III. No Effective Monitoring of Places of Detention in Uzbekistan10. The absence of independent, universal, and transparent monitoring of places of detention increases the risk that a person subject to return to Uzbekistan will be tortured and ill-treated—and makes it extremely difficult to track the treatment of Uzbek nationals extradited or otherwise transferred from abroad back to Uzbekistan. According to the International Crisis Group, “It is virtually impossible to find information about the returnees and guarantee their safety.”19 Under the subheading “disappearance,” the 2007 United States Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Uzbekistan states: “There were numerous unconfirmed reports of earlier disappearances in 2005 of persons who were present at the violent disturbances in May 2005 in Andijon. (See section 1.a.). The welfare and whereabouts of several of the refugees who were forcibly returned to the country during the year remained unknown.”20 11. In April 2006 the offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Uzbekistan were closed on request of the Uzbek government.21 It is widely believed that UNHCR assistance to refugees from Andijan, including facilitating the resettlement of hundreds of refugees, led to the Uzbek refusal to continue to host a UNHCR presence.22 Although the United Nations Development Program has assumed responsibility for the material well-being of UNHCR’s refugee caseload in Uzbekistan, which is comprised primarily of Afghan refugees, UNDP does not conduct visits to places of detention or track the treatment of persons returned to Uzbekistan from abroad. 12. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) does not monitor places of detention in Uzbekistan. The organization suspended its activities in 2004 because the Uzbek government failed to abide by its commitments under its agreement with ICRC. Although the European Union is said to be encouraged that the ICRC will resume visits to places of detention soon, to the best of our knowledge, no such resumption of ICRC visits has commenced.23
13. The lack of access to returnees should be seen in the context of the Uzbek government’s broader campaign of repression of civil society, which has included expelling numerous international organizations (e.g. Freedom House and the American Bar Association’s Europe and Eurasia Program, known as ABA/CEELI) from the country—and harassing those few, including Human Rights Watch, that remain.24 14. The Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Protocol) has been signed by 57 parties and establishes monitoring mechanisms that ensure independent international experts access to places of detention through inspection mechanisms similar to those used by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). Uzbekistan has neither signed nor ratified the Optional Protocol.
19 International Crisis Group Policy Briefing, “Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter,” Asia Briefing No. 54, November 6, 2006, p. 7, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/7051343CE5CDC8E6C12572810031BBEF/$file/ICG_uzbekistan___europes_sanctions_matte.pdf (accessed July 3, 2007). 20 US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007: Uzbekistan,” March 6, 2007, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78848.htm (accessed July 3, 2007). 21 UNHCR, “Uzbekistan: UNHCR Regrets Office Closure, Alternative Arrangements in Place for Care of Refugee Caseload,” April 18, 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/4444cb6516.html (accessed July 3, 2007). 22 See International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report 2007: Tashkent Regional Delegation, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/738D85/$FILE/icrc_ar_06_tashkent.pdf?OpenElement (accessed July 10, 2007). 23 Council Conclusions on Uzbekistan, General Affairs and External Relations, http://www.delkaz.cec.eu.int/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=145&Itemid=43 (accessed July 5, 2007). It is important to note that ICRC monitoring is not transparent. Its findings are confidential and shared only with the host government, thus ICRC monitoring would be of little benefit in terms of revealing publicly and with a view toward accountability, any breach of diplomatic assurances against torture that may occur post-return. |