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In March 2003, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) adopted a new country strategy for Uzbekistan, less than
two months before it held its annual meeting in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital. In
its strategy, the EBRD expressed serious concern over the human rights
situation in Uzbekistan, citing [s]ystematic violations of the freedom of
religion, expression, association and assembly, and problems of arbitrary
arrests and torture of detainees.1 To address these and other concerns
the Bank adopted a series of benchmarks for the Uzbek government to fulfill,
making continued investment in Uzbekistan
contingent on satisfactory progress in these areas and setting a one-year
deadline for compliance. Three of the benchmarks pertain specifically to human
rights: (1) greater political openness and freedom of the media; (2)
registration and free functioning of independent civil society groups; and (3)
implementation of the recommendations issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture), Theo
van Boven,
following his country visit to Uzbekistan in November-December 2002.
A broad campaign launched in 2002 by Human Rights Watch
and over fifty partner nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) urged the EBRD to
use the leverage provided by the May 2003 annual meeting to press for concrete
progress in human rights in advance of it. While the Bank did not attach the
holding of the annual meeting to improvements in human rights, the approach the
Bank took in the country strategy was significant in that it made clear that
the Bank expects reforms in exchange for its engagement with the government. An
important statement regarding Uzbekistan was also made by EBRD President Jean Lemierre,
who in his press conference at the conclusion of the May 2002 annual meeting in
Bucharest made clear that holding the annual meeting in Tashkent was not an
endorsement of the Uzbek governments human rights record, but rather an
incentive to make progress.2
One year after the adoption of the country strategy, it
is clear that the benchmarks did not trigger the necessary reforms. This
failure is attributable, first and foremost, to the Uzbek governments flagrant
disregard for human rights and democracy, an attitude exhibited even during the
EBRD annual meeting, when police detained or placed under house arrest human
rights defenders to prevent them from attending public demonstrations,
restricted media coverage of the event, and harassed and intimidated civil
society activists participating in the meeting.
In Uzbekistan, opposition political parties and
independent civil society groups cannot function without fear of interference,
harassment, confiscation of materials, and detention and ill-treatment. The
government continues to harass human rights defenders, has not registered
independent political parties or human rights groups, and has imposed
additional, more burdensome registration requirements on international NGOs.
Informal censorship of the media persists. Finally, Uzbekistan has not made
substantial progress on eliminating the systematic practice of torture in Uzbekistan.
The EBRD must also bear some responsibility for the
failure of the benchmarks to trigger reforms, as it rejected pressuring the
Uzbek government, through public engagement, as a tool for pressing it to meet
the benchmarks. Since the publication of the country strategy and the annual
meeting in Tashkent, the EBRD has, to our knowledge, not made a single public
statement reaffirming its reform demands, evaluating Uzbek government progress,
encouraging the government to take the steps necessary to meet the benchmarks,
or even commenting on the significance of the benchmarks for further engagement
with the Uzbek government.
Finally, for any leverage exercised by a multilateral
body to be effective, the individual governments affiliated with it must be
committed to making the established calls an integral part of their bilateral
relations with the target government. It is far from clear whether the EBRDs
shareholder governments took this step.
The Uzbek governments failure to make credible progress
in meeting the benchmarks must carry real consequences. Human Rights Watch recommends
that the EBRD suspend all public sector lending to the Uzbek government until
such time as the government demonstrates a genuine willingness and makes
substantial, measurable progress toward meeting the benchmarks. Exceptions
could be made for projects that directly affect the health, education, and
well-being of the general population. Projects falling into these categories,
however, should be closely monitored to ensure that they serve their intended
purpose.
At the same time, it is imperative that the Bank continue
to use the benchmarks as policy tools for reform. We firmly believe that if
properly supported by resources and political will, these benchmarks have a
real potential to trigger human rights reforms in Uzbekistan. The EBRD should
make the most of its political mandate and use the benchmarks to press for
tangible reforms. It should ensure that a coherent system of sustained
monitoring of Uzbekistans progress in meeting the benchmarks is set up, and
publicly call for change.
At the end of the country strategy period, in March 2005,
the EBRD should revisit Uzbekistans progress; if the government meets the
benchmarks, the Bank should reconsider engagement with the public sector. If
the government again fails to implement the necessary reforms, the Bank should
seriously consider putting a halt to all lending to Uzbekistan, again with a
narrowly-drawn and closely-monitored exception for essential services to the
general population.
In July and November 2003, Human Rights Watch published
fact sheets providing updates on human rights developments in each of the three
benchmark areas.
3 The present briefing paper
summarizes the Uzbek governments performance since the publication of the
March 2003 country strategy, providing detail first and foremost on
developments since November 2003.
[1] See EBRDs
Uzbekistan Country Strategy Overview, [online] http://www.ebrd.com/about/strategy/country/uzbe/main.htm
(retrieved March 4, 2004). The full statement reads: However, there are
serious concerns regarding development of genuine multi-party democracy and
pluralistic society and the situation with the rule of law and respect for
human rights remains difficult. The overall political environment in Uzbekistan is not conducive to criticism of Government policies. The executive power is not
sufficiently balanced by the legislature or judiciary. The judiciary is weak
and it does not contribute to fighting pervasive corruption. Systematic
violations of the freedom of religion, expression, association and assembly
have been documented by human rights monitors. An area of major concern is
arbitrary arrests and torture of detainees in order to obtain confessions or
incriminating statements.
[2] Transcript from
press briefing, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Annual
Meeting of the Board of Governors, Presidents press conference, May 20, 2002.
[3] See: Fact Sheet:
EBRD Annual MeetingTashkent and After June 2003 [online], http://hrw.org/press/2003/07/ebrd-factsheet.htm
(retrieved March 4, 2004), and Fact Sheet: Human Rights Developments in Uzbekistan from July to October 2003: Monitoring of the EBRD Human Rights Benchmarks,
November 2003 [online], http://hrw.org/campaigns/uzbekistan/uzbek-factsheet-1103.htm
(retrieved March 4, 2004).