Granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations to China and Human Rights (Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, May 2000)
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China's Accession to the WTO and Human Rights
Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations (May 10, 2000)
Statement by Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director, Asia Division


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We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today as you assess the implications for human rights of China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and consider whether to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status at this time.


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Human Rights Watch does not take a position on trade agreements per se, and does not endorse any particular trade agreement, including the one signed by the U.S. and China last November. However, we believe that the WTO process should be used to push for human rights improvements. Broader trade with China can be consistent with advancing human rights, but only if it is combined with effective, sustained pressure on China to respect basic civil and political rights.

In my testimony today, I would like to describe the recent deterioration of human rights conditions in China, examine the possible long-term impact of WTO membership on China's human rights performance, and present our recommendations to Congress on the PNTR issue and the broader policy implications of this important decision.

The WTO and China:

As a WTO member, China will commit itself to respecting global trading rules. This is a step towards China's integration into the international system regulating not only trade relations but also governments' treatment of their own citizens. Restructuring China's economy to fit WTO standards will give a boost to those within China arguing that it must further open up both politically and economically if it is to be a respected member of the international community.

But WTO membership will not itself lead to political changes. It could be an important catalyst for change over the long run if combined with consistent pressure from outside China. For instance, greater transparency in economic matters could increase demands and expectations from within China for more openness in other areas.

China is a long way from having a legal and court system that functions independently of the Party and the State. Demands to modernize China's legal system to handle commercial disputes, protect contracts and combat corruption could help lay the groundwork for an independent judiciary and the rule of law that might extend to the political and security realms. As the World Bank has pointed out, "economic reforms have made legal rules matter" in China.

The closing of thousands of state-run enterprises -- there are currently about 300,000, nearly half of them industrial -- could push workers to insist on greater collective decision-making on workplace issues and the need for a social safety net. They may increasingly insist on exercising the worker rights guaranteed in the U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (China signed this treaty in October 1997, but has not yet ratified it.) The official national employment rate is about eight percent, and in some rural areas it's much higher. A rise in the unemployment rate may create more instability in the short run, with the authorities clamping down on attempts by workers to organize. But eventually the government may be forced to create channels for workers to negotiate over their grievances. The alternative to allowing greater freedom of association is to risk disaffected workers turning against the state.

But I must emphasize that WTO membership in itself will not guarantee the rule of law, respect for worker rights, or meaningful political reform. Economic openness could be accompanied by tight restrictions on basic freedoms and a lack of governmental accountability. The Chinese government might seek to build the rule of law in the economic sphere while simultaneously continuing to pervert and undermine the rule of law elsewhere. For example, Chinese authorities claim to be upholding the "rule of law" by arresting and throwing in jail pro-democracy activists, and the nationwide crackdown on the Falun Gong movement has been cloaked in rhetoric about the "rule of law."

We believe the U.S. and China's other major trading partners must increase pressure on Beijing for significant improvements in human rights. It makes little sense to bring China into the WTO and expect it to abide by global trading rules when Beijing flaunts international rules of human rights with impunity. China must be moved to go beyond opening its markets to opening its jails, easing restrictions on the press and the Internet, and protecting the rights of workers, Tibetans, Uighurs and other ethnic minorities.

Human Rights Developments in China:

There has been a clear deterioration of human rights conditions in China. A tightening of controls on basic freedoms began in late 1998, escalated throughout 1999, and has continued into 2000. During her visit to Beijing this past March, Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, publicly condemned the crackdown on free expression, freedom of religion and association. The range of the crackdown suggests that a nationally coordinated campaign is underway to shut down all peaceful opposition in the name of maintaining "social stability." The annual "Strike Hard" anti-crime campaign, launched just last week, will reportedly target both common criminals and suspected dissidents.

Among the elements of the crackdown are:

  • an intensified attack on all organizations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as a threat to its rule;

  • a series of regulations that constrain free association, assembly and religious expression;

  • the ongoing arrest of Tibet "splittists" and tightened secular control of Tibetan Buddhism;

  • the stepped up pace of arrests and executions of activists in Xinjiang. Even a prominent Uighur businesswoman, Ms. Rebiya Kadeer, was detained last August and given an eight year prison sentence by the Urumqi Intermediate Court on March 10, 2000. She was convicted of "revealing state intelligence" abroad because she tried to send copies of news articles on repression in Xinjiang to her husband, who broadcasts from the U.S. on Radio Free Asia; court documents also say she had planned to give a list of political prisoners to a visiting Congressional staff delegation. Her case has been highlighted by the Congressional Human Rights Caucus and by Rep. Nethercutt and Rep. Porter in their concurrent resolution calling for her immediate release, which was adopted on May 2 in the Senate by unanimous consent;

  • the purge of four leading academics from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences last month, including the dismissal of its retired vice president, Li Shenzhi, who wrote an essay critical of the Chinese Communist Party, plus two economists who have urged more rapid economic reform, and a political science professor, Liu Junning, who has called for a modern political system;

  • ongoing attempts to interfere with the free flow of information at home and abroad, through new restrictions on the Internet and threats against academic research in open sources. We welcomed the release of the respected scholar, Song Yongyi, but his arbitrary arrest and detention are a clear reminder of the capriciousness of the "rule of law" in China and the dangers of conducting research into sensitive subjects.

    I would like to provide the Committee with a few examples to illustrate the depth and breadth of the current crackdown.

    On November 23, 1998, former premier Li Peng issued a statement that effectively banned opposition political parties. The following month, the courts gave heavy sentences to three leading members of the China Democracy Party (CDP), an open, peaceful opposition Party that had announced its formation prior to President Clinton's visit to China in June 1998. Veteran dissident Xu Wenli in Beijing, Qin Yongmin in Hubei province, and Wang Youcai in Zhejiang were sentenced to thirteen, twelve and eleven years respectively for "conspiring to subvert state power." The government's largely successful attempts to destroy the CDP have resulted in long prison sentences for its members in Beijing, Shanghai, and at least eight other provinces. In all, some twenty-five China Democracy Party members have been sentenced since December 1998 after trials lacking adequate procedural safeguards and closed in all but name. Others have been tried but not yet sentenced; at least a dozen more are still in detention. The most recent CDP member sentenced was Zhu Zhengming, given a 10 year prison term on charges of subversion in Hangzhou, in the province of Zhejiang, on May 1. Zhu was an engineer at a chemical plant and an activist in the China Democracy Party.

    Other attempts to organize groups outside official control have also been stifled. In November 1999, Aun Jun, an attorney who formed an organization called "Corruption Watch" to expose local corruption, was put on trial. On April 19, 2000 -- the day after the vote in Geneva on a U.S.-sponsored resolution on China at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights -- the court announced that he had been given a four year sentence on charges of subversion. Aun Jun had attempted to legally register the organization with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but it was banned.

    Throughout China, leaders of worker and peasant protests calling for workers rights have been detained. Also, those trying to organize workers, or protesting against exorbitant fees and taxes, corruption, or fixed local elections have been arrested and given sentences of up to ten years. The Party controls the country's only officially recognized workers' organization, the All China Federation of Trade Unions. Anyone trying to organize an independent union is routinely arrested. For example, Li Jinghua and Yan Jinhong were sentenced in January 1999 to reeducation through labor for leading steelworkers in 1998 to protest unpaid wages by blocking a railway line. Zhang Shanguang founded the Association to Protect the Rights and Interests of Laid Off Workers; he got a ten year sentence in December 1998 after telling a Radio Free Asia reporter about workers protests in Hunan province. But protests by workers continue almost daily. One indication of the high degree of unrest was a huge protest of some 20,000 mineworkers in Yangjiazhangzi, northeast China in Februrary. Angered by the loss of jobs and corruption, they reportedly burned cars, smashed windows, and blocked streets for three days; the People's Liberation Army was finally dispatched to put down the rebellion, arresting miners on charges of destroying public property.

    It's worth noting that China has not ratified key ILO (International Labor Organization) conventions protecting the rights of free association (87), the right to organize and bargain collectively (98), or on the abolition of forced labor (105). Of these, I might add that the U.S. has only ratified the ILO convention on forced labor.

    Restrictions on religious freedom have increased. The crackdown on Falun Gong clearly violates China's commitments to respect internationally-guaranteed rights of freedom of belief, expression, association and assembly. Members of Falun Gong were briefly detained by the thousands for "reeducation" after the group was officially banned on July 22, 1999, though most have since been released. Millions of Falun Gong books were confiscated and destroyed. According to official statistics released by the New China News Agency on April 20, 2000, there have been 2,591 cases of Falun Gong members or supporters taken up by the courts, resulting in ninety-nine convictions and eight-four prison sentences thus far. The actual numbers may be higher. Sentences officially confirmed have ranged from three to eighteen years. Also, in recent weeks there have been reports of three more imprisoned Falun Gong members dying due to beatings or hunger strikes; the total number of deaths is impossible to confirm. President Jiang has made it clear that the suppression of the Falun Gong remains a high priority as part of the government's broader effort to control all organizations. The number of Falun Gong members -- between two and seventy million in China -- their ability to organize, and their use of modern tools of communication have made the Falun Gong movement especially threatening. Yet last month, authorities admitted that the massive crackdown has failed to suppress the movement, and protests by Falun Gong members in Tiananmen Square continue on a regular basis.

    In early January 2000, Premier Zhu Rongji and State Councillor Ismail Amat gave speeches stressing the importance of control of religion to the stability of the state, and resistance to "hostile foreign forces" which they say use religion to undermine China's solidarity. Throughout the past year, there have been sporadic reports of arrests and detentions of Catholics and Protestants. Campaigns to register Catholic congregations in Hebei and Zhejiang provinces forced many worshipers into hiding. In an attempt to reaffirm the independence from the papacy of the official Catholic Church in China, the government's Religious Affairs Bureau and the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China arranged the ordination of five bishops in March, without seeking papal approval. During Easter Week last month, there were reports of harassment of members of the Catholic underground church in Wenzhou diocese, where a campaign has been underway by local officials since last year to force church members to join the official Catholic Patriotic Association.

    At least ninety-five Protestant house church leaders were detained early in 1999. A Protestant house-church group in Anhui province called the Full Circle Church was singled out for harassment last month. According to official press reports, forty-seven members of the group were detained by police on April 9; six of the organizers face criminal charges for establishing an "illegal sect" and for organizing "illegal gatherings." Eight others are likely to be given administrative punishments.

    Those released from prison still risk official harassment and intimidation. On March 29, 2000 Bao Tong, the former Chinese Central Committee member and senior aide to Zhao Ziyang, released a letter to the Chinese authorities protesting increased monitoring and harassment since the beginning of this year. Bao was released from prison in 1996, after being imprisoned during the student protests in 1989, and was then kept under house arrest for one year. When his political rights were finally restored in May 1998, Bao Tong began speaking out against government and Communist Party policies. In his recent letter, he declares: "My personal freedom has been limited and violated. Day and night, whenever I step out of my home, there are always six people closely following me." He also complains that reporters interviewing him have been warned they would be punished, and that his phone service has been cut at the time of important political anniversaries. His treatment violates guarantees of free expression contained in the Chinese constitution.

    Controls on the Internet:

    The government's attempts to control the Internet have ominous implications for U.S. businesses seeking to expand operations in China under the terms of the new U.S.-China trade agreement. In January 1999, new regulations were issued requiring bars and cafes with Internet access to register and inform the police about their customers. By May, the Ministry of State Security was able to track individual E-mail accounts through monitoring devices on Internet Service Providers. Internet bulletin boards were subject to round-the-clock monitoring; several were closed for hosting political discussions or postings critical of government policies.

    The government of Shanghai took the lead requiring corporate Internet users to register with the police, or face a fine. On January 26, 2000 new regulations retroactive to January 1 prohibited the transmittal of state secrets on the Web or through E-mail. The restrictions make both users and Web site owners liable for infractions. The broad language of the state secrets law invites selective application against anyone out of favor with the government. In addition, new regulations prohibit websites from independently compiling news or interviewing reporters; instead, they can only carry news already compiled by domestic newspapers.

    I should add that the publishing and print media have also been more tightly supervised. Last fall, local newspapers and magazines were put under Communist Party control. And the State Press and Publications Administration banned foreign investment in wholesale book publication and distribution, and limited the right to distribute textbooks, political documents, and the writing of China's leaders to a handful of enterprises.

    Foreign journalists and the local media in Hong Kong are facing tightened controls. Chinese officials have stopped issuing tourist visas for foreign reporters in Hong Kong going into mainland China for personal visits, and instead require them to join official tour groups. The recent warning by a senior Chinese official that the Hong Kong press should be careful how they report on Taiwan issues sparked protests by Hong Kong legislators and the Hong Kong Journalists Association.

    Recommendations to Congress and the Administration:

    We urge the Congress and the Administration to couple efforts to make China a more reliable trading partner with serious parallel pressure on China to comply with its international human rights obligations. The WTO process itself can be a useful source of leverage, along with other channels of pressure.

    1) Permanent NTR:
    China has lobbied for several years for an end to the annual review of its trade status under the Jackson-Vanik amendment of the Trade Act of 1974, and as part of the WTO deal President Clinton has pledged to give China permanent Normal Trade Relations status. We believe that in exchange for PNTR, Congress should insist on reciprocal concrete steps on human rights by China.

    Congress should set concrete, meaningful and realistic human rights conditions that China must meet before receiving permanent NTR. The president should be required to certify that these conditions have been met, and this could happen any time following China's accession to the WTO. For example, China should be required to:

  • ratify the two United Nations human rights treaties it has signed: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed in October 1998, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

  • take steps to begin dismantling the huge system of "reeducation through labor," which allows officials to sentence thousands of citizens to labor camps each year for up to three years without judicial review. A commission could be established for this purpose, and the U.S. and the U.N. could offer to provide support with technical assistance and rule of law programs;

  • open up Tibet and Xinjiang to regular, unhindered access by U.N. human rights and humanitarian agencies, foreign journalists, and independent monitors;

  • review the sentences of more than 2,000 "counter-revolutionaries" convicted under provisions of the Chinese law repealed in March 1997, with a view towards releasing most of them.

    Getting China to meet these conditions is possible, if the Administration engages in the kind of intensive, high level negotiations with Beijing it conducted to finalize the trade agreement last November. In light of the failure of the U.N. in Geneva to censure China, it is even more imperative that Congress and the Administration agree on meaningful human rights conditions on PNTR as one of the few remaining sources of serious leverage.

    To replace the annual trade status review, we would strongly support creation of a new mechanism, such as a special commission appointed jointly by Congress and the executive branch along the lines of what Rep. Sandy Levin has proposed. This commission should have staff based in China as well as in the U.S. It should issue a report annually on China's compliance with international human rights and labor rights norms. But this should be more than a pro forma process, or it will have no real credibility. Legislation establishing the commission should require a debate, in both houses of Congress, each year by a certain date, and a vote by Congress on the commission's findings and recommendations for U.S. bilateral and multilateral policy initiatives. These initiatives should be wide-ranging and include, as appropriate, both economic and diplomatic tools.

    2) U.N. Commission on Human Rights:
    We applauded the Administration's decision in January to sponsor a critical resolution on China at this year's annual meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. In announcing this decision, the State Department correctly noted that "China's human rights record has continued to deteriorate . . . Our goal in sponsoring a China resolution is to foster increased respect for human rights in China."

    Indeed, when confronted with a credible threat of a debate and vote in Geneva in the past, China has taken limited but important positive steps on human rights. It has also expended major effort worldwide to keep any critical resolution off the Commission's agenda -- including by threatening to cut off trade deals or investment opportunities to governments that might support action. This effort has been stepped up since 1995, when a China resolution came within only one vote of being adopted.

    Far in advance of this year's Commission meeting, it was clear that in order to have any chance at getting a debate and vote, the Administration needed to engage in high level lobbying of other Commission members and potential cosponsors, in Europe, Central and Latin America, and elsewhere. For months, we urged President Clinton to match his commitment to WTO, and his intensive personal lobbying of Congress on PNTR, with a similar commitment to wage an effective campaign in Geneva. Members of Congress also made appeals to the White House. Both Secretary of State Albright and Assistant Secretary Harold Koh were energetically involved in pushing the resolution -- the Secretary of State even flew to Geneva from India to speak to the Commission. We hope this Committee will congratulate them for their efforts. However, we unaware of any presidential involvement in the campaign.

    On April 18, the Commission adopted a procedural motion by China to keep the U.S.-sponsored resolution off the agenda: the vote was 22 to 18, with 12 abstentions; Romania was absent when the vote was taken. This decision gave the wrong signal to Beijing's leaders, and by refusing to even debate China's human rights record, seriously damaged the credibility of the Commission itself. Most importantly, it represented a dismal failure of political will on the part of many governments -- including members of the European Union (EU), Japan, Canada, and Australia -- that claimed to be concerned about human rights in China, but declined to cosponsor the resolution or to lobby vigorously against the no-action motion.

    After the vote, the EU tried to justify its lack of action with a weak statement of concern, basically hiding behind its human rights dialogue with China. The EU admitted that except for some limited improvements in the legal system, "little progress (on human rights) has been achieved on the ground." But it went on to "attach great importance to the EU/China human rights dialogue" while expressing the vague hope that this dialogue will be "translated into concrete actions."

    Mr. Chairman, dialogue must be accompanied by pressure. What incentive will Beijing now have, following its victory in Geneva, to go beyond dialogue to make serious improvements in its human rights practices? In fact, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture, Nigel Rodley, recently announced that his planned visit to China next month was on hold because Beijing would not agree to the U.N.'s criteria. These criteria include unrestricted access to detention centers and police stations as well as the ability to interview detainees confidentially.

    Meanwhile, following the Geneva vote, China offered to resume the bilateral dialogue on human rights with the U.S. that it suspended after last spring's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The Administration should not even consider agreeing to the dialogue if this would entail a commitment to abandon any future attempts to censure China at the Commission.

    3) Code of Conduct for Companies:
    China's entry into the WTO, and the implementation of the new bilateral agreement with the U.S., will lead to greater American private investment in China. We urge Congress to enact legislation originally introduced as early as 1991, and most recently in the House in 1995, outlining principles for a "code of conduct" for U.S. companies operating in China.

    The legislation should express the sense of Congress that U.S. companies should, among other things, prohibit the use of forced labor in their factories or by their subcontractors in China, prohibit a police or military presence in the workplace, protect workers' rights of free association, assembly and religion, discourage compulsory political indoctrination, and promote freedom of expression by workers including their freedom to seek and receive information of all kinds through any media -- in writing, orally, or through the Internet. The "code of conduct" bill should contain a registration and reporting procedure, and require an annual report to Congress and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the level of adherence to the principles by U.S. companies.

    4) Labor Secretary to China:
    U.S. Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman was invited to visit China by her counterpart, the Chinese labor minister, when he came to Washington, D.C., in March, 1999. We hope the Committee will urge her to travel to China as soon as possible in order to conduct a high-level dialogue on China's labor practices, including protection of key worker rights, the cases of detained workers and labor organizers, and the creation of social safety nets. She would be the first U.S. labor secretary ever to visit China. Members of the Committee might also offer to accompany Secretary Herman on the trip. Such a visit could also be used to explore how the U.S. could assist with training and technical assistance to strengthen the protection and independent monitoring of internationally-recognized labor rights.

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