.  Adding to that, there were no firm donor commitments to finance the program.  All these factors made us feel that we needed to step slowly and to appease the Kenyan government at first to get them to be part of the process.  We knew that we were dealing with the devil, but we did not want to expose them or ask for accountability because these were the people in power.  Our approach was to cool things down first, engage them, and then move to accountability and a national commission of inquiry.  This was the right approach, and it got us some distance, and there was some reintegration.  But, where there was not or when things went wrong, we had nothing to fall back on—not with the Kenyan government and not with UNDP in New York.  Everything always came back to the fact that we had no working agreement.134   

In its response to Human Rights Watch/Africa, UNDP acknowledged the difficulties this posed and elaborated on the reasons, stating:

The U.N. team on the ground, including the UNDP Resident Representative, would agree that the lack of a formal agreement between UNDP and the Government has been criticised as one of the factors contributing to the confusion.  This confusion arose, in part, from the difficulty in reaching agreement with the Government, but also the uncertainly over funding that made it impossible for UNDP to enter into specific commitments that would have allowed it to call for reciprocal formal commitments from the Government.135 

UNDP did, however, use the opportunity presented by the proposals of the National Committee for Displaced Persons (NCDP) to transmit written plans to the government in 1994 for a continued and expanded program.  According to UNDP, these were incorporated into the basic agreement between the government and UNDP.  However, these were not sufficient replacement for a formal agreement.

The lack of firm operating standards between UNDP and the Kenyan government allowed the government to disregard the UNDP program in ways that suited it and to avoid being held to any minimum standard of responsibility towards the displaced.  UNDP should have had an operating agreement with the Kenyan government signed prior to the program, binding the government to certain minimum steps, including free access to the displaced at all times; prior notification of any government movement of the displaced; advanced assessment by the U.N. of any areas designated by the government for reintegration; U.N.-supervised movement of people with advance notice to a reasonable area; no government registration of the displaced without U.N. presence; no government harassment of the displaced; no forcible destruction of camps; and disciplinary actions to be taken against government officials involved in mistreatment of the displaced.

Providing a National Forum for All Actors

One of the roles of the UNDP program was to convene a forum of all agencies involved with the displaced to ensure coordination and guidance on the overall implementation of the program and prevent duplication of efforts.  This endeavor was successful in furthering dialogue and reconciliation, as were its efforts to initiate local and regional community meetings to raise issues.  These fora allowed the local community representatives, government officials, NGOs and UNDP to regularly interact.

Since the inception of the clashes and prior to the UNDP program, a number of NGOs and church organizations had been assisting the displaced.  However, there was little or no coordination or cooperation among the nongovernmental sector, let alone with the international NGOs or the government.  Tensions have always run high between the government and the local NGO community, with constant government harassment and intimidation of NGO workers who attempted to assist the displaced.

In July 1994, UNDP set up a National Committee for Displaced Persons (NCDP) which consisted of representatives from the government’s Office of the President, donors, UNDP and the local and international nongovernmental community.136  The stated role of the NCDP working group, chaired by the Office of the President, was to “structure policy to be implemented in defined areas focusing on the district and local government administrations to coordinate and help the NGOs and church groups at the local level implement their programmes and activities.”

 

Although the full NCDP only met twice, it is widely agreed that it was a useful creation on several grounds.  First, the NCDP provided a forum for greater exchange of information and afforded the NGOs some measure of protection to raise issues and offer criticism without fear of government retaliation.  According to Ephraim Kiragu of the NCCK, “the one positive role that UNDP played was to facilitate a forum for the key players to meet.  It was the first time that we sat face to face around a table to discuss this issue with the government.  And that was useful.”137  Also in agreement was Irungu Houghton of the NGO Council who noted that “the NCDP meetings provided an opportunity for everyone to speak and to raise all issues in a forum.  The meetings served as an information gathering and sharing session, and one got a sense of government thinking.  The presence of donor countries at the meetings was positive.  The donors were there, and the government wanted funding so they could not intimidate people.”138

Second, the NCDP also created greater transparency on the part of the government, which was called to respond to developments at every meeting.  By including government officials in the wider dialogue with all the other actors, the government was forced to cooperate in the reintegration process and had to make the right noises, at least publicly, about the need for peace and reconciliation.  Further, even the limited cooperation of the government at the national level meetings sifted down to the local levels, and NGOs working with the displaced in some areas were able to elicit greater cooperation from local government officials, who would otherwise have been wary of cooperating without explicit orders from the national government.  “It was constructive to bring in the government,” noted Tecla Wanjala, who worked with the displaced in Western Province.  “It got some of the local officials who were hostile on board.”139

The NCDP meetings also engaged and sustained donor interest in the project.  One diplomat said:

UNDP was not very good about keeping the donors appraised about what was happening.  The lack of information further added to our unwillingness to contribute to a program which we already thought was problematic.  Once Killian Kleinschmidt [former UNDP Senior Technical Advisor] came on board, he personally did a lot to ensure that the information flow improved and that the NCDP meetings were a useful forum.  It was largely because of his efforts that we donated to the program.140

A further benefit of the NCDP meetings was increased communication between the various NGOs.  While the NGO contribution towards relief assistance and longer-term reintegration, particularly by the church organizations, has without question been the single most important source of help for most of the displaced, the NGO community was certainly not without its own competitiveness and lack of transparency.  As a result, areas were often being serviced by two or more groups, resulting in a duplication of effort in some areas and an absence in others.  Since update reports were given on each group’s work, the NCDP helped to facilitate the streamlining of NGO efforts and the division of operational areas, and focused greater attention on the neglected areas.  The NCDP also mitigated somewhat the competitiveness among the NGO community and allowed for greater information-sharing among the NGOs.

No Comprehensive Data Collection

The collection and documentation of data, while often time-consuming and costly, is an important dimension of dealing with any displacement program.  Without access to reliable information and data, it is difficult to assess the needs of the situation or to advance successful strategies.  Accurate data can provide an important indicator of how well the program is working and offer an ongoing opportunity to assess whether the program is meeting the needs of the remaining displaced.  That said, data on the internally displaced is often difficult to collect.  Undertaking a detailed enumeration can even place people at risk in some cases.  Notwithstanding these impediments, UNDP has recognized the need for better information systems on the internally displaced.141 

Since the beginning of the “ethnic” violence in 1991, the absence of accurate information on the situation has provided an opportunity for the Kenyan government to evade its responsibility to those who remain displaced and made it close to impossible for the NGO community to help many of those who remain off their land.  The consequences of the lack of accurate data, both qualitative and quantitative, have been tragic for those who remain displaced in Kenya today.  Even if an international program for the displaced was to recommence, there is little or no way to identify or contact many of those who still desperately need help to rebuild their broken lives.

In each of the affected areas, UNDP should have conducted an appraisal as soon as possible to register and determine names and numbers of displaced, the abandoned plot registration number, and the location from where each of the displaced had been forced.  Additionally, interviews with the displaced about their needs and conditions would have greatly enhanced UNDP’s ability to cater the program to the specific situation.  In Kenya, because of the national identity card system, it would have been relatively easy for UNDP to create a national data base using national identity card numbers and the corresponding plot number from which the person had been displaced.  In some areas, the local church and NGOs had already begun to use national identity card numbers in order to reduce duplicate registration.  However, one could get differing figures from different NGOs in the same areas.  UNDP could have given the responsibility for data collection to its field officers who could have obtained all the various estimates, collected names, and sent the information to Nairobi for the creation of a national database.  This database would certainly not have been 100 percent accurate, given the fact that UNDP was coming in two years after the violence had begun. Additionally, some of the displaced did not want to be on “lists” and others were dispersed among relatives or were out of the region, and hence could not have been sampled even if UNDP had tried.  However, accurate data, however incomplete, would have provided a basis upon which to sort and process information that could have been used during the program and subsequently.  For those displaced in incidents of violence that took place following the commencement of the UNDP program (between 1993 and 1995), UNDP could have been at the sites where the displaced were congregating to collect accurate data.

UNDP was the best placed organization to have collected the information on internally displaced numbers and needs, and the steps being taken meet these needs.  The UNDP displaced persons program was the major and only national program in the country.  It was the one actor with the capacity to access information from the widest range of sources, both inside and outside the government, and because of its stated partnership with the government, it was probably the organization that would have encountered the least government resistance.  While much of the data that UNDP would have collected would have relied on the work of the local NGOs, none of these groups on their own could have undertaken the task as effectively.  All of the local groups ran programs in certain areas, and while there was some cooperation, consultation, and even duplication, among the groups, there was no one local group well-placed to conduct anything on a national scale due to resource constraints and likely government obstruction.  Often, numbers varied widely among the groups in part because of the difficulty of accurately registering the displaced, because of fraudulent or duplicate registrations, and even because of number inflation by some local groups themselves, perhaps for fund-raising purposes.

The regular collection and distribution of data on the situation of the internally displaced would have kept the spotlight on the Kenyan government.  Had UNDP instituted a reporting procedure, which compiled and collated reports from its own staff and other sources, the program would have been better able to identify and register the displaced as well as to document what was happening to them in order to better follow their rehabilitation and reintegration.  UNDP field officers were required to submit bi-weekly reports to UNDP; however, these reports were not regularly shared, even with donors.  A diplomat who was based in Kenya at that time noted:

This was indicative of the larger problem of their poor reporting.  At the Excom meetings, UNDP, like many U.N. agencies, was very bad about reporting.  They didn’t give proper updates about what they were doing or what was happening.  For instance, during the month of September [1994], they simply stated that they were busy with the Rogge visit.142

Findings about the situation should have been published at frequent intervals and in a manner that was accessible to those in Kenya as well as the international community.  Regular public reporting by UNDP may have deterred abuses against the displaced by a government that was sensitive to negative publicity and its impact on renewed foreign aid.

UNDP was not unaware that the lack of information on the displaced was a problem.  In one of its earliest reports, UNDP noted that the numbers provided were inaccurate or too generalized and that data needed to be collected.143  The first Rogge report recorded that:

The numbers affected remain uncertain and somewhat speculative, as is invariably the case with internally displaced populations.  Local government administrations have little or no substantive data on the numbers affected, past or present, or those currently in need of assistance.  None have undertaken any systematic registration of displaced or otherwise affected persons.  NGOs and church groups providing relief assistance to affected populations have made considerable effort to register their clients, but most concede that their numbers are only approximations.  It is clear that there is some duplication in their registrations and that many non-affected persons succeed in getting themselves registered as beneficiaries.  On the other hand, many displacees do not get registered at all because they have left affected regions to return to their ancestral lands to draw upon the assistance of relatives or friends.  Others have simply “disappeared” into urban areas.  Elsewhere, displacees who have returned, or are in [the] process of returning to their farms have remained outside the NGO assistance network and thus remain unenumerated.144

The lack of data also allowed for some duplicate or fraudulent claims for food relief and benefits by people claiming to be displaced.  Conversely, lack of knowledge about assistance programs or fear of registering affected some, and they did not register at all.  Either they left the area to live with relatives, were absorbed into the urban poor, or remained by choice outside of the food assistance network, thereby remaining uncounted. 

Unfortunately, UNDP did not consider data collation a priority at all: not of the numbers of displaced that had occurred prior to their program, and not of those who were terrorized off their land in the midst of their program.  Instead, UNDP relied on an approximation of 250,000,145 which was the estimate given in the first Rogge report.146  UNDP has stated: 

The estimates throughout were just that—estimates.  This was made abundantly clear in both Rogge reports and UNDP had always indicated that the 250,000 figure that was being used was little more than a crude estimate.  The number was, however, based exclusively on data provided to Rogge by the NGOs and Churches; at no time were any Government estimates used.147

UNDP then continued to use the same figure throughout, even though by its own count, large-scale violence in October 1993 in Enosupukia, Narok district, was known to have displaced 20,600 more people (7,090 adults and 13,551 children)148 and in March 1994 in Burnt Forest another 10-12,000.149  This should have taken the estimated total up to 280,000, even by UNDP’s count, which by its own admission errs on the cautious side.  Yet, UNDP has continued to use the 250,000 figure up to today, which is at least 30,000 less than its estimated total should be.150

As the program unfolded, UNDP increasingly moved away from taking responsibility for collecting national data.  The second Rogge report explicitly discouraged registration on the grounds that it created expectations and should therefore not be emphasized.  Instead, Rogge urged that the program should focus on areas or zones where people were still displaced on the grounds that there was little to gain from obtaining exact numbers.151  To the contrary, the purpose of collating and documenting the names of those displaced would have provided a basis upon which to identify those scattered or converted into urban slum dwellers.  A UNDP official told Human Rights Watch/Africa:

In retrospect, we should have paid more attention to registering the displaced.  But we did what we thought was best at the time.  It seemed that there were more pressing things to deal with and we thought, at that time, by taking this approach we could achieve more.152   

 

Realizing that a lack of data or information on the whereabouts of the displaced would not only dissipate national and international outrage over the situation but also permanently subvert reintegration efforts, the government systematically dispersed congregations of displaced, which were easily visible to journalists, human rights and relief workers.  The government capitalized on the lack of such data by scattering congregations of displaced, using threats, intimidation, and in some cases force, making it impossible to assess the current situation or locate those who remain off their land.  For example, in late December 1994, the government told clash victims at the Eldoret NCCK community center to move back to their farms.  The Uasin Gishu DO, Daniel Lotoai, also made it clear that the government would only aid clash victims on their farms and not in centers and camps.153  Another example is the dispersal and relocation of thousands at Maela camp when the government left them at several random sites in Central Province without food or shelter.  The lack of data by UNDP made the government’s job all the easier since dispersed populations, while not reintegrated, were no longer identifiable. Many have become an urban working class and have disappeared into the anonymity of the cities and towns.

The lack of accurate data has also been questionably used by UNDP to put the best face on its program in Kenya.  UNDP has been consistently accused of downplaying the total number of displaced, while inflating its estimates of those reintegrated.   UNDP’s first attempt at estimating the numbers of those who had gone home was after the program had been in existence for one year.  In the second Rogge report of September 1994, UNDP consultant John Rogge stated:

[f]or the whole of western Kenya, an optimistic estimate might be that one third of the affected population is now back on its land and in the process of rebuilding its houses...A much larger proportion, perhaps as much as half of the total displaced in western Kenya, are in a transitional state of return.154

The wording was repeated by former UNDP resident representative to Kenya, David Whaley, at a NCDP meeting.  This assertion was then given the highest stamp of authority by UNDP when Administrator James Gustave Speth, on a visit to Kenya in September 1994, held a news conference publicly and definitively stating that “thirty percent of the 250,000 clash victims have been rehabilitated, 50 percent have moved closer to their shambas [farms in Kiswahili], while there are intricate land disputes involving the rest.”155  At a dinner hosted for him by the government, Mr. Speth noted that he was impressed by the government’s efforts to restore peace and rehabilitate the displacees, stating that “in a world of ethnic strife, what we saw during the visit to Molo is a government which is moving to reconcile tribal differences.”156  Mr. Speth made no mention of the continued threats or actual violence against the displaced, forced dispersals, the destruction of camp sites by administration police, or government harassment of those assisting the displaced.157  Mr. Speth also stated that Kenya would always be a friend of UNDP and that UNDP would continue to call for increased assistance to Kenya.158

According to UNDP, the 1994 estimate of those reintegrated was reached:

based on what the NGOs on the ground reported, including the Peace and Justice Commission [sic] in Nakuru.  The proposal in the Rogge report clearly stated that perhaps as much as a third were back living on their land and about half of the total were cultivating their land but not necessarily living on it, i.e. the other half were displaced.  John Rogge presented these “numbers” to an NGO seminar on the displaced shortly before his departure and the NGOs present did not disagree with the validity of these assertions.  Hence, the U.N. team used these numbers as working estimates for the programme.159

However, the assertion by UNDP that its program had resettled approximately one third of the displaced created an uproar among local relief and church organizations.  UNDP’s estimates of those who remained displaced was 30 percent fewer than the 240,000 estimated by the local relief organizations.160  Advocates for the displaced charged UNDP and the government of understating the number of people who remained uprooted. 

When called on to offer proof of this figure, UNDP quickly sought to distance itself from its own estimate of those reintegrated.  Not unlike the Kenyan government, which constantly blames others (including the press) for the ethnic violence, UNDP disingenuously accused the Kenyan press —which had cited a figure of 75,000 by calculating one third of UNDP’s estimated total of 250,000—of manipulating the figure and taking it out of context.  UNDP claimed that it had never used that numerical figure (which is technically correct, since it had used the wording one third).161

In late 1995, when UNDP ended its displaced persons program, it announced that some 180,000 persons had been resettled as a result of the program.  While Human Rights Watch/Africa is not in the position to verify the exact number of displaced remaining at this time, it does appear from interviews with local and international relief workers who were, and still are, assisting the displaced that the UNDP estimate is greatly inflated.  David Round-Turner, former policy advisor with the UNDP program, is also of the opinion that the figures are high.  He said, “UNDP was counting as returned even those who were staying at market centers, but who were returning to cultivate their land during the day.  If you do that, you get a much larger figure of returnees.”162  Ernest Murimi of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission flatly refuted UNDP’s estimate that its program has reintegrated some 180,000:

That figure surprised us.  People in the field were not consulted about that figure.  Where did it come from?  The government?  We asked UNDP to give us the names of the people who have been resettled here, we were told to ask the D.C. [District Commissioner].  UNDP should have—as its first priority—created a reliable registration system.  Now it is too late.  UNDP failed miserably.  Where did they resettle people?  Where is their evaluation?  These numbers they put out—ask them where they got them from.  Where is the list of names?  Which regions are they from?  We [the Justice and Peace Commission] can show you our list of people.  Where they came from, where they are, if they are back on their land.  UNDP has not been transparent.163

One diplomat said:

Even if UNDP wanted to come in today and rectify the damage it was party to, it would be impossible to locate all the displaced because of the lack of documentation.  UNDP never even followed up on those who were forcibly removed from Maela camp.  They didn’t even take on the responsibility of retrieving those people who were transported in lorries with fuel that UNDP paid for and were left by the side of the road in Central Province.  Who knows where these people are now?  Certainly not UNDP, and maybe no one.164

Had UNDP created a national database to register the displaced and to document the site of their displacement, the possibility of assisting those who remain displaced today would have been greatly augmented.

Reluctance to Criticize the Government’s Human Rights Abuses

“UNDP has done a magnificent job in Kenya”

—President Daniel arap Moi, September 1994

A major criticism leveled at UNDP was its unwillingness to speak out against the Kenyan government’s past and continuing role in intimidating, harassing, and even terrorizing the internally displaced.  While UNDP certainly can not be held responsible for the recalcitrant behavior of the Kenyan government, it can, be held responsible for not structuring the program in such a way to place safeguards against human rights violations; for not taking a lead role in speaking out against ongoing rights violations; and for not assisting the displaced to redress past and existing wrongs.  There were a wide variety of human rights issues that UNDP should have monitored.  Among the issues that needed to be addressed were the denial of basic human rights to the displaced; the harassment, intimidation and forced dispersals of the displaced; the complete lack of accountability for the perpetrators and inciters of the violence; and the expropriation and arbitrary tampering with legal titles to formally disinherit them of the land owned by the displaced.  Instead, UNDP’s silence on these issues gave the misleading impression that all was going well with the program and eventually undermined and compromised the reintegration process. 

According to UNDP, it constantly raised human rights issues with senior government officials in private meetings.165  Quiet representations by UNDP were fine.  However, when the Kenyan government continued to ignore such representations, it was incumbent on UNDP to become more outspoken about what was happening as well as to distance itself from the government in a manner that was apparent to Kenyans and the international community.  UNDP’s approach suited the Kenyan government.  It allowed them to continue to pursue their policy of ethnic persecution and prevention of return to select areas of land, certain in the knowledge that UNDP was not going to be publicly critical in such a way that would require the government to reverse the damage it had done.  In fact, UNDP did more than just remain silent in the face of continuing abuses.  Its public statements about the Kenyan government and the program, particularly during the September 1994 visit of Administrator James Gustave Speth,166 heaped praise on the government, leaving the misleading impression that it was only a matter of time before everyone would go home.  The perceived indifference to human rights abuses that UNDP demonstrated ultimately was detrimental to the long-term prospects of all the displaced and allowed the government to use UNDP as a cover for ongoing abuse. 

Some of the reasons the UNDP program in Kenya appeared unprepared or unwilling to deal with this inevitable and integral aspect of working with some displaced populations are discussed below.  However, regardless of the reasons, the result was that human rights monitoring and advocacy were not a prominent component of the program.  There was no effort by UNDP to sensitize its staff and that of the Kenyan government working on the program to human rights standards and policies relating to the internally displaced.  There was also no effort to document, report, or publicize the violations against the displaced; to mobilize international attention to the situation of the displaced; or, when necessary, to shame the government into complying with the reintegration process.  While there was talk by UNDP of the need for the government to create an enabling environment, no effort was made to promulgate articulated standards and to make these the minimum conditions for going forward with the displaced program.  Instead of pressing the Kenyan government to adopt policies that would have created an enabling environment, UNDP officials avoided any denunciation of the abuses. 

In large part, UNDP’s silence can be explained by the fact that it does not have a history of addressing the situations it is now dealing with in emergency programs.  While it has commendably grown to deal with the changing world, some of its working practices have not as of yet adapted.  UNDP as an institution has traditionally worked closely with government partners.  Some surmise that UNDP’s decision to align itself closely with the Kenyan government was an intentional policy decision as with all other programs it runs.  Further, UNDP has traditionally not perceived its role as an advocate on human rights protection.  In the face of government abuse, its institutional instinct is not to address human rights and protection issues, as some other U.N. agencies such as UNHCR, for example, would have been more inclined to do.  UNDP officials justified their public silence to Human Rights Watch/Africa in a meeting in January 1995 as the price paid to secure various operational goals that would ultimately help the displaced.167

 

As a result of its background, UNDP did not have extensive staff experience in this area.  Human rights experience and expertise at the field level on how best to approach these difficult issues appeared to be lacking.  As a result, instead of addressing government actions detrimental to the situation of the displaced, abusive actions on the part of the government were often explained away by UNDP field staff in a manner that mitigated government responsibility and accountability.  For example, UNDP officials on the Kenya program were quick to make excuses for the president’s inaction, dismissing setbacks in the program as the individual actions of certain government officials who were beyond his control, such as Rift Valley P.C. Ismael Chelanga or Ministers Nicholas Biwott and William Ntimama, who continued to make inflammatory statements against the displaced.  While the assessment by UNDP that identifiable individuals within the government were responsible for inciting the clashes is correct, the conclusion that President Moi and the state as a whole was not in control and therefore could not be held responsible incorrectly removed the responsibility of the government to act.  Ultimate responsibility for reintegrating the displaced remains with President Moi and his government, whether individuals in the government are inciting the violence independently or not. 

UNDP officials also sought to downplay the political nature of the ethnic violence, portraying it as if it was some complex, inscrutable problem of Africa that foreigners could never understand.  Additionally, there was an attempt to downplay the fact that there were victims and aggressors and to portray the problem as one of shattered communities, ignoring the justice and accountability issues involved for those affected by the violence, be they Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya or Kalenjin.168

It was also widely perceived that the UNDP silence around government actions was because UNDP officials tended to negatively equate any criticism of government policies as being supportive of the political opposition, which it sought to distance itself from.  Some have chalked this up to the conclusion that the UNDP resident representative at the time did believe that the government was making a good faith effort, due to his consistent public position in defense of the government’s record.  An academic who interviewed UNDP officials in the course of conducting research on Kenya had this observation to make about the UNDP program: 

My sense of it, broadly speaking, is that UNDP accepted, or were trapped in, a situation affording limited autonomy—perhaps even no autonomy whatsoever.  What autonomy they had seemed to be defined as intermediaries between the "two sides" meaning the government of Kenya (or Kalenjin) versus the opposition (Kikuyu).  Both sides were seen as equally culpable, but they had a stronger link to the government, given that it was their program partner.  Their relations with the other side, the opposition, were weak, and suspicion was the norm.  In our interviews they were concerned, I think, to convince us that the opposition was a major, if not the major, problem.  They also seemed to see themselves as almost co-rulers.169

Another explanation for UNDP’s silence on human rights issues at the field level—and its deflection of criticism of Kenya’s record—has been attributed to the institutional structure at UNDP which does not encourage or promote staff initiative in protecting human rights.  First, the dual designation of resident representative and resident coordinators poses problems.  UNDP resident representatives are expected, as a requirement of their job, to foster close working relations with the host government.  That same person is then designated resident coordinator to lead an emergency program, such as a displaced persons program, that may require criticism of government policy.  This dual designation poses inherent tensions for the resident representative.  In the Kenyan situation, this tension certainly was present.  One UNDP official said:

David Whaley [former UNDP Resident Representative to Kenya] came close to being made persona non grata and losing a promotion because he stuck his neck out on the displaced persons program in Kenya.  Moreover, he did not get  the backing of New York to address some of the key issues, such as legal reforms on land tenure.  Sometimes the people in the field feel that they are not getting the support they need from headquarters.  When they want to take a certain direction or speak up, they are stopped from doing so by people in headquarters who are not as well informed about what is happening or who reinforce the agency’s tradition of good relations with the government.170

Second, there is no formal human rights reporting requirement by UNDP headquarters.  This further reinforced the silence on human rights violations in the Displaced Persons Program in Kenya.  Regular situation reports, which documented the situation including human rights violations, were a required part of the work of the UNDP field officers.  However, these reports remained cursory and did not serve to increase international attention to the human rights situation of the displaced.  One internal donor report assessing the UNDP program in 1994 stated:

The information flow was never as forthcoming as it should have been.  For example, though field officers were asked to submit bi-weekly reports, these were not shared with donors.  This is part of the larger global problem of [UNDP’s] poor reporting.  Though lack of capacity is repeatedly cited, it seems to go beyond that to a reluctance to share the problems as well as the success stories.171

This approach was detrimental to the implementation of the program on the ground.  UNDP did not put into place safeguards to avoid government manipulation of the program nor did it create mechanisms to monitor and protect the displaced from government actions.  A former UNDP employee who worked on the program said “UNDP made a political miscalculation about the Kenyan government’s intentions in agreeing to this program.”  He said:

UNDP started well, but quickly the program was almost a total failure.  The problems came when it let the government come in strongly.  The government channeled UNDP funds through the ministries of education, health and agriculture.  The local D.C.s were allowed to chair the committees.  They overruled the local input.  The D.O.s were signatories to the accounts.  They signed the checks.  Through the local administration, and out of sight of the international and national groups based in Nairobi, the national government exercised extensive control over the UNDP program.172 

An international humanitarian worker said:

Throughout, we were frustrated that UNDP did not play a role in addressing the political issues.  We thought that we would address the relief and medical emergency needs and that their role would be to find lasting solutions to get people home—hard agreements with the government.  David Whaley [former UNDP resident representative to Kenya] and Philippe Chichereau [former UNDP senior technical advisor] talked like they believed they had something with the government, and each time the government undermined the program they acted surprised.  After a while, we gave up expecting anything from UNDP.173

Any prospect of UNDP support for accountability for past abuses was a further casualty of the reluctance to grapple with the political issues that might jeopardize a close partnership.  There was a deliberate decision not to pass judgment on the actual clashes on the grounds that it was up to Kenyan society, not outsiders, to determine the manner in which it would deal with the tragic elements of its past.  However, where serious human rights abuses form the backdrop to a humanitarian crisis, the U.N. should not operate its programs as if it were writing on a blank slate.  Unaddressed rights and justice issues of the past inevitably come back to haunt prospects for lasting reconciliation and peace.  The U.N. programs for the internally displaced must incorporate a mechanism that can be used to address abuses that have occurred, including the prosecution of offenders in the national courts.  There was also concern that UNDP involvement would allow government officials to portray the situation as a mere “development” problem and allow the government to underplay its damaging political role in fomenting and exacerbating the violence; let alone in consolidating the displacement through expropriations and underhanded land title switches.

Human rights documentation and regular reporting should have been one of the primary means to begin to halt abuses and prevent them from worsening.  In this sense, UNDP could have served as an international witness to violations and been the primary force behind mobilizing the appropriate protection measures.  Regular public reporting would have helped to ensure that human rights concerns were not subordinated to other political considerations and should have been a component of the UNDP program.  It should have been required to publish updates at frequent intervals in a manner accessible to both Kenyans and the international community.

In order to implement emergency-type programs, such as displaced persons programs, where human rights violations are often central to the success of the program, UNDP must evolve and expand the perception of its traditional role at the implementation level to incorporate human rights advocacy and protection work.  Internal displacement, by its nature, frequently has human rights concerns at its core and the agency must be prepared to stand up to government abuses.  Where private entreaties with the government do not work, UNDP must be prepared to use more public means or mobilize pressure from other quarters.  Inevitably, that will introduce some discord with government officials.  However, that must be the minimum price for respect for fundamental rights.

No Protection Component

“UNDP did not speak out when we needed protection from the government.”

—Kikuyu displaced person, Maela, Nakuru District, August 7, 1996

Protection and security have not been central concerns for many humanitarian and development agencies involved with the internally displaced.  Protection of the physical safety and the human rights of the internally displaced must be as much a part of international programs as the provision of relief assistance, because security threats often undermine the ability for the displaced to return to their land. 

Protection is a clearly established concept within the refugee protection framework and the responsibilities of UNHCR.  However, since it is often U.N. agencies other than UNHCR that are administering programs for the internally displaced, the result is that a strong protection component is frequently lacking.  UNDP was no exception in this regard.  UNDP, as a routine matter, does not include or view protection concerns as part of its traditional mandate.  Few staff on programs for the internally displaced have expertise to deal with the physical safety of the displaced, even in places where protection issues are paramount.   However, programs that deal with the internally displaced are made more difficult by the security and political issues surrounding the nature of their displacement than many other development projects in which UNDP is involved in worldwide.174

Protection issues with the displaced in Kenya came up both with regard to ensuring physical security from threats of coercion and violence, and the longer term issues of defending legal rights that were violated by those responsible for the displacement.  Within the ambit of protection activities, UNDP should have also seen its role as providing an umbrella of protection to the local and international relief organizations working with the displaced.  Yet, there was some resistance within UNDP to interpreting its mandate to include protection responsibilities on the grounds that it would be too “political” and would jeopardize the ability of the agency to provide relief assistance.  However, without a protection component, programs for the internally displaced will be prone to serious setbacks.

 

UNDP itself knew this, but ultimately did not do anything about it.  The first Rogge report clearly stated:    

The question of security throughout the clash areas is fundamental to the success of any rehabilitation and reconstruction program.  This can only be provided through a forceful and sustained commitment by the highest echelons of the Government of Kenya and all its responsible local administrations, including local chiefs and elected local councillors.  Local agitation by any party against any ethnic group must be immediately and forcefully aborted at its source.  Perpetrators of violence such as looting must be dealt with as common criminals and brought expeditiously before the full process of the law.175

In a mission report written two years later, UNDP once again underscored the need for protection:

The role played by Government in providing security to all citizens is paramount.  There can be no half measures.  Amid all the needs expressed by those displaced or affected by clashes, security is predominant: physical security, of person and property; security to plant and harvest crops; security of title, of lease and the security to carry on legitimate business regardless of ethnicity.176

Although the provision of security is ultimately the responsibility of the government, UNDP had a major role to play in making the Kenyan government commit to provide the necessary security for the displaced to return to their land.  Since 1993 until the present, many of the displaced interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Africa expressed a willingness to return to their land, provided there was adequate security.  Security does not necessarily mean a heightened police presence in an area (particularly where the police were previously shown to take sides in the violence), but rather a genuine reassurance and tangible steps by the national government to engender confidence among the displaced that the government will not tolerate any intimidation or violence and that prompt government action will be taken to avert violence.

It was critical that UNDP insist that the Kenyan government ensure adequate security for the program, facilitate access to areas and send a clear message throughout its administration for transparency and efficiency.  Repeated calls from donors for the Kenyan government to step up this role continued during the UNDP program.177  The threat of insecurity—real or perceived—remains up to today a major impediment to return.  From the outset, UNDP should have worked immediately with the security forces and local administration, providing training on rights and legal responsibilities to create a vision of what their role should be in the reintegration process.  Similar efforts conducted by UNHCR with Kenyan police in Northeastern Province have resulted in a notable difference in diminishing police abuses against the refugee population in the area and enhanced security for the refugees from outside attackers (see section on Strengthening the U.N. Framework to Protect the Displaced).

UNDP must develop clearer protection politics for its programs for the internally displaced, which center around protecting lives and safety, defending legal and human rights and promoting international standards.  UNDP should have, as an absolute prerequisite of the program, insisted on minimum protection safeguards.

Strained Relations with Donors

Donor governments can often play a role in raising human rights violations and other concerns with governments.  In situations where the U.N. is better served by not publicly speaking out on an issue, often donor governments can step in to raise issues on behalf of the U.N.  For UNDP in Kenya, the donor voice could have provided the opportunity to raise the more controversial issues that UNDP felt constrained to raise.  Yet, Human Rights Watch/Africa interviews with donors and UNDP officials on the Kenyan program often degenerated into a finger-pointing exercise.  Officials in UNDP expressed the belief that the some donors, who had originally asked for the Kenya program, ultimately did not provide the necessary funding to make it succeed, and some donors, in turn, accused UNDP of not informing or mobilizing the donors to address the problems in the program.

The donors in Kenya represented a potentially powerful ally in raising human rights issues.  The Moi government, although often publicly hostile to donor influence, has had a long history of responding to donor pressure with regard to human rights and economic reform.  Through such sustained donor pressure, some significant human rights gains have been obtained in Kenya including the government’s abandonment of the use of the Preservation of Public Security Act to detain critics indefinitely without charge, the restoration of tenure to judges as well as relative improvements in freedoms of expression, assembly and association.  Although the situation in Kenya today is by no means ideal, there has been a relative improvement in the rights situation since the mid-1980s, in large part due to multilateral and bilateral donor pressure that augmented the domestic calls for change.  This is not to say that human rights and protection issues were the sole determining factor in decisions on aid and investment, nor that the donors could have been relied on give this issue priority over other national interests.  However, the donors did take an interest in the situation of the displaced in Kenya, and themselves expressed concern about the government’s actions against the displaced.

UNDP had ready access to the donor community through its Executive Committee (Excom) of the National Committee for Displaced Persons (NCDP).  Excom was made up of two members each from the government, bilateral donors, multilateral donors, religious organizations and NGOs.  One of the terms of reference of the Excom was to “Discuss and develop approach, policy and strategy of the long term programme on the basis of the Rogge report, its recommendations and subsequent reports.”  The Excom provided a useful structure through which donors were able to provide feedback to the government about the progress. 

UNDP did use the NCDP and other mechanisms to keep donors informed.  During the preparatory phase, the resident representative had regular briefings with donor representatives and the Rogge report was made available to all.  However, according to donor representatives, UNDP could have taken far better advantage of the presence of the donor countries in Excom, which included representatives from Kenya’s major donors—including the U.S., the U.K and the E.U.—to put pressure on the Kenyan government where UNDP for whatever reason did not want to.  However, some donors noted that UNDP did not fully inform or engage their embassies and that UNDP was not always responsive in terms of answering to the members of Excom, as they were theoretically supposed to be.  One diplomat formerly based in Kenya said, “They [The UNDP Displaced Persons Program] seemed to respond to the upper echelons of UNDP.  They needed to be held more accountable to the Excom.  UNDP would often go off and do its own thing and then call in other parties when they needed to hide behind the curtain of ‘Excom.’”178 

One explanation offered by one UNDP official who had worked on the program was that UNDP was in a dilemma because it was simultaneously seeking funding from the same donor countries and, had the program been portrayed as problematic, it might have lost funding prospects that it was already having a difficult time obtaining.  However, UNDP’s perceived silence about the human rights problems in the program had its own detrimental effect on the way donors perceived the program.  Some NCDP members became wary of being too close to the UNDP program and became progressively less inclined to commit funding because of UNDP’s unwillingness to speak out against government abuses or to mobilize the donor community.  To some donors, UNDP’s response to the forced dispersals at Maela confirmed these reservations.  Following the dispersals, a meeting of the Excom was called to discuss the events at Maela.  The government refused to attend: neither of the two Kenyan government officials involved with the UNDP program, Wilfred Kimilat from the Office of the President and Excom chair Paul Langat, made themselves available for the meeting, suggesting alternative dates.  Yet David Whaley, UNDP Resident Representative to Kenya at the time, continued to try to accommodate and excuse the government’s actions as something less than what they were.  The January 4, 1995, meeting that was held without a government presence was termed an “informal meeting” for purposes of information exchange in order to placate a possible negative government reaction if a formal Excom meeting was held.  It was at that meeting that David Whaley characterized the forced dispersal of thousands of Maela residents as a “temporary hiccup” in the program, further reinforcing donor scepticism about UNDP.  A diplomat who attended the Excom meetings said:

Donors never believed that the government was serious about this program.  We also never had a sense that UNDP was willing to rock the boat.  They were too cautious.  In front of us, David Whaley said the right words, but frankly, the necessary action was missing.  As a result, we were unwilling to make a large financial commitment to this program because we didn’t have confidence in the Kenyan government or UNDP’s willingness to push the government where it needed to be pushed.”179 

UNDP should have demanded more involvement from the donor governments on the Excom.  This group of donors has traditionally been very influential in changing Kenyan government policy through lobbying.  A strong coalition of bilateral donors could have strengthened UNDP’s position and also allowed UNDP to raise concerns strongly without doing so itself.

Undermining Local Nongovernmental Efforts

“UNDP needed to work as a partner with the groups on the ground, not as a bulldozer.”

—Local NGO worker, Namwele, Bungoma district, August 3, 1996

A potential strength of the U.N. in working with internally displaced populations is the capacity to back up and strengthen local partners in the task of assisting and protecting the displaced.  NGOs have developed a wealth of experience, probably more so than the U.N., in dealing with displaced populations.  The local NGOs are often closer to the ground and have better links and a more thorough grasp of the situation.  Local groups also remain longer than international programs, and therefore strengthening national institutions and grassroots efforts can in turn strengthen the ability of this civil society sector successfully to demand government accountability.  Conversely, the weakening of the NGO sector allows greater unchecked opportunities for government abuse of power. 

By the time UNDP became involved with the displaced, almost two years after the clashes began, the local NGOs, particularly the NCCK and the Catholic Church, had been (and remain today) the primary providers of emergency relief and assistance to the displaced.  In some areas, the local groups had begun cooperating and sometimes organized joint relief committees to coordinate the assistance.  These local organizations had several main advantages over UNDP at the outset in that they had close proximity to the displaced and had functional structures in the displaced areas.  More importantly, they had developed the trust of the victims.  In turn, UNDP could have played a useful role in mitigating some of the less admirable practices of certain NGOs, including duplication of effort, inflation of numbers for fund-raising purposes, corruption, and a stress on charity and food aid rather than reintegration or long-term activities.  In fact, the second Rogge report raised the latter problem.

When the UNDP program began, its stated plans broadly included provisions to work with and assist nongovernmental and church organizations.  Yet, without exception, all the local NGOs and church organizations interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Africa accuse UNDP of distancing itself from the local groups that had been working with the displaced, and in some cases even of undermining and inadvertently destroying local efforts.  Without exception, the Kenyan NGOs interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Africa believe that the relationship with UNDP was, as one NGO worker put it, “a one-way street.”  It is a widely shared view among the NGOs that UNDP took credit for their successes but did not strengthen their programs or defend them from government criticism for the work they were doing.  One 1994 internal donor assessment of the UNDP program noted:

UNDP does not have the universal respect of NGOs on the ground.  Because of the close nature of their work with the GOK [government of Kenya], they are often perceived as being an instrument of the GOK.  Further, in at least one district, cultural insensitivity [on the part] of a UNDP field officer has resulted in the alienation of other NGO groups and the District Officer.180

Some attribute this to the fact that the NGOs and churches were not only providing relief assistance to the displaced, but they were also speaking out about the government’s role in fomenting the violence and harassing the displaced.  As a result, these groups had come under strong attack from the government, which accused them of everything from sedition to treason.  Others chalk it up to UNDP’s decision to partner itself so closely to the government that it had to distance itself from the NGOs to avoid similar accusations.  Ernest Murimi of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission noted: “UNDP should have tapped into existing structures that the NGO community in Kenya had already set up.  Instead, they came in and centralized their program through the local government administration structures and completely marginalized the NGOs.”181

The one area that is repeatedly cited by UNDP as its success story of reintegration— and by the NGOs as a prime example of UNDP’s damaging effect on local NGO reintegration efforts—is in Western Province.  When UNDP came in to Western Province, it centralized all efforts in the area through the Western Province Coordinating Committee (WPCC),  replacing a similar body which had been previously set up by the local NGOs.  Tecla Wanjala, who worked with an NGO in the area at that time said:

The groundwork for the resettlement had already been done by the time UNDP came.  We were doing it before UNDP.  We had formed a coordinating committee with the local groups—Action Aid, the Kenya Red Cross, the Catholic Church, the Church Province of Kenya and the NCCK.  We struggled to get our programs coordinated to better serve the area.  By the time UNDP took over the WPCC in 1994, we had even employed a coordinator.  Then UNDP came in and hijacked the process.  They didn’t want to work closely with us, the local NGOs, because the government was attacking us for helping the displaced.  Instead, they hijacked our structures and distanced themselves from us.  All donor funding began to go to UNDP and therefore all projects began to get funding through UNDP.  Then, without notice, after Maela, UNDP withdrew and closed down its program in 1995.  Now, the momentum that the local organizations had created is gone, and UNDP is gone, and we have no way financially to sustain the efforts that we had begun before UNDP came.  So, the local efforts have collapsed.  Now there is a complete vacuum.182 

The Centre for Refugee Studies at Moi University, Eldoret, was commissioned by UNDP to assess independently UNDP’s role in Western Province, the one area which UNDP touted as its success story for fund-raising purposes.  When UNDP received a negative assessment of its role in the area, the reported response of UNDP official William Lorenz, who received the staff of the Centre for Refugee Studies, can only be described as hostile.  UNDP refused to engage in any further discussions with the Centre for Refugee Studies at Moi University and to date, UNDP has never followed up or addressed the issues raised in the report.  The September 1995 draft report by the Centre for Refugee Studies was particularly critical of UNDP’s interaction with the local NGOs in the WPCC, the regional coordinating body set up initially by the local NGOs and later taken over by UNDP.  The report concluded:

Given the capacity of UNDP and its national involvement in the issue of displacement, it was, and still is, probably in the best position to offer positive support to such a local initiative as WPCC.  However, the general agreement in the field was that UNDP weakened WPCC considerably, rather than strengthen[ed] it...There was a general lack of understanding on the peoples’ part of what UNDP’s role was in the Committee...Even after promising to provide for operational costs of WPCC, UNDP was inconsistent in disbursing funds.  Of concern to this study was its manner of operation which has been largely unprofessional and uncontractual...Such inconsistencies have greatly weakened the activities of WPCC...As funds and support from UNDP became almost random, the NGO Council on the other hand withdrew its support for WPCC.183

The Centre for Refugee Studies report also concluded that:

Perhaps the greatest inconsistency of UNDP came with the Quick Impact Projects [“quips”].  As actors were preparing to launch rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNDP requested them to generate quips for funding...Several quips were generated and approved by WPCC for funding.  However, only 3 NGOs: CRWRC [Church Reformed World Relief Committee], International Child Trust (ICT) and Action Nordsud, were funded.  This reduced cooperation between other actors and the committee, which was by now perceived as a UNDP body.  In spite of these inconsistencies, UNDP did not explain the discrepancies, either to the committee, or individual NGOs.  This failure to keep promises, by UNDP, increased resentment towards it and also against WPCC for its ineffectiveness in influencing funding decisions, in their favor, by UNDP.  This resentment was translated into distrust of UNDP and falling morale among actors.  At the time of the study, UNDP was accused by every respondent of having hijacked the coordination process.  In the words of one respondent, “rather than being a member of the committee, UNDP became a commander”...The internal politics within the displaced persons programme at UNDP spilled over, and affected the performance of WPCC.  For instance, [UNDP] Field Officers were not properly briefed and this became a constant excuse at WPCC meetings.  In the end, their whole participation was judged as a failure by all the actors on the ground.”184

UNDP should have shown greater recognition of the local NGOs’ contribution to the internally displaced and should have established a true partnership with them.  A component of the UNDP program should have been to increase the capacity of the local groups and to provide them with some measure of protection from the ongoing government harassment that has characterized their work.

No Effort to Seek Long-Term Solutions

“Yes, people wandered back, but not because of anything that UNDP did.”

—International humanitarian worker, Nairobi, August 30, 1996

Finding lasting solutions to the problem of internal displacement requires attention to the root causes.  Those organizations that work with the displaced must have a long-term vision about preventative action and resolution of the issues that led to the violence.  The U.N, and UNDP in particular, is well suited to design programs to address the long-term issues that will strengthen development efforts.  The question that UNDP needs to ask itself is whether its programs for the displaced are intended only to provide humanitarian relief assistance or whether the agency envisions a more lasting contribution that taps into its development expertise?  If it is the latter, then its programs for the internally displaced must address the root causes of the displacement and better engage the host government in implementing the necessary programs.

In Kenya, unresolved land tenure issues dating from the colonial period were a major factor in the government’s ability to mobilize members of the Kalenjin and Maasai communities to launch attacks on their neighbors.  These tensions were exacerbated by unresolved grievances arising out of  post-colonial distribution of land, growing land pressures, and a high population growth that adversely affected traditionally pastoralist groups among others.185  Issues of land ownership, acquisition of land, unauthorized plot demarcations and settlement were critical to a sustainable solution to the displaced problem in Kenya.  Displaced residents repeatedly informed UNDP that land ownership and scarcity were a major cause of the unrest and needed to be addressed.186

UNDP was well aware of the fact that any long-term solution required attention to land tenure issues.  Once again, UNDP was unable or unwilling to take any concrete action in the face of government resistance.  One of UNDP’s stated objectives was “to assist in civil registration in order to maintain an accurate record of the displacees and to initiate systematic land registration.”187  The first Rogge report stated that the Kenyan government had to:

take forceful steps to ensure that no one loses their rights to own land in any areas settled prior to the clashes.  Local administrations must be required to process the speedy issue of land titles in areas where subdivision of farms have been surveyed.  Elsewhere, the surveying of subdivisions must be accelerated.  Irregularities in the sale of shares by cooperative scheme managements and within local land registry offices need to be more closely and forcefully policed.  There should be appropriate administrative measures in place to ensure that land sales be minimized in the clash affected areas for a period of time, pending a just resolution of outstanding clams of ownership and a regularization of displacees access to lands on which they had been living prior to the clashes.  A request to donors by the Government for assistance in manpower development and computer application for its land title and surveys offices should be received positively by them.188

John Rogge was aware that the land registration system was backlogged, and records were a mess.  He also was aware that the irregularities were being exploited by those who had instigated the “ethnic” violence.  He did state that the program should find ways to build capacity and accountability in the system, which was currently unable to keep pace with the huge numbers of farms that had been sub divided and needed to be surveyed and registered.189  The second Rogge report recommended that:

Where UNDP, in collaboration with the donors, can play an invaluable role regarding the land tenure dilemma, albeit outside the ambit of the DPP [Displaced Persons Program], is in a long-term capacity building of the various government agencies involved in the regulation and allocation of lands.  This involves the Lands Adjudication and Settlement Department, the Surveys Department, and the Land Titles Department.  The convoluted system which is in place is hopelessly overburdened, and is unlikely to ever catch up with the existing back-log...UNDP’s mandate of capacity building must, therefore, be directed to addressing this urgent problem.190

In one of its program proposals, UNDP actually put forward a plan of action which, had it been implemented, would have made a significant contribution to Kenya’s long-term development prospects.  UNDP had plans that “[t]he difficult issue of land ownership, regularization of land titles and deeds, registration of clash affected victims, will be covered...with provision of training, surveying equipment, transport, legal assistance and organization of registration exercises.  The reallocation of under utilized land will be one of the aspects of the Programme.”191

Even under normal circumstances, land rights in Kenya are subject to a complicated, overburdened, and outdated set of land tenure and registration laws set out in a complicated web of legal regimes, including English, Indian and customary law. All former “native reserve” areas restricted to Africans during the colonial period are governed under English law with land titles issued under the Registration Land Act.  The Government Land Act, drawn from Indian law, governs land in urban areas.  Customary law is also operational in some areas.  Individual ownership rights are still not traditionally recognized in some areas, for example among pastoral and nomadic groups in the Rift Valley and North Eastern Province.    Different types of land tenure are governed under settlement schemes, trust land, cooperative/company farms, group ranches and government land.192  Kenya’s land ownership system is hopelessly outdated and backlogged.

The complicated nature of the land laws in Kenya and the weak judicial system have allowed for theft, or “land grabbing” as it is known, to become a national past time among government officials.  Land is a scarce and valued commodity that has been used, by the colonial and post-colonial governments in Kenya, as a means to consolidate political power.  President Moi’s government is no exception in this regard, using corruption and manipulation to acquire and control land for political ends.  The “ethnic” violence has furthered this process.  The failure to resolve the land crisis in Kenya is a critical impediment to resolving the ethnic tensions inflamed by the recent violence in a long-term manner. 

Human Rights Watch recognizes that the issue of land law reform faced resistance from government quarters for obvious reasons.  As UNDP points out:

It is true that the justice and land issue was not resolved.  The failure to do so, however, was the responsibility of the government.  Both UNDP and other donors (e.g. Germany) offered repeatedly to provide technical assistance for land registration and the reform process.  These offers were not accepted.  No donor can impose technical assistance when it is not wanted.193 

Nevertheless, UNDP has an express mandate to address the issue of land reform, and in light of the importance of this issue in resolving the Kenyan crisis, it was incumbent on UNDP to bring pressure to bear on the government.  It is not entirely true that no donor can impose technical assistance when it is not wanted.  It is certainly more difficult, but it is not impossible.  There are examples, in the Kenyan context alone, of the government conceding to pressure from the World Bank or donors to accept technical assistance, for example, to address government corruption or to promote structural adjustment policies, such as privatization or trade liberalization.  One former UNDP official who worked on the displaced persons program concluded that this issue alone holds the key to reintegration:

The ethnic violence is an issue that will continue to simmer until the land registration department is revamped.  What we needed was a team of competent UNDP consultants to pressure the government to take steps in this regard.  They were the only ones who could have done that.  The government is susceptible to international pressure.  UNDP should have mobilized that pressure.194

In any program for the internally displaced, UNDP must address the long-term impediments to reconciliation and reintegration.  This issue of land tenure pressures is a commonly faced impediment to reintegration of internally displaced populations.  As a practical matter, UNDP remains a preeminent, if not the preeminent entity, to develop strategies to address this issue. Given its development expertise, it is well-suited to addressing problems such as land tenure pressures, which are often key to a resolution.

Damaged Credibility after Abandoning the Displaced

“Tell UNDP that we are still refugees in Maela.  We are still suffering. 

Our land has been taken.  Our children are not in school.  We cannot get medical care.  People are still suffering here.  It is a struggle to live.”

—Kikuyu displaced women, Maela, Nakuru district, August 7, 1996

Few among those who remain displaced in Kenya have not heard of the UNDP program that was set up to return them to their land.  Not surprisingly, the feeling that UNDP abandoned them when the program ended in November 1995 runs deep among those interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Africa.  By 1995, the UNDP program was floundering and at a standstill following the government’s actions in Maela.  Reintegration and reconciliation appeared to be progressing or not, regardless of UNDP’s presence.  Meanwhile, UNDP had alienated the NGO and donor communities. It had inflated the numbers of estimated returnees all the while asserting that no numbers could be estimated.  It was widely perceived to have aligned itself closely with the government regardless of what occurred.  It was seen to have countenanced forced dispersals of camps.  Its program had never made the transition from short-term relief programs to long-term sustainable development programs.  In short, the closure of the UNDP program was not in and of itself a bad thing.  It was a recognition that it had been badly compromised because it had never demanded of the government minimum conditions for operation.  However, for those who remain displaced, the closure of the UNDP program is still a bitter pill to swallow.  The end of an international presence in the rural areas brings with it the realization that what little hope they ever held out for returning to their land is unlikely to materialize.

Human Rights Watch/Africa visited Maela and interviewed some of the displaced who remain there or who had been relocated to Central Province when Maela was cleared by the government in December 1994.  Virtually abandoned and still destitute, the remaining displaced reported that no international agency had visited Maela for over a year.  The fact that UNDP was so involved in providing services at Maela in 1994 had raised expectations that the large international agency would ensure the safety and eventual reintegration of the displaced there.  The displaced were even more crushed that UNDP did little or nothing for them following the dispersal.  One displaced man said, “after the government did all that to us, all UNDP did was to come back here in January 1995 and take all their office equipment and leave.”195  Ernest Murimi of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission said: “UNDP cannot come back in here.  The program failed miserably and there is no trust in them.”196

For all the flurry around Maela, little was actually done by UNDP to negotiate the return of those forcibly removed from Maela and to provide redress.  As far as Human Rights Watch/Africa was able to determine, no security officers were ever disciplined for their mistreatment of the displaced at Maela.  Some of those displaced who were dumped in Central Province made their own way back to Maela.  One of those displaced recounted what had happened to him:

I was on a lorry with 145 other people.  We were made to leave our belongings behind.  We were taken to Central Province and left near the D.O’s office.  We weren’t given anything.  I asked an administration policeman where we were supposed to go.  He pointed to a forest nearby.  We stayed there for two weeks.  MSF [Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain)] helped us.  The D.O’s office then told us that it was illegal for us to be there.  We were taken to Ol Kalou, then to Tumaini.  We were not given any assistance the whole time.  I used to have a two-acre plot in Enosupukia.  Now, I will never have anything.  My message to UNDP is: Don’t forget us.  Fulfill your promises to us.  Among the clash victims, only a few have been resettled.  Even the land that was given to some of the displaced [200 families at Ol Kalou] has been taken by the government.  The chief got twenty acres, the P.C. got 100 acres and the D.C. got some.197

International responsibility for the internally displaced, once embarked on, should not be administered in this manner.  For many of the displaced, the international presence is the only hope they have that something will be done to ameliorate their dire situation.  UNDP should ensure that in the future, contingency planning provides for alternatives, including political and financial support for NGOs, should it need to pull out or should it be expelled.

After UNDP: The Current Situation Facing Kenya’s Internally Displaced

The Kenyan government has used violence to remain in power by punishing and disenfranchising opposition supporters, while rewarding its supporters from the Kalenjin and Maasai groups with illegally obtained land. It has also successfully driven thousands of Kikuyus, Luos, and Luhyas from land that is politically and economically valuable.  The government, although distancing itself publicly from calls for the introduction of majimboism (ethnic federalism), has promoted a majimbo policy by strengthening the Rift Valley Province as an ethnically-defined regional base for those in power: new institutions and services include Moi University, a military college, a branch of the Central Bank of Kenya, an ammunitions factory and an international airport in Eldoret.  Moreover, the threat of renewed violence continues to haunt those who have returned to their land—a strong message to potential opposition supporters in the next election due to be held by early 1998.  The after-effects of the ethnic clashes continue to be seen in the ethnically fractured and volatile political climate that the government still manipulates to its ends.  Relying on other forms of repression as well as the disarray and divisions within the political opposition, the Moi government has had less need to rely on the tactics of terror and bloodshed to ensure its incumbency.

The lack of data on the displaced has had tragic consequences for those who remain off their land.  Many of those who are still displaced come from areas such as Olenguruone, Enosupukia, and Mt. Elgon where the remaining Kalenjin and Maasai residents have sworn not to allow other ethnic groups to return to their land, and the government has shown no signs of taking any action to put an end to this ethnic expulsion.  Most of these displaced have drifted to other areas of the country to become agricultural day laborers or to urban areas in search of work.  Others have become part of the unemployed poor, adding to the alarming levels of crime in Kenya largely caused by poverty and government mismanagement of resources.  In 1995, UNDP had estimated that there were about 50,000 people living in “very temporary refuges” or “surviving in peri-urban slum areas,” who have been “overlooked” because of the difficulty of finding satisfactory and quick solutions.198  It is likely that this number is even higher now.  It is unrealistic to believe that specific programs can be introduced for the urban displaced living in the slums of Nairobi or even in Nakuru or Kisumu.  In these larger urban areas, the best that can realistically be undertaken is to ensure that such displacees are included within existing programs for urban slum populations.  However, UNDP should ensure that any such programs do not further the government’s policy of reintegration of the displaced outside of the Rift Valley Province. 

Abandoned and forgotten by the international community, and victims of their own government, Kenya’s internally displaced seem destined to become a permanently disenfranchised underclass.




125Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Frederick Lyons, UNDP Resident Representative to Kenya, Nairobi, August 22, 1996.

126Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with international relief worker (name withheld by request), Nairobi, July 30, 1996.

127Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Ernest Murimi, Executive Secretary, Justice and Peace Commission, Catholic Diocese of Nakuru, Nakuru, August 6, 1996.

128Letter from David Whaley, former UNDP Resident Representative to Kenya to Mr. W. Kimilat, Permanent Secretary, Kenyan Government, December 27, 1994.

129In this regard, UNDP adds:”The issue of IDPs [internally displaced persons] in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya was important for donors from 1993 to 1995, but it was not the determining factor in decisions on aid and investment.  Structural adjustment was the priority.  This was the critical aspect of the Kenyan situation discussed at the Consultative Group meeting of 15 December 1994.  The statement of Chair [sic] of that meeting, in voicing the generally accepted view that there had been improvements in the human rights area as well as a lessening of ethnic tension, contributed to the decision to release external funding but it did not determine it.  The sudden reversal of budgetary policy that occurred in the week following the CG [Consultative Group] meeting was a more serious development for most donors than the tragedy at Maela.  It was certainly the key factor that led to a change of heart on the part of the World Bank and the IMF [International Monetary Fund].”  See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.7.

130Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Frederick Lyons, UNDP Regional Representative to Kenya, Nairobi. August 22, 1996.

131Following forced relocations of the displaced from Maela camp, pledges of U.S.$556,476 by the U.S. government and U.S.$540,000 by the Swedish government were suspended.  Positive indications given by Belgium for U.S.$3 million at the 1994 December Consultative Group meeting were also withdrawn.  UNDP,”UNDP Mission Report,” April 18-22, 1995, Annex 1.

132Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Frederick Lyons, UNDP Regional Representative to Kenya, Nairobi. August 22, 1996.

133See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.2.

134Human Rights Watch/Africa telephone interview with former UNDP Displaced Persons Program official (name and location withheld on request), New York, March 12, 1997.

135See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.6.

136Although attendance at the meetings varied, the official membership of the NCDP included representatives from the Kenyan Government’s Office of the President and the Vice-President and from the Ministries of Finance, Lands, and Planning and Development.  Among the bilateral donors, representatives from the Embassies of the U.S., U.K., Netherlands and Canada were represented.  Among multilateral donors, the E.U., WFP, UNIFEM and UNICEF were represented.  Among the Kenyan nongovernmental organizations, representatives from the NCCK, the Church Province of Kenya (CPK), the Catholic Secretariat, the Muslim World League, the NGO Council, FIDA-Kenya, Kituo cha Sheria (Legal Aid Center) and Inades Formation were members.  Among the international nongovernmental organizations, Oxfam, Action Aid, Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) and Catholic Relief Services were also members.  The International Committee of the Red Cross had observer status.

137Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Ephraim Kiragu, Director, Development Unit, NCCK, Nairobi, August 8, 1996.

138Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Irungu Houghton, National Council of NGOs, Nairobi, August 9, 1996.

139Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Tecla Wanjala, Coordinator, Peace and Development Network (Peace-Net), National Council of NGOs, Nairobi, August 8, 1996.

140Human Rights Watch/Africa telephone interview with a diplomat (name and location withheld by request), New York, March 13, 1997.

141“UNDP recognizes the need for better information systems in IDPs [internally displaced persons].  Apart from registering IDP number and needs, such systems must also record action taken to meet both relief and development requirements.  This indispensable data is often neglected in the understandable rush to assist, yet it is the foundation for coherently shaping comprehensive programmes from the activities of different agencies.  UNDP will continue to contribute to the building of information systems on IDPs at the country level.” “Further Elaboration on Follow-up to Economic and Social Council Resolution 1995/56: Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance,” U.N. Doc. DP/1997/CRP.10, February 28, 1997, para. 18. 

142Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with diplomat formerly based in Kenya (name withheld on request), New York, July 12, 1996.

143Government of Kenya/UNDP, Programme Document: Programme for Displaced Persons, Inter-Agency Joint Programming, October 26, 1993, p.6-7.

144Rogge Report I, UNDP, September 1993, para.3.

145UNDP placed the number of displaced in April 1993 at 255,426.  The breakdown of the figures by district was as follows: Bungoma, 21,100; Busia, 1,800; Elgon, 14,375; Kakamega, unknown; Vihiga, unknown; Kisumu, 8,975; Nyamira, 750; Kisii, 2,300; Kuria, unknown; Turkana, 16,625; Trans Nzoia, 18,525; Elgeyo-Marakwet, 22,300; Uasin Gishu, 82,000; Nandi, 17,850; Kericho, 6,550; Bomet, unknown; Narok, 900; Nakuru, 40,700; Laikipia, 600.  John Rogge,”The Internal Displaced Population in Western, Nyanza and Rift Valley Provinces: A Needs Assessment and Rehabilitation Program,” UNDP Draft Report as quoted in Government of Kenya/UNDP Program Document: Program for Displaced Persons, Inter-Agency Joint Programming, October 26, 1993, p.8. 

146Many believe that this initial estimate was conservative, and that the estimate is more in the range of 300,000.  See, for example, U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1996 (Washington D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 1996),  p.53.  When Human Rights Watch/Africa conducted research in 1993, it also estimated a total of 300,000 based on the finding that in many places the count of displaced persons cited included only the adults, ignoring the large numbers of displaced children (estimated by UNDP to make up some 75 percent of the total displaced population).  Human Rights Watch/Africa, Divide and Rule, p.71.  

147See Appendix: UNDP Response, pp.5-6.

148Summary report from the Enabling Environment Working Group contained in minutes of the second NCDP meeting, Methodist Guest House, Nairobi, November 1, 1994.

149Rogge Report II, UNDP, September 1994, 2.3.

150UNDP’s response is twofold: (1)”The specific response to the Rogge report underestimating numbers by 30,000 was explained at a meeting with the HRW [Human Rights Watch] in New York in February.  This explanation has not been taken into consideration in the current report.  The issue concerned data for Mt. Elgon region where the NCCK [National Council of Churches] had greatly inflated numbers.  Rogge opted on the side of caution to adjust these numbers to what he saw on the ground.  He was subsequently proved right in doing this since two months after the survey, the NCCK Relief Co-ordinator for the Mt. Elgon area was removed for misappropriating relief funds and was accused of greatly inflating the number of beneficiaries in his area. The missing 30,000 to which the HRW refers in report are the 30,000 which the NCCK Co-ordinator was accused of inflating” and (2)”A more basic issue is that given the uncertainties of the data, to dwell extensively on whether the numbers were 250,000 or 280,000 is somewhat irrelevant.”  See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.6.  

Human Rights Watch met in January 1995 (not February), with Resident Representative to Kenya, David Whaley, and Senior Technical Advisor, Killian Kleinschmidt.  The interview notes of that meeting, however, indicate no reference to UNDP taking into account number inflation in Mt. Elgon.  With regard to the second response, Human Rights Watch/Africa agrees that extensive dwelling on the exact number serves little purpose.  However, UNDP has been accused by the NGO community of underestimating the total displaced and inflating the numbers reintegrated.  The Kenyan government has also capitalized on the lack of accurate data to evade its responsibilities to the displaced.  In such a situation, an explanation of the numbers is warranted.   

151The report read: "It is suggested that less emphasis be placed on further systematic registrations of affected populations by concerned NGOs and religious institutions.  Registrations of individuals always create expectations, and expectations invariably produce more ‘beneficiaries.’  As relief interventions are replaced by rehabilitation and reconstruction inputs, it makes much more sense to now focus on clearly identifying and targeting areas/communities which have been affected by the disturbances or into which displacees have settled or are returning.  The rapid transition from targeting resources at individuals to targeting them at communities will also significantly accelerate the process of reconciliation.” Rogge Report II, UNDP, September 1994, Executive Summary, para.9; and presentation by John Rogge, UNDP consultant contained in minutes of the third Excom Meeting, Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, September 8, 1994.

152Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with UNDP official (name withheld on request), New York, February 26, 1997.

153“Internal Refugee Families Ordered to Leave Eldoret,” KNA News Agency: Nairobi, in English 1444 gmt, December 28, 1994.

154Rogge Report II, UNDP, September 1994, p.2(4)(5).

155“75,000 Clashes’ Victims Resettled,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), September 14, 1994.

156“A Little More Respect for the Truth, Please,” The Weekly Review (Nairobi), September 23, 1994.

157UNDP takes issue with Human Rights Watch/Africa’s assessment that Mr. Speth did not hint at human rights problems which needed to be addressed.  UNDP points out that Mr. Speth”clearly made the point that while as many as one-third of the displaced persons had been resettled, there remained many who remained displaced...[and] there were still intricate land disputes involving the rest.”  See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.4.

158“U.N. Body Reassures Kenya on Support,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), September 13, 1994.

159See Appendix: UNDP Response, pp.3-4.

160U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1995 World Survey Report (Washington D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 1995), p.62.

161Killian Kleinschmidt, Senior Technical Advisor, UNDP Displaced Persons Program,”The Programme for Displaced Persons and Communities Affected by the Ethnic Violence in Kenya,” UNDP, November 1994, p.2; and NCCK,”UNDP Official Disputes Resettlement Story,” Clashes Update, (Nairobi: NCCK), no.21, October 27, 1994, pp.1-2.

162Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with David Round-Turner, former Policy Advisor, UNDP Displaced Persons Program, Nairobi, August 26, 1996.

163Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Earnest Murimi, Executive Secretary, Justice and Peace Commission, Catholic Diocese of Nakuru, Nakuru, August 6, 1996.

164Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with a diplomat (name withheld on request), Nairobi, July 30, 1996.

165UNDP also says that it constantly raised these concerns publicly, and that its unflinching criticism of human rights violations was eventually the element that brought the joint program to a halt.  Appendix: UNDP Response, p.4.

This statement is not wholly accurate.  Human Rights Watch/Africa has examined virtually every public statement and UNDP document on this program.  UNDP only became vocal in December 1994-January 1995 after the forced dispersals at Maela.  Prior to that, its handful of references to human rights violations minimized them as the individual actions of a few government officials.  The UNDP program did not come to a halt because UNDP spoke up about ethnic discrimination and forced expulsions.  The UNDP program ended because it had never been structured in such a way as to incorporate safeguards and mechanisms, as a pre-condition of the program, that would have made it more difficult for the government pursue its policies of ethnic persecution. 

166Indicative of the appearance of complicity between UNDP and the Kenya government was an editorial piece contained in the government-owned Kenya Times newspaper which stated:”Mr. Speth cocked a snook at Kenya’s ill-informed critics, domestic and foreign, when he expressed complete satisfaction with the resettlement of families displaced during ethnic clashes in Molo and the efforts being made by the Government to bring about reconciliation among the so-called rival communities.  ‘In a world of ethnic strife, what we saw during the visit to Molo is a Government, which is moving to reconcile tribal differences,’ he said, and expressed the hope that Kenya would lead the way in ethnic reconciliation just as it had done in sustainable development.  This, indeed, is a heartening and well-deserved compliment from a well-informed person of Mr. Speth’s stature.  On Monday, President Moi lauded the work being done by UNDP when Mr. Speth called on him at State House, Nairobi.  The Head of State said that the UNDP had done a magnificent job in Kenya...We on our part are grateful to Mr. Speth for his clear-headed vision of Kenya as a leading nation in Africa and to UNDP for pledging $80 million for various projects in the country.  We hope that Mr. Speth will see to it that his organization releases much more financial assistance for Kenya as early as possible.” “UNDP Official’s Views Encouraging.” Kenya Times (Nairobi), September 14, 1994.

167Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with David Whaley, former UNDP Resident Representative to Kenya and Killian Kleinschmidt, former UNDP Senior Technical Advisor to the Displaced Persons Program, New York, January 12, 1995.

168Human Rights Watch/Africa interviews with UNDP officials, local and international NGOs, journalists and academics between 1993 and 1997.

169Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Professor Frank Holmquist, Hampshire College, Amherst, January 16, 1997.

170Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with UNDP official (name withheld on request), New York, February 26, 1997.

171 Internal donor evaluation of the UNDP program (donor name withheld on request) November 1994, provided to Human Rights Watch/Africa, July 1996.

172Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with former UNDP Displaced Persons Program employee (name withheld on request), Nakuru, August 7, 1996.

173Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with international relief worker (name withheld on request), Nairobi, July 30, 1996.

174See Roberta Cohen,”Protecting the Internally Displaced,” World Refugee Survey 1996, (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington D.C.: Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 1996), p.23.

175Rogge Report I, UNDP, September 1993, para. 8.

176UNDP,”UNDP Mission Report,” April 18-22, 1995, p.4.

177British High Commissioner Sir Kieran Prendergast called on the government to do this at the second NCDP meeting.  Minutes of the second NCDP meeting, Methodist Guest House, Nairobi, November 1, 1994.

178Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with diplomat formerly based in Kenya (name withheld on request), New York, July 12, 1996.  

179Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with a diplomat (name withheld on request), Nairobi, August 8, 1996.

180Internal donor evaluation of the UNDP program (donor name withheld on request), November 1994, provided to Human Rights Watch/Africa, July 1996.

181Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Ernest Murimi with Executive Secretary, Justice and Peace Commission, Catholic Diocese of Nakuru, Nakuru, August 6, 1996.

182Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with Tecla Wanjala, Coordinator, Peace and Development Network (Peace-Net), National Council of NGOs, Nairobi, August 8, 1996.

183“Western Province Coordination Committee (WPCC): A Performance Appraisal” (draft), presented to UNDP/UNOPS, (Eldoret: Centre for Refugee Studies, Moi University), September 1995, p.47.

184Ibid., p.47-48.

185Isaac Lenaola, Hadley H. Jenner, Timothy Wichert,”Land Tenure in Pastoral Lands,” African Centre for Technology Studies, In Land We Trust: Environment, Private Property and Constitutional Change (Eds. Calestous Juma, J.B. Ojwang), (London and Nairobi: Zed Books and Initiatives Publishers, 1996). pp.231-257.

186UNDP,”UNDP Mission Report,” April 18-22, 1995, p.3.

187Government of Kenya/UNDP, Programme Document: Programme for Displaced Persons, Inter-Agency Joint Programme, October 26, 1993.

188Rogge Report I, UNDP, September 1993, part 3(16.2).

189Presentation by John Rogge contained in minutes of the third Excom Meeting, Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, September 8, 1994.

190Rogge Report II, UNDP, September 1994, part 6.4.

191UNDP,”Programme for Displaced Persons and Communities Affected by Ethnic Violence,” Nairobi, February 1994, p.7.

192Under settlement schemes, administered by the Settlement Fund Trustees, the large tracts of colonial settler land that were sold to the government were surveyed, demarcated into smaller plots, and offered to the landless with a long-term mortgage loan of over twenty years, with an initial down payment of 10 percent.  If the scheme is registered, at the end of the mortgage, the person can collect the title and own the land outright.  If the scheme is not registered, then outright purchase certificates were given.  Trust Land is administered by the Local Councils, but survey and demarcation done by the Ministry of Lands and Settlement.  The process is slow and is arbitrated by committees of elders.  Appeals are heard by an Arbitration Board and the Minister has the final resort.  Titles can only be given where there are no objections.  Cooperative farms are owned jointly by a group that pays off the mortgage over time.  Group ranch land is administered under the Group Ranch Act which allocated hundreds of thousands of acres as communal land for the pastoralist Maasai community.  Adjudication is currently underway to divide and privatize this land so that resident Maasai can sell or lease the land.  However, this process has been fraught with corruption as government officials working in the land offices and elsewhere have acquired this land.  Government lands are mainly forest area.

193See Appendix: UNDP Response, p.5.

194Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with David Round-Turner, former Policy Advisor, UNDP Displaced Persons Program, Nairobi, August 26, 1996.

195Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with displaced (Kikuyu) man, Maela, Nakuru District, Rift Valley Province, August 7, 1996.

196Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Ernest Murimi with Executive Secretary, Justice and Peace Commission, Catholic Diocese of Nakuru, Nakuru, August 6, 1996.

197Human Rights Watch/Africa interview with displaced (Kikuyu) man, Maela, Nakuru District, Rift Valley Province, August 7, 1996.

198UNDP Office for Project Services,”1995 Inception Report, Internally Displaced Persons Programme,” Nairobi, 1995.