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II. Maximizing the Impact of the ICC 

In order to achieve its full potential, the court's impact must not be limited solely to prosecuting a handful of perpetrators.  Because the ICC will be trying only a few cases in each situation, maximizing the effect of those cases is essential to extend the reach of the court’s work.  We believe several components are necessary to accomplish this: broad outreach and communications, active field engagement, wide promotion of victim participation in proceedings, an independent Victim’s Trust Fund, an effective victim and witness protection program, and a focus on promoting complementarity.

A. Effective Outreach and Communications

Unlike a national court whose authority is implicitly accepted, the ICC has no deep-rooted legitimacy in the communities where it is working and is often viewed with suspicion, if not outright hostility, by those who fear its work.  It conducts proceedings in languages not always accessible to the local population.  Its legal procedures may be very unfamiliar to people in the communities affected. The fact that the ICC works in communities that are polarized and war-torn makes outreach and communications all the more important because those threatened by the court will do their utmost to tarnish it.

Although outreach (including press strategy) will not change the minds of those seeking to distort the work of the court for political reasons, it will also provide some counterweight to intentionally inaccurate information about the court.  It is not intended to create a consensus about the court, rather it provides the necessary tools for local communities to have a correct understanding of the court’s role.  Outreach can create a sense of awareness and interest in the legal process.  Human Rights Watch believes it is necessary to provide those who are looking for justicea better understanding of the court’s mission.  Outreach will also assist those undecided about the ICC to better understand its functions.  Initiatives to inform the public about the ICC's work are critically important to making the court relevant to the very people in need of justice.  This will also have the practical benefit of making people more willing to cooperate and assist the court.

Because none of the usual means for disseminating information about a national court are readily available to the ICC, the court needs to have an effective strategy for external relations, public information and outreach to popularize its work.  Human Rights Watch believes effective outreach and communications require meaningful engagement, dialogue and exchange with local communities and media.  An outreach and communications program must also start early to be most effective.

The importance of implementing an active outreach and communications program from the outset of operations is a key lesson the ICC needs to fully learn from the experience of the ad hoc tribunals.  At the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, outreach was an afterthought and, in fact, was never included in the tribunal budget.  The ICTY began its investigations in 1994.  The first indictments were issued in late 1994 and early 1995.  However, the outreach program was not started until the fall of 1999 when the tribunal realized how poorly it was perceived in former Yugoslavia.  Regional outreach offices were finally established in 2000 and 2001 and they have had to work hard since then to correct public opinion that had already been adversely affected by a biased media.²  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established in November, 1994, and issued its first indictments a year later.  However, an active outreach program was not initiated until late 1998 by which time public perception of the tribunal had been negatively influenced by government criticism.³

While the Special Court for Sierra Leone is based in the country where the crimes occurred and Sierra Leone is in a post-conflict transition, there are relevant lessons that can be drawn from its practices. The Special Court has directly engaged the local population throughout its operations, from holding “town hall” meetings across Sierra Leone when the court was first established, to continually disseminating information about its proceedings through video, radio, workshops and written material.  Through direct engagement from its early stages, the Special Court has helped ensure that the local population has an accurate understanding about its work which in turn has contributed to raising people’s belief that justice can and should be done for serious crimes.⁴

Human Rights Watch welcomes the initiation of outreach activities by the ICC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda and is pleased that the ICC has agreed upon an Integrated Strategy for External Relations, Public Information and Outreach.  In the past few months, for example, the ICC has held an information workshop in Uganda for delegations from local councils as well as a seminar for Ugandan judicial authorities and information meetings for lawyers and journalists.  The ICC has also held seminars for lawyers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Kinshasa and has participated in other workshops or meetings organized by NGOs throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  In addition, the ICC has developed an interactive radio program in Bunia and the prosecutor has invited community leaders from Uganda to The Hague for important discussions.⁵  The Registry also reports having prepared outreach materials for distribution in the various country situations.⁶

While these efforts are important, they have not been enough to provide basic knowledge to the affected communities about the ICC.  Human Rights Watch researchers in northern Uganda encountered the widespread impression that the ICC is being manipulated by President Museveni.  They also found that there is misunderstanding about the ICC’s ability to prosecute crimes that occurred before July 2002 which fall outside of the court’s jurisdiction.⁷ In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, our researchers have come upon widespread confusion about why the ICC started its Uganda investigation before beginning its efforts in Ituri.  Moreover, local civil society members have expressed concerns about the lack of information regarding the progress of investigations and there are signs that they are beginning to lose enthusiasm for the court’s work.  In Sudan, the news of the ICC referral generated a great deal of hope and high expectations among civil society groups in Darfur, but the lack of outreach since then has left many victims feeling disillusioned about the prospects for justice.

Human Rights Watch believes that that the ICC must significantly enhance its outreach and communication activities in several ways in order to make the court accessible and meaningful to those most affected by the crimes. First, though the organs of the court have agreed upon an Integrated Strategy for External Relations, Public Information and Outreach, country specific strategies also must be agreed upon and implemented promptly. These strategies must include a clear division of responsibilities between the different court organs.  Plans should also be tailored to respond to the particular challenges that exist for conducting outreach in each country.  For example, in countries where there is limited internet access, press releases may have to be hand delivered to local newspapers, as is done in Sierra Leone.  Where journalists have limited access to phones, means may have to be devised to enable reporters to call the press office collect or reach the press office in some other way.  To be successful, situation specific strategies must evolve over time in response to feedback from relevant sectors of society in each country, including local journalists and civil society groups.

Second, Human Rights Watch is concerned that the ICC's outreach operations are not adequately funded at this time.  This prevents outreach from being sufficiently far-reaching and maximally effective.  The lack of resources demonstrates the low priority the court attaches to outreach.  Similarly, the proposed budget currently allocates only 210,000 euros (or less than 0.3% of the budget) to fund all outreach efforts in the field including meetings with community leaders, printed materials, radio programs and three conferences a year with 100 participants.⁸ Human Rights Watch believes that the small amount allocated is not nearly enough to cover the range of activities required in the three countries where investigations are ongoing.  The staffing proposed for the field offices is too few and too junior.  The proposed staffing does not reflect the importance of outreach to local communities as part of fulfilling the court’s mandate.  Even worse, the ICC's modest request for field staffing was cut further by the Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF) which recommended funding only five of the eight GS-OL posts proposed in the ICC budget.  Cutting positions in the field assigned to work in outreach sends the wrong message from the ASP to court officials about the importance it attaches to outreach as a component of the court’s overall strategy.  The cut in local staff also probably will be seen as a lack of appreciation for the added value local staff provide to outreach efforts, a value disproportionate to their modest salaries.  We urge the ASP not to cut these positions and to signal court officials that outreach should be an essential component of their operations vis-à-vis local communities.⁹

Third, the current plans are too reliant on NGOs.  The Report on activities of the Court to the ASP states that “In conducting outreach activities, the Registry relies on local actors.”¹⁰ The rationale for cutting the ICC’s proposal for three additional GS-OL staff is that the work of this section “would rely to a large extent on the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) present in the field.”¹¹  Yet no mention is made of what type of assistance NGOs would be providing.  As far as we know, no discussions have been conducted with local NGOs in the field on this.

Furthermore, although numerous international and local NGOs disseminate information about the court, for a variety of reasons, they cannot substitute for some amount of court-conducted outreach with ordinary citizens.  In some country situations there is no civil society strong enough to conduct outreach.   To the extent NGOs exist, they may not have the necessary resources to provide outreach for the court.    In addition, local NGOs may be affiliated or perceived to be affiliated with a particular ethnic, political or social group.  This could create the appearance of bias if the ICC is not able to work with groups of different allegiances equally.  Furthermore, there are situations in which the government is hostile to the ICC and it may not be safe for an NGO to be publicly associated with the court.  Moreover, some messages can only be given by the ICC itself because they would not be received in the same way if delivered by NGOs.  Finally, because the ICC is a complex institution, NGOs may not be able to answer accurately all of the questions that arise about the court.  Direct involvement by ICC officials in outreach will ensure that the information given to the communities is entirely consistent with the message the court seeks to deliver.   

Aside from supporting the ICC’s proposed budget for outreach, Human Rights Watch encourages the ASP to request that the court report on implementation of its Integrated Strategy for External Relations, Public Information and Outreach.  The ASP should further request that the court continue to submit detailed progress reports on outreach to the ASP Bureau and the Committee on Budget and Finance over the course of the year.  

Human Rights Watch recommends that, at its upcoming session, the ASP:

• supports the proposed budget in its entirety in the area of outreach;
• sends a strong message in its Omnibus Resolution to the ICC about the importance of conducting its own outreach to local communities and media in fulfilling its mission; and
• welcomes the ICC report on outreach strategy and encourages the ICC  to submit regular detailed reports on how its outreach strategy is being implemented to the ASP Bureau and the Committee on Budget and Finance.

B. Adequate Field Presence and Engagement

In addition to outreach and communication, in order to maximize impact within the communities most affected by the crimes, it is essential that the court have sufficient staff and resources in its field offices in each of the situations under investigation.  Human Rights Watch welcomes the opening of ICC field offices in Kampala and Kinshasa in the past year.¹² Human Rights Watch also welcomes the increased ICC field presence reflected in the proposed 2006 budget.  Additional resources and field-based staff are proposed for the OTP, the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU), the Victim Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS), and the Public Information Unit.¹³  In total, over thirty new field-based positions are proposed for the court’s operations.  In addition, the proposed budget includes requests for funding the hiring of local staff for these offices.  We believe that hiring local staff is a positive development.  The court will need to rely heavily on local staff for information about events and conditions in formulating its strategies in order to make sure outreach, witness protection and press relations are meaningful to the local population.  The establishment of the Registry’s Field Operations Section to coordinate administration, logistics and communications with respect to all field activities also reflects the ICC’s increased emphasis on field activities as the number of situations under investigation grows.  

Human Rights Watch further welcomes funds in the proposed 2006 budget for judges to make visits to the field.  This will provide judges with a better understanding of the context in which crimes were committed.  Human Rights Watch encourages the ASP to go a step further and ask the ICC to submit an option paper at the next ASP session on the possibility of conducting in situ proceedings where feasible.   The beneficial effect of conducting proceedings in the country where the crimes occurred cannot be overstated.  As demonstrated by the experience of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in-country proceedings make an important contribution to making the justice process real for those most directly affected.  The ASP should encourage the ICC to consider instituting at least a limited number of such proceedings where possible. 

Human Rights Watch also believes the ICC must strive to establish limited but effective field presence in the areas where the victims are located and not just in the capital cities of countries where investigations are taking place.  While offices in the capitals are important as a base of operations and for relations with government officials, they are no substitute for presence in the affected communities.  Given the difficulty and expense of travel for victims and witnesses, locating field offices solely in the capitals has the practical effect of making the offices inaccessible to the people who may be most in need of information or interaction with the ICC.  It will also be extremely difficult for the court to implement  effective management of victims’ participation, victim and witness protection or outreach, if ICC staff is far removed from the communities where investigations are ongoing.

Human Rights Watch recognizes the serious challenges posed by security risks in the field.  In this regard, we welcome the tireless efforts of court officials to secure their presence in Bunia, Ituri.  Bunia is 1700 kilometers away from Kinshasa, making it impossible for the Kinshasa office to have an effect in the areas most interested in proceedings.  Even with the pressing security difficulties, we urge the ICC to examine fully any possibility for limited field presence as close as possible to, if not in, the areas it is investigating.

Human Rights Watch urges the ASP to:

• encourage the ICC to submit an option paper on conducting in situ proceedings where possible; and
• encourage the ICC in its Omnibus Resolution to establish a field presence as much as feasible in or near the areas being investigated.

C. Ensuring the ICC Adequately Prioritizes Victims and Witnesses

Adequately addressing witness and victim issues at the ICC is another crucial component to ensure that the court maximizes its impact with those most affected by the crimes being investigated and prosecuted.  The ICC gives a central role to victims in the international justice process.  This reflects a major advance for an international justice mechanism.  The statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“the Rules”) provide victims with rights to participate in proceedings and opportunities to receive reparations, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.¹⁴  Additionally the Rome Statute and Rules require comprehensive protection of witnesses and victim participants involved with the court at each stage in proceedings.¹⁵  

The ICC has made important efforts to ensure effective participation of victims and to establish a protection program for witnesses and victim participants.  However, as discussed below, Human Rights Watch believes it is crucial that the court enhances its efforts in this area.  The ASP has a critical role to play in supporting a viable, but broad  view of the ICC’s functions regarding victims and witnesses.  The ASP should approve necessary support for activities related to witnesses and victims. Human Rights Watch also believes it should approve regulations for the Victims Trust Fund that allow the Fund to have a deep impact on the affected communities.  

1. Victims’ Participation

At the ICC victims have a unique opportunity in the proceedings of an international criminal tribunal to serve as “participants.”  In this capacity, victims are empowered to present their views and concerns beyond giving testimony as witnesses.¹⁶ Victims’ participation could break down the traditional barriers between victims and the international judicial process.  It could enable victims to have some input  in their interaction with the ICC.  Victims’ participation, if properly handled, should make justice more accessible and meaningful to those who have suffered the most.   

The potentially large number of victims, the victims’ lack of understanding of ICC proceedings, and the likely difficulty of reaching victims based in rural areas create enormous challenges to successfully realizing victims’ participation.  Avoiding tensions between different victims groups and the creation of unrealistic expectations for victims, along with ensuring adequate legal representation, are further challenges facing the court.  Moreover, due to the groundbreaking nature of victims’ participation in international criminal proceedings, there are no previous experiences from which the ICC can benefit in addressing these challenges.

In this context, the ICC has taken a number of important steps to initiate victims’ participation.  For example, the VPRS has developed application forms for victims’ participation which have been approved by the presidency.  The VPRS has also started to provide some training in the field primarily to local NGOs.  These NGOs may be able to serve as intermediaries between the ICC and possible victim participants by reaching out to victims, providing information about becoming a participant, and assisting in filling out applications for participation.¹⁷ 

The first application by victims to serve as participants in proceedings has been submitted from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.  Progress has also been made in providing legal representation for victim participants.  In September 2005, the ICC established an independent office to assist in ensuring adequate legal representation for victim participants, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims.  Hiring staff for this office is underway, along with efforts to develop its policies and working methodologies.¹⁸  Additionally, the ICC has a limited budget to provide legal aid upon court order to indigent victims for legal representation of their own choosing.¹⁹

These efforts are commendable, but Human Rights Watch believes they must be significantly strengthened to make victims’ participation meaningful.  While the current budget proposal reflects important increases to the budget for field operations, funding remains inadequate.  The proposed 2006 budget requests only seven field-based staff members from the VPRS to be allocated between the three situations currently under investigation.²⁰   Human Rights Watch is concerned that this limited staffing will not be enough to enable VPRS to contact a sufficient number of possible victim participants.  

We are similarly concerned by the CBF proposed cut of 10% to support for legal representation for victims and accused.  The court prepared its proposed budget based on the OTP’s assumption that there will be two trials at the court in 2006.²¹  The Registry foresees two legal representation teams for victims at trial.  The effect of the 10% cut is to reduce legal representation for victims by one team.  Given that four legal representation teams for victims’ participation is in itself fairly limited, the ASP should reject the proposed cuts. 

The current plans to ensure victims' participation also appear to reflect too much reliance on local partners.²²  We recognize that the ICC will not be able to reach all possible victim participants.   However, there are real questions regarding the capacity, resources, willingness, and potential risks for local partners.  As a result, the VPRS will need to articulate clearly how local partners will be best utilized.

The limited extent of outreach to possible victim participants to date also is cause for concern. It so far consists only of production of outreach materials and ICC participation in several seminars organized by local partners.²³  This level of outreach makes it extremely difficult for possible victim participants, particularly those based in rural areas, to become aware of the rights and opportunities the ICC offers.  

In short, Human Rights Watch recommends that, at its upcoming session, the ASP:

• affirms in its Omnibus Resolution the important role of victims at the ICC, noting the unique policies regarding victims’ participation and reparation;
• requests in its Omnibus Resolution that

- the ICC report to the Bureau and the CBF on its activities in regard to victims participation; and

- the ICC develop a common focused strategy regarding victims to ensure that victims are accorded adequate prioritization by all organs of the court; and

• approves all budget provisions related to field staff to assist in victims’ participation and reinstates proposed cuts to legal representation.

2. Maximizing the Impact of the Trust Fund for Victims

In keeping with our view that the vision of the court should include an effort to have a broad impact on affected communities, Human Rights Watch believes the Trust Fund for Victims should be not be limited to the implementation of reparation orders.  It should be used in a way to benefit more than just the narrow class of victims affected by crimes that resulted in a successful prosecution.  Therefore, Human Rights Watch supports draft regulations for the Trust Fund that would allow its board of directors both to implement court orders for reparations and to allocate voluntary contributions more broadly to benefit victims of crimes under investigation by the ICC.²⁴ 

Human Rights Watch is a member of the Victims’ Rights Working Group and supports its positions on the Trust Fund.²⁵  In particular, Human Rights Watch agrees that the drafters of the Rome Statute did not intend to limit the Trust Fund exclusively to implementing reparation orders by the court.  Because the court will only prosecute a limited number of people, a large number of victims would be left uncompensated by a narrow interpretation of the Trust Fund’s scope.  This may lead to tension and resentment.  The Trust Fund for Victims should be allowed to use other resources it has raised to implement programs flexibly for the benefit of victims once investigations have begun. 

Furthermore, Human Rights Watch believes that the Trust Fund should be able to start projects for the benefit of victims once the prosecutor has formally opened an investigation.  This standard limits the situations for which funds will be disbursed yet allows the board the ability to fund projects closer to the time of the atrocities when the funds are most needed.  Waiting until post-conviction before distributing funds could mean that victims have to wait many years before receiving assistance.  By this time the impact of the assistance may not be as great. 

Finally, preserving the board’s discretion and independence to use its expertise to direct the allocation of funds that are not used for reparation orders without requiring a court order is important.  This will help to ensure the board is able to fulfill its mandate and maintain its independence from the court.  The court may feel uncomfortable making judgments about victims’ compensation before there is a conviction.  Although Human Rights Watch recognizes that decisions to allocate funds will always entail difficult choices, allowing the board the flexibility to apply funds where most needed allows the board to maximize the Trust Fund’s potential.

The other issue of continuing contention is the earmarking of voluntary contributions collected by the Trust Fund for Victims.  Human Rights Watch believes that permitting partial earmarking in a limited way will maximize the ability of the Trust Fund to attract donations.  The proposed regulations include provisions ensuring that allocations from earmarking are made consistently with Rule 85 and do not result in an inequitable distribution of funds and property among groups of victims.²⁶  Furthermore, the board itself can adopt additional measures to guarantee that funds are collected and distributed in a way that does not compromise the objectives of the Trust Fund for Victims.  For example, the Victims’ Rights Working Group proposed that the board itself establish categories from which donors can choose to earmark funds and set a cap on the amount of a donation which may be earmarked.

In short, it is important that the regulations for the Trust Fund for Victims create a reasonable, but generous mandate allowing it to perform its functions in a meaningful manner.  Human Rights Watch believes it is crucial that the ASP reach a consensus on the regulations at this ASP session to enable the Trust Fund for Victims to begin its important work.

Human Rights Watch urges the ASP to finalize ongoing discussions and adopt Regulations for the International Criminal Court Trust Fund for Victims.

3. Victim and Witness Protection

No one disputes that protection and support for victim participants, witnesses and others at risk are “paramount concerns” for the International Criminal Court.²⁷   The experience of the ad hoc tribunals and the Sierra Leone Special Court suggests that protecting those willing to come forward and testify--whether for prosecution or defense--will be key to the effectiveness of the ICC.  The capacity of the ICC to ensure adequate protection will likely determine the extent to which victims and witnesses will be willing to participate in court proceedings.  It will also affect their perception of the institution’s sensitivity to their needs and circumstances.  An effective protection program is therefore essential to the operations of the ICC.

Effective protection creates many challenges.  National authorities in the countries where international tribunals operate are often incapable or unwilling to assist with meaningful protection.  The ICC is currently investigating situations where conflict is ongoing and where civilians, human rights activists and staff of international organizations face serious security risks daily.  Logistics for operating in these situations are extremely difficult.  The ICC’s financial and capacity constraints make meeting protection obligations all the more difficult.  

Despite the challenges, the annual Report on the activities of the court submitted to the Assembly of States Parties²⁸ indicates that the ICC has made important strides over the past year in developing a functional protection scheme.  The court has made efforts to coordinate action by the OTP and the Registry’s VWU during the investigation phase.  For example, the VWU and the OTP have jointly developed security protocols for each of the situations under investigation to guide the work of the investigators who contact potential victims and witnesses.  VWU staff members have in some instances accompanied investigators in order to monitor the situation of victims and witnesses.   The OTP has taken precautions to limit the number of individuals contacted and to conduct interviews in a discrete manner.  This includes using intermediaries or means and locations that limit their exposure.   The Gender and Children Unit of the OTP has created a roster of external psychologists to assist with the assessment of the psychological condition of witnesses prior to interviews and to provide specialized support for traumatized individuals.  The VWU has developed emergency response systems that allow victims and witnesses to seek assistance at any time should their security be threatened.  Recent decisions by both Pre-Trial chambers have also demonstrated the chambers’ commitment to understanding security challenges faced by victims and witnesses in the field and to ensuring that the court takes all necessary measures to protect them.²⁹

With the issuance of the Uganda arrest warrants and the assumption that there will be arrest warrants in one other situation in the coming months, the ICC is entering a new phase of its operations which will pose new and more acute challenges for the protection of victims and witnesses in contact with the court.  In many ways, the efficacy of the protection scheme and the recent activities of the court will be put to the test.  In this context, it is vitally important that protection activities receive the full attention and resources required to be effective.

While the details of the court’s witness protection programs must remain opaque for reasons of security, Human Rights Watch is concerned about items in the budget that create questions about the operational capacity of the protection unit.  Human Rights Watch believes it is crucial that the VWU steps up its field presence in this new phase of the court’s operations.  The proposed hiring of two P-3 protection officers and two P-2 support officers, as well as a number of GS-OL local staff to manage the VWU protection and support activities in the field are welcome steps.  Adequate field presence is key to ensure that the court is able to monitor regularly the security of victims and witnesses and be able to intervene immediately when necessary.  We have questions, however, as to whether the proposed level of staffing (and the location of staff in Kinshasa or Kampala which is remote from where victims and witnesses are located) is sufficient to ensure effective protection and support.   

The limited staffing is linked to the court’s intent to rely on local networks and individuals to provide for witness protection in remote and insecure areas.  Indeed, in the Report on the activities of the Court to the ASP, the ICC acknowledges that it will have to rely on partners to implement its protection plan.³⁰  Although a witness protection program will certainly need to rely on local actors to some extent, the apparent reliance on local partners–in substitution for court personnel–raises some concerns about both conceptual and practical requirements of witness protection.  Important issues with respect to confidentiality may be compromised by providing information about the identity of witnesses to local actors.  Furthermore, to the extent local partners are involved, they by and large do not have witness protection experience and may be extremely limited by resource constraints and capacity.  Moreover, involvement in witness protection activities is likely to expose them to serious risks.   It will therefore be important for the court to clarify the extent to which it will rely on local partners and the modalities this reliance will take.  

In accordance with obligations under Article 93 of the Rome Statute,  States Parties should assist the court in providing witness and victim protection, including through relocation agreements.  States Parties may also need to use their influence to ensure that cooperation agreements are undertaken with peacekeeping operations that may play an important role in providing witness and victim protection.  Finally, States Parties must also be willing financially to support effective protection measures.  Protection is not cheap, but it is necessary and it is well worth the costs. 

Human Rights Watch urges the ASP to approve all budget provisions related to victim and witness protection and reject the CBF’s recommendation to cut two P-2 field positions proposed by the VWU.

Human Rights Watch further urges States Parties to assist the court with protection by signing relocation agreements and influencing other UN agencies and states to sign cooperation agreements.

D. Complementarity

To maximize the ICC’s impact, Human Rights Watch believes it is essential for the court to assist and, where necessary, press states to conduct national investigations and trials.  This is inherent in the Rome Statute’s fundamental principle of complementarity.  There is a role for the prosecutor, the Registry and the States Parties in this endeavor as the ICC should view complementarity as a crucial part of its overall strategy for achieving justice. In this regard, Human Rights Watch welcomes the efforts of the prosecutor to develop a digital library on the crimes in the Rome Statute that will be accessible to states.   We urge the prosecutor to speak publicly on the importance of national prosecutions conducted in a way consistent with internationally accepted fair trial standards.  In addition, where appropriate the Prosecutor should assist national prosecutions of ICC crimes.

Human Rights Watch urges the ASP in its Omnibus Resolution to encourage all organs of the ICC to include activities promoting complementarity as part of their overall strategy.

E. Strategic Plan

One important means to ensure that the ICC develops an appropriate institutional approach for maximizing impact is for the organs of the court to agree on and apply a set of guiding principles to its operations.  Human Rights Watch welcomes the 2004 recommendation of the CBF to the court that it articulate a set of global long-term objectives for inclusion in the draft 2006 budget.  This proposal was intended to address “fragmentation” and duplication of work in the various organs of the court.³¹ In December 2004, in response to the CBF recommendation, the court created an inter-organ working group to develop a five-year Strategic Plan.³²  Human Rights Watch appreciates the commitment of the court to developing this plan as a means to identify and implement an appropriate vision for its operations.   

In April 2005 the court informed the CBF that the Strategic Plan would be ready in July. However, the court has now reported that it will need more time to complete its plan.³³  Given that the Strategic Plan is the instrument by which the court will express the content of its vision, a delay of another year is problematic.  Key decisions regarding the development of the institution are already being taken.  What is at stake is a strategic direction that can and should have impact on ICC practice and policies.  

Moreover, as discussed earlier in this paper, Human Rights Watch has made recommendations about which guiding principles should be identified and operationalized by the court to achieve a proper institutional approach.  This requires a conception of the court’s mandate that recognizes the purposes underlying the creation of the ICC.  These principles extend beyond fair and effective trials for serious crimes and include maximizing impact in local communities to limit impunity for serious crimes and build respect for the rule of law.  As such, we believe the Strategic Plan must include the following key elements:

o credible and impartial investigations with adequate explanation to local populations by the Office of the Prosecutor concerning its policies and decisions not to prosecute where appropriate;  

o effective outreach, field engagement and promotion of complementarity in the communities most affected by the crimes;

o effective victims’ participation and reparations as well as protection and support for testifying witnesses and victim participants; and

o fair and efficient trials of all accused.

The enumeration of even the most appropriate guiding principles, however, is only the first step.  The more daunting task will be ensuring that these are translated into action.  In order to help ensure that this can be accomplished, clear plans to implement the principles must be identified.  Reliable indicators to evaluate their implementation will also need to be developed.  To further assist in accomplishing this objective and ensure that appropriate principles are in place, feedback from relevant stakeholders on the Strategic Plan should also be obtained in a manner consistent with the independence of the court.

Human Rights Watch recommends that the ASP in its Omnibus Resolution:

• welcomes the preparation of the Strategic Plan and urges the ICC to finalize it as a matter of priority and develop plans for implementation as soon as feasible; and
• urges the ICC to emphasize in its Strategic Plan key elements such as outreach and victim participation that have been addressed in this paper.

Human Rights Watch also recommends that upon finalization of the Strategic Plan, the ASP Bureau initiate an ASP working group to discuss the Plan.