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VII. Annex: Eleven Detainees in Undisclosed Locations

1.  Ibn al-Shaikh al-Libi (Libya)

Detention not “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ⁷⁵

Background

Listed among the most wanted al-Qaeda leaders whose assets were frozen by President Bush. Al-Libi allegedly led the training camp at al-Khaldan, one of al-Qaeda’s largest camps, ⁷⁶ and worked under Abu Zubayda.

Arrest

Arrested in late December 2001 or early January 2002 by Pakistani authorities after fleeing the fighting in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan.

Detention

Al-Libi was reportedly in U.S. custody at the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan soon after his arrest. ⁷⁷ According to U.S. officials, he was then interrogated by U.S. officials aboard the USS Bataan, an amphibious assault ship in the Arabian Sea, where American John Walker Lindh and other detainees were being held. ⁷⁸ Newsweek reported a clash between the FBI and the CIA after al-Libi’s arrest:

FBI officials brought their plea to retain control over al-Libi’s interrogation up to FBI Director Robert Mueller. The CIA station chief in Afghanistan, meanwhile, appealed to the agency’s hawkish counterterrorism chief, Cofer Black. He in turn called CIA Director George Tenet, who went to the White House. Al-Libi was handed over to the CIA. “They duct-taped his mouth, cinched him up and sent him to Cairo” for more-fearsome Egyptian interrogations, says the ex-FBI official. “At the airport the CIA case officer goes up to him and says, ‘You’re going to Cairo, you know. Before you get there I’m going to find your mother and I’m going to f--- her.’ So we lost that fight.” (A CIA official said he had no comment.) ⁷⁹

The Washington Post likewise reported that the capture of al-Libi generated the first real fight over interrogations of the secret detainees: the CIA wanted to threaten his life and family; the FBI objected. ⁸⁰

Intelligence

Al-Libi reportedly provided the CIA with information about an alleged plot to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Yemen with a truck bomb. ⁸¹ Al-Libi was also a principal source for Bush administration claims that al-Qaeda collaborated with Saddam Hussein, particularly the assertion by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the United Nations that Iraq had provided training in “poisons and deadly gases” for al-Qaeda. ⁸² According to Newsweek, however, al-Libi recanted after being confronted with the testimony of other detainees: “Some officials now suspect that al-Libi, facing aggressive interrogation techniques, had previously said what U.S. officials wanted to hear.” ⁸³

2. Abu Zubayda, a.k.a. Zubeida, Zain al-`Abidin Muhammad Husain, `Abd al-Hadi al-Wahab (Palestinian)

Detention “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ⁸⁴

Background

Allegedly senior al-Qaeda operational planner, potential heir to bin Laden. Zubayda is said by U.S. officials to have organized several attacks on U.S. interests, including the failed “millennium plot” to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport and a hotel in Jordan frequented by American tourists. He reportedly has strong ties with Jordanian and Palestinian groups and was sentenced to death in absentia by a Jordanian court for his role in the millennium plot. ⁸⁵ He is also believed to have played a role in plots to blow up U.S. embassies in Sarajevo and Paris in the fall of 2001, as well as in the Sept. 11 attacks. Zubayda worked in Pakistan and coordinated al-Qaeda volunteers traveling to Afghanistan, sending individuals to training camps and assigning them to cells overseas once they completed trainings. ⁸⁶ After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, Zubayda reportedly led an effort to rebuild al-Qaeda in Pakistan. He is said to have been commanding an al-Qaeda faction that was planning new attacks against American interests, according to U.S. officials. He was third on the U.S. list of wanted al-Qaeda suspects, after Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri.

Arrest

Arrested in March 2002 in Faisalabad, Pakistan. He was said to be seriously injured in a shootout with the Pakistani and American forces that captured him in a Pakistan safe-house in March 2002.

Detention

Zubayda was reportedlyin U.S. custody in Pakistan ⁸⁷ under CIA control, as of June 2002. ⁸⁸

According to Time magazine, a “well-placed American military official” said that the U.S. had initially looked for an ally to conduct an interrogation. “Someone is going to squeeze him…We’ve been out of that business for so long that it's best handled by others. …It's not pulling out fingernails, but it's pretty brutal.” ⁸⁹ However, confirming his capture on April 3, 2002, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said, “We have him. He is under U.S. control at the present time. We are responsible for him…. He is receiving medical care, and we intend to get every single thing out of him to try to prevent terrorist acts in the future.” ⁹⁰ Both the Washington Post and the New York Times, however, reported that U.S. officials initially withheld painkillers from Zubayda, who was shot during his capture, as an interrogation device. ⁹¹

When Zubayda was captured, the debate between the CIA and FBI over interrogation tactics reportedly re-heated (after the al-Libi case, above). This time, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III reportedly decided to hold back FBI involvement. “Once the CIA was given the green light . . . they had the lead role,” a senior FBI counterterrorism official told the Washington Post. ⁹²

Intelligence

U.S. officials say that Zubayda has provided intelligence on al-Qaeda’s efforts to build a “dirty bomb” and that his information helped lead to the arrest of Jose Padilla, the American allegedly plotting to use such a weapon in the United States. U.S. intelligence and national security officials told the Washington Post that Zubayda’s information led to the apprehension of other al-Qaeda members, including Ramzi Binalshibh, Omar Faruq, Rahim al-Nashiri, and Muhammad al-Darbi. ⁹³ All four remain under CIA control. The 9/11 Commission report refers to the intelligence reports of seven interrogation sessions with Zubayda, dating from February 2002 to April 2004.

3. Omar al-Faruq (Kuwait)

Detention not “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ⁹⁴

Background

Faruq is said to be a key link between al-Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups in Southeast Asia, especially the Jemaah Islamiyah. ⁹⁵ According to Time magazine, quoting a CIA report, Faruq was a senior al-Qaeda operative co-ordinating Islamic militants in Southeast Asia and had admitted to being the mastermind behind a number of attacks on Indonesian churches on Christmas 2000, which killed eighteen people and injured one hundred. According to the BBC, Faruq was al-Qaeda’s most senior representative in the region. ⁹⁶ Faruq was said to have admitted planning a series of bomb attacks targeting U.S. embassies in Southeast Asia timed to coincide with the anniversary of the September 11 attacks. ⁹⁷

Arrest

Arrested in June 5, 2002 in Indonesia by Indonesian authorities. ⁹⁸

Detention

He is said to be in U.S. custody ⁹⁹ under CIA control. ¹⁰⁰ Upon his arrest in Indonesia in June 2002, Faruq was reportedly hooded and flown to Bagram airforce base, Afghanistan, on a CIA aircraft for questioning. When his hood was removed in Bagram, the seals of the New York City Police and Fire Departments were reportedly on the wall in front of him. After three months of interrogation, he reportedly told interrogators that he was a senior al-Qaeda representative in Southeast Asia, reporting to Abu Zubayda. ¹⁰¹ According to the New York Times:

What is known is that the questioning was prolonged, extending day and night for weeks. It is likely, experts say, that the proceedings followed a pattern, with Mr. Faruq left naked most of the time, his hands and feet bound. … Mr. Faruq may also have been hooked up to sensors, then asked questions to which interrogators knew the answers, so they could gauge his truthfulness, officials said. The Western intelligence official described Mr. Faruq’s interrogation as “not quite torture, but about as close as you can get.” The official said that over a three-month period, the suspect was fed very little, while being subjected to sleep and light deprivation, prolonged isolation and room temperatures that varied from 100 degrees to 10 degrees. ¹⁰²

Although Indonesia had turned Faruq over to the United States, the United States would not allow Indonesian authorities to interrogate Faruq, angering some Indonesian officials.They were allowed to submit questions, which the Americans then asked. ¹⁰³

Intelligence

According to U.S. officials cited by the BBC, Faruq “at first said very little, but then in early September he broke down.” ¹⁰⁴ Faruq reportedly told his interrogators of preparations to attack American embassies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Cambodia with explosives-laden trucks. ¹⁰⁵ As a result of Faruq’s disclosures, the United States issued an alert and closed its embassies. ¹⁰⁶ Faruq’s questioning also provided evidence against the radical Islamic cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, who was convicted on charges of violence by an Indonesian court. According to his U.S. interrogators, he is said to have given details of Jemaah Islamiyah's ties to al-Qaeda. ¹⁰⁷

4. Abu Zubair al-Haili, a.k.a. Fawzi Saad al-`Obaydi (Saudi Arabia)

Detention not “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ¹⁰⁸

Background

Allegedly ran al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Zubair is said to have played a major role in bringing recruits to training camps in Afghanistan prior to September 11. He was deputy to or associate of Abu Zubayda. ¹⁰⁹ He is said to have aided al-Qaeda members flee from Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. According to the Moroccan Justice Ministry, he was one of three Saudi men arrested while plotting to attack warships in the Strait of Gibraltar. ¹¹⁰ His trainees are believed to include Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged 9/11 conspirator, and Richard Reid, the alleged “shoe bomber.” ¹¹¹

The British Sunday Telegraph, basing its information on a British government dossier on Iraq, said that Abu Zubair, at the time linked to Saddam Hussein, was trained in Iraq. This report also said that in the 1990s, Zubair's “Supporters of Islam” organisation was sent by Saddam Hussein into northern Iraq to “assassinate leading Kurds and to build chemical warfare facilities.” Zubair is then said to have defected from Saddam Hussein to al-Qaeda. ¹¹²

Arrest

Arrested in June 2002 in Morocco by Moroccan authorities. ¹¹³

Detention

When Zubair was apprehended, U.S. officials reportedly said that they were in no hurry to take custody of Abu Zubair because the Moroccans “can use much more persuasive methods in questioning a suspect.” ¹¹⁴ In August 2002, U.S. sources were “unwilling to say where al-Haili is being held or by whom.” ¹¹⁵ He is said to be in U.S. custody now, however. ¹¹⁶

Intelligence

Because Zubair reportedly helped al-Qaeda operatives flee Afghanistan, it was hoped that he would know the false names and identities that some of them had assumed. ¹¹⁷

5. Ramzi bin al-Shibh (Yemen)

Detention “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ¹¹⁸

Background

Alleged conspirator in Sept. 11 attacks. He failed four times to get a U.S. visa. ¹¹⁹ Bin al-Shibh is said to have become a key member of the al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany after he sought asylum there in the late 1990s. He reportedly met Muhammad Atta, the leader of the Hamburg cell, through a local mosque in 1997. Intelligence officials say bin al-Shibh may also have been involved in the attacks on the USS Cole and a Tunisian synagogue. ¹²⁰

Arrest

Arrested in September 2002 in Karachi, Pakistan.

Detention

After his arrest, the Pakistani government handed him over to the United States, ¹²¹ which reportedly took him initially to a secret CIA installation in Thailand. ¹²² He has since been kept in custody in an undisclosed location under CIA control. ¹²³ The United States district court trying Zacarias Moussaoui, charged with conspiracy in the 9/11 attacks, decided in April 2004 to allow Moussaoui to take testimony from bin al-Shibh and two other al-Qaeda members. The United States had refused, citing national security concerns. ¹²⁴ In September 2004, a U.S. appeals court reportedly said that Moussaoui could submit written questions intended for the detainees. ¹²⁵ In the trial of Munir al-Mutasaddiq in Hamburg, Germany, accused of complicity in the 9/11 attacks, the defense for months requested bin al-Shibh’s testimony. Finally, on August 11, 2004, the U.S. Justice Department provided excerpts from interrogations of bin al-Shibh, according to which Motassadeq was not involved in the plot. ¹²⁶

Intelligence

According to the Commission on Terrorist Attacks, bin al-Shibh sent $14,000 to Moussaoui in August 2001 based on the understanding that Moussaoui was to be “part of the 9/11 plot.” ¹²⁷ According to the New York Times,

Mr. bin al-Shibh has …. proven to be cooperative with interrogators, several senior officials said. But they said his cooperation also did not begin immediately. Several senior counterterrorism officials overseas said recently that they understood that both men [bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Muhammad] possibly had begun to cooperate either after being subjected to coercive interrogations or after being threatened with torture, an accusation adamantly denied by American officials…. Under harsh interrogation methods, both Mr. Muhammad and Mr. bin al-Shibh appear to have been willing to provide elaborate accounts of past events. But they appeared to have been less willing to describe operations that have not yet been carried out, leading some of the intelligence officials to raise questions about the truthfulness of some or all of their statements. ¹²⁸

The 9/11 Commission report refers to the intelligence reports of 41 interrogation sessions with bin al-Shibh, dating from July 2002 to July 2004.

6. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a.k.a. Abu Bilal al-Makki, Abdul Rahman Husain al-Nashari, formerly Muhammad Omar al-Harazi (Saudi Arabia or Yemen—Born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia)

Detention “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ¹²⁹

Background

Allegedly chief of al-Qaeda operations in the Persian Gulf. Al-Nashiri was one of the "Afghan Arabs" who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. ¹³⁰ An explosives expert, he is described by the 9/11 Commission as “the mastermind of the Cole bombing and the eventual head of al-Qaeda operations in the Arabian Peninsula,” reporting directly to Osama bin Laden. ¹³¹ He is also believed to have played a role in a foiled plot in 2002 to bomb U.S. and British warships in the Strait of Gibraltar; the attack on the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002; and the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. ¹³²

In July 2004, a Yemeni court charged al-Nashiri in absentia and five other people with the Cole bombing. ¹³³ Yemeni officials said that Yemen had sought al-Nashiri’s extradition, but the Yemeni prosecutor in the case questioned whether that had been done. ¹³⁴ On September 29, 2004 al-Nashiri was sentenced in absentia to death in the case. ¹³⁵

Arrest

He was reportedly arrested in November 2002 in the United Arab Emirates. While intelligence officials would not say where he was caught, ¹³⁶ one U.S. official told CNN that he was captured "in the region for which he was responsible." The Washington Post reported it was in Kuwait, ¹³⁷ but according to the BBC the United Arab Emirates authorities had arrested al-Nashiri in October. ¹³⁸ He was said to have been caught thanks to intelligence provided by Saudi authorities but also thanks to Abu Zubayda’s intelligence. ¹³⁹ President Bush hailed his capture, saying, “We did bring to justice a killer.” ¹⁴⁰

Detention

Officials confirmed that al-Nashiri was held briefly in Afghanistan before being transferred to his current location but have not said where he was taken after that. ¹⁴¹ The U.S. initially withheld his name while he was being interrogated, hoping he would lead them to other senior members of al-Qaeda. ¹⁴² U.S. officials stated on November 21, 2002, that Al-Nashiri was being interrogated in an undisclosed foreign country. ¹⁴³ In June 2004, he remained under CIA control. ¹⁴⁴

Intelligence

Tom Ridge, the U.S. Homeland Security director, confirmed his capture and declared on November 17, 2002, that “the prisoner was providing useful information.” ¹⁴⁵ Another U.S. official said: “He has been of some help in terms of information.” His interrogation may have led the FBI to warn about “possible attacks on U.S. warships, ports, naval bases and cruise ship docks.” ¹⁴⁶ The 9/11 Commission stated that evidence of Osama bin Laden’s involvement in the Cole bombing came from the interrogation of al-Nashiri and Attash. ¹⁴⁷ The Commission report refers to the intelligence reports of nine interrogation sessions with Al-Nashiri, dating from November 2002 to February 2004.

7. Mustafa al-Hawsawi (Saudi Arabia)

Detention not “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ¹⁴⁸

Background

Al-Hawsawi’s name appears frequently on the al-Qaeda money trail being tracked down by authorities, but his multiple aliases and birthdates have complicated investigations. The U.S. indictment charging Zacarias Moussaoui with conspiracy in the 9/11 attacks lists a number of transactions involving al-Hawsawi in the months leading up to the attacks. They include: the opening of a checking account in Dubai at the same branch where hijacker Fayez Ahmed opened a savings account the same day, and subsequent transactions between the two accounts; and receiving a package sent by Muhammad Atta from Florida to Dubai one week before the attacks. On Sept. 11, 2001, just hours before the attacks on the United States, al-Hawsawi emptied Ahmed’s Dubai account and deposited more than $22,000 into his own account. ¹⁴⁹

Arrest

Al-Hawsawi was arrested by U.S. and Pakistani forces on March 1, 2003 (together with Khalid Shaikh Muhammad) in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. ¹⁵⁰

Detention

The FBI declared that Hawsawi (and Khalid Shaikh Muhammad) were transferred to a “secure site outside Pakistan where they are being interrogated.” ¹⁵¹ Reports say al-Hawsawi (together with Khalid Shaikh Muhammad and `Abd al-Qadus was taken to U.S. Bagram airbase in Afghanistan. But the U.S. forces spokesman in Afghanistan, Colonel Roger King would not confirm the reports. ¹⁵² As with Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, the federal appeals court granted Zacarias Moussaoui access to testimony from al-Hawsawi after a prolonged debate over the implications of such a move for national security. ¹⁵³

Intelligence

According to the Christian Science Monitor, intelligence given by Hawsawi led to the capture of Yasser al-Jaziri, another al-Qaeda financier, in March 2003. ¹⁵⁴ The seizure of his computer led to “lists of contributors around the globe, including bank account numbers and names of organizations that have helped finance terror operations.” ¹⁵⁵

8. Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, a.k.a. Shaikh Muhammad, Ashraf Ref`at Nabith Henin, Khalid `Abd al-Wadud, Salem `Ali, Fahd bin Abdullah bin Khalid (Kuwait)

Detention “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ¹⁵⁶

Background

Described by the 9/11 Commission as “the model of the terrorist entrepreneur,” “KSM” was “the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks.” ¹⁵⁷ He was also allegedly the mastermind behind the murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002, USS Cole attack, 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the attack on a synagogue on the island of Djerba in Morocco in 2002, and virtually every other major al-Qaeda attack. Muhammad is allegedly the third-ranking official of al-Qaeda. He is said to be fluent in Arabic, English, Urdu, and Baluchi. KSM graduated from the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in 1986 before moving to Peshwar, Pakistan, where he became acquainted with bin Laden. ¹⁵⁸ KSM helped finance the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, masterminded by his nephew Ramzi Yusif. In 1994 he joined Yusif in the Philippines to plan the blowing up of American airliners flying from Southeast Asia. Yusif and two other conspirators were arrested and brought to the U.S. for trial, but Muhammad eluded capture following his indictment in 1996 for his role in the plot. In early 1999, bin Laden endorsed KSM’s plan of using aircraft as weapons and some months later in Kandahar they drew up targets which included the White House and the Pentagon; the Capitol; and the World Trade Center. KSM was subsequently the lead planner of the attacks. ¹⁵⁹

Arrest

U.S. and Pakistani officials announced that KSM was arrested on March 1, 2003 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, though there are rumors that he was in fact arrested earlier. Tom Ridge, the U.S. Homeland Security director, boasted: “We got a big one this past weekend.” White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said “Let's just say it's been a good day for all around the world, except for al-Qaeda.”

KSM’s two sons, Yusif al-Khalid (nine years old) and Abed al-Khalid (seven) were reportedly picked up in September 2002 by Pakistani security forces during an attempted capture of KSM. They were reportedly held in an undisclosed place until KSM’s arrest in March 2003 when they were reportedly transferred to custody in the United States, allegedly in order to force their father to talk. However U.S. authorities have denied that the two children were in the custody of U.S. officials, either in the U.S. or anywhere else, or that the boys had been interrogated by U.S. officials. ¹⁶⁰

Detention

KSM was reportedly questioned initially by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) before being turned over to the United States at Chaklala Air Force base in Rawalpindi. There, he was reportedly flown to the CIA interrogation center in Bagram, Afghanistan, and from there, some days later, to an "undisclosed location." ¹⁶¹ On September 30, 2004, in the first Presidential debate, President Bush said that KSM was “in prison.” There have been persistent allegations that Khalid Shaikh Muhammad has been tortured in detention. According to the New York Times, “C.I.A. interrogators used graduated levels of force, including a technique known as 'water boarding,' in which a prisoner is strapped down, forcibly pushed under water and made to believe he might drown.” ¹⁶² The same accountadded “The methods employed by the C.I.A. are so severe that senior officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have directed its agents to stay out of many of the interviews of the high-level detainees, counterterrorism officials said. The F.B.I. officials have advised the bureau's director, Robert S. Mueller III, that the interrogation techniques, which would be prohibited in criminal cases, could compromise their agents in future criminal cases, the counterterrorism officials said.”

Intelligence

Khalid Shaikh Muhammad has reportedly provided a wealth of information, though there are conflicting reports as to whether he began to provide it immediately or not. ¹⁶³ In late March 2003, Time reported that KSM had "given U.S. interrogators the names and descriptions of about a dozen key al-Qaeda operatives believed to be plotting terrorist attacks on America and other western countries, according to federal officials" and had "added crucial details to the descriptions of other suspects and filled in important gaps in what U.S. intelligence knows about al-Qaeda's practices." ¹⁶⁴ An analysis of the dates of the intelligence reports of seventy-six interrogation sessions with KSM cited by the 9/11 Commission, however, suggests that most of the information provided by KSM on the 9/11 plot, at least, came only a year after his capture. ¹⁶⁵ Much of the report of the 9/11 Commission concerning that plot is based on information provided by Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. The BBC cited intelligence sources as saying that Hambali (see below) was captured based on in information revealed by Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. ¹⁶⁶ “He's singing like a bird,” a senior European counterterrorism official told the New York Times in June 2004. ¹⁶⁷ Extracts of Khalid Shaikh Muhammad’s interrogation reports were, after initially being refused, provided in Mounir Motassadeq’s trial in Hamburg, Germany. ¹⁶⁸

 9. Waleed Muhammad bin Attash, a.k.a. Tawfiq ibn Attash, Tawfiq Attash Khallad (Yemen)

Detention “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ¹⁶⁹

Background

Alleged top al-Qaeda operational commander suspected of playing crucial roles in both the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and the Sept. 11 terror attacks. Attash lost his lower right leg in battle in Afghanistan and, according to his interrogation by U.S. officials, later volunteered to become a suicide operative. ¹⁷⁰ He was arrested in Yemen in 1999, but was apparently released after Osama bin Laden’s intervention. ¹⁷¹ According to the interrogations of Khalid Shaikh Muhammad and Attash made available to the 9/11 Commission, Attash was selected as one of the 9/11 operatives by bin Laden but was unable to obtain a U.S. visa. ¹⁷² U.S. officials believe he coordinated, at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000, the activities of two hijackers who crashed a plane into the Pentagon on Sept. 11. He also cased flights in South East Asia. ¹⁷³ Attash was allegedly in Afghanistan for much of the planning of the attacks and was believed to have moved to Pakistan by late 2002, according to U.S. officials. ¹⁷⁴

Arrest

Attash was arrested April 29, 2003 along with five other suspected al-Qaeda members in a police raid in Karachi, Pakistan and handed over to the U.S. forces.President Bush hailed his arrest as a “major, significant find” in the war against terrorism.“He's a killer. He was one of the top al-Qaeda operatives…He was right below Khalid Shaikh Muhammad on the organizational chart of al-Qaeda. He is one less person that people who love freedom have to worry about.” ¹⁷⁵ Police reportedly found 330 pounds of high explosives and a large quantity of guns and ammunition when he was arrested. His arrest reportedly uncovered a plot to crash a small aircraft carrying explosives into the U.S. consulate in Karachi. ¹⁷⁶

Detention

Attash is said to be is in U.S. custody in an undisclosed location. ¹⁷⁷

Intelligence

Attash was initially interrogated by Pakistani intelligence officials and was then handed over to the U.S. agents for questioning in the presence of Pakistani officials. ¹⁷⁸ According to Time magazine, Attash provided U.S. interrogators with information about connections between Iran and al-Qaeda. ¹⁷⁹ The 9/11 Commission stated that evidence of bin Laden’s personal involvement in the Cole bombing came from the interrogation of al-Nashiri and Attash. ¹⁸⁰ Information gleaned from the interrogation of Attash is relied on heavily in the 9/11 report, ¹⁸¹ which refers to the intelligence reports of twenty-seven interrogation sessions with Attash.

10. Adil al-Jazeeri (Algeria)

Detention not “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ¹⁸²

Background

After volunteering in the Afghan war against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, al-Jazeeri lived in the region for more than fifteen years. ¹⁸³ Pakistani authorities believe he served as a contact between al-Qaeda and the Taliban and also served as an aide to the former Afghan foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil in Kabul. ¹⁸⁴ He is also believed to have served as a facilitator for al-Qaeda by arranging money transfers, preparing visas, etc. ¹⁸⁵

Arrest

Arrested on June 17, 2003 in the district of Hayatabad, in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Detention

Al-Jazeeri was first questioned by the Pakistani police, ¹⁸⁶ and possibly subjected to ill-treatment while in incommunicado detention. ¹⁸⁷ On July 13, 2003, according to a Pakistani intelligence official, he was flown out of Peshawar on a small plane in the custody of U.S. agents while blindfolded and with his hands bound. ¹⁸⁸ The State Department reported in December 2003 that “Adil Al-Jazeeri, a suspected Osama bin Laden aide, was recently arrested by Pakistani authorities and turned over to the U.S.” ¹⁸⁹ He is believed to have been taken to the U.S. airforce base in Bagram, Afghanistan, for further questioning. ¹⁹⁰

Intelligence

He was expected to provide information about the al-Qaeda network: “Being a facilitator [al-Jazeeri] is privy to certain activities which normal operatives do not have. He must have a lot of information.” ¹⁹¹

11. Hambali, a.k.a. Riduan Isamuddin (Indonesia)

Detention “confirmed” by the U.S. government. ¹⁹²

Background

Indonesian cleric, a top figure in the coordination between al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a terrorist network in Southeast Asia. ¹⁹³ The CIA has called him “South East Asia's bin Laden.” ¹⁹⁴ The al-Qaeda-JI  relationship married “al-Qaeda’s financial and technical strengths with JI’s access to materials and local operatives.” ¹⁹⁵ Hambali allegedly organized or financed the October 12, 2002 Bali nightclub bombing, the August 5, 2003 Jakarta Marriot Hotel bombing, and bombings in Manila in 2000 that killed 22 people, ¹⁹⁶ and he is said to have been involved in preparations for Sept. 11. Hambali was videotaped in a January 2000 meeting with two of the 9/11 hijackers in Malaysia – Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazm. ¹⁹⁷ He is said to have been planning to carry out an attack on a meeting of world leaders in Bangkok in October 2003. ¹⁹⁸

Arrest

Hambali was captured on August 11, 2003 in Ayutthaya, Thailand, perhaps by a joint U.S.-Thai police operation. ¹⁹⁹ (The United States reportedly paid Thailand U.S. $10 million for its part in his capture.) ²⁰⁰ His capture is said to have been organized by the CIA. The BBC cited intelligence sources as saying that he was captured based on information revealed by Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. ²⁰¹ After his seizure, President Bush said in a speech to troops “Hambali was one of the world’s most lethal terrorists... He is no longer a problem to those of us who love freedom…. He's a known killer.” ²⁰² The Australian Prime Minister John Howard said “There should be universal relief and pleasure that a man as evil as Hambali has been caught…. This man is a very big fish.” ²⁰³

Detention

After Hambali’s capture in August 2003 in Thailand, he was handed over to the CIA. He has since been held in an undisclosed location by the U.S. Hambali was originally reported to be held on the U.S. military base on Diego Garcia Island, but subsequent assurances from the U.S. government to the British government that no detainees are being held there have since cast doubt on those reports. The United States has not responded to repeated requests from Human Rights Watch for information on Hambali’s location, legal status, and conditions of detention. ²⁰⁴ The Indonesian government has become increasingly frustrated with U.S. delays in giving it access to Hambali. During an October 2003 stop in Bali, President Bush promised Indonesian President Megawati that the U.S. would give access to Hambali. But U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft told Megawati that “no time frame” has been set for Hambali to be questioned by Indonesia. ²⁰⁵ Although the U.S. has given Indonesia interview transcripts, Indonesia has insisted it cannot use such transcripts in court.

Intelligence

“Hambali is the one man who knows more than any other on the terrorist cells through Indonesia and Southeast Asia,” said Indonesia’s then senior security minister and now president-elect, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. ²⁰⁶ Indonesian authorities were not able to obtain physical access to Hambali, but managed to interview him on the JI network through written questions and answers. The chief of Indonesian intelligence, A.M. Hendropriyono, said that Hambali’s answers provided important information: “From those we have a picture of the size of the network and the targets for their plans.” ²⁰⁷

Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra confirmed a report in The Australian newspaper that Hambali revealed while under interrogation that he had the Australian and U.S. embassies in his sights. ²⁰⁸

Khalid Shaikh Muhammad reportedly told U.S. interrogators that he gave the money for JI’s Philippine operations to Hambali. Hambali reportedly told interrogators that he had transferred $25,000 in July 2003 to a cell in the southern Philippines that was working with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a separatist group with a history of violence. ²⁰⁹ The information provided by the U.S. to Philippine authorities from the interrogations is said to have helped lead to the arrest of several members of a JI cell in the Philippines. ²¹⁰ The 9/11 Commission report refers to the intelligence reports of nine interrogation sessions with Hambali, dating from January 2003 to March 2004.