In stark contrast to the worldwide trend toward abolition of the death penalty, in Saudi Arabia its use has become increasingly frequent.⁽¹⁾ Since 1990 at least 540 people have been executed in Saudi Arabia, usually by public beheading; at least one hundred people were reported executed in the first nine months of 1997 alone. Most of these were foreigners accused of any of a variety of offenses, including drug-trafficking, murder, armed robbery, and sexual offenses. In at least some cases there was ample evidence to support victims' claims of innocence.⁽²⁾

On Friday December 13, 1996 (3 Sha`ban 1417), `Abd al-Karim Mara`i al-Naqshabandi, age forty, was executed in Riyadh. A Syrian national who had worked for Saudi Prince Salman bin Sa`ud bin `Abd al-`Aziz for over fourteen years, al-Naqshabandi was convicted of practicing witchcraft (sihr) against his employer, who is the son of the former king of Saudi Arabia and the nephew of the current king. The information Human Rights Watch has been able to collect about the al-Naqshabandi case indicates that gross violations of human rights took place, and that al-Naqshabandi may have been prosecuted and then executed to satisfy the wishes of his wealthy, well-connected employer.

In April 1997 Human Rights Watch obtained copies of some of the documents al-Naqshabandi submitted to the court during his trial. Our subsequent investigation included interviews with members of al-Naqshabandi's family, as well as efforts to contact the Saudi ministers of justice and interior and the Syrian ministers of foreign affairs and interior (see appendices). In all cases the ministries involved failed to respond to our repeated requests that they clarify key issues in the case.

Among the documents submitted to the court were three long handwritten letters addressed to Judge Sulayman al-Samhan of the Greater Court of Riyadh and signed by al-Naqshabandi. Written in simple, sometimes awkward Arabic, they are the letters of a man trying to construct a legal defense without access to a lawyer or to legal books, and with only the most rudimentary idea of how a legal argument is made. The cover letter implores the judge to read what follows, saying that

I can't make myself heard except through these papers. My fate lies in them, and the fate of my family which is threatened with destitution and expulsion and losing everything if you don't read these papers that clarify my case. Your Excellency, I was not able to clarify to you during the [court] sessions all that I have to say, because of the position that I am in when I attend [the session], with its terror, and the guards, and the insults in people's eyes. And also because the [length of the] time of the sessions is not sufficient.⁽³⁾

The letters themselves describe the events leading up to al-Naqshabandi's arrest, and contain detailed allegations concerning his abuse by the Prince Salman and by officers from the police and the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (hay'at al-amr bilma`ruf wa al-nahi `an al-munkar, CPVPV). He also provides the names of twenty-three individuals whom he says could verify his account if only the judge would call them to testify. According to al-Naqshabandi's family, the judge did not call a single defense witness, nor apparently did al-Naqshabandi know that he had to follow specific procedures to request formally that witnesses be called. This deadly lack of knowledge -- knowledge that any lawyer or the judge himself could have provided -- is apparent throughout al-Naqshabandi's written testimony, as he misses opportunities to argue against the legality of the charges against him, enter evidence to support his claims, challenge the jurisdiction of the arresting agency, or even bring a complaint against the officers who abused him and threatened him with torture to obtain a confession. It also appears that al-Naqshabandi may never have been formally convicted or sentenced. Family members who saw al-Naqshabandi only three days before his execution say he was in good spirits and had no knowledge of his conviction, nor of the death sentence that the Ministry of the Interior claims was ratified more than a week earlier. Al-Naqshabandi's wife only learned of her husband's execution when she received a telephone call from his brother, who had read about it in the newspaper.

While there are many other cases of individuals executed in Saudi Arabia after trials that failed to meet minimum standards of fairness, Human Rights Watch finds that this case deserves special attention. To begin with, the charges themselves are extremely vague, and suggest a dangerous expansion in the powers given to judges to define criminal activity and determine punishments. It is precisely this type of case that reveals the inherently cruel and irreversible nature of the death penalty, and the reason for Human Rights Watch's categorical opposition to its use.

Secondly, the case highlights the many serious shortcomings of a legal system that fails to provide minimum due process guarantees and offers myriad opportunities for well-connected individuals to manipulate the system to their advantage. At every step from his arrest to his execution, al-Naqshabandi's basic rights were violated in some way, and at no stage does it appear that any state agency intervened to protect his rights. Indeed, his arrest, detention and execution may have been part of an effort by the prince and individuals in authority to silence someone who simply knew too much about his employer's private life and business dealings, as al-Naqshabandi's family alleges.

Finally, this case reveals the special vulnerability of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia. Saudi labor laws give employers tremendous control over their employees' movements, including the power to prevent them from leaving the country. Often this control becomes a source of leverage for extracting concessions from employees, who have few opportunities for recourse. This vulnerability, coupled with a judicial system that fails to meet basic standards of independence and impartiality and that allows indefinite pretrial detention and convictions based on forced confessions, not only allows but encourages human rights abuses.

THE SPECIAL VULNERABILITY OF FOREIGN WORKERS

Foreign workers typically enter Saudi Arabia under the sponsorship (kafala) of a Saudi employer and are thus subject to significant restrictions on their freedom of movement, "giving rise to conditions that might involve forced labor," according to the U.S. Department of State.⁽⁴⁾ Sponsored employees cannot legally leave the country, travel outside the city of their employment, or change jobs without obtaining the written permission of their sponsors.⁽⁵⁾ Employers often confiscate workers' passports as well, leaving them subject to arrest as undocumented aliens.

Taken together, these practices make it easy for unscrupulous employers to pressure their employees to relinquish their legitimate claims for compensation or to submit to labor conditions other than those specified in their contracts.⁽⁶⁾ The 1996 U.S. Department of State report on Saudi Arabia states that

[t]here have been many reports of workers whose employers have refused to pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other promised benefits . . . . The labor system abets the exploitation of foreign workers because enforcement of work contracts is difficult and generally favors Saudi employers. Labor cases can take many months to reach a final appellate ruling, during which time the employer can prevent the foreign laborer from leaving the country; alternatively, an employer can delay a case until a worker's funds are exhausted and the worker is forced to return to his home country.⁽⁷⁾

The Asia-Pacific Mission for Migrant Filipinos (APMMF) reported in August 1997 that more than one hundred Filipino citizens stranded in Riyadh without exit visas had staged a sit-in at the Philippine Labor Compound in Riyadh to protest the Philippine government's failure to aid in their repatriation. According to APMMF, there are approximately 500 stranded workers in Riyadh alone. "Most of them have grievances lodged at the Saudi Court against their employers or sponsors for contract violations such as non-payment of wages, long hours of work, poor working and living conditions, sexual and physical abuses. Others become stranded after they were forsaken by their sponsors and 'run away' (sic) from their employers."⁽⁸⁾

Workers who resist such abuses can be subject to deportation or trial on unrelated spurious charges;⁽⁹⁾ individuals awaiting deportation often spend long periods of time in substandard deportation facilities awaiting processing of the required paperwork. While in custody these individuals may be subject to ill-treatment, including face slapping and beatings on the soles of the feet (falaqa), at the behest of the employer.⁽¹⁰⁾ In some cases torture or the threat of torture has been used to extract confessions. Foreigners who have been arrested will often be deported, regardless of the outcome of their trial, and thus be unable to claim any back pay or other benefits stipulated in their contracts. Foreigners found guilty of crimes often receive harsher sentences than do citizens, both because of de facto discrimination against foreigners and because Saudi law favors Muslims over non-Muslims in many kinds of legal disputes, and only Muslims are allowed to become citizens.⁽¹¹⁾

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Saudi Arabia

1. Conduct an independent investigation into the arrest, detention, trial and execution of al-Naqshabandi, and make the investigation's findings public. The investigation should determine whether any of the due process rights listed above were not respected, and whether al-Naqshabandi was subjected to physical abuse while under interrogation. If it is found that al-Naqshabandi's rights were violated those responsible should be prosecuted and compensation should be granted to his survivors.

2. Return al-Naqshabandi's body to his family for burial in Syria, as the family has requested.

3. Make public the law under which al-Naqshabandi was arrested and convicted, including the precise definition of terms such as "witchcraft" and "polytheistic and superstitious books," and the nature of any legally specified punishments.

4. End the criminalization of "witchcraft," and other such vaguely worded charges. No one should be prosecuted for the exercise of the freedom of expression or belief.

5. Take immediate steps toward the elimination of the death penalty from Saudi law, including immediately halting all executions, and undertaking a full review of the use of the death penalty with a view to its total abolition. Until full abolition is effected, take particular care to scrupulously observe all fair trial standards.

6. Ensure that all laws exist in clear written form, and are freely available to the public and to all parties engaged in legal actions. At a minimum, all crimes punishable by imprisonment, corporal or capital punishment should be codified in written form, in such a way as to make clear each element of the crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

To the Government of Syria

In light of the grave abuses suffered by Syrian national al-Naqshabandi in Saudi Arabia, and in light of the pattern of abuse of foreign nationals that has been documented, we urge the Syrian authorities to work to defend the internationally recognized rights of its nationals in Saudi Arabia. In particular, we call upon the Syrian Government to:

1. Request an independent investigation by Saudi authorities of the arrest, detention, trial and execution of `Abd al-Karim al-Naqshabandi, with the findings to be made public. If it is found that al-Naqshabandi's rights were violated, ask that those responsible be prosecuted and compensation granted to al-Naqshabandi's survivors.

2. Continue to press for the return of al-Naqshabandi's body to his family in Syria.

3. Monitor closely the treatment of Syrian nationals in Saudi Arabia, and undertake vigorous efforts to protect them from human rights abuse by Saudi authorities.

4. Ensure that Syrian diplomatic staff in Saudi Arabia visit regularly all Syrian detainees and prisoners in Saudi Arabia, and further ensure that these individuals have access to legal counsel of their choice, as required under international law.

1. By 1996 the number of countries that have abolished the death penalty for all crimes (fifty-eight) was more than twice what it had been in 1981 (twenty-seven). The figure reaches one hundred if countries that are abolitionist in practice are included. Amnesty International, The Death Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1996 (London: Amnesty International, June 1997), AI Index: ACT 50/05/97.

2. As in the case of `Abd al-`Aziz Muhammad Isse, a Somali national who was executed in 1995 for a murder that occurred prior to his arrival in Saudi Arabia.

3. Cover letter to Judge Sulayman al-Samhan, Greater Court of Riyadh, undated.

4. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1997), p. 1375.

5. See for example Council of Ministers Resolution No. 826 of 1975, Rules for the Regulation of the Labor Force Movement, which prohibits workers from changing sponsors unless the original sponsor agrees to the transfer. In cases where a worker's contract with one sponsor has terminated and the worker does not agree to its renewal, that sponsor can still prohibit the worker from obtaining work with another sponsor; in such instances the worker is repatriated for at least one year (at least three years if "trade secrets" are involved). A worker who violates these rules is automatically deported. An English translation of Resolution No. 826 appears in Alison Lerrick and Q. Javed Mian, Saudi Business and Labor Law: Its Interpretation and Application 2nd Ed. (London: Graham & Trotman, 1987), Appendix 46, pp. 546-47.

6. In theory Saudi Arabia's Labor Commission provides foreign and local workers with a neutral agency to adjudicate and arbitrate labor disputes. In reality a large segment of the working population -- domestic or household workers -- is excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction. Commission offices are often difficult to reach and successfully pursuing a complaint may require several visits, a costly and dangerous proposition for workers not in possession of a passport who must travel to an office in another city. For a detailed description of the functioning of the Commission and case examples, see Lerrick and Mian, Saudi Business and Labor Law, pp. 305-29.

7. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, p. 1375.

8. Quoted in Asian Human Rights Commission (ahrchk@HK.Super.Net), "Stranded Workers in Saudi Arabia," E-mail to Asia Human Rights Alert Mailing List, August 22, 1997.

9. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, p. 1371.

10. Human Rights Watch/Middle East telephone interview, a lawyer practicing in Saudi Arabia, name withheld on request, August 1997. See also U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, p. 1369.

11. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, p. 1369.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

THE SPECIAL VULNERABILITY OF FOREIGN WORKERS

THE ORIGINS OF THE "WITCHCRAFT" CHARGE

The Legal Basis for the Charge
The Background to the Charge

ARREST AND DETENTION

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

SENTENCING AND EXECUTION
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS

RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDICES

• Letters to the Saudi Ministers of Interior and Justice
• Letters to the Syrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice