Background Briefing

<<previous  |  index  |  next>>

Events in 2003-2004

By all accounts, the Darfur conflict first assumed serious dimensions in the Deleig-Garsila-Mukjar area in August 2003, as in much of West Darfur, several months after the government launched its counter-offensive against the insurgency in North Darfur. By July 2003, the main rebel group—the SLA—had established a presence not only in North Darfur and the Jebel Marra massif, but also in the Sindu Hills located south of Jebel Marra, within the Deleig-Mukjar-Shattaya semi-circle.

In August 2003, the SLA launched attacks on police stations and government offices and looted weapons and ammunitions stocks, fuel depots and other resources in the Mukjar area. In one of its first attacks in the area, in early August 2003, the SLA struck the police station in Bindisi town, south-west of Mukjar, and looted weapons and a radio. Two people were reportedly killed in the attack, including an Arab prisoner in the police prison, and a local businessman was reportedly abducted.  Other attacks on Mukjar and Arwala (northeast of Garsila) followed the same pattern but “didn’t hurt anyone,” according to a government official in Mukjar.20 Human Rights Watch received reports that some civilians fled into Garsila in late-2004 following SLA attacks in the area, but is unable to confirm the precise number or origin of the displaced people.21 

The first government offensive: August-December 2003

In August and September 2003, following a policy initiated in other parts of Darfur, the government of Sudan recruited and mobilized militia forces in West Darfur in response to the SLA’s attacks. This force was conceived as a key supplement to the small number of army troops deployed in the region, and to the use of aerial bombardment.

As in other parts of Darfur, these militias, some of which were recruited into the government-sponsored Popular Defence Force (PDF)22 along ethnic lines, included mainly nomadic or semi-nomadic groups of Arab origin. According to several witnesses, the Sudanese government followed two distinct strategies in its recruitment. First, it issued a public call to arms to defend against rebel incursions. In some places, members of non-Arab ethnic groups such as the Fur and Masalit responded, but Human Rights Watch was consistently told that the government turned these individuals away or refused to give them weapons, unlike the Arab recruits.23 Second, Human Rights Watch was told that the Sudanese government pursued secret meetings with key leaders of Arab tribes in Darfur, particularly those tribal leaders belonging to the ruling national party, and tried to enlist these leaders and their followers in the militias.24

Many leaders of the larger Arab ethnic groups, which had their own dar or homeland, such as the cattle-owning Riziegat of South Darfur and the camel-owning Beni Hussein of North Darfur, refused to join the government’s cause; while some individuals from those tribes have participated on both sides of the conflict, the tribe as a group has not.25  For some of the smaller nomadic tribes, however, particularly those without a dar, including those groups who recently migrated to Darfur from neighboring Chad, joining the militias provided an opportunity to gain loot and access to fertile land and water resources.

The government-backed militias became known by their victims as “Janjaweed,” drawing on a local term for highway robbers and outlaws. One observer told Human Rights Watch, “After the [SLA] attacks on Mukjar [in August 2003], the government started recruiting Difa al Shabi [PDF] and they didn’t stop until the rebels removed themselves from the area.”26 

The Mukjar and Bindisi area appears to have been among the first areas in West Darfur to be targeted by the government’s newly-assembled militia forces. On Friday, August 8, 2003, Janjaweed militia was mobilized and according to an elderly woman from Mukjar, “a helicopter came three times to re-supply the Janjaweed with ammunition.”27

One week later, at least seven villages in the area were attacked by government and militia forces. In the village of Kudun, near Bindisi, less than twenty kilometers from Mukjar, one witness said, “I was awakened by the sound of heavy artillery and approaching Janjaweed….The Janjaweed were in front and then there were two cars from the police behind them carrying the ammunition.”28 While many fled the village and survived, at least eleven people were killed in Kudun that day. “Everyone ran away to save their lives. Most of the old men were killed that first day…Everyone who didn’t run was killed,” said a forty-year-old Fur resident.29

Attacks on other villages in the area followed a similar pattern of killing and looting. In many of the attacks in August and September 2003, however, the villages and crops were initially left intact. Since most of the residents were farmers anticipating harvesting their crops in October-December, many of the displaced people remained in the bush in hiding for several days before tentatively returning to their homes. In most cases, the government militia attacked the Fur residents several times, often with increasing violence if there was any resistance, until the residents were entirely expelled from the area. For instance, the Janjaweed militia attacked Kudun again in late-August 2003 and killed thirty-two people. By late-August 2003, however, some of Kudun’s residents mobilized to protect themselves, and fifteen of the attackers were reportedly killed.30

By November 2003, towns like Bindisi and Mukjar more than tripled in size due to the influx of displaced people from the surrounding villages. People fled to these towns because there was some government administrative presence, and sometimes army troops and the faint hope of relief and transport, in these locations.31  More than eighty villages in these areas had been attacked, looted and burned, sometimes several times.

Villages in the Garsila-Deleig area north of Mukjar came under attack slightly later, with the brunt of the offensive taking place in October and November 2003. A Fur observer in Garsila described the government’s response in that town to Human Rights Watch:

In September 2003, they called the Arab tribes together—the commander of the police, Mubarak al Khidir, the Garsila commissioner, Jaffer Abdel Hakh,32 and [several other officials]—they called us and told us they wanted people to arm themselves to defend. The weapons were given to Hamdi, an army soldier with two stripes. Hamdi only called the Arab tribes—the Fur went to get their quota and he said ‘Frankly, you Fur are all rebels.’  The Arab tribes were given uniforms and guns.33

Coordinated attacks on villages around and east of Garsila, in the hills, occurred over several weeks in October 2003, forcing thousands of civilians to seek security and assistance in Garsila and Deleig.34 According to several witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, one of the leaders of the Janjaweed militia forces in this area was a man with the “nom de guerre” of Ali Kosheib, from the Beni Halba tribe, who was based in Garsila.


Simultaneous with the attacks on villages to the west and southwest of the Sindu Hills, government and militia forces attacked villages on the eastern side of the hills, in the Shattaya locality of Kass province, South Darfur. Ahmed Angabo, the commissioner of Kass town, the provincial capital of Kass province, openly acknowledged recruiting militias and integrating them in the regular armed forces.35

Villagers in the Shattaya area fled the ground and air attacks by running to the nearby hills or to the larger towns. A thirty-one-year-old Fur teacher from Tiro, a village between Shattaya and Artala, told Human Rights Watch:

Tiro was initially attacked on December 5, 2003. December is the time for the harvest so the day Tiro was attacked I was carrying my sorghum and groundnuts from the farm to the house.  When I came near the house I heard the shouting [sic] of the guns…I saw people running and then suddenly I saw Janjaweed wearing khaki soldiers’ trousers and shirts….We went to Artala on foot, about three-and-a-half hours. The people of Artala saw so many people from Tiro that day. You could see the smoke rising and covering the sun.36

The government and militia offensives in the area in late 2003 were accompanied by another development—the early migration of camel and cattle nomads through the area. Typically, pastoral movements through the Wadi Saleh farmland were restricted until well after the main October-November harvest, when pastoralists would graze their animals on the harvested fields, fertilizing them. This arrangement, while fragile and prone to small-scale clashes, had been agreed upon again by Arab and Fur communities at the end of the bloody 1987-89 Fur-Arab conflict.

By November 2003, however, huge herds of camels were already making their way through the area, taking advantage of the emptied villages and farms to graze directly on farmland that was usually off-limits for several more months. Many desperate villagers stayed in the vicinity of their villages, trying to salvage some part of their crops, only to see the bulk of the harvest eaten or trampled by the animals. Individuals who tried to return to the villages and dig up their buried stored grain were sometimes violently attacked by militia members. Yet even worse was to come.

The second government offensive: February – March 2004

After the collapse of ceasefire talks between the government of Sudan and the rebel groups in December 2003, Sudanese president Omar el Bashir vowed to “annihilate” the “hirelings, traitors, agents and renegades.”37 The Sudanese government together with its militias conducted a massive government offensive throughout Darfur in January and February 2004; at the same time it imposed near-absolute restrictions on access to the region for humanitarian agencies who sought to assist hundreds of thousands of homeless internally displaced persons. 

By January 2004, many villages around the Sindu Hills had been repeatedly attacked and most of the civilian population had either congregated in the larger towns of the region—Mukjar, Bindisi, Garsila, Deleig, Shattaya, Artala and others—or were living scattered in the hills and few remaining intact villages in the area, trying to salvage parts of their harvest.

Fighting around the Sindu Hills: February 2004

Despite the Sudanese government’s declaration of victory on February 9, 2004, the conflict intensified in February and March 2004, apparently because the SLA was determined to prove that it was still a viable force. In mid-February, the SLA attacked Mukjar and other locations. The rebel movement claimed to have killed more than one hundred government soldiers in its clashes with government troops. While Human Rights Watch has been unable to verify this claim, observers in Garsila witnessed unusually large numbers of wounded government soldiers brought to the town after fighting in the Sindu Hills in February 2004.38

The SLA’s presence and attacks prompted a massive response by Sudanese government forces and militias that targeted civilians and civilian villages. By mid-March, the government’s scorched earth campaign of ground and air attacks around the Sindu Hills had removed almost all existing or potential perceived support base for the rebellion by forcibly displacing, looting and burning almost every Fur village near the hills and then extending “mopping-up operations” to villages and towns further away. 

These tactics—which were replicated throughout much of Darfur--were supplemented by other particularly brutal crimes in the Wadi Saleh, Mukjar and Shattaya localities as a form of collective punishment—and total subjugation—of the civilian population for its perceived support of the rebel movement.

March 2004: Summary executions in Mukjar, Garsila and Deleig

At the beginning of March 2004, Sudanese government forces, including local government officials, police and Janjaweed militias, rounded up and killed more than 200 displaced Fur men, including community leaders, in a coordinated sweep of the Garsila, Deleig, and Mukjar areas. People displaced from villages east of Garsila and Deleig appear to have been specifically targeted. A witness to the arrests in Deleig said:

In Deleig it started March 5, 2004. The soldiers and the Janjaweed went to Sindu to fight the rebellion. When they came back they surrounded Deleig and caught a lot of people—maybe 100-120—and collected them in the police station over three days. Then they took them away in groups and they never came back. People saw them being taken away in groups of forty, twenty-five, five—they were killed in different places.39

A Fur sheikh or village-level leader from a village near Deleig who was displaced in Deleig at the time of the round-up told Human Rights Watch that on Monday, March 1, 2004, several omdas (leader one step above a sheikh) were arrested and put in prison, allegedly for being SLA.  The following Friday, March 5, he said “Those arrested were more, maybe 200. The whole place was surrounded and all the important people were taken out….They came and inspected all the houses and if you weren’t home, then ‘you are SLA.’ This order came from above, from Garsila.”40 

The operation was clearly planned and coordinated over a wide geographic area. While Deleig is fairly close to Garsila—approximately thirty kilometers northeast—Mukjar lies at least sixty kilometers south of Garsila and is at least a five-hour drive on the poor roads. Following the round-ups, the men were then taken out of the towns and executed in smaller groups.

Villagers from the Garsila area told Human Rights Watch that they woke up on March 5, 2004, to find an area encompassing thirty-two villages surrounded by government troops and Janjaweed. The government and militia forces then entered the villages and began asking men where they came from. One hundred and four individuals—most of them people who had been displaced from villages in the Zara and Kaskildo areas south-east of Deleig, in the hills, and many of them sheikhs and omdas—were taken to the government jail in Deleig. That same night, according to local people, seventy-two of the 104 were loaded into army trucks by government and militia forces, and driven two kilometers to a valley where they were executed.41

A survivor of one these mass executions told a neighbor that the arrested men were taken in army trucks and cars to a valley a few miles from Deleig.  “Then they lined us up, made us kneel down and bend our heads – and shot us from behind.  I was left for dead….The executioners were army soldiers and Janjaweed, operating together.”42 One of the Janajweed commanders repeatedly mentioned in connection with these events was Ali Kosheib, reportedly still based in Garsila as of October 2004.

In Mukjar, events followed a similar pattern. Following an SLA attack on Mukjar in late-February 2004, any Fur men trying to enter Mukjar were screened by government and militia forces. According to several Mukjar residents, within Mukjar many of the displaced were collected in the military compound and the commissioner’s compound and “everyone who was Fur was disarmed. Then they let the Janjaweed go through the town and loot and kill.”43

On March 2, 2004, the government and militia forces attacked villages east of Mukjar and “at least eleven villages [northeast] in the Sindu area.”44 Many displaced people came to Mukjar following the attacks. As in Deleig, at least seventy displaced men and community leaders were rounded-up, taken out of town and executed. “The young men who gathered here were taken from the military compound by car to the forest and shot there,” said one local observer.45 Another Mukjar resident who witnessed the round-ups in March said “the omdas and sheikhs were taken by the police, to the police station, and then the Arabs took them away in cars and killed them.”46

Another Mukjar witness noted that sometimes if individuals had enough money, they could pay the militia and government forces to let them go, but “if they had no money, then they would be killed. Sometimes they took ten people at a time; the largest group was fifty-two—they were taken by Ali Kosheib north of Mukjar at the beginning of March. Ali Kosheib said he was transferring them to Garsila, but he killed them on the way.”47


A relative of one victim was informed that his brother’s body had been seen outside Mukjar. He said, “A woman came to me, [she] had gone to collect firewood near the airstrip [under construction at the time]. She saw twenty-nine bodies. When the people were killed we heard the gunshots but we thought it was just shooting. Only when the women saw the bodies, we realized they’d been shot.”48

The relative went to the police and requested permission to retrieve and bury his brother’s body. The man told Human Rights Watch, “the commissioner of Mukjar49 was present but he said nothing. The police said […] they would get back to me but until now there is nothing. Aside from the police, there is no other option—no court—even the commissioner is with them [those who executed his brother].”50

A presidential commission of inquiry established by Sudanese president Omar El Bashir in May 2004 visited West Darfur, including Deleig, in late 2004, to investigate allegations of gross human rights abuses. According to local residents, members of the commission interviewed police from Deleig who told them about the events.  HRW received a report that at least one police officer who told the commission about the round-ups and summary executions was dismissed.51

The commission’s findings were made public in late-January 2005. It concluded that “incidents of rape and sexual abuses took place in the various states of Darfur but it has not been proven to the commission that there was systematic and widespread abuse that would constitute a crime against humanity.”52

In recent months, Human Rights Watch has received reports that mass graves have been seen between Garsila and Mukjar.  In one case, witnesses said they saw a trench with up to ten individuals buried in it and that they were told that at least three other trenches were in the vicinity.53 Forensic analysis would be required to determine whether these bodies are from the March 2004 executions or other violence.

Shattaya and Kailek: Creating a prison camp

At the same time as the events in Mukjar and Garsila but on the other side of the hills, villages in Shattaya locality experienced two sharp waves of violent attacks, in February and March 2004.

Residents of Shattaya town and nearby villages such as Artala described the attacks by government forces and militia in early February and early March 2004, including occasional aerial bombardment that forced many villagers to run into the nearby hills. A forty-year-old woman from Shattaya said:

We were attacked by twenty-seven cars with Doschka guns on top, they were shooting at the mountains. I saw them killing groups of two, three, five, seven people. When we were in the mountains we were bombed by airplanes. Some went down the mountains. When we came down, they shouted at us “abid, abid, abid” [slave, slave, slave] and “Tora Bora” and “SLA.”54

A fifty-year-old Fur woman from Shattaya town told Human Rights Watch about the attack on Shattaya town and her subsequent detention in Kailek, which became notorious for the inhuman conditions in which the displaced people were held:

[We] ran to Shattaya council and some men were killed there, they were shot. [The government forces and Janjaweed] were coming behind us with cars and horses. Some people ran to Kailek, there were Difa al Shabi [PDF] there with some of our own people. The people in Difa al Shabi tried to protect them but they were also killed. All of us from Shattaya, we were climbing the mountains with our cattle. When we were resting and getting water…we saw horses and cars coming—all of them were climbing the mountains—some on foot and some on horses. They surrounded us and said, “You all go down.”….On the mountain they separated the men and women. They tied the men’s hands with rope and tied them to donkeys and beat the men and made them run behind the donkeys. People from all regions—Shattaya, Kailek—were there and we went down and were gathered in Kailek. They said, “If you need death, you will see it now.”55

Human Rights Watch received reports of torture and deliberate killings during and following the attacks. A thirty-five-year-old man from Shattaya was caught by the militias in their February 10, 2004 attack on Shattaya town and tortured by the militias. He said, “[I] was pressed down with a gun over my neck. Then a [clothes] iron was heated in the fire and pressed on my arm.” The man was later among the displaced persons detained in Kailek in March and April, 2004. 

Several thousand displaced people from Shattaya area were held in Kailek for weeks in March and April 2004 in appalling conditions. They were subjected to heinous atrocities. According to several eyewitness accounts, men repeatedly had their hands tied with rope and were then tied to camels; the animals were then beaten into a gallop so that the men were dragged behind. One man detained there said he saw “nine people [who were] shot in front of my eyes after they were caught. Others in my group were hung from their neck from trees in a way that nearly killed them. Others were tied behind a camel and dragged around at high speed. One of them was totally covered in blood but still alive. Others were deliberately trampled on by horses and camels, killing some of them.”56

In other cases, men were summarily executed by gunshot or stabbing, often in front of their wives and families.57 Children were thrown into fires, and women and girls were repeatedly raped.  “They used to take the young girls and rape them—they would spend two or three days outside and then bring them back,” one survivor told Human Rights Watch. The militia members controlling the town told a group of women, “You women, you hear this, there is no other god except us.”58 Old women were forced to serve the animals with grass, and some old women were forced to carry buckets of water on their heads and serve the camels, “to be less than camels.”59

Along with a few members of the police, the Janjaweed militias were given full control of the displaced persons in Kailek and controlled their movements, including access to water, food and other essential items.  Some of the displaced people were held in Kailek more than fifty days.  Apparently, at some point in March, the commissioner of Kass issued a decree “prohibiting by force all [internally displaced persons’] movement out of Kailek,” possibly to ensure that witness accounts did not reach international ears.60

Human Rights Watch also received reports that a “court” was set up in Kailek by members of the militias, including Janjaweed leader Abu Kamasha, in which displaced people were “punished” by being beaten, sometimes to death, and raped. In some cases these abuses were reportedly carried out not only by militiamen themselves, but also by their children, whom they ordered to “help execute the punishments, to hit persons until they died.”61

By the time the Sudanese government begrudgingly permitted U.N. staff from humanitarian agencies to visit the region, in late April 2004, many of the displaced children in Kailek were in a state of extreme malnutrition.  Shocked humanitarian aid workers estimated that scores of people had died in the dire conditions and noted the presence of a stock of sacks of sorghum and millet in the building used by the police. Despite the dire conditions, many of the displaced persons requested that no aid be distributed in Kailek for fear it would induce further violence against them.62

United Nations staff also reported the near-total destruction of Fur villages en route to Kailek, similar to the pattern of scorched earth on the Garsila-Mukjar side of the hills. The U.N. report noted, “The visit confirmed several reports from IDPs…of heavy destruction and depopulation of the Fur villages in the Shattaya area, while the mission also passed through several ‘Arab’ villages all still standing, conspicuously intact, populated and well functioning.”63 

The U.N.’s telling report continued, “The last village before Shattaya is Abruminoa which, until attacked on February 12, 2004 housed some 6,000 people and is of considerable size, including a large market area. The village is now completely obliterated, with all items of value looted, including doors and metal roofs on buildings. All farming areas around the destroyed villages have been looted and used as grazing spots for camel and cattle herds.”64

Shortly after the U.N.’s visit in April 2004, and in the face of considerable Sudanese government resistance and denials of the gravity of the situation, relief agencies moved the displaced people in Kailek to Kass and other locations where security and relief conditions, while far from ideal, were a significant improvement.

The U.N. report also noted that Kailek was controlled by a mixture of police and Janjaweed militia forces, all of whom were well armed and wore government uniforms. As noted above, one of the key leaders of the Janjaweed in the Kailek area, who has been mentioned in numerous accounts of abuses in the Shattaya region, is called Abu Kamasha. He reportedly lived in Amnabasa in 2004.  The former commissioner of Kass, Ahmed Angabo, is also reported to have been deeply implicated in the destructive operations in Shattaya region.

[20] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur, October 16, 2004.

[21] Confidential communication to Human Rights Watch, December 2003.

[22] The Popular Defence Force (PDF) was created in 1989, after the current government came to power, as an Islamist government-sponsored militia under the jurisdiction of the Sudanese army, which trains, arms, and supervises these forces. It was intended as a supplement to the army, which was then dominated by western-trained officers and considered too secular. PDF recruitment reflected the locality, and in Darfur was along Islamist lines until the recent conflict, and previously incorporated many of the now-targeted ethnic groups. The Darfurian PDF were used extensively by the government in the war in southern Sudan.

[23] Human Rights Watch interviews, Darfur, October 2004.

[24] Human Rights Watch interview, South Darfur, October 1, 2004.

[25] Other Arab tribes who refused to respond to the government’s call included the Beni Hussein, the Ta’isha and the Ma’alia, among others.

[26] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur, October 2004.

[27] Human Rights Watch interviews, October 2003.

[28] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur, October 16, 2004.

[29] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur, October 16, 2004.

[30] Human Rights Watch interviews, October 2004.

[31] It is likely that initially many people still retained some expectation that they would find some security in the larger towns. In any event, options for flight were limited by continuing fighting and transport difficulties. Bindisi and Mukjar are in a very remote part of Sudan, far from the state capitals. In later months, including up to the present time, many people fled Mukjar and Bindisi for even larger towns such as Nyala in South Darfur, and Zalingei, where they hoped for greater protection.

[32] Jaffer Abdel Hakh left the position of Garsila commissioner shortly after these events, on or around April 2004, and was promoted to the position of Minister of Health for West Darfur.

[33] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur, October 14, 2004.

[34] Coordinated government-militia attacks also took place in other parts of West Darfur. Dozens of villages around Murnei, eighty kilometers east of Geneina and along the border with Chad in Dar Masalit, were repeatedly attacked and “ethically cleansed” of the Masalit population in the period between October and December 2003. For further details see Human Rights Watch report, Darfur Destroyed.

[35] Situation of human rights in the Darfur region of Sudan, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN.4/2005/3, p. 16.

[36] Human Rights Watch interview, South Darfur, October 11, 2004.

[37] Agence France Presse, “Sudanese president vows to annihilate Darfur rebels,” December 31, 2003.

[38] Human Rights Watch interview, December 2004.

[39] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur, October 15, 2004.

[40] Human Rights Watch interview, Wadi Saleh, West Darfur, October 2004. Hassa Balla, the commander of the PDF forces in Garsila who was also allegedly implicated in the executions was still in Garsila in this position as of October 2004. Human Rights Watch interview with government official, Garsila, October 17, 2004.

[41] Human Rights Watch interviews Darfur, April 2004.

[42] Human Rights Watch interviews, Darfur, April 2004.

[43] Human Rights Watch interviews, West Darfur, October 16-17, 2004.

[44] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur October 16, 2004.

[45] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur, October 17, 2004.

[46] Human Rights Watch interviews, West Darfur, October 16, 2004.

[47] Human Rights Watch interviews, West and South Darfur, October, 2004.

[48] Human Rights Watch interviews, West Darfur, October 17, 2004.

[49] Each state province has a commissioner, who is the highest-level government official in the province and usually reports to the wali or governor of the state, based in the state capital.  The commissioner of Mukjar at the time of these events left for some months in 2004 but recently returned to Mukjar and is apparently still in this position.

[50] Human Rights Watch interview, West Darfur, October 17, 2004.

[51] Human Rights Watch interviews, West Darfur, October 14-15, 2004.

[52] “Sudan committee acknowledges rights abuse in Darfur but rejects genocide,” Agence France Presse, January 20, 2004, at 

[53] Confidential communication to Human Rights Watch, December 2004.

[54] Confidential communication to Human Rights Watch. Darfurian civilians have told Human Rights Watch that they refer to the rebels as “Tora Bora” because the Darfur rebels hide in the hills, as did the Afghan rebels of that name. The government forces may use it as well for its “terrorist” connotation. 

[55] Human Rights Watch interviews, South Darfur, October 2004. A few of the Darfur PDF units, some who were recruited before the conflict and not as “Janjaweed,” have attempted to protect civilians.

[56] Confidential communication to Human Rights Watch.

[57] Human Rights Watch interviews, South Darfur, October 2004.

[58] Human Rights Watch interviews, South Darfur, October 2004.

[59] Confidential communication to Human Rights Watch.

[60] “United Nations Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid Assessment Mission: Kailek town, South Darfur,” April 25, 2004, p.4.

[61] Confidential communication to Human Rights Watch.

[62] “United Nations Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid Assessment Mission: Kailek town, South Darfur,” April 25, 2004, p. 5.

[63] “United Nations Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid Assessment Mission: Kailek town, South Darfur,” April 25, 2004.

[64]  “United Nations Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid Assessment Mission: Kailek town, South Darfur,” April 25, 2004.

<<previous  |  index  |  next>>January 2005