LIBERIA

Human Rights Developments

Although significant progress was made in the second half of 1993 toward ending Liberia's bloody civil war, combat involving the Liberian warring factions and the West African peacekeeping force took a heavy toll on the civilian population. The June massacre of almost 600 civilians in a displaced persons camp in Harbel served to heighten international attention to the war and pressure the parties to resume peace negotiations. Nevertheless, the lack of protection for civilians from abuses by all sides and the profound distrust among the warring factions remained obstacles to lasting peace. The peace agreement signed in July was believed to be Liberia's last, best hope.

Throughout 1993, Liberia remained divided: the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) governed the capital, Monrovia, backed by the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG); Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the main rebel group, controlled some 60 percent of the country; and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a rebel group made up primarily of soldiers from former President Samuel Doe's army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), controlled at least two western counties. The warring factions are based in part on ethnic affiliations: the AFL is composed mainly of Krahn, the ethnic group of former President Samuel Doe; ULIMO is supported largely by Mandingos and Krahns; and the NPFL was initially formed by Gios and Manos.

The event that set the stage for the developments of 1993 took place in October 1992, when the NPFL attacked Monrovia, ending two years of an uneasy peace and reigniting the civil war. Fighting raged in and around the city, with the suburban areas particularly hard hit. Approximately 200,000 people displaced from these areas flooded into the central city to escape the fighting, and hundreds of civilians were killed.

The offense caught ECOMOG unprepared, and thus compelled it to adopt a new strategy: in the interests of ending the war and defeating a seemingly intractable adversary in the NPFL, ECOMOG accepted the assistance of other Liberian factions in fighting the NPFL. The human rights record of these factions-ULIMO and the AFL-ranged from suspect to abysmal. The AFL was thoroughly discredited by its gross abuses during the 1980s and especially during the war in 1990, when it massacred civilians and devastated Monrovia. ULIMO is an offshoot of the AFL, and its conduct in the areas it captures have included attacks on civilians, looting, and executions of suspected NPFL sympathizers.

After first supporting the right of the AFL to defend itself from attack, ECOMOG soon permitted the AFL to operate alongside the multinational troops, although the AFL retained a separate command structure and controlled certain areas on its own. ECOMOG has claimed that ULIMO operated independently, but it was clear that some coordination existed. There was little indication that ECOMOG tried to curb excesses by these factions. The collaboration between ECOMOG and AFL/ULIMO changed the dynamics of the war, and raised questions about ECOMOG's commitment to human rights.

Meanwhile, refugees fleeing NPFL territory told of an ongoing pattern of NPFL abuses against the civilian population, especially harassment and looting, but also killings. For example, there were reports that in May the NPFL was responsible for a massacre at Fassama that left approximately one hundred civilians dead, although this was never fully verified. NPFL fighters continued to act with impunity in their territory. The human rights abuses and intransigent attitude of the NPFL constituted a serious obstacle toECOMOG's efforts at peacekeeping.

There was increasing concern about ECOMOG air attacks on NPFL territory using Nigeria's Alpha jets. The NPFL had no air force, and ECOMOG planes could easily reach the whole country. Targets included the port of Buchanan and areas around Gbarnga, Kakata, Harbel and Greenville, as well as border areas in the Ivory Coast. There was also charges that ECOMOG violated medical neutrality by attacking hospitals-Phebe Hospital outside Gbarnga, F.J. Grante Hospital in Greenville, and the Firestone Hospital. Precise information about the targets and casualties were not available, because independent observers were prevented for security reasons from traveling to the sites. Relief convoys also were attacked, including a Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) convoy in April that was carrying medicines and vaccines.

There were consistent reports, by ECOMOG as well as other neutral sources, of the NPFL using the civilian population or civilian institutions as a shield for its military activities, which is a direct violations of the Geneva Conventions. Nevertheless, ECOMOG had an obligation under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population, and was prohibited from conducting attacks that, while aiming at a military target, might be expected to inflict disproportionate harm on the civilian population.

The AFL maintained a fairly low profile from the November 1990 cease-fire until the NPFL offensive in October 1992. However, a pattern later emerged of AFL soldiers engaging in looting and armed robbery, with civilians fearing reprisals if they reported the incidents. One highly visible case illustrating the AFL behavior occurred on January 31, 1993; Brian Garnham, a British citizen working at the Liberian Institute for Biomedical Research, an affiliate of the New York Blood Center, was killed by the AFL. Garnham and his American wife, Betsy Brotman, had lived in Liberia for many years. After the killing, AFL soldiers went on a looting spree, emptying the laboratory compound of whatever they could carry.

In late April, five AFL soldiers, including two officers, were charged in connection with Garnham's murder; however, none was charged with murder. The most severe charges were brought against the platoon commander, Capt. Gbazai Gaye, who was charged under Art. 131 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for perjury, and under Art. 133, for conduct unbecoming an officer. As of November, the charges have either been dismissed or dropped against all the soldiers except one, who still faced charges of larceny.

For its part, ULIMO engaged in a pattern of abuses: it limited the free movement of people and goods in its territory; it denied Africa Watch a pass to travel to its areas without an ULIMO "escort"; and it established checkpoints along the roads, at which civilians and relief organizations often faced harassment. There were also reports of atrocities by ULIMO forces; Amnesty International received reports in March about the execution of fourteen young men suspected of supporting the NPFL in Zorzor, and the killing of thirteen civilians in Haindi. Liberian human rights monitors expressed concerns about summary executions, beatings and arbitrary arrests. Documenting human rights conditions in ULIMO territory proved to be difficult, largely because ULIMO denied access to independent observers. One of the most vicious acts of the entire war was the June 5-6 massacre of approximately 547 civilians, mostly women and children, at a displaced persons camp outside Harbel. The victims were shot, beaten or hacked to death, and mutilated. Initial reports seemed to indicate that the NPFL was responsible, and the interim government issued a report confirming that assumption. However, a UN investigation later concluded unequivocally that the massacre was carried out by the AFL. (See below.)

The massacre heightened attention to the Liberian war and set in motion a series of important international developments. On June 9, the UN Security Council condemned the massacre, requesting that the Secretary-General launch an immediate investigation and warning that those responsible would be held accountable for their actions. The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, dispatched his special representative to Liberia, Trevor Gordon-Somers, to investigate the massacre. Gordon-Somers's report to the Secretary-General was never published, nor were his conclusions made public.

On August 4, Boutros-Ghali ordered an independent inquiry into the Harbel massacre. A three-member panel, headed by Kenyan attorney general Amos Wako, visited Liberia in August and concluded that the massacre was "planned and executed by units of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)." The report went on to recommend that three soldiers be prosecuted in connection with the massacre. In September, the interim government detained the three soldiers named in the report, but openly questioned the U.N.'s findings.

Simultaneous with these initiatives, the peace process gained momentum. In a major breakthrough, on July 25 a peace agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin, by the NPFL, ULIMO and IGNU. The accord followed UN-sponsored negotiations in Geneva involving representatives of all the factions. These negotiations were part of a series of peace talks spearheaded by Gordon-Somers. Representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also served as sponsors of the Cotonou agreement. The accord called for a cease-fire on August 1, the formation of a transitional government, disarmament and encampment of combatant forces, followed by elections.

An important element of the plan involved the creation of a UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help supervise and monitor the agreement, in conjunction with ECOMOG. The plan also provided for an expanded ECOMOG force, under the auspices of the OAU, to be composed of African troops outside the West African region. These new contingents would be responsible for disarmament and encampment, and would be monitored by UNOMIL.

The accord also provided for an amnesty for "all persons and parties involved in the Liberia civil conflict in the course of actual military engagements." Clearly, an amnesty for acts committed between combatants during a conflict is substantially different from one covering war crimes or crimes against humanity. The gross atrocities committed during Liberia's war should be excluded from any amnesty, as should attacks against civilians who took no part in the hostilities.

The peace accord stipulated that concomitant with disarmament, a five-person Council of State elected by all the factions would take power from the interim government until elections were held. A thirty-five-member transitional parliament would include thirteen members from the NPFL and the interim government, and nine from ULIMO. On August 16, the Liberian factions elected Bismark Kuyon, representing IGNU, as chairman of the interim council, and Dorothy Musuleng Cooper of the NPFL as vice-chairman. On October 20, the NPFL abruptly replaced Musuleng Cooper with Isaac Mussah, a notorious NPFL commander. On November 15, IGNU replaced Kuyon with Philip Banks, who had been serving as Justice Minister.

As of November, the process had reached a stalemate. The transfer of power hinged on the beginning of disarmament, which in turn depended on the arrival of the expanded ECOMOG troops. The countries that agreed to contribute those troops were Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Uganda, contingent on the provision of outside assistance. Finally, as part of the Benin meeting of November 3 through 6, the parties agreed that the transitional government would be installed upon the arrival of the first expanded ECOMOG troops.

In a disturbing development, a number of former officials of the Doe regime who were known for their involvement in human rights abuses were named to the transitional government and electoral commission. In addition to the nomination of Isaac Mussah, the most serious concerns focused on two ULIMO nominees-George Dweh, reputedly linked to killings at the height of the civil war; and Jenkins Scott, former Justice Minister and closely associated with Doe's repressive policies.

The situation of the displaced civilians and residents in many parts of central and northern Liberia became increasingly desperate by the summer of 1993. Relief assistance to these areas had been effectively cut off after the October 1992 offensive, although some food and medicine continued to flow through the Ivory Coast border. Relief groups found that up to 700,000 civilians in NPFL territory were in danger, with 200,000 already suffering starvation. Aid workers estimated that hundreds of children could die every week due to hunger and malnutrition.

Meanwhile, an estimated 652,600 Liberians remained as refugees in the neighboring countries: 380,000 in Guinea; 250,000 in the Ivory Coast; 12,000 in Ghana; 7,000 in Sierra Leone; and 3,000 in Nigeria. (The war also displaced some 200,000 Sierra Leoneans, 162,000 of whom went to Guinea and 105,000 to Liberia.) The issue of repatriation of the refugees remained subject to progress on the political front and the resolution of certain security concerns, and as of November no significant repatriation had occurred.

In a surprising development, on August 31, Ernest Shonekan, Nigeria's interim president, announced that Nigeria would withdraw its troops from Liberia within seven months. Nigerian troops formed the backbone of the ECOMOG force, and had become the principal enemy of Charles Taylor's NPFL. The Nigerians had also effectively financed the West African intervention, which was estimated to have cost well over $500 million.

The emergence in September of a new armed faction, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), threatened to disrupt the peace accord by attacking the NPFL. Reports indicated that the LPC was largely Krahn and included many former AFL soldiers.

The Right to Monitor

A number of human rights organizations were established in Monrovia and were able to function without interference from the interim government or ECOMOG.

· The Catholic Peace and Justice Commission was the human rights and peace component of the Catholic Church of Liberia. It sought to gather and disseminate information on human rights violations, and engaged in some humanitarian relief.

· The Center for Law and Human Rights Education aimed to create awareness among Liberians of their basic rights. It operated two education projects, a Legal Aid Clinic, and a Resource and Documentation Library.

· The Liberian Human Rights Chapter and the Association of Human Rights Promoters were formed to act as human rights advocacy groups, and the Human Rights Chapter published a bulletin on human rights.

However, these Liberian human rights monitors operated under the same constraints as their international colleagues in trying to document violations in territory controlled by the NPFL or ULIMO: access was often prohibited by the factions or became too dangerous due to the fighting.

There were no known human rights organizations operating in either NPFL territory or ULIMO territory.

The Role of the International Community

U.S. Policy

After years of supporting the brutal and corrupt regime of former President Doe in the 1980s, making it the largest recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa, the U.S. withdrew from Liberia more or less completely once the war began in 1990. Toward the end of 1993, however, when it became clear that the latest peace plan required substantial U.S. assistance if it was to succeed, Liberia finally became a higher priority.

The main tenets of U.S. policy toward Liberia in 1993 were to support conflict resolution efforts by ECOWAS and the UN, to withhold recognition of any government in Liberia-neither the interim government nor the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly, the civilian arm of the NPFL-and to promote ECOWAS and its peace plan. By year's end, the conflict resolution efforts had gained new momentum, leading to a significant commitment of American resources. On September 30, the U.S. obligated $19.83 million ($13 million in Economic Support Funds and the rest in Foreign Military Financing) to the UN Trust Fund for peacekeeping in Liberia. The money would be used by ECOMOG and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to help finance the deployment of the expanded ECOMOG troops, but not for lethal assistance.

The U.S. was the leading donor to the victims of the war: since the beginning of the conflict, the U.S. had provided some $250 million in humanitarian assistance. According to the State Department's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, in fiscal year 1993 the U.S. provided approximately $62 million, including assistance to Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana and the Ivory Coast. An additional $28.7 million had been provided since April 1991 to assist the ECOWAS-led peace process. But, although the Clinton administration acted quickly to condemn the June massacre in Harbel and to welcome the July peace agreement, it did not stress adequately the human rights component of the crisis. The administration should have made clear to all the warring factions that human rights issues would directly impact U.S. foreign assistance to any future government, and that the U.S. would distance itself from any force that continued to violate human rights and international law.

The Clinton administration's human rights policy would have been enhanced by greater attention to abuses by the ECOMOG forces. The U.S. was clearly aware of the increasing human rights problems associated with the ECOMOG intervention, yet U.S. policy still revolved around full support forECOMOG. There is an obvious discrepancy between what American officials say in private and their public positions. Given the Clinton administration's request for $12 million for ECOWAS's peacekeeping activities in fiscal year 1994, the U.S. was likely to have some leverage over ECOMOG's behavior. It was critical for the administration to make clear its concern about human rights violations by both ECOMOG and the forces with which ECOMOG was allied, and condition its aid on respect for human rights. The U.S. should also have supported enhanced training for the new ECOMOG forces, with an emphasis on internal disciplinary structures and procedures for addressing human rights complaints.

Liberia would have been an excellent test case for the approach enunciated by the U.S. at the United Nations Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, described in the U.S. Human Rights Action Plan. Under this plan, the administration called for human rights to be "an integrated element of all U.N. peacekeeping, humanitarian, conflict resolution, elections monitoring, development programs, and other activities."

On June 9, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose testified about U.S. policy toward Liberia before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs. His statement reiterated the administration's objectives: a negotiated settlement, disarmament of the warring factions, return of the refugees and displaced persons, and free elections leading to the establishment of a unified government "based on respect for human rights, democratic principles and economic accountability."

The U.S. deserves credit for pushing the U.N. to include a human rights component to UNOMIL's mandate. Although the language was not as strong as might have been hoped-it did not establish a human rights office or provide for the deployment human rights monitors-at least the U.N. resolution acknowledged officially that reporting on human rights violations was part of UNOMIL's mandate in Liberia.

The U.N. Role

Although the United Nations has contributed significantly to the emergency relief and humanitarian aid that has gone to Liberia, it did not address the Liberian crisis in political terms until November 1992, almost three years after the crisis erupted. In 1993 all indications were that the U.N. considered Liberia a regional problem best dealt with by ECOWAS, the regional body. While strengthening and supporting the regional organization was a laudable effort, the U.N. should have ensured that human rights issues figured prominently in the regional organization's efforts.

After finally addressing the Liberian crisis in November 1992 and imposing an arms embargo (Security Council Resolution 788), the Secretary-General dispatched a special representative, Trevor Gordon-Somers, to investigate the situation. Human rights language was notably absent from his report released in March (not to be confused with his later report on the Harbel massacre), thus missing yet another opportunity to insert human rights protections into the peace process. Th March report suggested that there might be a role for U.N. observers to monitor a new cease-fire agreement, but foresaw no human rights monitoring component to their mandate.

The U.N.'s humanitarian mandate in Liberia was challenged when ECOWAS stepped up its effort to block cross-border humanitarian assistance to NPFL territory from the Ivory Coast. In early May 1993, ECOWAS executive secretary Abass Bundu called on relief organizations to cease all cross-border relief operations. ECOMOG contended that Taylor uses the cross-border convoys to transport supplies for his forces, and told relief organizations that they must inform ECOMOG when they conduct cross-border operations. However, since humanitarian aid was exempt from the U.N. embargo of November 1992, ECOWAS's stand contradicted the U.N.'s mandate to deliver such assistance.

This tension between the U.N. and the international relief organizations intensified on July 30, when Gordon-Somers wrote a diplomatic note to the Ivorian Minister of Foreign Affairs urging that a Médecins Sans Frontières convoy not be permitted to cross from the Ivory Coast into Liberia "because it is in violation of the Cotonou peace agreement." The U.N. defended its decision on the grounds that all convoys had to be checked for arms by U.N. observers. Relief groups, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, strongly protested the U.N.'s actions.

After the Harbel massacre in June, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali condemned the killings and instructed Gordon-Somers to conduct an investigation into the incident. While this quick response by the U.N. was welcome, it was ultimately undercut by the fact that Gordon-Somers's reportto the secretary-general was not published, or his findings revealed. Questions were raised as to why the secretary-general chose to send Gordon-Somers, when his role as a mediator of the conflict precluded him from making any findings that would antagonize any of the warring factions. As noted above, however, the secretary-general did order a subsequent investigation whose findings were published.

On September 22, the Security Council adopted Resolution 866 establishing the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for seven months. UNOMIL was to comprise approximately 500 members, some 300 being military, and its primary purpose was military: to monitor the cease-fire, the arms embargo, and disarmament and demobilization of combatants. In addition, UNOMIL was to observe the electoral process, help coordinate humanitarian relief and report "any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-General." This last aspect was particularly welcome, but it would have been important to specify the need to report on violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

The Work of Africa Watch

Given the ongoing crisis in Liberia and the abuses committed by all sides to the conflict, Africa Watch decided to focus an investigation on the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia from a human rights perspective. The mission was conducted in March, and evaluated the West African peacekeeping force's three years in Liberia, with particular emphasis on the period of renewed warfare since October 1992. In June, Africa Watch published "Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights in Liberia."

Africa Watch was actively engaged in advocacy about human rights in Liberia with the new Congress and administration, conducting briefings, drafting letters, suggesting language for legislation and highlighting issues that required action from the U.S. government. On June 9, Africa Watch testified on Liberia before the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and called on the United States and the United Nations to integrate human rights into the peace process. In addition, Africa Watch was called upon to conduct frequent radio and press interviews about human rights in Liberia with U.S., African and European journalists.