Background Briefing

previous  |  index  |  next>>

Independence of Police Station Visiting Delegations

The Role of the Governors

Several board members interviewed drew attention to the boards’ lack of independence from the office of the governor, which is in effect a police authority: governors are responsible for policing in their province, and police and gendarmerie chiefs are answerable to the governor. Yet governors are also a dominating presence on the human rights boards: in practice they appoint most of the members,36 and—such is the power of their position in the provincial landscape—they can also advance or retard the career of any civil servant serving on a human rights board.

In some provinces, board members were extremely pessimistic about the boards’ potential for action, and even about the motivation for establishing the boards. One bar association representative had stopped attending meetings because “the boards look as if they were just set up to comply with the law and regulations … the fact that a public servant chairs its meetings is clearly a handicap.”37 A second bar association representative said that in his view the boards were a dead letter, and “would never be able to do anything constructive while under the governors’ authority.”38 Another said that his board “is not democratic because some representatives are really scared to talk in front of the assistant governor. If you go to small towns, the anti-democratic atmosphere is even worse.”39

Several governors and assistant governors who spoke to Human Rights Watch quite frankly admitted that their own highly influential position conflicted with the basic aim of the human rights boards. Two assistant governors, for example, suggested that boards should be recruited by public advertisement and meet in the absence of the governor.40 Another assistant governor and a governor separately suggested boards are powerless to act unless they conform to the governor’s agenda.41 Several delegates also pointed out that since boards have no dedicated secretariat, premises or funds, they are utterly dependent on the goodwill and cooperation of the office of the governor for these facilities.42 The representative of the Van bar association mentioned that he had offered to lead some visits to checkpoints and police stations in 2004, but since the assistant governor had not provided transport, the visits never took place.43

In most of the visits described by board members, delegations included representatives from bar and medical associations, but governors or assistant governors were usually also present. As one assistant governor pointed out, the inclusion of the governor on visiting delegations may, in the early days, open doors that would otherwise remain closed to delegations, and demonstrates the state’s commitment to this form of supervision.44 However, as time goes on the need to show convincing independence will weigh more heavily, and the ultimate aim should be that the governors will stand back, endorsing the authority of the visitors where necessary, but not participating in or reporting on actual visits. Moreover, close involvement of governors obviously presents potential problems in organizing unannounced visits. One bar association representative told of one supposedly surprise visit that was met by a formal police welcome that suggested they had been expecting the delegation’s arrival.45

The more convincingly independent the make-up of human rights board delegations, the more effective their monitoring will be. Unless they stand well outside the chain of command and influence running from the interior ministry through governors to police and gendarmerie chiefs, delegations are unlikely to ask difficult questions, insist on access, and reliably record negative findings. Certainly any detainees interviewed during a visit will be aware of the relationship between the police and the governor, and will be inhibited if the delegation cannot show persuasive signs of independence.

Uneven Participation of Bar and Medical Associations

In its monitoring duties, the boards’ claim to independence relies heavily on the participation of the bar and medical association representatives who are best qualified in terms of independence (as well as professional expertise and interest) to lead and support the board’s monitoring activities. Although bar and medical associations have an automatic right to be represented on provincial human rights boards, they do not always participate. In Kütahya the medical association did not take up its seat because neither the provincial board nor the medical association was aware that the association was supposed to be represented.46 In summer 2005 the medical association took up its seat on the board and began to attend meetings. The Ankara medical association is currently not participating on their provincial board because they were not satisfied that their contributions were reflected in the proceedings of the board.47 The Adıyaman bar association told Human Rights Watch that it had not been attending board meetings because its representative had repeatedly turned up for meetings only to find them cancelled at the last moment. The Adıyaman bar association has since revised this stance, and in response to the increased interest in the monitoring role of the boards, now intends to attend to attend meetings in order to participate in police station visiting.48

Board members warned that even bar and medical association representatives are not necessarily beyond the governor’s influence. If the medical association representative is employed in a local state hospital, for example, it may be difficult for them to propose or participate in challenging visits to police stations which may be embarrassing for the governor, who can affect their professional life in various ways. The response of a medical association board member to a question from Human Rights Watch about the independence of the boards illustrates the pressure that governors can bring to bear on even the more independent members of the commission: “I may be a member of the medical chamber, but I am a state employee, and right now I am responding to your questions [conscious that I am] a state employee.”49

Involving NGOs

Two board members mentioned that the credibility and independence of the boards would be strengthened if the two national human rights organizations, the Human Rights Association (HRA) and Mazlum-Der, were to serve on the boards.50

Currently, the HRA and Mazlum-Der do not participate in any activities of the human rights boards. They have various reservations about serving on the boards, but in particular they are unwilling to participate in the process of adjudicating on individual complaints of human rights violations. The HRA and Mazlum-Der do not feel that the boards are a fair tribunal (for various reasons, including their lack of independence). The HRA and Mazlum-Der cannot risk having their status as human rights organizations used to legitimize decisions which wrongfully exculpate state officials. However, Ayhan Bilgen, president of Mazlum-Der, said that his organization “would definitely like to assist the boards in monitoring police stations, on a consultative basis.”51 HRA president Yusuf Alataş stated that his organization would be “very willing to participate in any truly independent human rights institution established according to the Paris principles, but not with these boards, who have no separate budget, and no powers. However, we would be willing to participate in police station visiting on a consultative basis if invited.”52

The HRA and Mazlum-Der could contribute local knowledge, knowledge of international standards and experience of monitoring and reporting human rights violations. Even more importantly, their participation would encourage the human rights board delegations towards greater independence from the provincial governor, and thereby increase the credibility of the boards with the outside world, detainees and victims of ill-treatment.

Closed institutions of all kinds present a risk of the psychological, physical and sexual abuse which were so long pandemic in police stations in Turkey. Following a visit to Saray Rehabilitation Center, a psychiatric institution in Ankara, in January 2005, the human rights commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly reported that it had discovered children tied to their beds and imprisoned naked in cold rooms. A report by Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI) in September53 suggested that such ill-treatment and neglect may be widespread in psychiatric hospitals. MDRI’s report described, for example, how children were subjected to electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), and had their hands and feet bound to their beds for long periods. MDRI recommends that Turkey should move from an institution-based to a community-based model of care for people with disabilities. In the meantime, its report urges that institutions should be opened up to public oversight, and that an independent human rights monitoring agency should be created to inspect institutions holding psychiatric patients and minors, and report publicly.



[36]Regulation on the foundation, duties and working principles of provincial and local human rights boards, published in the Official Gazette, November 23, 2003, Article 5.

[37]E-mail communication to Human Rights Watch from bar association representative, name withheld, July 20, 2005.

[38]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Tekirdağ bar representative Savaş Kayan, June 22, 2005.

[39] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with bar association representative, name withheld, June 14, 2005.

[40] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Balıkesir assistant governor Sadık İkizler, July 28, 2005.

[41]Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with and with governor, name withheld, and assistant governor, name withheld, August23, 2005; The latter colourfully summed up the situation with the proverb “at sahibine göre kişner” (the horse neighs according to its owner).

[42]Regulation on the foundation, duties and working principles of provincial and local human rights boards, published in the Official Gazette, November 23, 2003, Article 15.

[43] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Murat Timur, London, June 21, 2005.

[44]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Sadık İkizkez, July 28, 2005.

[45] Human Rights Watch telephone interview, name withheld, July 12, 2005.

[46] Human Rights Watch telephone interview, name withheld, August 17, 2005.

[47] E-mail communication to Human Rights Watch from Ali Gököz, July 12, 2005, and Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Gököz, July 14.

[48] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with M. Nazım Pektaş, June 29, 2005.

[49] Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, July 14, 2005.

[50] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Hasan Hüseyin Yıldız, July 14, 2005 and Tekirdağ bar association representative Savaş Kayan, June 22, 2005

[51] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ayhan Bilgen, September 9, 2005.

[52] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yusuf Alataş, September 9, 2005.

[53] Behind Closed Doors: Human Rights Abuses in the Psychiatric Facilities, Orphanages and Rehabilitation Centers of Turkey/Kapalı Kapılar Ardında: Psikiyatri Kurumları, Türkiye’nin Rehabilitasyon Merkezleri ve Yetimhanelerinde Yaşanan İnsan Hakları, Mental Disability Rights International, September 28, 2005.


previous  |  index  |  next>>March 2006