III. Beyond Investigations and Trials: Maximizing Impact with Affected Communities
A. Victims’ Participation and ReparationsVictim’s participation and reparations at the ICC12 provide important opportunities for the court to enhance its impact with affected communities. The Strategic Plan makes significant references to victims,13 but does not adequately address this aspect. 1. The importance and difficulties of realizing victims’ participation and reparations Victims’ participation has the potential to increase the relevance of the ICC among affected communities. It can break down the barriers that have traditionally separated victims and international judicial processes, by enabling victims to have some involvement in the court’s proceedings. Reparations can also play an important role in enhancing the court’s resonance with local populations: reparations can have strong symbolic importance as they may be seen to acknowledge the gravity of the crimes and the suffering caused. Reparations may also provide the most tangible reflection of the ICC’s contribution to victims. In order to achieve these benefits, affected communities must understand the rights of victims to participate and to receive reparations. This will help to ensure that victims are able to exercise these rights, and have realistic expectations about them. There are numerous challenges to ensuring that affected communities have an adequate understanding of these rights, challenges that are magnified by the absence of precedents to rely on and learn from. Experience has shown that the workings of a complex criminal proceeding, particularly at an international justice mechanism, may be confusing or even daunting to many victims. Lack of information may discourage them from applying to participate or to receive reparations, or from actively participating. For example, we understand from partners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that many victims and organizations working with victims are awaiting more information on reparations before deciding whether to apply to participate or apply to receive reparations. Other challenges include: Sustained efforts over time will be needed to overcome the obstacles involved. 2. Key components to realizing victims’ participation and reparations The Strategic Plan should emphasize the role of victims in the court’s activities, and seek to utilize victims’ participation and reparations to maximize the ICC’s impact with affected communities. The plan should include the following strategies to achieve this: o The role of victims at the court and the limitations of this role; o How to apply to participate; o How to apply to receive reparations; and o Court policies on participation and reparations as they are decided by the judges.15 Given logistical, financial, and security constraints, victim participants will likely not attend the majority of proceedings. Legal representatives will be responsible for informing them about some developments, but the court should also incorporate steps in the plan to provide broader information about the proceedings to victim participants. The Strategic Plan should reflect that all court organs share the responsibility to implement victims’ rights and to ensure that a range of victims of crimes investigated by the ICC are represented in the court’s work. For instance, the OTP may include charges that are representative of the range of crimes committed in a situation, allowing a variety of victims to participate.17 Victims interact with the different organs at different stages. Every organ must account for this interaction and keep victims’ rights in mind at all times. Finally, the Strategic Plan should recognize that intermediaries can extend the ICC’s work, but cannot substitute it. The court has emphasized reliance on intermediaries, such as NGOs, to implement victims’ participation and reparations by disseminating information and assisting victims in filling out forms.18 Seeking the assistance of intermediaries is understandable: some NGOs have strong relationships with victim populations and expertise in the local culture, and the ICC has limited resources. However, local NGOs may have limited capacities to assist the court, and may face security risks to providing assistance. We understand that the court has not been able to secure firm cooperation from many potential partners. This underscores the importance of the court conducting the core of this work, at least in its first years. B. Field EngagementWith the ICC based far from the countries where the crimes were committed, the court runs the risk of being perceived as distant and irrelevantby the people it was created to serve. The Strategic Plan lists “development of options for the geographic location of the court’s activities” (the “Geographic Options”) as an objective,19 but does not provide any details. The plan should indicate objectives and strategies to utilize field engagement to help make the ICC’s work accessible and meaningful to local populations.20 The necessity of “field engagement” in the country where the crimes occurred for the ICC to maximize its impact with affected communities cannot be overstated. By field engagement, we mean a substantive, sustained presence of the court in situation countries,21 when the security situation allows it, including through: These are explored in more detail below. 1. The importance and difficulties of field engagement Field engagement is central to the court’s ability to maximize its impact in several ways. Presence by court staff in the field brings the court physically and culturally closer to local populations. Court activities conducted in situation countries—particularly any proceedings held in situ—will likely create more interest from affected communities than activities in The Hague. Many States Parties have expressed their hope that the ICC will soon consider seriously the possibility to hold some proceedings in situ.23 Local partners in the DRC and Uganda have expressed frustration about ICC staff “flying in and out” of their countries. They have indicated that the absence of ongoing engagement by ICC staff has created false expectations about the court. Increased ICC staff presence in the field may make the court more sensitive to the needs of affected communities and provide staff with a better appreciation of the local culture and context. Court activities in the field could also facilitate interaction between the court and domestic justice systems in situation countries. This can contribute to enhancing respect for the rule of law and human rights, and strengthening national judicial institutions in these countries (for more discussion of this, see this section, parts D and E, below.) In situ proceedings may provide even greater opportunities for such interaction. Situation countries are often unstable, creating complex security challenges. Where the country is undergoing armed conflict or where the government does not welcome ICC involvement, these challenges will obviously be intensified. Logistical constraints and financial costs create additional obstacles, particularly to holding any proceedings in situ. Substantial time and effort will be required to overcome these challenges. However, the Strategic Plan and Geographic Options are important opportunities for the court to take initial steps toward achieving effective field engagement.
2. Key components of the court’s approach to field engagement The Strategic Plan should envision coordination and a common vision among the ICC’s different organs and staff based in The Hague and the field. A number of specific activities detailed below should also be included. a. Visits by top ICC officials to situations under investigation The Strategic Plan should propose that top ICC officials regularly visit the field24 to: a. ICC field offices and decentralization of functions The Strategic Plan should include the ICC’s establishing, where possible, field offices in every country where it is conducting investigations. When the security situation does not allow, offices in neighboring countries should be considered. Field offices should have a comprehensive role throughout the period of ICC involvement, and be established as soon as possible after the Prosecutor opens an investigation.25 The Strategic Plan or the Geographic Options should also address the court’s approach to the staffing, location, and functions of field offices. While the court’s approach will need to be tailored to each situation, we see the following aspects as important: b. In situ proceedings In light of the unique challenges posed by holding in situ proceedings, a gradual approach by the ICC is warranted. In the short term, the ICC should assess the logistical, security, political and financial aspects of holding in situ proceedings. This assessment should be made with input from field office staff and presented to the Assembly of States Parties. In the long term, the ICC should draw on this research to consider holding at least partial in situ proceedings on the basis of relevant criteria, such as the symbolic nature of particular proceedings for affected communities, and the security arrangements they entail. Possibilities might include proceedings involving testimony of key witnesses, final moments in the presentation of the case, or the reading of the judgment. C. Outreach and CommunicationsOutreach and communications are crucial ways for the court to maximize the impact of trials with local populations. Quality judicial proceedings in The Hague that are not perceived as relevant to affected communities would be a missed opportunity. As currently formulated, the Strategic Plan creates the impression that outreach and communications are primarily means to secure cooperation and support for the court.27 This is indeed an important possible outcome, but the Strategic Plan should take a broader view. 1. The importance and challenges to effective outreach and communications Outreach and communications can help demonstrate that justice is being done, by providing the tools to local communities to develop an accurate understanding of the court’s work, including complex legal proceedings.28 Outreach and communications can also help strengthen respect for the rule of law and accountability for serious crimes more generally, by enhancing perceptions about the role of justice for serious crimes and contributing to the court’s potential deterrent effect.29 Unlike a national court whose authority is implicitly accepted, the ICC has no deep-rooted legitimacy in the countries where it will work. It will also operate in communities that are polarized and wartorn. These facts make effective outreach and communications all the more important, but create challenges. Notably, those threatened by the court can be expected to do their utmost to promote misinformation about the court.30 2. Components of the court’s approach to outreach and communication We see three key phases for the court’s plans on outreach and communications.31 The first phase should be making general information about the court and its mandate accessible to local populations.32 The second phase should be holding events where court staff can have direct exchanges with local communities, such as town hall meetings. This will give a human face to an otherwise abstract institution and allow these communities to express their views to court staff. As the ASP has noted, outreach is about more than providing information; it is about engaging communities.33 The third phase should be informing local populations about developments in ICC proceedings. Given that trials are long and complex, the court will need to identify creative approaches to update local audiences in a way that sustains their interest. This may include video summaries, radio summaries, or partial in situ proceedings. Additionally, the court should regularly use international and national media to react to developments in the situations under investigation. Addressing inaccurate information is crucial to avoid misperceptions. Also, timely dissemination of public information, such as statements by the Prosecutor about ongoing abuses in the DRC or Darfur, may contribute to stemming abuses.34 D. The Complementarity PrincipleThe purpose of the court is to prosecute the most serious crimes of concern to the international community when national courts are unable or unwilling to do so. To maximize the effect of these prosecutions, however, the Strategic Plan should envision the ICC acting as a catalyst for effective investigations and fair and expedient trials of serious crimes by national courts in certain instances. The court’s application of the “complementarity principle”35 allows important opportunities for the court to take limited steps to promote credible national accountability efforts. 1. The importance and difficulties of leveraging the complementarity principle Promoting national prosecutions can help ensure greater accountability for serious crimes. This will increase the benefit of the ICC’s work with affected communities. However, the ICC may encounter serious obstacles in promoting national prosecutions. In situation countries, states that are unwilling to investigate serious crimes are unlikely to be interested in drawing from ICC expertise and practice to enhance their capacity. States that are unable to investigate serious crimes might have such limited capacity as to preclude the possibility of any fair and expedient trials at the national level. Given the breadth of the ICC’s responsibilities, there are also limitations on how much the court can focus on national prosecutions. Within these constraints, however, the court should begin to identify ways in which it can leverage the complementarity principle to encourage states to bring perpetrators of serious crimes to justice.36 2. Key components to utilizing the complementarity principle to promote national prosecutions Where serious crimes have been committed, but the court has not exercised jurisdiction, this could be accomplished through a two-pronged approach: creating a credible prospect that the court may exercise its jurisdiction, while also pressing states to fulfill their responsibility to investigate serious crimes.37 This will be particularly useful where national courts have capacity, but have not pursued prosecutions. Strategies to implement this approach should include: The court can also encourage trials of serious crimes in national courts by urging states to apply Rome Statute standards. Ways for the court to accomplish this include calling on states to ratify the Rome Statute and harmonize national legislation with the Rome Statute, and raising awareness about ICC jurisprudence.38 While the ICC is not a national justice reform project, in countries under ICC investigation it can undertake targeted initiatives to enhance the capacity of their national courts to prosecute serious crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been criticized for missing the opportunity to positively impact justice systems in the former Yugoslavia; former ICTY staff expressed hope that the ICC will interact more extensively with states on domestic prosecution of war crimes.39 Given that the ICC will likely only conduct a limited number of trials of alleged perpetrators for each situation under investigation, promoting the possibility for greater accountability through national prosecutions in situation countries is all the more important.40 Several low cost strategies could be employed by ICC staff in situation countries to implement this objective:
E. LegacyMaximizing the court’s impact with affected communities is not only important in the short term, but in the longer term. This includes leaving a lasting legacy long after the court has completed its work in a situation country. We see two broad ways in which the court can achieve this, both of which have been discussed in previous sections: The Strategic Plan should identify leaving a meaningful legacy as an objective and identify strategies to achieve this objective. They should be considered from the outset of ICC operations in every situation.43 [12] For the first time, victims have the opportunity at an international criminal tribunal to serve as “participants” in the proceedings. As participants, victims are empowered to present their views and concerns beyond giving testimony as witnesses. It is also the first international tribunal offering victims the possibility to receive reparations. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force July 1, 2002, arts. 68(3) and 75. [13] The court’s goal to provide “quality of justice” is defined as including “ensuring full exercise of the rights of all participants.” ICC presentation of the draft Strategic Plan, May 16, 2006. [14] For instance, partners in Uganda have expressed that Ugandans do not believe that the five suspects from the Lord’s Resistance Army leaders will be arrested and sent to the ICC. They are therefore hesitant to come forward to participate, for fear of reprisal. [15] For instance, Pre-Trial Chamber I recently issued an important decision on the participation of six victims in court proceedings. This decision holds that Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute is applicable at the investigation stage. It also provides that victims may participate when a matter is still defined as a situation, in addition to when it has been later narrowed to specific accused persons. If confirmed, this decision should be explained in an accessible manner to victims and organizations working with victims, to provide greater clarity on participation. “Decision on the applications for participation in the proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6,” (Pre-Trial Chamber I), January 17, 2006. [16] For more recommendations about disseminating information to victims, see Victims Rights Working Group, “Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: Summary of Issues and Recommendations,” November 2003, [online] http://www.vrwg.org/Publications/1.html, p. 15. [17] The Registrar can also inform and facilitate the participation of a broad range of victims; judges will take decisions on the participation of victims. [18] The 2006 ICC budget states: “Strategies for informing victims, disseminating standard application forms and ensuring appropriate assistance to victims in making their applications and throughout the proceedings necessarily depend on developing and maintaining relations with intermediaries on the ground …” See “Proposed Programme Budget for 2006 of the International Criminal Court,” August 24, 2005, [online] http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/documentation/doc_4thsession.html, para. 441. [19] This is listed under the goal of “quality of justice.” [20] Human Rights Watch understands that the ICC intends to detail the Geographic Options within three years. However, it is crucial that the Strategic Plan provide at least some clarity on the ICC’s vision and plans for field activities. [21] In some instances, “field” may also refer to countries that are neighbors of situation countries. [22] The Rome Statute expressly provides for the possibility of holding proceedings elsewhere than the seat of the court in The Hague. Rome Statute, art. 3(3). [23] During the U.N. General Assembly meeting on the ICC in November 2005, Uganda said the following: “Once trial proceedings begin, it may be in the interests of the court and natural justice to hold such proceedings in the vicinity where the crimes were committed, i.e. in situ, taking into consideration logistical concerns and access to the court by victims.” During the ASP in December 2005, Nigeria said the following on behalf of the twenty-seven African States Parties: “[T]he strategy of the court should ensure that justice is actually done. What we mean by this is that justice has to be seen to be done by the affected communities…. [T]rials should, as much as possible be carried out in the localities or region where the crime took place.… This would leave a legacy of lasting respect for the enforcement of international justice directly to communities suffering the break down of the respect of the rule of law.” See [online] http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=ga60 and http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=asp4. See also “Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” August 23, 2004, S/2004/616, [online] http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html, para. 44. [24] In this regard, Human Rights Watch welcomes the recent visits to the field by top ICC officials. The Registrar visited Uganda (Kampala and Gulu in the North) and Chad at the end of March and beginning of April 2006, and the Chief Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor (Prosecutions) visited Kinshasa on April 2-4, 2006. [25] Human Rights Watch welcomes the establishment of several field offices to date. [26] Local partners in Uganda have expressed this sentiment about the ICC field office in Kampala. Another illustration of this issue is from the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): According to some analysts, the information center established by the ICTR in Rwanda’s capital Kigali, while “attractive to a tiny part of the urban elite … offers little to the majority of Rwandans, who are illiterate and live in rural areas.” See Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, eds., My neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 56. [27] “Increased awareness and understanding of the Court’s activities” and “ensuring the publicity of all proceedings for local and global audiences” are two objectives under the goal of “a well-recognized and adequately supported institution.” ICC presentation of the draft Strategic Plan, May 16, 2006. [28] For discussion of the challenges to ensuring awareness and understanding of the court, see this section part A. [29] For instance, during a meeting in April 2006 between a Human Rights Watch researcher and the leader of an armed group allegedly responsible for grave human rights violations in Katanga in the DRC, the leader mentioned the recent arrest on an ICC warrant of Thomas Lubanga, and expressed his intention to investigate abuses committed by his troops because he did not want to “end up like Lubanga.” [30] For discussion of other challenges related to outreach and communications, see this section, part A. [31] Human Rights Watch notes that the ICC is preparing a detailed strategic plan specifically on outreach activities (the “Outreach Plan”), in response to a request by the ASP. See “Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties,” adopted by the Fourth Assembly of States Parties, December 3, 2005, [online] http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/asprecords/ASP_4thsession.html, para. 22. We understand that this plan will address specific strategies for each of the situations under investigation, includingthe structure of the outreach office, and the court’s relationship with other actors conducting outreach. We also understand that external consultations will soon take place on the Outreach Plan. At the same time, the Strategic Plan should articulate at least some of the court’s plans for outreach and communications. [32] The court has indicated a reliance to a large extent on local actors to conduct outreach and communications. See “Report on the activities of the Court, Fourth session of the Assembly of States Parties,” September 16, 2005, [online] http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/documentation/doc_4thsession.html, para. 77. As discussed in this section, part A, the plan should recognize that the court itself needs to conduct the bulk of its outreach and communications activities. See also “Memorandum to State members of the Assembly of States Parties,” Human Rights Watch, November 2005, [online] http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=browserdoc&type=21&module=592&b=3, pp. 2-5. [33] “Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties,” para. 22 (“The Assembly of States Parties recognizes the importance for the Court to engage communities in situations under investigation in a process of constructive interaction with the Court, designed to promote understanding and support for its mandate, to manage expectations and to enable those communities to follow and understand the international criminal justice process….”). [34] U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour recently stated, “I believe we must call on the ICC to act more robustly, and visibly discharge the mandate ... that the Security Council has conferred on it.” See “UN rights chief urges ICC to act on Darfur,” Reuters, May 11, 2006. [35] This principle provides that the ICC will exercise its jurisdiction only when states are unable or unwilling. [36] This approach may be incorporated in the Strategic Plan in its third mission statement: “The ICC will… contribute to long lasting respect for and the enforcement of international criminal justice, to the prevention of crime and to the fight against impunity.” However, the plan does not appear to identify objectives to achieve this goal. ICC presentation of the draft Strategic Plan, May 16, 2006. See also “Informal expert paper: The principle of complementarity in practice,” 2003, [online] http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/complementarity.html, p. 3 [37] This role has been envisioned by the ICC Prosecutor from early in his tenure. See “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor,” September 2003, [online] http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_policy.html, pp. 2-3 (“To the extent possible the Prosecutor will encourage States to initiate their own proceedings… The existence of the Court has already encouraged States to incorporate as domestic law the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Even before the initiation of any investigation by the Court itself, the use of this legislation will be a major step in bringing to justice the perpetrators of atrocities.”). [38] The ICC president and judges have taken welcome steps in this regard, including meetings with government officials from non-States Parties, and speaking on the need for effective implementing legislation. For instance, in December 2005 President Kirsch visited India and Pakistan and met with parliamentarians, government officials, judges, civil society and the media. See “ICC newsletter #7,” April 2006, [online] http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/newsletter/index.html. [39] See “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings,” David Tolbert, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Volume 26:2 Summer/Fall 2002, pp. 5 and 13 (“The United Nations has spent hundreds of millions of dollars creating a uniquely important court, which has clearly served a significant role in the region, yet a huge opportunity will be lost. Instead of serving as an important tool of legal development and as a catalyst for local war crime prosecutions, the tribunal will apparently fold its operations without contributing much to either the justice systems in the region or the prosecution of war crimes… There is scope for this important assistance to be delivered in some cases, and the failure to use the ICTY’s experience and expertise in the local courts in Bosnia should not be repeated.”). [40] The Prosecutor has stated: “The Office will function with a two-tiered approach to combat impunity. On the one hand it will initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for the crimes. On the other hand it will encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work with the international community to ensure that the offenders are brought to justice by some other means.” See “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor,” September 2003, [online] http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_policy.html, p. 3. [41] See Human Rights Watch, “Justice in Motion: The Trial Phase of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 17, no. 14(A), October 2005, [online] http://hrw.org/reports/2005/sierraleone1105/, p. 36. [42] In this regard, Human Rights Watch welcomes the 2004 initiative of the European Commission and six donors active in the DRC to conduct an audit of the justice system in consultation with national authorities, and to develop a coordinated plan of action in which transitional justice issues figured prominently. [43] “Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” p. 16.
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