Background Briefing

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The International Community

Anxious to maintain the appearance of constant progress towards peace, donors and representatives of the United Nations and of mediating mechanisms fail to react effectively to delays in implementing the ceasefire and power-sharing agreements or to outright disregard for certain of their provisions. 

Following a ceasefire accord in late 2002, European donors began providing food to the FDD and other rebel groups, supposedly to enable them to gather their forces in agreed-upon sites to be counted, disarmed, and demobilized. A year and a half later they   resumed the distribution offood to the rebel forces even though many of them are not yet gathered in the specified sites and even though those in the sites remain armed. Donors have not been able to obtain a reliable count of combatants and so deliver food according to needs estimated by the rebel forces. In some sites, rebel forces have stocked excess food, some of which may be used to attract new recruits or to win political support in adjacent areas. According to local witnesses, in at least one case, food delivered to a site in Bubanza was later trucked by government military vehicles to FDD posts at Mbare Gasarara, where the combatants were engaged in combat.86 Donors are unwilling to end food deliveries because they fear upsetting the peace process. As a result of donor reluctance to confront the problem, Burundians now “treat the food deliveries as a right,” exclaimed one frustrated diplomat. “And they are adopting the same attitude towards [support for] an integrated army,” he added.87

The World Bank and others pledged considerable funds for the peace process, to pay for demobilization and disarmament; now some Burundian leaders insist that the international community must also assume the cost of the newly integrated army, far beyond the means of the Burundian government itself. Although it initially seemed impossible that donors would agree to contribute funds for such a standing army, even if meant only to sustain it during the years of its eventual reduction, several are now said to be considering this course in hopes of speeding the peace process and avoiding further conflict in Burundi.88

In April 2004 and after more than a year in the field, the African Union force lacked the funds to continue its peacekeeping efforts.The Secretary-General proposed having the Security Council adopt the force as a UN peace-keeping force, doubling the number of troops to more than 5,600 and including civilian services to monitor human rights and to assist in preparations for elections.89

There are some signs that the international community is taking a firmer stand towards Burundian leaders. On April 21, the chair of the IMC criticized the delays in the peace process and asked that all rebel movements finishing to have their combatants assembled by mid-May, but as of early June this had not been done.90The World Bank said that release of its funding for demobilization depends on the JCC agreeing finally on a definition of “combatant.” It also said that the Burundian government must provide a plan for demobilizing the Gardiens de la Paix. On June 5, the regional leaders who have been following the Burundi peace process met once more and rejected a government effort to extend the transition by a year. They insisted that the government begin planning immediately for elections to be held by the October 31 deadline and they agreed to help mobilize resources to support cantonment of the forces and integration of former combatants. Equally significant, the leaders decided to impose as yet undefined “restrictions” on the FN|L and asked the newly formed Peace and Security Council of the AU to recommend further sanctions against the FNL if there is no end to combat within three months.91

With the new UN presence and this firmer stance by international leaders, there is greater hope for peace than at any time in the recent past. Should that peace be achieved, justice for the crimes described in this paper must be the next priority.





[86] Human Rights Watch interview, Bujumbura, March 17, 2004.

[87] Human Rights Watch interview, Bujmubura, March 22, 2004.

[88] Human Rights Watch interview, Bujumbura, March 31, 2004.

[89] Human Rights Watch interview, by telephone to Washington, April 28, 2004.

[90] Arib News, “Dinka appelle au désarmement avant le 15 mai prochain,” April 21, 2004.

[91] IRIN, “Great Lakes: Stick to peace accord, regional leaders tell Burundi”, June 7, 2004.


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