Background Briefing

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COTE D’IVOIRE

Human Rights Concerns

The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire that broke out in September 2002 nominally ended in July 2003, several months after the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. However, the country has made little progress towards long-term peace. The peace process is not only deadlocked, it is unraveling. Since the beginning of 2004, Côte d’Ivoire has become a more deeply divided and dangerously polarized society. At present, Côte d’Ivoire is effectively split in half, with government-held areas in the south and territory controlled by rebels in the north. Civilians continue to suffer at the hands of both sides and their associated militias, and from the economic hardship engendered by the conflict.

Ivorian military, gendarmes, police forces and pro-government militias continue to commit serious abuses in Abidjan and other parts of the country with total impunity. Most recently, security forces violently cracked down on a demonstration by opposition groups in March 2004. The crackdown lasted days and, according to a United Nations report, resulted in 120 deaths, many caused by indiscriminate fire from security forces. The Ivorian government admitted that those responsible for the deaths included government-backed militias it termed “parallel forces.” 

Human Rights Watch is concerned about the escalation and commission of egregious violations by Ivorian government-backed militias, drawn mainly from youth supporters of President Gbagbo’s party. Since 2000, the government has increasingly relied on government-backed militias for policing and, since 2002, for combating the rebellion. These groups have served as a lightly-veiled mechanism to intimidate and abuse political opposition and those, who by virtue of their religion, ethnicity and/or nationality, are thought to oppose the government, most notably Muslims, northerners and West African immigrants mostly from Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Guinea. Some of these militias have reportedly been armed and trained by the country’s security forces.

The militias have often operated in tandem with government security forces. Under the umbrella group name of the “Young Patriots,” these civilian militias have been reputed to have close links to the Presidency and possibly to the cocoa industry. Militias have been active in Abidjan and other urban settings as well as in the rural areas, particularly where there has been ongoing violence against the immigrant communities who are the primary source of labor on cocoa and coffee plantations.

Since 2002, thousands of militant youth, many from President Gbagbo’s Bete ethnic group, have enlisted in the state security corps, including the gendarmerie, the police and the military. It has been reported that some radical members of these institutions have disobeyed orders from their hierarchy. We are told President Gbagbo’s administration has promoted these so-called patriotic elements within the military and the gendarmerie at the expense of more moderate members of the hierarchies. The regime increasingly deploys all three corps to enforce security. This has led to a confusing picture regarding responsibility and accountability of security forces for recent abuses, particularly since perpetrators generally did not wear identifying insignia.

The general breakdown of law and order and the proliferation of armed groups in the northern, rebel-controlled area of Côte d’Ivoire have also led to abuses of civilians. There have been specific threats to particular groups such as Liberian refugees and members of ethnic groups perceived to support the Ivorian government.

Regional Impact

Credible sources have reported that, in anticipation of a resumption of hostilities, both the Ivorian government and the rebel coalition known as the Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) have been recruiting combatants from Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso, including children and refugees. State and non-state actors alike can all too easily buy the allegiance of these combatants with the promise of looted goods or a few dollars. These militias, private armies of thugs, and roving groups of fighters routinely commit abuses against, and often terrorize, civilians.

Despite considerable effort by the international community to bring about sustainable peace and stability within the sub-region, a chain is only as good as its weakest link, and today that link is Côte d’Ivoire. If the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is not brought under control, it could draw in roving combatants from neighboring countries. A return to all-out war in Côte d’Ivoire could threaten many lives and jeopardize the United Nations’ efforts to stabilize both Sierra Leone and Liberia. The Linas-Marcoussis agreement, meant to bring about an end to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, was signed nearly one and a half years ago and yet a return to war seems more and more possible.

Action by the African Union

The A.U. has issued statements condemning the deterioration of peace in Côte d’Ivoire and the related abuses. On March 27, the PSC called for parties to “exercise restraint,” resume dialogue, and adhere to the Linas-Marcoussis agreement.5 On April 13, the Chairperson of the Commission of the A.U. issued a report calling for an end to impunity and appealing “to the Government of and the Forces Nouvelles to take the necessary measures to bring the perpetrators of human rights violations to justice.”6

The PSC Communiqué of May 25 reiterated the call to resume dialogue; requested the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to carry out an investigation in human rights violations committed on March 25-27, 2004; and supported the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights in its decision to investigate human rights violations committed since the start of the crisis in 2002. It also mandated ECOWAS “to take necessary action to ensure full restoration of operations of state.”7

Significantly, the Chairperson’s report also recognized the role that criminal activity and third-party involvement have played not only in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict but also in the region as a whole: “…the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and other conflicts in West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone) are inter-related. The factors of instability, particularly the circulation of, and trafficking in, small arms and light weapons, the phenomenon of child soldiers and the use of mercenaries, have all a regional dimension; hence the need for a global approach to find lasting solutions to the prevailing instability in the region.”8

Recommendations to the African Union:

  • Condemn all violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that have taken place in Côte d’Ivoire during and since the 1999 military coup and call on the Ivorian government and rebel forces to end all ongoing abuses.

  • Insist that the Ivorian government disarm and disband pro-government militias and youth groups, and that individuals alleged to have committed abuses are investigated and held accountable for criminal acts perpetrated by them by a competent judicial body.

  • Speak out on the imperative of accountability for abuses committed since the 1999 military coup.

  • Urge the government to restrain from using hate-speech that could inflame violence towards individuals based on their ethnicity, nationality, political affiliation or ethnic group.

  • Insist that governments in West Africa fully comply with the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons to curb the flow of weapons to all sides of the Ivorian conflict. The exemption process should be made fully transparent and any and all exemptions granted should be on the public record.



    [5] PSC, Communiqué (Addis Ababa: March 27, 2004), paragraph 3.

    [6] Chairperson of the Commission, Report on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Addis Ababa: April 13, 2004), section V(40).

    [7] PSC, Communiqué (Addis Ababa: May 25, 2004), C(7).

    [8] Chairperson of the Commission, Report on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Addis Ababa: April 13, 2004), section V(41).


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