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U.S. Programs to Develop Alternatives to Antipersonnel Mines
Human Rights Watch Backgrounder
April 2000


Policy Background
Budget Environment
Track 1
Track 2
Track 3
Studies of Landmines Alternatives
Appendix 1: Landmine Alternatives At-A-Glance
List Of Acronyms


Nearly four years ago, in May 1996, the United States began a search for alternatives to antipersonnel landmines so that the U.S. military could completely eliminate their use "as soon as possible." A little more than a year later, a target date of 2006 was established for fielding alternatives, thus permitting the U.S. to join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (Ottawa Convention) at that time.

Today, it appears very unlikely that the Pentagon will meet the target date - if it proceeds as planned. An apparently reluctant and unenthusiastic Pentagon made very little progress in the search for alternatives from 1996 to 1998, spending $5 million in the process. While significant strides have now been made in finding an alternative to "dumb" (non-self-destructing) mines, the search for alternatives to "smart" (self-destructing) mines, particularly those in "mixed" systems in combination with antitank mines, is at the very early stages.

The status of alternatives for the three categories of U.S. antipersonnel mines is as follows:

Non self-destructing antipersonnel mines - Prototype replacements were tested in October 1999, a major contract for engineering and testing is about to be let, a production decision is scheduled for July-September 2002, with up to 523,000 units expected to be produced by 2005. These are being developed for use in Korea, but could be used elsewhere, too. Human Rights Watch has learned that the prototype system under consideration has a feature that allows the munition to be target activated - which would make it prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.

"Pure" self-destructing antipersonnel mines - Current U.S. policy is to end use of these mines (primarily ADAMs) by 2003. The "alternative" being pursued is to combine them in a projectile with existing antitank mines to create a new mixed mine system called RADAM. DoD has asked for $47.7 million for RADAM this year, with a final production decision to be made October-December 2000. The Pentagon plans to spend $150 million to procure this new mine system that is illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty and would have to be destroyed after 2006 under existing U.S. policy.

Self-destructing antipersonnel mines in mixed systems - The directive for concept exploration for an alternative to mixed mine systems was not issued until March 1999. The initial solicitation for concepts went out in August 1999 but was withdrawn the next month. Another solicitation was released in February 2000, with industry responses due on March 3. The fact that the search for alternatives to mixed mine systems is still in the early concept stages makes it very unlikely that a material replacement will be ready by 2006, thus delaying U.S. accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Human Rights Watch is concerned about the status and direction of the current U.S. landmine alternatives program. Clearly, the chasm between the President's stated goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006 and the Pentagon's actions calls into question the real commitment to identifying and fielding alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Concrete steps should be taken now to put the alternatives program on the proper track and to avoid the wasteful expenditure of taxpayer monies on weapons that would be prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Human Rights Watch recommends:

Clarifying and reinforcing the objectives and deadlines for each track of the landmine alternatives program.

Eliminating the RADAM program.

Making the non-self-destructing mine alternative compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty by removing the target-actuated feature.

Making compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty a clear requirement of all the landmine alternatives tracks; alternatives must not be target activated and must be able to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants.

Exploring seriously non-material alternatives to antipersonnel mines and ending the Pentagon's focus only on material solutions. Non-material solutions could include changing tactics and doctrine, increasing the number of other weapons systems, or retrofitting existing mixed munitions to remove the antipersonnel mines.


Related Material

New U.S. Mines Would Violate Treaty
HRW Press Release, April 7, 2000S

Landmine Monitor Report 1999
Toward a Mine-Free World

The quest for alternatives to antipersonnel mines began with President Clinton's landmine policy announcement in May 1996. His stated aim was to "end reliance on [antipersonnel mines] as soon as possible."(1) A memorandum issued by Secretary of Defense William Perry tasked elements of the Department of Defense with finding alternatives for all antipersonnel mines in the U.S. inventory.(2) The ensuing year was spent on devising ways to implement Secretary Perry's instruction.(3)

The alternatives program underwent a dramatic change in September 1997. Upon deciding to withdraw from negotiations for the Mine Ban Treaty, President Clinton announced that the U.S. would end the use of pure (stand alone) self-destructing antipersonnel mines by 2003 everywhere except for Korea and seek alternatives to pure and non-self-destructing (NSD) antipersonnel mines to completely end their use globally by 2006.(4) However, the President also decided to retain indefinitely mixed mine systems that contain both antipersonnel mines and antitank mines; as a result, ambiguity surrounded the need for alternatives for mixed mine systems. A memorandum by Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre institutionalized a new set of objectives for the landmines alternatives program on 21 October 1997.(5) No requirement for an alternative for mixed systems was included in Hamre's memorandum.

However, in May 1998 as part of a compromise with Senator Patrick Leahy, the Administration declared unequivocally that the "United States will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if we succeed in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our antipersonnel landmines and mixed antitank systems by then."(6) (italics added) The details of this new policy are contained in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 64 issued on 23 June 1998.(7) Deputy Secretary Hamre issued another memorandum on 23 March 1999 to conform implementation of declaratory policy with acquisition program objectives. The Pentagon now describes its alternatives programs as Track 1, Track 2, and Track 3.

Disturbingly, it appears that many in the Pentagon still do not treat the 2006 date seriously. For example, an April 1999 briefing on the alternatives program stated that 2006 is an "objective, not a deadline," and that there is "no deadline" for finding alternatives to mixed systems.(8)


After spending some $5 million on alternatives from 1996-1998, the budget increased to $21 million in FY 1999. It is estimated at $39 million for FY 2000, and $94 million has been requested for FY 2001. The Pentagon's figures for current plans through FY 2005 indicate that more than $300 million will be spent on research and development, and more than $500 million on procurement of mine alternatives. The funding requests contained in President Clinton's budget for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement categories for each track of the antipersonnel landmine alternatives program are presented below.(9) All figures are in thousands of dollars.

Program FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 (req.) FY 2002


FY 2003


FY 2004


FY 2005


Track 1 NSD-A 13,856 17,734 12,538 60,811 121,809 121,562 121,448 469,758
Track 1 RADAM 0 7,967 47,674 47,621 47,543 0 0 150,805
Track 2(10) Self-Healing Minefield, Tags, others 6,971 13,000 9,925 0 0 0 0 29,596
Track 3 Mixed System Alternatives 0

0 23,800 26,267 26,340 43,797 50,081 170,285

(in thousands of dollars)

20,827 38,701 93,937 134,699 195,692 165,359 171,529 820,744


Track 1 is intended to meet the President's goal of developing alternatives to antipersonnel mines in Korea by 2006.(11) Track 1 has two major components: an alternative for non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use in Korea; and retrofitting of 155mm projectiles that contain antitank mines to incorporate antipersonnel mines thus creating an artillery-delivered mixed munition, the RADAM. Though developed for Korea, these systems would also be available globally.

The replacement of the Pursuit Deterrent Munition (PDM) was another need identified by Pentagon officials. PDM is a Special Operations Forces weapon comprised of a single ADAM antipersonnel mine mated with a hand grenade-like fuze. The military requirement for a replacement munition for PDM was dropped sometime between October 1997 and January 1998.(12)

The Joint Requirements Oversight Committee validated Track 1 requirements on 24 November 1997.(13) As new obstacles and uncertainties emerged for Track 1 in 1997 and 1998, time consuming adjustments to program plans and acquisition schedules were made to reflect the changes in U.S. policy. The Operational Requirements Document (the war-planner's needs) for Track 1 will be finalized sometime in 2000. It is unclear if this important acquisition document will be made public.


RADAM will combine into one projectile seven antitank mines from the Remote Anti-Armor Mine System (RAAMS) projectile with five antipersonnel mines from the Area Denial Antipersonnel Munition (ADAM) projectile.(14) The total program cost for RADAM is estimated to be $150 million for 337,000 munitions through FY 2004.(15) An acquisition decision (Milestone III) for RADAM will occur in the 1st quarter of FY 2001 and deployment in the 1st quarter of 2002.(16) The Army requested $47.7 million for RADAM procurement in its FY 2001 budget request.(17) The Pentagon has conceded that RADAM "does not technically comply" with the Mine Ban Treaty.(18)

Between late 1997 and 1999 funds to initiate the RADAM conversion were not immediately available because "new start" authorization was not forthcoming from the Senate Armed Services Committee. The only activities on RADAM to occur were in-house design studies by military offices. The funding impasse continued until DoD requested $48 million in its FY 2000 budget request for RADAM. After a compromise was reached between the President's National Security Advisor, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Senator Leahy to allow for funding of clearly identified pre-production activities, congressional conferees reduced this amount to $8 million.(19) These funds will be spent on pre-production engineering and manufacturing development activities. This will be accomplished at Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, a government owned facility in Texarkana, Texas operated by Day and Zimmermann of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.


The non self-destruct [antipersonnel mine] alternative (NSD-A) program will result in a "hand emplaced munition developed to meet the mission requirements formerly accomplished by M14 and M16 non self-destruct antipersonnel mines."(20) The NSD-A system consists of a munition (apparently an existing antipersonnel mine like the M16) with a modified sensor/fuze package, a signal repeater unit, and a control unit to activate the kill mechanism once the target has been confirmed as a combatant.

The administrative lead time and source selection for this procurement were completed in May 1998.(21) The Army awarded contracts totaling nearly $70 million to Alliant Techsystems of Hopkins, Minnesota and Textron Defense Systems Corporation of Wilmington, Massachusetts on 3 December 1998 for prototype development of the NSD-A.(22) NSD-A underwent accelerated prototype assessment testing (PAT) in October 1999 at Fort Benning, Georgia by troops from North Carolina and Hawaii. To support the testing, 1,540 test articles were procured.

The Army will spend over $17 million in FY 2000 on general and engineering support for design and production efforts for NSD-A. Included in this amount is funding for a follow-on contract for continued engineering and manufacturing development (EMD).(23) The DoD is currently developing a sole source justification for combining the contract for a joint award to Alliant and Textron. This contract will be for engineering support and qualification testing in preparation of procuring up to 523,000 munition systems between FY 2002 and FY 2005.(24) The production decision for NSD-A is scheduled for the 4th quarter of FY 2002.(25)

Human Rights Watch has learned that the prototype NSD-A has a feature that allows the munition to be target activated. In such a mode, where the munition can be exploded by the contact of a person, it would be prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. The sensor packages for NSD-A rely on trip wires or pressure fuzes.(26) During the PAT it was revealed in press coverage of the event that the NSD-A sensor/fuze "systems can be overridden so that the munitions can detonate themselves when triggered."(27) In a presentation during a public session of the National Academy of Sciences committee on landmine alternatives, Pentagon acquisition officials also discussed this feature as a "battlefield override system." The target-actuated feature was also referred to as a "command fire option."(28) On 28 February 2000, Sen. Leahy wrote a letter to Deputy Secretary Hamre to express concern about the battlefield override system. A review of publicly available Pentagon acquisition documents did not reveal the origin of a requirement for a target-activated feature for the NSD-A.

The following table summarizes the FY 1999 and FY 2000 NSD-A program.

NSD-A Cost Analysis (29)
NSD-A Action Performing Activity FY 1999 Award Date

FY 1999 Costs (in thousands of dollars) FY 2000 Award Date FY 2000 Costs (in thousands of dollars)
Test Hardware Textron Nov 98 3844
Test Hardware Alliant Nov 98 4965
EMD Alliant Mar 00 6350
EMD Textron Mar 00 6350
EMD Misc. Various 624
Engineering Support TACOM-ARDEC Oct 98 1900 Oct 99 2600
Engineering Support Misc. Various 1564
PAT support Government Jan 99 1056
Program Management PM-MCD Oct 98 300 Oct 99 246


The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is responsible for the Track 2 of the landmine alternatives program. Track 2 is focused on developing innovative concepts to find better ways to perform the traditional functions of antipersonnel landmines such as maneuver denial approaches.(30) Track 2 will receive nearly $30 million between FY 1999 and FY 2001.

Track 2 was initiated in October 1997, with an interim report delivered in November 1997.(31) The Track 2 effort is looking at concepts that lie between two extremes; on one hand, a straight replacement munition for an antipersonnel mine and on the other, a military environment where antipersonnel mines would be unnecessary.

The first research and development procurement under Track 2 was released by DARPA on 14 June 1999. DARPA is soliciting innovative proposals for a "self-healing minefield" wherein surface laid antitank mines have the ability to move to close breaches in antitank minefields made by enemy forces. This would replace the perceived need for antipersonnel mines to protect the antitank mines. DARPA began preliminary development of design issues, algorithms, and initial demonstration of subsystems for the self-healing minefield in 1999 and will continue into 2000 and beyond.(32) Contractor proposals for the procurement were due on 2 October 1999. DARPA intends to award contracts of up to three years and totaling $13 million sometime during the first half of FY 2000.(33)

Another project being undertaken by DARPA is to use microelectronic tags to identify targets for direct and indirect fire systems, typically minimally guided munitions.(34) Apparently, these small tagging devices would act as "thistles" and attach themselves to persons entering an area sown with them. Presumably, there would be some kind of target discrimination to separate combatants from non-combatants prior to the employment of any munitions. DARPA analyzed the concept parameters for tagging individuals, investigated the effects of alternatives to antipersonnel mines on soldiers and units, developed and demonstrated the tagging concepts in laboratory conditions during 1999-2000. The next steps for the tagging program will be to demonstrate the adhesion of tags in the field and demonstrate the viability of in-field wakeup and down-range communications with tags in FY 2001.(35)


The final track of the antipersonnel landmine alternatives program, the search for alternatives to mixed munitions that contain antitank and antipersonnel mines, originated in PDD 64. Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre signed a directive for concept exploration on 23 March 1999, a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) was validated on 9 April 1999, and Program Budget Decision 722 allocated a total of $228 million for Track III RDT&E efforts.(36) The anticipated program cost of Track 3 through FY 2005 is estimated by the Pentagon to total $170 million.

The U.S. Army released a broad agency announcement (BAA) soliciting concepts for Track 3 in August 1999. Two critical acquisition requirements were included in the supporting documentation for this solicitation. The MNS for "Mixed Landmine Systems Alternatives" and "Battlefield Shaping and Force Protection against Personnel Threats" conceptually laid out the Pentagon's requirements for Track 3. Neither MNS requires Mine Ban Treaty compliance; the lack of target discrimination is noted as a deficiency of current mine systems.(37) This solicitation was withdrawn on 8 September 1999 for unspecified reasons.

The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in conjunction with the Communications and Electronics Command issued a BAA on 27 March 2000 to solicit submissions for critical or unique component technology that may provide or enhance near, mid, and far term solution to Track 3 of the landmine alternatives program. The component technology may provide or enhance a current or future systems ability to rapidly identify ground threat activity, provide targeting information, and deliver precision munitions on to the target. A funding line of $2-3 million has been set aside for these component technology concepts. Submissions are due by 11 May 2000.(38)


The Army released another BAA on 1 February 2000 for systems and operational concepts for the Rapid Tactical Terrain Limiter (RATTLER) which apparently replaced the August 1999 solicitation. In this BAA is the statement that the "U.S. Government desires to be in a position to be considered compliant with the Ottawa Convention by 2006."(39) Additionally, the definition of antipersonnel mine in Appendix J of the solicitation is the definition used in the Mine Ban Treaty.(40) Industry responses to the RATTLER BAA were due on 3 March 2000.


While there have apparently been numerous internal Pentagon studies on landmine alternatives concepts, there has yet to be an independent evaluation of the available technologies and solutions for replacing antipersonnel mines on the modern battlefield. Section 248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 requires that the Pentagon enter into two contracts with appropriate scientific organizations, to study existing and new technologies and concepts that could serve as landmine alternatives.(41) The National Academy of Sciences is currently conducting one of the studies. Their report is due by the end of 2000. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory are conducting the second study. The date for the submission of their report is not known.

Another provision of the same legislation also requires that the Secretary of Defense submit to the congressional defense committees a report describing the progress made in identifying technologies and concepts for landmine alternatives. A provision of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act expands submission of this report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee.(42) This report is due no later than 1 April 2000 and again in 2001.

The Pentagon has generally concentrated on examining the utility of antipersonnel mines in its existing war plans. Several retired military leaders have questioned the utility of antipersonnel mines in Korea citing the overwhelming technological superiority of U.S. weapons being able to compensate for having no antipersonnel mines. Additionally, some military experts have questioned the utility of antipersonnel mines, both dumb and smart, in the face of modern U.S. warfighting doctrine that relies on speed, maneuver, and counterattack. A limited number of other states have begun exploring alternatives to antipersonnel mines. South Africa, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have reportedly invested some funds toward weapons systems that replace the function of traditional antipersonnel mines and are treaty-compliant.(43)


Human Rights Watch is concerned about the direction of the current U.S. landmine alternatives program. Clearly, the chasm between the President's stated goal and the Pentagon's actions calls into question the commitment to identifying and fielding alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Concrete steps should be taken now to put the alternatives program on the right track and to avoid the wasteful expenditure of taxpayer monies on weapons that would be prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. Our recommendations include:

Clarify and reinforce the objectives and deadlines for each track of the landmine alternatives program. In particular, based upon statements made in public forums by key acquisition officials, it appears some in the Pentagon may believe that the date by which the U.S. would sign the treaty is an "objective not a deadline" and that the search for alternatives for mixed munitions has "no deadline."

Eliminate the RADAM program. RADAM violates the Mine Ban Treaty because it contains prohibited antipersonnel mines. The Pentagon has conceded that "RADAM does not technically comply" with the Mine Ban Treaty. Spending $150 million on a weapon that would be fielded and then banned in a few years is wasteful.

Make NSD-A compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty. The Pentagon must modify NSD-A to remove the target-actuated feature.

Compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty must be a requirement of the landmine alternatives program. It is heartening to see that in the recent request for proposals for Track 3 the acknowledgement that U.S. seeks to be in compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006. However, the Administration must immediately fix the deficiencies in Track 1 noted above to meet the goal of Mine Ban Treaty Compliance. Advanced concepts to replace landmines altogether must not be target activated and be able to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants.

Look closely at non-material alternatives. Apparently, the Pentagon is focused only on material solutions as landmine alternatives. Each of the tracks it is funding seems destined to acquire a new or modified weapon. Non-material solutions to compensate for the removal of antipersonnel landmines from the U.S. inventory could include changing tactics and doctrine, increasing the number of other weapons systems, or retrofitting existing mixed munitions to remove the antipersonnel mines.


Role Traits System Deadline Source Directives Alternative Program Name Status
Protective Minefield - Korea only

(hand emplaced)





2006 for Korea only 16 May 96

17 Sep 97

21 Oct 97

23 Jun 98

NSD-A EMD; production decision in 4th quarter FY 2002, Army lead
Tactical Minefield (remotely delivered) AP


ADAM 2003, 2006 for Korea 17 Sep 97

21 Oct 97

23 Jun 98

RADAM EMD; production decision in 1st quarter FY 2001, Army lead

(hand emplaced)



PDM 2003 17 Sep 97

21 Oct 97

None None
Mixed Systems

(remotely delivered protective and tactical minefields)








2006 (?) 23 Mar 99 RATTLER Concept Exploration, OSD lead
All Landmines All All Unknown 16 May 96

21 Oct 97

None Applied Research, DARPA lead


ADAM Area Denial Antipersonnel Munition

AP/AT antipersonnel/antitank

APL-A antipersonnel landmine alternatives [program]

ARDEC Armament Research and Development Engineering Center (U.S. Army)

BAA broad agency announcement

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

EMD engineering and manufacturing development

FY fiscal year

GEMSS Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System

MNS mission needs statement

MOPMS Modular Pack Mine System

NSD non self-destruct

NSD-A non self-destruct [antipersonnel mine] alternative

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OUSD(A&T) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)

PAT prototype assessment test

PDD Presidential decision directive

PDM Pursuit Deterrent Munition

PE program element

PM-MCD Project Manager for Mines, Countermine, and Demolitions (U.S. Army)

RAAMS Remote Anti-Armor Mine System

RADAM Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition

RATTLER Rapid Tactical Terrain Limiter

RDDS Research and Development Descriptive Summary

RDT&E research, development, test and evaluation

SD/SDA self-destruct/self-deactivate

SOF special operations forces

TACOM Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (U.S. Army)

1 White House Fact Sheet, "U.S. Announces Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy," 16 May 1996.

2 Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Implementation of the President's Decision on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 17 June 1996.

3 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (OUSD(A&T)), Fact Sheet: "Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives Activities," undated.

4 White House Fact Sheet, "U.S. Efforts to Address the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines," 17 September 1997.

5 Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives (APL-A) Briefing delivered by COL Thomas Dresen, Project Manager for Mines, Countermine, and Demolitions to the National Defense Industrial Association's 43rd Annual Fuze Conference, 7 April 1999, slide 7. Hereafter cited as 'Dresen APL-A Briefing.'

6 Letter from National Security Advisor Samuel Berger to Senator Patrick Leahy, 15 May 1998.

7 Dresen APL-A Briefing, slide 6.

8 Dresen APL-A Briefing, slide 6

9 All data extracted from DoD-wide and Army FY 2000 and FY 2001 RDDS for Program Elements 0604808A and 0602702E.

10 DARPA Track 2 project costs for FY 2002-2005 are not separately broken out in its budget justification documents and are not reported here. They could amount to tens of millions of dollars.

11 "Missions Need Statement for Battlefield Shaping and Force Protection against Personnel Threats," Landmine Alternatives Track III Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) DAAE30-99-BAA-0103, 12 August 1999.

12 Colin Clark, "Pentagon Edges Forward on Landmine Alternatives," Defense Week, 29 June 1999, p. 3.

13 OUSD(A&T) Fact Sheet.

14 "Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives (APL-A)" briefing by MAJ Ted Jennings, Office of the Project Manager for Mines, Countermine and Demolitions presented at the National Defense Industrial Association's International Infantry and Small Arms Symposium & Exhibition, 21-24 June 99, slide 19. Hereafter cited as "Jennings APL-A Briefing."

15 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, Appropriation: 2034 Procurement of Army Ammunition, FYDP Procurement Annex, 14 February 2000, p. 26

16 Department of the Army, Research and Development Descriptive Summary (RDDS), PE Number 0604808A: Landmine Warfare/Barrier - Engineering and Manufacturing Development for FY 2001, February 2000, p. 1069.

17 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 2001, Procurement Programs (P-1), p. A-14.

18 Department of Defense, "Landmines Information Paper," 3 March 1999, p. 8.

19 Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations Act, House Report 106-371, p. 170.

20 Dresen APL-A Briefing, slide 10.

21 Dresen APL-A Briefing, slide 9.

22 U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Procurement Award Notice DAAE30-99-C-1010 and DAAE30-99-C-1011, 3 December 1998.

23 Department of the Army, RDDS, PE Number 0604808A, February 2000, p. 1069.

24 U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Solicitation Notice DAAE30-99-R-0108, 29 February 2000.

25 Department of the Army, RDDS, PE Number 0604808A, February 2000, p. 1069.

26 Dresen APL-A Briefing, slides 13 and 15.

27 Pennington Way, "Army Tests Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives," Defense Daily, 2 November 1999, p. 4.

28 National Academy of Sciences committee to examine Alternative Technologies to Replace Anti-Personnel Landmines, December 9-11, 1999, Arlington, VA. See also "Strategic and Tactical Landmine Usage Overview," Presented to the National Academy of Sciences by Greg Bornhoft (BRTRC Technology Research Corporation), Rrepresenting US Army Engineer School, November 15, 1999.

29 Department of the Army, RDDS, PE Number 0604808A, February 2000, pp. 1071-1072.

30 Dresen APL-A Briefing, slide 5.

31 OUSD(A&T) Fact Sheet.

32 DARPA, RDDS, PE 0602702E, "Tactical Technology-- Applied Research," February 2000, p.95 and RDDS, PE 0602702E, February 1999, p. 86.

33 DARPA, "Self-Healing Minefields," solicitation package BAA99-21, 14 June 1999.

34 DARPA, RDDS, PE 0602702E, February 2000, p. 93.

35 DARPA, RDDS, PE 0602702E, February 2000, p.95 and RDDS, PE 0602702E, February 1999, p. 86.

36 Jennings APL-A Briefing, slide 20.


37 U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Landmine Alternatives Track III BAA solicitation package DAAE30-99-BAA-0103, August 1999.

38 U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, BAA solicitation package DAAE30-00BAA-0101, 27 March 2000.

39 U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Rapid Tactical Terrain Limiter (RATTLER) BAA solicitation package DAAE30-00-BAA-0100, 1 February 2000, p. 1.

40 RATTLER Solicitation, p. 19.

41 Public Law 105-261, Page 112 STAT. 1958

42 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, SEC. 621

43 For examples, see Jane's International Defense Review, March 1998, p. 30 (ff).