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Summary

Since the recent political upheavals in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the opposition in Azerbaijan has had increased hopes for international support, expecting its demands for democracy to lead to a change of government, either through elections or revolution. It has viewed the parliamentary elections set for November 6, 2005, as a possible turning point. Yet, refusing to implement key reforms, the Azerbaijan government has showed an apparent lack of political will to ensure free and fair elections. The existing climate of intimidation, particularly against the opposition Azadliq bloc, has sent a strong message to voters about whom they should support. Equally worrisome, judging from the government’s harsh response to protests after the October 2003 presidential election,  is a real potential for violent confrontation if the opposition decides to attempt large scale protests after the November elections.

Azerbaijan has a history of elections that fall far short of international standards, and of government-sponsored repression of opposition parties. The high level of unemployment and poverty – and especially the high rate of public sector employment—makes the population particularly vulnerable to government pressures. Threats of dismissal from work and other unofficial economic sanctions are enough to ensure the loyalty of many to the government. The culture of impunity further compounds an environment in which government election violations go unheeded.

Although it simply restated existing law, a May 11 decree by President Ilham Aliev calling on local authorities to ensure that the November parliamentary elections are held in a democratic manner, and to refrain from unlawful interference, was welcomed by the international community as a positive sign of political will to hold free and fair elections. The decree, however, has not been implemented, and as the election campaign has advanced, it has become clear that local government authorities, as well as law enforcement officers, are consistently interfering in the election campaign.

Problems in the electoral process, pinpointed by local and international observers in past elections, have not been remedied and similar patterns of violations have recurred during the pre-election campaign for the November 6 parliamentary elections. In particular, election commissions rarely decide complaints in favor of candidates who present credible evidence of violations. The government refused to change the composition of the elections commissions and for the most part, the members of the election commissions, some of whom were implicated in  fraud in the 2003 presidential elections, have remained the same. The ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP), headed by President Ilham Aliev, dominates the electoral commissions. It nominated the chairpersons of the election commissions at all levels and holds a majority on every commission.

The government also refused to consider inking voters’ fingers as a mechanism for reducing the risk of multiple voting, a relatively simple measure that international election experts believe to be crucial if fraud through multiple voting is to be avoided. Instead the government introduced voter cards. However, local and international election monitors found that voter cards were not being distributed in a controlled fashion, rendering them ineffective as a mechanism to stop multiple voting.

A positive development was the registration, without party-based bias, of candidates for the election, an issue that had been problematic in previous elections. However, after the registration period ended and the campaign began, it was clear that serious violations of Azerbaijani law and international standards were taking place on a regular basis and threatened the integrity of the election.

Media monitoring found that although state media was honoring its commitment to allocate  free airtime to the major parties and blocs and grant free space in state-owned newspapers, all other coverage was overwhelmingly pro-governmental in character. All the nationwide television stations, whether private or state run, were similarly biased in favor of the government. The government closed down a radio station in the city of Shaki, which broadcast a daily half-hour program with views from opposition as well as government candidates in the election. Police beat journalists trying to report on opposition rallies; in at least one case a journalist was rendered unconscious and hospitalized after a police beating.

Local government authorities and law enforcement officers have obstructed the opposition’s efforts to campaign. Reports of pressure on government workers, particularly teachers, to attend the ruling YAP candidates’ meetings with voters have been common. There were incidents of police interfering with and dispersing opposition and independent candidate meetings with voters. Police detained campaign workers for opposition and independent candidates and warned them to stop their political work. On numerous occasions, campaign workers who were putting up campaign posters were detained, charged with public order offenses, and sentenced to several days in prison.

The authorities have restricted freedom of assembly, refusing to allow the opposition Azadliq bloc to hold rallies in the center of the capital, Baku. When opposition supporters attempted to gather for the unauthorized rallies, police responded with violence, beating the demonstrators with batons, and arrests. As the campaign progressed, police violence escalated. The police response to an attempted rally on October 9 was reportedly highly aggressive, with police beating people indiscriminately. International observers saw many protesters injured, some unable to stand. In at least one incident, police also brutally beat detainees in a police station after arrest. Many demonstrators were sentenced to several days in prison for public order offenses.

The authorities targeted the opposition-affiliated youth movement, detaining and harassing their members. Of particular concern were the August and September arrests of three members of Yeni Fikir (New Thinking), a youth organization affiliated with the Popular Front Party, are accused of attempting to violently overthrow the government. Although Human Rights Watch is not in a position to investigate the government’s allegations against Yeni Fikir, the context and timing of the arrests suggest that they may be politically motivated. In what appeared to be a well organized campaign, for days after the arrest of Ruslan Bashirli, the leader of Yeni Fikir who was accused of cooperating with Armenian secret service agents, pro-government demonstrators carried out protests, and at times attacks, on offices of the Popular Front Party throughout the country. In most cases, police failed to take action to protect the Popular Front Party offices and members, and did not bring any prosecutions for the attacks.

The attempted return of Rasul Guliev, the exiled leader of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) and former parliamentary speaker accused by the authorities of embezzlement of state funds, was accompanied by mass detentions and the deployment of military and police personnel throughout Baku. Law enforcement authorities targeted relatives of Guliev for arrest. On October 17, the day of Guliev’s announced return, police arrested probably hundreds of his supporters, charging most of them with public order offenses. Guliev’s failure to return, apparently thwarted by Azerbaijani authorities, was followed by dismissals of high-level government officials and the arrests of a government minister and his brother, who were accused of an attempted coup d’etat.

The research for this paper was carried out in Azerbaijan from August to October 2005. Persons interviewed by Human Rights Watch included opposition and independent candidates in the forthcoming elections, activists, supporters, and their relatives; local and international observers; members of diplomatic missions and international organizations; representatives of local and international media outlets; representatives of nongovernmental organizations; and lawyers. Human Rights Watch also met with representatives of the Nakhchivan Electoral Commission and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Efforts by Human Rights Watch to secure appointments to meet representatives of the Procurator-General’s Office, the Presidential Administration, and the Central Election Commission, were unsuccessful.