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III. BACKGROUND

Over the course of nearly three decades, Angolans suffered through one of the most brutal and protracted internal armed conflicts in recent history. The conflict claimed approximately 1 million lives. Some 4.1 million people were displaced during the latter phase of the conflict, with 400,000 of these fleeing to neighboring Zambia, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Namibia.

On April 4, 2002, following the death of UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, the Angolan Army (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNITA, which brought an end to the fighting. The document, also referred to as the Luena Accords, reiterated the main elements of the Lusaka Protocol, which had been signed in 1994. The Luena Accords provided for the implementation of a ceasefire through the demobilization of UNITA’s military forces. UNITA officers were to be integrated into the new, unified government army and national police. ⁵

Times of War

During the civil war, both the government and UNITA committed widespread abuses against the civilian population. Violations included direct attacks on the civilian population, extra-judicial executions, rape and other sexual assault, torture and mutilations, forced conscription of child soldiers, indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, abduction of women and girls, and looting.⁶ Intellectuals were persecuted and killed, as were journalists and rights activists.

There was no private press in Angola prior to 1991. The only alternative to state media was Imparcial Fax, a private newspaper that circulated via fax. Publication of Imparcial Fax ended in January 1995 when an unidentified assailant murdered Ricardo Mello, its manager and chief editor, in Luanda.⁷

Throughout the 1990s, journalists operating in government areas were murdered, assaulted, and received threats to their physical safety.⁸ They also faced enormous obstacles in gathering information. Not only was their access to official information denied, a practice that still prevails, but witnesses and other primary sources were also reluctant to go “on record” due to fear of reprisals. This situation limited journalists’ access to the range of information necessary to produce quality work.

Government censorship and intrusion in the media were flagrant. For example, publications that quoted UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi were prohibited.⁹ It was common to find application forms for membership of the MPLA in newsrooms, a hint not lost on journalists and media professionals. Often, journalists who did not fill out such forms were denied access to official sources and encountered difficulties in publishing their stories. The Angolan Journalists’ Union has also alleged that government agents infiltrated the newsrooms to monitor journalists’ activities and political tendencies.¹⁰

In the last years of the conflict, many journalists were summoned for questioning by Angolan police concerning their newspaper articles or radio broadcasts. A number of journalists were threatened with physical harm. Some were assaulted and others were accused of libel or defamation of government officials.¹¹

UNITA was also heavy-handed with journalists. Until it was shut down by the Angolan government on April 1, 1998, journalists who worked for the Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel (VORGAN), UNITA’s radio station, were threatened with physical aggression and imprisonment if suspected of passing information to government forces.¹² VORGAN, a symbol of UNITA, had programs designed to broadcast propaganda against the MPLA government but sometimes targeted the peace agreement and U.N. representatives working in Angola.¹³

The Situation Today

The government continues to dominate both print and broadcast media. An analysis of data provided by the National Treasury Directorate shows that in fiscal year 2002, subsides for state media accounted for 88.9 percent of all operational subsidies for state-owned business.

Source: National Treasury Directorate, Luanda, 2003

Angola’s public television station (TelevisÃo Pública de Angola, TPA) and its National Radio of Angola (Rádio Nacional de Angola, RNA) rule the national airwaves. TPA operates two television channels and RNA operates five radio stations in Luanda.¹⁵ RNA is also the only broadcaster to offer programs in indigenous African languages. The Angolan capital also has four private radio stations operating under government license: LAC (Luanda Antena Comercial, since 1992); Rádio Ecclésia, a Catholic-owned radio station; Radio Escola, designed to train new professionals; and, since March 2003, Radio CEFOJOR, a commercial radio station also designed to train young radio journalists.¹⁶ President José Eduardo dos Santos has mentioned the possibility of allowing private television stations to operate.¹⁷ However, most Luanda journalists outside of the state media take the view that in the absence of a transparent process for the issuing of a license, such a station would simply be a business opportunity for an ally of the president.¹⁸

The only daily newspaper is the Portuguese-language, state-owned Jornal de Angola, which published its first edition on July 29, 1975. The private press, often viewed as the only section of the media to reflect a range of political views, is growing slowly. As of 2004, there were seven private newspapers in Angola: Folha 8, established in 1994; Agora, established in 1996; O Angolense, established in 1997; and Semanário Angolense, Actual, A Capital, and A Palavra, all established in 2003. These run weekly. Often, technical and financial constraints, rather than political obstacles, hinder these newspapers’ efforts to reach their readers. Newspaper distribution is limited almost exclusively to Luanda and the papers cost on average 120 Kwanzas (approximately $1.50 (U.S.)) each. Therefore, they reach just a few thousand Angolans.¹⁹

Several journalists from the private press reported that financial constraints are currently the greatest challenge facing the media in Angola. A dearth of quality printing facilities in Luanda means that all of the private papers except one are printed by the same printing house. This lack of competition as well as the cost of paper has lead to the doubling of printing costs in the last year. USAID has donated paper to some of the private newspapers.

“The assistance from the U.S. helped a lot, but the paper is coming to an end. Some newspapers are at risk of shutting down,” one journalist warned.²⁰

Private newspapers are difficult to obtain even in the larger provincial centers; one obstacle to distribution is the refusal by the state airline, TAAG, to transport these papers as cargo.

Although the private press is now generally free to scrutinize government policies, it can still be dangerous for journalists to investigate certain high-ranking government, MPLA, and UNITA officials. In some provinces, such as in Cabinda, journalists have reported that they still find MPLA membership application forms in media offices.²¹ Many of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch also described seeing MPLA party membership forms in secondary schools and universities.

There are some 126 political parties registered in Angola, though only a few are active in organizing public protests against the government, adopting public policies, and calling for new elections. Among them, the small opposition party, Party for the Democratic Support and Progress of Angola (Partido de Apóio Democrático e Progresso de Angola, PADEPA, also known as PADPA), which was created in June 1995, has suffered repressive reactions to its public protests.²² National legislation was recently changed and the state no longer subsidizes the creation of new parties; however, state funds are still available to parties with seats in the National Assembly.

Organized civil society, which has developed in Angola since 1991, operates mainly from Luanda. During the war, a number of prominent intellectuals, union leaders, non-governmental organizations, and several church-based groups worked to bring the fighting parties to negotiate to end the war and the associated widespread rights abuses. At present, with the end of hostilities in most of Angola,²³ hundreds of NGOs have formed. These NGOs and the broader civil society in which they exist face serious difficulties in restructuring their strategies and identifying short- and medium-term objectives. Nevertheless, a number of national organizations have developed skills and implemented projects to promote human rights and foster reconciliation. Collaborative efforts with international groups and other partnerships have been fundamental for this transition. Yet these efforts have been geographically concentrated and have suffered from limited operational capacity even in the capital.

There are other important restraints to popular participation in the decision-making process in Angola. More than 30 percent of the Angolan population is not able to read a letter or a newspaper. Forty-six percent of women fifteen years old or older do not know how to read and write, compared with 18 percent of men in that same age group. The urban population is 48 percent more likely to know how to read and write than the rural population.²⁴ While 38 percent own a radio, only 14 percent own a television.²⁵ Radio broadcasts (by RNA or foreign-based short-wave stations) are nevertheless followed enthusiastically throughout Angola. In Luanda, the phone-in programs that Rádio Ecclésia introduced in the late 1990s have opened a space for public debate, and their popularity has prompted RNA and the commercial stations to also include phone-ins in their programming. This underlines the importance of making independent radio transmission available throughout the country.