

Reassuring Omens, Bold Visions

On May 13, 2000, the *Economist*, the venerable and influential magazine of the global English-speaking political classes, dubbed the continent "Hopeless Africa." Yet beyond the ubiquitous images of war, positive, though less "newsworthy," changes were evolving at the societal level. Thanks to discernible changes in public attitudes and less willingness to accept the inevitability of authoritarian rule, it was at the grassroots that the most promising battles were being waged for a more humane Africa. Human rights groups, churches, academics, and other civil society activists demonstrated an uncommon resolve, courage and willingness to put their lives on the line to resist repression and lead the push among nongovernmental actors for transparency, participation, and accountability.

The indignant demand for more democracy came against a backdrop of deterioration and decay in the quality and performance of public institutions, in their ability to produce the results that people demanded and would respect. Demands for change resonated with the public at large, including sectors of society that were only tenuously tied to the system, with little access to employment, food, health care, education, or other benefits that government was supposed to bring. But their aspirations bumped up against governments that had been unable to provide political and social progress. As the pressure built up during the year, governments in a number of countries began to pay more attention as concepts of transparency and accountability took hold.

The phenomenal transition in Zimbabwe was the most dramatic illustration of a yearning for democracy and human rights, and of the dogged determination of civil society actors to engineer and orchestrate reform. Not so long ago the prospect of Zimbabwe's ruling party losing a referendum vote and coming close to losing control of parliament would have bordered on the surreal. But that was precisely what happened. First, the Zimbabwean electorate voted down a government-sponsored constitution at a referendum in April, and two months later the ruling party—that had been thought unassailable—came close to losing its parliamentary majority. The June elections came in the wake of a period of unprecedented violence in which supporters of the ruling party reportedly killed nineteen people, including white farmers and opposition politicians, beat up hundreds more, raped dozens of women, and occupied more than one thousand commercial farms. At the vanguard of pressure for change was a coalition of nongovernmental forces that confronted the powers that be, questioning not only their efficacy but also their legitimacy. This was an insurrection of courageous academics, high school teachers, priests, students, lawyers, judges, citizens, all seeking to move their country closer to the ideals of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law. They rose to that task very effectively and pulled off a people-power revolution that achieved astonishing gains in a short span of time.

The organizational effectiveness of the Zimbabwe groups was considerably helped by two factors: a popular backlash, especially among the urban electorate, against persistently high levels of unemployment, poverty, corruption and an infusion of talent and organizing capabilities that rapidly professionalized the ranks of the civil society coalition and later the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Sophisticated and adroit, the opposition became highly effective media operators, ensuring a forceful projection of their message both at home and abroad. It did not lead to a change in government, but it marked a big step along the way.

As developments in Zimbabwe heralded bolder, increasingly courageous grassroots movements, the Ivory Coast too saw changes towards greater empowerment of nongovernmental forces, and renewed engagement of the Ivorian people. In massive demonstrations sparked by a controversial presidential election, thousands of Ivorians spilled onto the streets of Abidjan to force the Ivorian president General Guei from power. Moreover, in the general uprising, voters in the northern power base of opposition leader Alassane Ouattara largely boycotted the elections. Despite harsh repression under General Guei since his coup, and even in the face of intense gunfire, protesters demonstrated across Abidjan, storming state radio and television stations in what appeared to be a spontaneous popular revolution. This "People Power Revolution" was set off by mass dissatisfaction with Guei's attempts to rig and steal the elections, and also with an earlier court ruling that excluded two major political opposition figures from the presidential election.

Equally undaunted were civil society and human rights groups in the rebel-held eastern provinces of North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Although the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) authorities sought to limit the many and vigorous actors, civil society groups struggled to maintain their rights to free expression and association, serving as a channel for criticizing the RCD and its Rwandan allies. In addition to dozens of human rights associations, there were uncounted development and humanitarian nongovernmental groups, activist churches, and independent journalists. Although the rebel authorities and their Rwandan allies resorted to such tactics as physical assault, arbitrary arrest, and detention, activists courageously persevered to maintain the only line of defense against glaring human rights abuses by self-styled liberators.

In DRC's southern neighbor Zambia, a less dramatic but nonetheless crucial development took place during the country's World Bank Consultative Group (CG) meeting. For the first time in Africa, a transparent CG meeting where all deliberations were open to independent human rights and civil society activists was convened in Lusaka in July. Building upon the experience of a previous CG meeting in Malawi when a select number of NGOs were invited to a session on human rights and governance, the Bank and a number of bilateral donors used it as a precedent to persuade the Zambian authorities of the benefits of opening up the discussions. After strenuous objections to the participation of human rights and civil society activists, Zambia's Minister of Finance Kahele Kalumba relented and agreed to have the entire meeting opened to civil society groups, both local and international, including traditionally tightly closed sessions. The human rights performance of the government was openly discussed during the meeting in the presence of NGOs. This was a significant opening given the strategic importance of a World Bank Consultative meeting to an aid-dependent government like Zambia. Seemingly, the success of the Lusaka meeting was due to good teamwork between Zambia's bilateral donors, and a new, more open team at the World Bank—reflecting a softening of the World Bank's compartmentalization of poverty reduction versus human rights, and some risk-taking by the Zambian government.

War-torn Angola also showed signs of pressure for change. With an eye to forthcoming elections, seventeen minor opposition parties met in May to fashion an alliance to foster opposition to the war, and advocate free and fair elections. Concurrently, Angola's churches—known to command the largest base of support in the country—formed a joint body to champion peace and national reconciliation. In Sudan too, in the face of overwhelming security obstacles, the New Sudan Council of Churches' "People-to-People" reconciliation process held a meeting in May in conflict-ridden southern Sudan, of people on the east bank of the Nile, despite overwhelming ethnic and military impediments. The May meeting sought to build upon the positive results of the West Bank March 1999 meeting.

There were other interesting trends in Senegal, Eritrea, and Somalia. In Senegal, the electorate rejected President Abdou Diouf in his quest for a fourth consecutive term. Following a highly competitive March election, Diouf peacefully conceded defeat to veteran opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade who took almost 60 percent of the votes cast. Diouf, head of the party that had governed Senegal since independence from France in 1960, became only the third elected African head of government to leave office following an election. Prior to the elections, Senegal set another precedent in February 2000, when a Senegalese court indicted Chad's exiled former dictator, Hissène Habré, on torture charges and placed him under house arrest. It was the first time that an African had been charged with atrocities in his own country by the court of another African country and represented a major step toward promoting the rule of law and breaking the cycle of impunity in Africa. But Senegal somewhat tarnished its reputation when its judiciary dropped charges against Habré under what seemed to be questionable circumstances. An appeal by Chad's torture victims was still pending at this writing.

In Eritrea, although decision-making remained tightly controlled within the governing People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the sole party operating in the country since the country became formally independent in 1993, there were signs of possible openings. The constitution guaranteed freedom of expression and the press, but the government severely restricted those rights. The government owned all the broadcasting media, and the only printing press in the

country. But following military setbacks in the war with Ethiopia during the first half of 2000, and the catastrophic displacement of almost a third of the Eritrean population as a result of that war, the pressure mounted for a genuine implementation of the constitution. An intense debate was reportedly taking place in Eritrean elite circles, behind closed doors, on how and why the country went to war in the first place. Questions were reportedly also being raised on the conduct of Eritrean diplomacy during several unsuccessful rounds of negotiations to end the war. Probably in a concession to the mounting tide for change, the Eritrean National Assembly concluded its thirteenth session on October 2 by announcing that multiparty elections would be held in December 2001. The assembly formed a committee to draft regulations to govern political parties. Also in the aftermath of the war, about a dozen private newspapers and magazines started publication. The Eritrean government also softened the severe restrictions it had imposed in 1999 on foreign NGOs that had denied them any operational role, and limited their contribution to the health and education sectors, through government channels and approved programs. Facing a complex disaster resulting from war and drought, the government invited back several international NGOs that had left the country to protest the policy. The government even ended its decade-long feud with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) by inviting it to establish a delegation in Asmara soon after the war broke out. In midyear, the Eritrean government ratified the Geneva Conventions.

Even the sickest man of Africa, Somalia, showed prospects of renewal. After descending into a maelstrom of warring regions and factions since the 1991 ouster of the late ex-president Barre, Somalia had been without a national government. But following the InterGovernmental Authority (IGAD)-backed national reconciliation conference in August to discuss a peace plan put forward by Djibouti's President Ismael Omar Guelleh, a new transitional government was put in place. Shedding past fears, tens of thousands of Somalis staged demonstrations in the capital, Mogadishu, and other cities in support of President Guelleh's peace proposals. President Salad Hassan subsequently reclaimed Somalia's U.N. seat and addressed the U.N. Millennium Conference in New York.

The most important question for Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, or Somalia—and by association, for Africa—was whether the changes would prove more than cyclical upturns. To the degree that developments mirrored a change in the public's state of mind, and a perception that they could influence the composition of a government and its policies, it appeared that the human rights advances would endure. These developments were driven by a combination of greater pressures on government and the gathering force of globalization, with Internet communications playing a growing role. As communications became close to instantaneous across international boundaries, African electorates, with nongovernmental forces at the vanguard as in Zimbabwe, became increasingly well informed and able to demand higher standards of governance. These developments would hardly change the face of Africa overnight. But they showed what could be done by ordinary people despite massive repression. The information revolution could in time accelerate political transformation and alter the political and human rights landscape in Africa and beyond.

Such challenges to the power base of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, a longtime and controversial strongman, the warlords in Somalia, or the rebel forces in the DRC, could help sway many who would otherwise have felt that the task was too daunting. But the durability of the courage and determination of civil society to bring change would remain in doubt in the absence of substantial financial and diplomatic support from abroad. Under the best of circumstances, civil society and other advocates of change would have a hard time challenging wrongs that had gone on for decades, presided over by entrenched regimes often with substantial foreign support. The lesson for the international donor community was that institutions and policy decisions that led to human rights abuses were not intractable and inevitable. Investments in civil society initiatives would help ensure that the momentum generated by the events of 2000 was sustained and would embolden those seeking to influence and change institutions and policies—though progress would quite likely be painfully slow. The international community should be generous.

Staying the Course in a Tempest-Tossed Climate

Other good news from Africa was that two sub-Saharan giants—Nigeria and South Africa—continued to make the transition to democracy, albeit on somewhat bumpy courses. Botswana, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Namibia also maintained steady growth. In particular, Mozambique's record was remarkable. Despite being pummeled by cyclone-driven floods, the worst in living memory, and severe tensions spawned by the 1999 December presidential and parliamentary elections, Mozambique was once again on its feet with the fastest growing economy in the world.

Still, the premier case for Africa remained decidedly focused on South Africa. The country continued to benefit from a holdover of political virtue derived from its political and constitutional transformation from apartheid to a constitutional democracy—despite the stormy political climate engendered by the crisis in Zimbabwe that threatened to engulf the entire sub-region. South Africa's rebound continued to be driven by responsible governmental actions in most areas of public policy. The constitutional framework was strengthened by passage of major legislation mandated under the 1996 constitution: the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, and Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act. The national assembly also passed legislation giving protection to "whistle blowers" disclosing information in the public interest. In a landmark September judgment on economic and social rights, the constitutional court found that the government had an obligation under the constitution to provide short-term housing for several hundred people evicted from their homes and in desperate need.

But though its achievements remained impressive, South Africa was not out of the woods. The growth, employment, and redistribution (GEAR) program implemented in previous years still failed to bring economic growth to some sectors of society, which had barely benefited or had even fallen further behind since 1994, leading to disagreement between the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies in the labor movement. In particular, joblessness remained intractably above 30 percent. There were other major problems: crime rates remained shockingly high; "taxi violence" between competing operators of minibus taxis remained a crime control riddle; violence against women, including sexual violence, remained alarmingly uncontrolled, with very high numbers of reported rapes; reports of police corruption and brutality were common during the year; and, despite over-congested prisons, the criminal justice system seemed unable to cope. Despite policies and laws designed to bring transformation to all sectors, implementation sometimes seemed a distant dream. The government's credibility and effective leadership also risked being undermined by conflict between health professionals and President Mbeki, who had controversially expressed doubt as to the link between HIV and AIDS, and the government's decision not to supply anti-retroviral drugs to HIV positive pregnant women to prevent transmission of the virus to their babies. Nonetheless, the ANC-led government continued to hold extraordinary political capital and the transformation program seemed broadly on course.

In Nigeria, Africa's most populous state and the economic heartland of the subregion, the military remained in the barracks. Viewed from the perspective of President Bill Clinton's two-day August visit, it seemed that Nigeria had much to celebrate. But after what some saw as a year of waffling by President Olusegun Obasanjo, a number of political worries tempered any optimism. Yes, things had changed, but the question was whether enough had changed. Little had been done to address serious and deep-rooted problems such as the unrest in the Niger Delta, secessionist demands from the southwest, high unemployment, the collapse of social services, and school closures. With worsening economic conditions and government failures to deliver any benefit from democracy, popular fatigue provided fuel for communal violence at flashpoints throughout the country. The declaration by several northern states that Islamic Sharia law would be extended to criminal law sparked deadly clashes between Muslims and Christians. The uncertainty caused by all these problems seriously damaged the country's prospects for desperately needed economic rejuvenation and for sustaining and deepening its democracy. Many ascribed much of the blame to Obasanjo—though the challenges he faced were

more institutional than personal. He was accused of being reluctant and incapable of dealing firmly with important issues, including the bickering between the president and the legislature that seemed to have distracted attention from the need to make real progress.

Nonetheless, the good news was that none of those factors seemed likely to blunt the fundamental forces that had driven the switch from military rule to civilian government. The passage to democracy would be rough but would stay the course. A crucial element was that the major international actors kept their faith in Nigeria's democracy experiment. Would the armed forces risk making a bad situation worse by staging a coup? Given Nigeria's status as a bellwether for the region as a whole, the international response would be far from sanguine. The military would risk sharp international censure. The chances were that the military would probably not wish to turn the clock back. In the long term, nothing could do more to secure Nigeria's democracy than a decisive break with its past: constitutional reform to provide an agreed framework for the representation of Nigeria's disparate communities, the overhauling of a ramshackle legal and governmental structure, and human rights reforms to underpin the rule of law, accountability, and transparency.

Emblems of Bad Old Habits

While democracy was strengthened in select African countries, parts of the continent remained mired in authoritarianism, brutalized politics, and violent conflicts. At least thirteen nations in the region were engaged either in open conflict or heated disputes, some with internal groups and some with neighboring states, spawning large-scale forced migration and abuses of civilians either directly targeted or caught in crossfire. Ethnically inspired violence spread in Senegal's Casamance, the Great Lakes, the Horn of Africa, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and other regions, proving that self-serving political elites continued to play the ethnic or nationalist card in an effort to consolidate their power at the expense of civilian casualties. Even in countries such as Nigeria, where the government has worked to counter the negative use of ethnicity and religion by forces outside of the government, ethnic strife remained a concern. Several countries that had benefited from the wave of democratization with the promise of more participation, transparency, and accountability in the early 1990s saw tightening control and shrinking political space.

One electoral process after another stumbled into difficulty. Electoral manipulation, government spending to support its own candidates, and the pervasive pro-government bias of most local media left electoral landscapes badly tilted in favor of incumbents—despite the now ubiquitous presence of election observers and their ritualized post-election reports. Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia saw stagnation or regression.

In Ivory Coast, sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest economy, soldiers launched a coup that brought to power a strongman, General Robert Guei, on December 24, 1999, and clobbered Ivory Coast's standing as a stable financial and political power. The new military regime was expected to come under pressure to make good on its pledge to move quickly toward democracy and demonstrate more openness than the previously entrenched regime of ex-president Henri Konan Bedie. But such expectations were quickly dashed as General Guei deliberately sought to disqualify his key rivals for the presidency in the October 22 elections. As widely expected, President of the Supreme Court Tia Kone announced on October 6 the disqualification of twelve presidential hopefuls—including Alassane Dramane Ouattara, leader of the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), the main opposition party—and the approval of only five—including Guei himself—ahead of the vote.

In another key country, the Kenyan state seemed to have run out of both money and ideas. The constitutional reform process which could have brought greater democratization remained unsettled. And yet the government of President Daniel arap Moi continued to block progress on promised reform. The political crisis was paralleled by a marked deterioration in the economic situation, caused by state fumbling and corruption. The standard of living for the average Kenyan continued to drop, and the year was typified by unprecedented electricity rationing and water shortages in the capital Nairobi and other cities. At the end of July, President Moi signed on to exceptionally exacting conditions in return for renewed International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending. Moi nominally committed himself to doing something desperately difficult: to change an immeasurably corrupt and authoritarian country.

Elsewhere in the sub-region, the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) won a victory in May's tightly controlled elections, two days after Ethiopia launched its largest military offensive against Eritrea. Allegations of fraud and violence marred these elections, particularly in rural areas. In Uganda, just four days after Zimbabwean voters defied massive intimidation to rebuke the de facto single party rule of President Mugabe, President Yoweri Museveni's de facto one-party system was extended in a referendum marked by poor voter turnout. The choice in the referendum was whether to return to a multiparty system or to continue Museveni's favored so-called no-party system. Having called for a boycott of the referendum poll, the traditional opposition parties declared a moral victory, saying that the turnout of roughly 40 percent was too low for a mandate on a key constitutional and human rights issue. In the long term, the outcome could be that the no-party system might undermine the efforts to develop what was needed to sustain several of the positive changes that Museveni's Movement system had introduced. Of greatest concern was that behind the illusion of inclusion under the no-party system was a concentration of power in the ruling elite, high-level corruption, and mismanagement of resources.

In Rwanda, General Paul Kagame was selected by the national assembly as president following the sudden resignations of the speaker of the national assembly, the prime minister, and the president within the first three months of the year. Two of the three of who had resigned their posts left the country, saying they feared for their lives. As Kagame's party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, consolidated its power, it announced communal-level elections for late 2000, in which political parties could play no role. Zambia's poor performance on the democratization front undermined President Chiluba's credibility as a broker for peace and democracy in the DRC. Political parties, NGOs and other civic interest groups were regularly denied permission to assemble by the government's political and security apparatus or had their meetings violently broken up by police on public security grounds.

After a year-long lull in fighting, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war again. On May 12, Ethiopia launched a massive attack against Eritrea and successfully recaptured disputed territories that Eritrea had occupied. The two-year conflict was estimated to have killed and wounded tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians and uprooted nearly a million people. Displaced Eritreans fleeing the fighting credibly reported the involvement of the Ethiopian army in large-scale destruction and looting of civilian property, the harassment of civilians, particularly men of military age, and a high incidence of rape. On the home front, the Ethiopian government continued to face internal armed insurgencies in the Oromia and Somali regional states and other remote regions, and to hold without charge or trial thousands of people it suspected of sympathizing with the insurgents. By early 2000, Ethiopian authorities, citing broad threats to national security, had arbitrarily and harshly returned some seventy thousand Ethiopians of Eritrean parentage to Eritrea. For its part, the Eritrean government forced an estimated forty thousand Ethiopians back to Ethiopia in the months that followed the outbreak of hostilities. Eritrean authorities also interned thousands of Ethiopian residents under harsh conditions in the wake of Ethiopia's offensive in May, citing unspecified threats to national security.

Destructive wars persisted in Angola, DRC, Burundi, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and on the border between Liberia and Guinea. Noncombatants continued to bear the brunt of the interminable fighting. In the DRC it was 1999 redux: tangled webs of allies facing off in a devastating war with no end in sight. The conflict pitted the government of President Kabila, and allied troops from Zimbabwe, Angola and, Namibia, against the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), as a proxy for forces fielded by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The RCD had split into two competing groups in May 1999, with the mainstream faction supported by Rwanda, and the other backed by Uganda. In the northern province Equateur, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) obtained military support from Uganda.

Apparently fighting on the side of President Kabila's government were rural militia, known locally as the Mai-Mai; and predominantly Hutu fighters commonly known

as Interahamwe. Human rights and humanitarian conditions continued to deteriorate throughout the country as both government and rebel forces and their backers were reported involved in patterns of civilian killings and widespread rape of women, while government forces carried out indiscriminate shelling in Equateur. There was no improvement between 1999 and 2000. And yet there was no tangible progress in efforts to stop the ruinous war and its associated senseless killings: peace talks aimed at reviving the moribund peace deal signed in Lusaka in 1999 crumbled without an agreement on peace enforcement mechanisms amid mutual accusations of cease-fire violations.

The war in the Congo was increasingly closely linked to the seven-year civil war in Burundi as Kabila reportedly supplied more and more weapons for the Burundian rebel movement, Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), in return for its help in defending Lubumbashi. A Burundian peace agreement, promoted by former South African President Nelson Mandela and U.S. President Clinton, had no effect on the combat, which grew considerably in the months after its August signing. Although parties to the war increasingly fought a classic war, they also continued to target civilians, with more than a thousand killed by October. An estimated one hundred and fifty thousand persons have been killed since the start of the war. The FDD and a rival rebel movement talked of new peace negotiation in early November but set conditions which made an agreement appear unlikely.

In Angola, a series of major victories by the government that pushed the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) out of its strongholds in the central highlands of Angola in late 1999 raised expectations that the war might be nearing a decisive phase. At this writing, fierce fighting was raging, particularly in the areas close to the Zambian border, resulting in significant refugee inflows into Zambia. Human rights violations, a hallmark of the Angolan war, remained widespread and systematic. Disoriented and smarting from setbacks suffered at the hands of government forces, UNITA resorted to guerrilla attacks and indiscriminate killings.

As the country's ravaging seventeen-year war raged on, Sudan remained a blatant human rights abuser, while rebel groups committed their share of violations. The Khartoum government intensified its bombing of civilian targets in the war in the south and its efforts to hamper relief food operations to needy civilians. For its part, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the principal rebel movement in the country, continued to foster glaring abuses including looting of food and other provisions from the population, sometimes with civilian casualties; recruitment of underage boys; and rape. In the meantime, the government's war machine was poised to benefit substantially from new oil revenue. According to a government announcement, 20 percent of its 2000 revenue would be spent on defense, including an arms factory near Khartoum. It was estimated that following the first export of oil in August 1999, defense spending in dollars had increased 96 percent in two years.

In Sierra Leone, despite the Lomé Peace Accord signed on July 7, 1999 that committed the rebels to lay down their arms in exchange for representation in a new government, the war and its associated abuses continued, though at a lower intensity and with a reduction in the rebels' signature abuses, the amputation of limbs, for the first few months of the year. The May collapse of the peace process after the capture of some five hundred United Nations peacekeepers, reversed this trend and ushered in an increase of all classes of human rights abuses by the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other militias, including limb amputation, and a disturbing intensification of abuses by pro-government forces, against whom previous allegations had been few. Women were particularly targeted for sexual violence. In thousands of cases, rape and other forms of sexual violence were followed by the abduction of women and girls who were forced into bondage to male combatants in slavery-like conditions. If that was not enough, the war became increasingly regionalized, sucking Guinea and Liberia into a tangled web of cross-border attacks with devastating consequences for noncombatants and refugees living in border areas.

The Private Press: Beaten Back But Not Cowed

The rapid growth of independent media endured, although the degree of media freedom differed widely. For the most part, levels of freedom corresponded with levels of democratic development. The Internet also dramatically enhanced the access and distribution capabilities of the independent press, fostering freer flows of information in general. Eroding governments' ability to control the press and manipulate facts, the Internet also relieved the financial stresses that many African news agencies faced. South Africa, Nigeria, Botswana, Mauritius, Mali, Senegal and some others generally continued to register high levels of media freedom.

But in several countries, severe levels of intolerance persisted. Many a government seemed all too alert to the danger that a free flow of information in society could undermine their grip on power. During the year, there was a rampant use of intimidation, assaults and detention, banning and radio closures, prolonged prosecutions and libel suits, or economic coercion to silence independent media.

Despite an improved climate for freedom of expression in Angola, a campaign of harassment against journalists continued. The privately owned media was targeted, apparently because it had increased its investigative and critical posture. Since November 1999 at least six journalists had been convicted of libel or defamation by government officials. On December 10, the directors of *Folia 9*, and the privately owned weekly newspapers, *Agora* and *Actual*, were ordered by police to retract stories that concerned a report by the U.K.-based NGO Global Witness, saying the government had corruptly used oil revenues. For its part, the official media published detailed refutations of the Global Witness report. On July 27, the Angolan government signaled its intention to tighten further controls on the media when it published a draconian new draft media bill that guaranteed presidential immunity to criticism and would send journalists to prison for criticizing or questioning government officials. The bill would allow the government the right to decide on who could practice journalism, seize and ban publications, and to detain journalists for thirty days before charges were filed.

The independent media also continued to come under legal pressure in Zambia, where the trial of six journalists from the *Post* who were detained in March 1999 for publishing a story that criticized Zambia's military capability and preparedness in the face of a possible military attack from Angola dragged on. All the reporters, including editor-in-chief Fred M'membe, were charged with "espionage." All twelve pleaded not guilty to the charge, and on August 19, after repeated trial adjournment, the state dropped its charges against all except M'membe. An unexplained fire on September 3 at the *Post* offices damaged some U.S.\$500,000 worth of equipment.

In South Africa, eyebrows were raised when more than thirty editors and writers were subpoenaed to appear before the South African Human Rights Commission to answer charges of racism. They were ordered to produce documents related to their editorial decisions, and the commission had the power to search their offices. The journalists could face fines or up to six months in jail if they failed to comply. The journalists stood their ground but offered to give evidence voluntarily if the subpoenas were withdrawn. Following a public outcry, the commission relented and withdrew the subpoenas. The hearings followed the release of an interim report commissioned by the Human Rights Commission and much criticized on methodological grounds, which found that the South African media was riddled with racism and racial stereotyping. The final report, which included material from the hearings, received a much more favorable reception, and included constructive recommendations to address these problems.

In Liberia, the year witnessed numerous incidents of detention and ill-treatment of journalists, a community under heavy attack since President Taylor took power in 1997. In March, Suah Debe, head of the Liberian Press Union, was briefly detained without charge after giving a radio interview condemning the closure of two radio stations. In April, Isaac Redd, radio broadcaster on the state radio station, was detained and held without charge for several days by the police. He was later accused of speaking against the president and charged with "criminal malfeasance." In August, four members of a foreign news film team, in Liberia to film a

documentary, were arrested, charged with espionage, and detained for a week. The team had been given official permission to film in Liberia, but were accused of filming in restricted areas and seeking to damage the country's image by falsely linking President Charles Taylor to diamond smuggling. They were released following international pressure.

For its part, the Ethiopian government continued to abuse freedom of speech and of the press. At least twenty-seven journalists lived in exile at this writing, having fled their homeland due to repeated arrests, ill-treatment in detention, and the threat of extraordinarily high bail amounts. Eight reporters remained behind bars. In mid-August, sudden increases in printing costs, by more than a third, put additional pressures on some thirty-six private publications as well as the government press in Ethiopia. The private newspapers went on strike in September, and warned that the high production costs could eventually force them out of business. They urged the government to reduce taxation on imported paper and other print inputs.

In April, several journalists were assaulted in Zimbabwe. On April 22, a bomb shook the premises of privately owned Zimbabwean *Daily News*. On 6 April, Nyasha Nyakunzvi and Tsvangirai Mukwazhi, respectively editor and a photographer with the *Daily News*, were held for two hours by youths from the ZANU-PF armed with iron bars. A week earlier a photographer and a journalist with Agence France-Presse, and a cameraman from the British news agency Reuters had been threatened by about fifty men armed with machetes and iron bars.

In the DRC, scores of journalists were imprisoned apparently without legal justification. President Kabila's government had detained over 110 journalists and harassed many others since it took power in 1997. Private newspapers and radio and television stations were often shut down or banned from coverage of news deemed sensitive by the government. A special military court in mid-September sentenced two journalists to two years in prison for defying such directives. There were also numerous accounts of torture and other inhumane treatment. In Bukavu, the capital of rebel-held south Kivu province, photographer Jean Pierre Tanganyika, also known as Dudo, was arrested after a grenade explosion on August 26 for having taken pictures of the injured victims at the scene. He was detained without formal charge at the local army barracks, briefly released on September 16, and rearrested again on the same day. His whereabouts remained unknown.

Aware that a large proportion of the population relied on radio for news, governments sought to silence independent radio broadcasting. The government-owned radio station provided the only news broadcasts heard by most Liberians. Two independent radio stations came under attack in March 2000: Star Radio and Radio Veritas, the radio station of the Catholic Church. Star Radio was forcibly closed, and remained so at this writing. At the beginning of October, the Zimbabwe police shut down Capital Radio, an independent radio station, and seized its equipment. The station began broadcasting after the Supreme Court ruled that Zimbabwe's broadcast monopoly was inconsistent with the country's constitutional provisions regarding the fundamental right to freedom of expression. President Mugabe's government then promulgated a presidential order outlawing private broadcasting without state approval. According to the police, Capital Radio had breached that order. At this writing, the station's legal action disputing the legality of the government's actions was still pending. In Kenya, however, several independent television and FM radio stations began broadcasting in 2000, obtaining licences after applications made several years earlier, some as far back as 1992.

The growth of the independent broadcast sector resulted in a notable expansion in the airing of differing opinions, particularly on radio. These licences were, however, restricted principally to urban areas.

More Human Fallout

The massive numbers of displaced persons in Africa remained a major human rights catastrophe. As of January 2000, there were 6.3 million Africans of concern to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), from an estimated 22.3 million worldwide. Of the top twenty countries from which people fled from around the world, eight were in Africa. Eleven African states hosted refugee populations of 100,000 or more. The figures were equally striking in terms of internally displaced populations (IDPs): eight African countries were among the twenty countries with the largest internally displaced populations. Indeed, in several African countries, as in Sierra Leone, armed groups purposefully uprooted civilians, creating massive populations of refugees and IDPs in order to forward political or military objectives with little or no regard for human suffering.

Sudan alone had approximately four million IDPs—the largest IDP population in the world. Angola's growing IDP population stood at some 2.5 million. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia resulted in massive internal displacement, particularly in Eritrea where 1.5 million people were uprooted, including 90,000 who sought refuge in neighboring Sudan. Hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo resulted in the displacement of 1.6 million people, one million of whom had little or no access to humanitarian assistance with dire consequences. The UN reported that infant mortality among the displaced was the highest in the region, and that maternal mortality was the highest in the world. Some of the longest and most forgotten refugee crises were on the African continent, with recurring refugee movements caused by conflicts spilling over into neighboring countries. Refugee crises in Africa invariably affected a whole subregion—and sometimes beyond.

The Horn of Africa countries continued to be producers and receivers of refugees simultaneously. And in West Africa, the interlocking conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea affected populations in all three nations. Balancing national security concerns with the obligation to provide safe asylum and protection to refugees was one of the most challenging issues for host governments in Africa. Internal conflicts alarmingly spilled across borders into neighboring countries, resulting in greater militarization of refugee settlements by armed elements, weapons flows, cross-border attacks, forced recruitment of refugee children, and rape and other physical attacks on refugee women and children in camps. The security risk increasingly associated with hosting refugees from intractable regional conflicts resulted in a growing unwillingness by host governments to provide asylum and protection. Xenophobia and anti-refugee sentiment continued to grow, even in countries with a generous history of hosting those fleeing conflict. The failure by African governments and the international community to separate out combatants from refugees in the camps exacerbated the problem and made refugee camps more likely targets for attack.

For example, in September, tensions rose between Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, each accusing the other of supporting rebel activity. Guinea, one of the largest refugee hosts in Africa, intermittently closed its border with Sierra Leone, fearful of incursions by Sierra Leonean rebels. In September, an inflammatory public statement by the president of Guinea provoked widespread rapes and other attacks by Guinean police, soldiers, and civil militias against Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees.

Defending Human Rights

The human rights movement continued to register significant strides across the continent, although there were variations in the environments in which they operated. Many countries continued to liken human rights advocacy by local NGOs to disloyal political opposition or collaboration with those fighting the government of the day.

In several countries, including DRC, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Liberia, and Ethiopia, individual activists faced intimidation, arrest, assault, and sometimes death for their advocacy of human rights. The risk that rights defenders faced was underscored on August 24 when Fr. John Kaiser, a well-known human rights activist in Kenya, was brutally murdered at night by unidentified persons some fifty miles outside Nairobi. A Catholic parish priest in the Rift Valley area and a U.S. citizen, Father Kaiser had worked in Kenya for thirty-six years and had been an outspoken human rights activist. In 1999, the Law Society of Kenya had honored Father Kaiser with its annual human rights award.

THE DRC CONTINUED TO BE ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS. THE GOVERNMENT IN LATE MAY DETAINED FOR WEEKS FÉLICIE MALANDA NSUMBU AND GEORGES KATIMBIKA, RESPECTIVELY THE SECRETARY AND FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL UMBRELLA GROUP FOR DEVELOPMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND ACCUSED THEM OF CONTACTING THE REBELS. IN EARLY JUNE, THE GOVERNMENT PREVENTED REPRESENTATIVES OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION FROM LEAVING THE CAPITAL TO ATTEND PREPARATORY TALKS FOR THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE IN COTONOU, BENIN. ON JANUARY 16, SECURITY FORCES OF THE RCD ARRESTED AT HER HOME IMMACULÉE BIRHAKIKA, PRESIDENT OF THE WOMEN'S GROUP PROMOTION AND SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S INITIATIVES (PAIF), AND HER COLLEAGUE JEANNINE MUKANIRWA, PAIF'S VICE PRESIDENT. THE TWO, AND OTHER WOMEN HELD LIKE THEM AT THE INFAMOUS "BUREAU 2" DETENTION CENTER IN GOMA, WERE WHIPPED WITH A PIECE OF FIRE. ON OCTOBER 9, RCD SOLDIERS BROKE UP A MEETING HELD BY THE UMBRELLA GROUP FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN BUKAVU. CONGOLESE AND RWANDAN SOLDIERS BEAT THEM WITH STICKS AND FISTS IN FRONT OF A BIG CROWD. THE RIGHTS GROUPS WERE PLANNING TO DISCUSS FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES TO THE PREVIOUS WEEK'S VISIT TO EASTERN DRC OF UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MARY ROBINSON.

PRESIDENT CHARLES TAYLOR OF LIBERIA AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ALSO CONTINUED TO ATTACK HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS FOR PUBLICIZING ABUSES AND BLAMED THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY FOR THE WITHHOLDING OF INTERNATIONAL AID. IN DECEMBER, 1999, JAMES D. TORH, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF A CHILD-RIGHTS ORGANIZATION, FORE-RUNNERS OF CHILDREN'S UNIVERSAL DEVELOPMENT, WAS DETAINED AND CHARGED WITH SEDITION FOR A SPEECH HE MADE. TORH WAS DENIED BAIL FOR FIVE DAYS AND UPON RELEASE, HE FLED THE COUNTRY. IN NAMIBIA, A ZAMBIAN-BORN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST AND A FOUNDER MEMBER AND EXECUTIVE OF THE NAMIBIAN SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WHO HAD LIVED IN NAMIBIA FOR SIXTEEN YEARS WAS ON FEBRUARY 21 EXPELLED BY IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED SUPPORT FOR CAPRIVI SECESSIONISTS.

BUT IN NIGERIA, NUMEROUS AND SOPHISTICATED HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS WERE ABLE TO OPERATE FREELY THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT, LONG RECOGNIZED AS THE ONE OF THE MOST VIBRANT NETWORKS ON THE CONTINENT, STRENGTHENED ITS ADVOCACY—TO THE EXTENT THAT ITS LEGISLATIVE AND REFORM PROGRAM WAS VASTLY MORE AMBITIOUS THAN THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN SOUTH AFRICA TOO, ACTIVISTS CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF FREEDOM. OCCASIONAL GOVERNMENT HOSTILITY TO NGO CRITICISM WAS NEUTRALIZED BY STRONG COLLABORATION IN GOVERNMENT-NGO PARTNERSHIPS ELSEWHERE.

THERE WAS ALSO SOME ENCOURAGING NEWS FROM COUNTRIES WHOSE DEDICATED HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORKS OPERATED IN LESS THAN FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. IN RWANDA, THE LEAGUE FOR PROMOTING AND DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS (LA LIGUE RWANDAISE POUR LA PROMOTION ET LA DÉFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, LIPRODHOR) MONITORED JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS RELATED TO THE GENOCIDE AND MADE PLANS TO OBSERVE A NEW ALTERNATIVE JUSTICE PROCESS SET TO BEGIN OPERATING EARLY IN 2001. THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC LIBERTIES (ASSOCIATION POUR LA DÉFENSE DES DROITS HUMAINS ET DES LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUES, ADL) EXECUTED A USEFUL STUDY OF VILLAGIZATION, A GOVERNMENT POLICY OF FORCED RESETTLEMENT OF THE RURAL POPULATION. THE LEAGUE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE GREAT LAKES (LA LIGUE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE DÉFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME DES GRANDS LACS, LDGL) INITIATED A CAMPAIGN AMONG ITS MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS TO END IMPUNITY IN THE REGION AND TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, AS DID THE BURUNDIAN LIGUE IHEKA. THE BURUNDIAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF PRISONERS DID THE FIRST NATION-WIDE CENSUS OF PERSONS JAILED IN NATIONAL PRISONS AND SECURED THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS WHO HAD ALREADY SERVED THEIR TERMS AND YET REMAINED IN JAIL.

IN AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH WAS NOT KNOWN FOR TOLERANCE OF INDEPENDENT MONITORING, THE ETHIOPIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (EHRCC) CONTINUED TO REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. SEVERAL CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING EHRCC, THE ETHIOPIAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, THE INTER-AFRICA GROUP, AND THE ADDIS ABABA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE CONVENED PANEL DISCUSSIONS THAT ALLOWED RULING PARTY AND OPPOSITION CANDIDATES TO AIR THEIR PROGRAMS BEFORE URBAN VOTERS, MAINLY IN THE CAPITAL. THE ETHIOPIAN WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION CONDUCTED TRAINING FOR WOMEN CANDIDATES. PROGRESS WAS REGISTERED TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT IN ETHIOPIA OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE FOR THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE OUTGOING PARLIAMENT IN JULY UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED BILLS ESTABLISHING THE ETHIOPIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO DENY RECOGNITION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE, WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN 1997 BY MEMBERS OF THE OROMO COMMUNITY. THE GOVERNMENT ARRESTED EIGHT BOARD MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE SHORTLY AFTER THEY APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION OF THE ASSOCIATION, AND CONFISCATED ITS OFFICE RECORDS AND EQUIPMENT IN 1999. GARUMA BEKELE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE LEAGUE, AND ALSO EDITOR OF *URJI*, AND ADDISU BEYENE, SECRETARY OF THE OROMO RELIEF ASSOCIATION AND PROMINENT RIGHTS ADVOCATE, TOGETHER WITH SOME FIFTY OTHER PROMINENT OROMO CIVIC LEADERS, REMAINED IN JAIL SINCE THEIR ARREST IN OCTOBER 1997. THEIR TRIAL FOR CONSPIRACY CONTINUED IN CAMERA. MARY ROBINSON, THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, SAID DURING A VISIT IN OCTOBER THAT HER AGENCY PLANNED TO OPEN A REGIONAL OFFICE IN ADDIS ABABA TO WORK WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE OAU.

Organization of African Unity

AS COUNTRIES IN AFRICA CONTINUED TO ERUPT IN VIOLENCE, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) ONCE AGAIN FAILED TO RISE TO THE CHALLENGE OF EFFECTIVELY DEALING WITH ISSUES OF STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT. THROUGH MEASURES TAKEN AT SEVERAL SUMMITS, THE OAU ATTEMPTED TO BECOME A MORE PROACTIVE, UNIFIED BODY; HOWEVER, ITS EFFORTS WERE UNDERMINED BY DECISIONS WHICH CALLED INTO QUESTION ITS COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY. WORKING MOSTLY IN TARDY REACTION TO CRISIS SITUATIONS, THE OAU FOUND ITS ACTIONS LARGELY FUTILE IN SOLVING THE CIVIL STRIFE IN MANY COUNTRIES. THE ONE EXCEPTION, THE OAU'S SUCCESS STORY FOR THE YEAR, WAS THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT WHICH HELPED HALT THE TWO-YEAR WAR BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA, WITH A JUNE 19 AGREEMENT TO END HOSTILITIES AND WORK OUT A FINAL SETTLEMENT. THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS A PRODUCT OF OAU INTERVENTION, CONSISTED OF DETAILED PLANS TO DISENGAGE THE TWO ARMIES AND TO ALLOW A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO PATROL PARTS OF THE ESTABLISHED BUFFER ZONE. AS PART OF ITS EFFORTS TO OVERSEE THE AGREEMENT'S IMPLEMENTATION, THE OAU SENT MILITARY OBSERVERS IN SEPTEMBER TO MONITOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

IN COUNTRIES LIKE THE DRC, COMOROS, SIERRA LEONE, AND THE IVORY COAST, THE OAU'S PRESENCE WAS EITHER NOT VERY VISIBLE OR FOR THE MOST PART IGNORED. IN APRIL, LEADERS OF EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN STATES MET UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (E.U.) AND THE OAU IN CAIRO. IN THE FIRST SUMMIT OF ITS KIND, PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, TRADE, ILLEGAL ARMS, DEBT RELIEF, AND OTHER ISSUES. A CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT WAS BLOCKED AT THE LAST MINUTE. CONVENED BY THE NORTH-SOUTH CENTER, THE GATHERING WAS MOVED TO LIBSON, WHICH DIMINISHED ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE SUMMIT. THE OAU'S APPARENT SILENCING OF CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS WEAKENED ITS CREDIBILITY AS AN ORGANIZATION COMMITTED TO THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY. AFRICAN NATIONS HAD HOPED TO MAKE ECONOMIC ISSUES A PRIORITY AT THE CONFERENCE, PARTICULARLY THE ISSUE OF DEBT RELIEF. THE E.U. DECIDED TO REMOVE TRADE BARRIERS TO AFRICA, BUT REFUSED TO ESTABLISH NEW MEASURES TO ADDRESS AFRICA'S BURGEONING DEBT. THE SUMMIT RESULTED IN THE 110-POINT CAIRO DECLARATION, WHICH INCLUDED AN AFFIRMATION OF THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT NO NEW INITIATIVES FOR THEIR PROTECTION.

THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL OAU SUMMIT HELD IN LOMÉ, TOGO, IN JULY SYMBOLIZED THE ORGANIZATION'S DESIRE TO MOVE TOWARD GREATER UNITY DESPITE DEEP DIVISIONS. DURING A SUMMIT IN SYRTE, LIBYA, THE PREVIOUS YEAR, THE OAU ISSUED A DECLARATION COMMITTING ITSELF TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AFRICAN UNION. THE AIMS OF THE UNION INCLUDED THE PROMOTION OF STABILITY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, AND SOLIDARITY BETWEEN COUNTRIES. TWENTY-SEVEN OF THE THIRTY-THREE MEMBER STATES THAT ATTENDED THE LOMÉ SUMMIT SIGNED A DRAFT OF THE AFRICAN UNION TREATY, AND IT WAS EXPECTED THAT TWO-THIRDS OF OAU MEMBER STATES WOULD HAVE RATIFIED THE TREATY BY THE NEXT YEAR'S SUMMIT. THIS STEP TOWARD GREATER UNITY WAS HOWEVER OVERSHADOWED BY SEVERAL COUNTRIES' BOYCOTT OF THE SUMMIT. ANGOLA'S PRESIDENT, JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS, ASKED THAT THE SUMMIT'S VENUE BE MOVED TO ADDIS ABABA AFTER TOGOLESE PRESIDENT GNASSINGBE EYADEMA WAS IMPLICATED IN DIAMOND AND ARMS TRAFFICKING WITH UNITA BY A U.N. REPORT. AS HOST OF THE SUMMIT, EYADEMA STOOD TO INHERIT THE CHAIR OF THE OAU FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR. IGNORING BOTH ANGOLA'S REQUEST AND A RECOMMENDATION BY ROBERT FOWLER, HEAD OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, TO AVOID HOLDING CONFERENCES IN SANCTIONS-BUSTING STATES, THE OAU DECIDED TO KEEP THE SUMMIT IN TOGO.

Namibia and the DRC expressed solidarity with Angola and also boycotted the summit. During the summit, OAU members extended support for the efforts of the Angolan government to restore peace, while condemning UNITA for its violent actions in Angola.

The summit sought to address current crises as well as those from the past. Initiatives were proposed to investigate the illegal trade of conflict diamonds and the resumption of fighting in Sierra Leone. A mini-summit was held among West African leaders, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and the executive secretary of ECOWAS to discuss the continuing hostilities in Sierra Leone. The absence of Angola, the DRC, and Namibia prevented a mini-summit from being held to discuss the conflict in the DRC. The OAU members also voted to enact a maritime blockade on Anjouan to discourage its secession efforts from the Comoros. Perhaps grabbing the most international attention was a report released by the OAU's International Panel of Eminent Personalities demanding the payment of "significant reparations" by countries that failed to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Belgium, France, and the United States were specifically mentioned as guilty of inaction, along with the UN Security Council. The report also called for attention to alleged war crimes by the Rwandan Patriotic Front during the genocide.

In many countries in Africa, the OAU's efforts to restore peace and stability had little or no result. In 1999, OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim had "morally guaranteed" the Lomé peace agreement for Sierra Leone, which included a blanket amnesty for all abuses committed prior to its conclusion. Since then, the agreement had been torn to shreds as fighting had resumed and human rights abuses were rampant. In June, the OAU named a special envoy to Sierra Leone in hopes of enhancing its efforts to end the conflict. A delegation in Freetown pressed for a cease-fire but President Kabbah stated he would not comply until the rebels had returned the areas seized since the signing of the Lomé Accord. Since many of these areas include diamond mines, the fighting continued with no signs of stopping. In August, OAU chair Gnassingbe Eyadema called for a change in the UN monitoring force's mandate from one of peace enforcement to peacekeeping. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights sent a delegation led by the commission's chair, Eyo Dankwa of Ghana, to Freetown in February 2000, after strong lobbying from NGOs attending the commission's October 1999 session in Kigali. The delegation, continuing a tradition of ineffective missions by the OAU organ, met with no victims and almost no local human rights groups, did not go outside of Freetown, and produced no written report of its findings or recommendations.

After leaving the construction and implementation of the Lusaka Accord for the DRC in the hands of Zambian President Chiluba, who was representing the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the OAU appointed Sir Kefauwe Mstire to be the facilitator of an internal dialogue on the future of the DRC. Throughout the year, the accord was repeatedly violated and an internal dialogue never materialized. President Laurent Kabila rejected Mstire on the grounds he was biased toward rebel groups. Despite the OAU's repeated calls for a cease-fire, all parties continued to engage in fighting. After a regional leaders' summit sponsored by SADC was held in August, Kabila suspended the implementation of the peace accord and called for direct negotiations with Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, to be overseen by the UN and OAU. At this writing, no movement had been made in that direction.

The situation in the Comoros provided an excellent example of the OAU's efforts being largely ignored. The OAU had sought to defuse the Anjouan island secession crisis in the Indian Ocean Republic for three years. In April 1999, Colonel Azali Assoumani staged a bloodless coup and established a military government. Assoumani refused to hold elections until the secession attempt was ended. The OAU repeatedly criticized the coup and Assoumani's unwillingness to hold democratic elections. Early in the year, the OAU increased pressure on Anjouan separatists by enacting a travel embargo and freezing the financial assets of the leaders. Assoumani asserted that the OAU had failed to resolve the crisis and Comorans could find a solution themselves. In August, the military government and Anjouan separatists held talks, which resulted in an agreement ending the secession attempt. The OAU criticized the agreement because its formation did not include the input of a majority of the Comoran people, and failed to adhere to the framework established by the 1999 OAU brokered reunification accord. Despite OAU condemnation of the agreement for threatening the unity of the Comoros, the military regime and Anjouan separatists called for the OAU to lift its trade and travel embargo.

The OAU condemned General Robert Guéi's coup in Côte d'Ivoire and called for elected President Henri Konan Bédié to be reinstated. Guéi refused to step down, but declared that elections would be held in October. Staying true to its decision that military juntas would not be allowed to participate in the OAU, Guéi was banned from this year's summit. At its summit in July, the OAU created the "Group of Ten" to ensure that the upcoming governmental transition in the Côte d'Ivoire was peaceful. The group consisted of Togo, South Africa, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal. At the end of September, the Group of Ten called upon Guéi and the leaders of political parties to form a national transitional council to guide the country toward peaceful elections. The OAU also requested that presidential elections be postponed until legislative elections had taken place. There were mixed reactions to the group's proposal among the political leaders in Côte d'Ivoire. As of this writing, the OAU's requests remained ignored.

The International Response

Trapped in The Basement Of Global Priorities?

There was little new movement in international policy on African issues. As the international community seemed reconciled to the notion that Africa was locked in a permanent pattern of annihilation and turbulence, big powers seemed unprepared to elevate the plight of millions of Africans trapped by conflict and human rights abuse to a global priority. The year opened on a high note and witnessed a flurry of activity: hectic agendas and rounds of announcements; high-powered delegations traversing the continent; commissions galore examining and reexamining urgent issues; declarations and resolutions continued to be churned out; reports and documents adorned with the habitual exhortations and reaffirmations of lofty visions continued to be released. But real action that could curb cataclysmic trends if rhetoric was matched by commitment inched forward at a snail's pace. When it came to the pivotal issue of funding, major players resorted to fudging, making no commitments, only "options to consider." As a result, it became predictable that once again pledges would be unfulfilled.

The United Nations' Strategic Ghetto

The year 2000 was inauspicious for the United Nations in Africa, although it aimed much of its official rhetoric toward the continent and its current activities there. This increase in rhetoric was not matched with a comparable increase of financial support or other resources. The woes of the UN in Africa, especially its peacekeeping missions, seemed to represent system-wide failures of the UN. Furthermore, the major powers were reluctant to intervene in Africa under UN supervision and the forces of the countries that took part in peacekeeping missions were often ill-trained and ill-equipped. While the UN and the Security Council no longer treated Africa with the indifference that it did during the early 1990s, it clearly failed to address African issues with the material resources they so desperately needed.

The UN engaged in a rare bout of self-criticism at the close of 1999. The Report on the Genocide in Rwanda severely condemned the lackadaisical manner in which the Security Council treated Rwanda, due to its and Africa's marginalized status within the international community. The report, released on December 16, 1999, declared that, "the Security Council, led unremittably by the United States, simply did not care enough about Rwanda to intervene appropriately." The report went on to denounce the Security Council's tragic decision to reduce UNAMIR in the face of killings, rather than to try to muster political will to try and stop them.

Ultimately, "[The Security Council's] refusal to sanction a serious mission made the genocide more likely." In response to the report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for more effective UN engagement in Africa and better coordination between the Security Council and regional organizations.

As if in response to these views, the United States representative to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, used the U.S. stint as President of the Security Council to lead the UN to focus its attention on Africa during January 2000. Undertakings were made that the UN would lead from the front in addressing Africa's problems and make Africa safe for human rights and dignity. The Security Council held meetings on the effects of HIV and AIDS in Africa, the growing problems of refugees and internally displaced persons in the continent, and the conflicts in Angola, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called "Africa's First World War."

The issue of AIDS in Africa received additional attention during the month, as the United States declared it a national security threat, the first time a health issue had been linked to national security in the United States and within the Security Council. Annan declared that the impact of AIDS on Africa was no less destructive than that of warfare itself, and many speakers called for the conspiracy of silence about AIDS to end. Dr. Peter Piot, director of UNAIDS, noted that roughly U.S. \$1-\$3 billion was needed to sustain and expand these campaigns. What happened after the ringing speeches? Only a tiny fraction of that total sum had been raised at this writing. Moreover, the international community continued to be less and less responsive to Africa's refugee and IDP emergencies. Food deliveries were curtailed during the year and relief programs for Africa remained drastically underfunded. For example, UNHCR programs throughout West Africa faced a U.S.\$27 million funding shortfall in an overall budget of U.S.\$77 million. Similarly, in Tanzania, which hosted the largest number of refugees in Africa, refugee food rations were cut in September due to insufficient funding. The international community's lack of response to African crises continued to contrast sharply with its generous and relatively speedy response to alleviate the suffering of displaced persons in 1999 during the humanitarian crises in Kosovo and East Timor.

The Millennium Summit, held in New York September 6-9, 2000, gave world leaders another opportunity to convey their concern and interests in Africa affairs. Following closely after the release of the Brahimi report, which scrutinized UN peace and security operations, the Security Council in resolution 1319 decided unanimously to overhaul UN peacekeeping operations to create a more effective and better-financed force "by adopting clearly defined, credible, achievable and appropriate mandates." The Brahimi report, released on August 17, 2000, criticized the concept of impartiality, which had guided UN peacekeeping efforts in the past that had led to the failure to distinguish between the victim and the aggressor. In addition, the report demanded that peacekeeping missions should specify orders to use force to better serve as a credible deterrent, a veiled reference to the UN peacekeeping mission debacle in Sierra Leone. The report also noted that "spoilers" of peace accords tended to be those with access to funds to supply weapons, a reference to the illicit trade in diamonds that supported continued fighting in Angola, the DRC, and Sierra Leone. Resolution 1319 pledged to enhance the effectiveness of the UN in addressing all stages of the conflict, reaffirmed its determination to give special attention to the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa given the specific characteristics of African conflicts, and emphasized the importance of continued cooperation and effective coordination between the UN, the OAU, and African sub-regional organizations in addressing conflicts in Africa.

As part of this trend, Secretary-General Annan's Millennium Report urged developed nations to make special provisions for the needs of Africa, to fully support Africans in their struggle to overcome the continent's problems, and to curb the illegal traffic in small arms by supporting regional disarmament measures. Despite the renewed focus on Africa, many African leaders felt that not enough was being done within the Security Council to address African issues, quickly or effectively. South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki stated, "Our collective rhetoric conveys promise. Our offense is that our actions convey the message that we do not care." Indeed very little had been accomplished by the peace and security operations in Africa between January and September. Overall, the UN remained as ill-prepared for the next big crisis as it was for the last.

Following two years of fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the United Nations established UNMEE, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, when a new outbreak of hostilities erupted. A severe drought in the Horn of Africa had affected roughly ten million people in the region, which the fighting exacerbated, causing a severe humanitarian crisis, and the Security Council called on the OAU to immediately initiate peace talks between the countries. On June 19, 2000, the foreign ministers of both countries signed an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities under the auspices of the OAU, with representatives from the United Kingdom and the United States present. The following month the Security Council passed Resolution 1312, which called for one hundred military observers to be sent to the region to verify the cessation of hostilities between the two countries in order to prepare for a larger peacekeeping mission. On September 15, Security Council Resolution 1320 authorized the deployment of up to 4,200 troops until March 1, 2001 to monitor the cease-fire agreement. Although the security conditions improved, as Annan noted in a report on September 19, the humanitarian issues caused by the drought were still a cause for serious concern.

Combat and tension continued to plague the DRC, despite the Lusaka peace agreement signed by the government of the DRC, five neighboring countries, and one of the two main rebel groups in July of 1999. The disengagement plan hammered out by the United Nations and a joint military commission drawn from the governments and the factions involved provided that the belligerents should start simultaneously withdrawing their forces forty kilometers (twenty-five miles) from the frontline within weeks. But there was little evidence to validate the optimistic messages by the UN that the ceasefire was holding. Although Security Council Resolution 1279 extended the mandate of MONUC in November 1999, authorizing five hundred UN military observers to the region, fighting continued between government troops and rebel groups in the eastern region of the country. Some members of the Security Council, specifically the United States and Great Britain, did not want UN troops in the region while fighting continued, further delaying the deployment of UN troops to the country. Security Council Resolution 1291 expanded MONUC to 5,537 soldiers in February 2000, to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and to supervise the disengagement and redeployment of troops. The whole concept of MONUC seemed to have been founded more on hope than experience. Many analysts doubted its viability, given the impossibility of protecting civilians in the huge country with such a small force. At this writing, UN optimism had waned considerably, though MONUC's mandate was extended by a further two months in October 2000. There seemed to be a real chance that MONUC would simply wither and die.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited eastern Congo for three days in early October to meet with the leadership of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), local human rights activists, and representatives of UN agencies working in the country. Upon her return, she pledged to make the humanitarian situation within the DRC a higher priority for the UN.

The peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone illustrated many of the structural flaws that hindered the effectiveness of the United Nations. Since the inception of UNAMSIL in October of 1999, officials in charge of the mission appeared unable to address the most basic security issues or cooperate among themselves. Besides the UN's inability to protect its own staff, UNAMSIL's most egregious failure was its inability to protect civilians in the face of increasing human rights violations, a clear failure to fulfill its mandate. In May, the killing of at least ten and the capture of roughly five hundred UN peacekeepers forced the UN to reassess its role in Sierra Leone and the future of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Even the successful rescue of the UN hostages in July and the SLA capture of the notorious leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, in May did little to repair the public image of UNAMSIL. Contributing countries were reluctant to continue supporting a costly and seemingly doomed peacekeeping mission. At the end of September, the Indian government announced its intention to withdraw its troops from UNAMSIL: its 3,059 troops made up one quarter of the 12,477 troops and were the best equipped. The Indian commander, Major General Vijay Jetley, had engaged in a public row with leaders from Nigeria, the largest troop contributor to UNAMSIL, accusing them of undermining the operation and doing business with the RUF in

diamond mining operations. He also upbraided the Jordanian troops for collaborating with dissident former government soldiers known as the West Side Boys, by giving them supplies. Jeterley was criticized for his treatment of soldiers from other nations under his command and his lack of communication with other military and political leaders during the hostage crisis in May. Following India's decision, Jordan reportedly decided that it did not want its troops to remain in Sierra Leone unless a NATO country was persuaded to play a significant role in the U.N. force. Additionally, the U.N. was unwilling to stiffen its mandate from peacekeeping to peacemaking, although it continued to increase the troop size of the mission. On August 4, UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded and its authorized troop presence was increased in successive resolutions: from the original six thousand in October 1999 to thirteen thousand in May. In September, the secretary general recommended that the troop strength be further increased to 20,500.

The United Nations Security Council agreed on August 14 to set up a war crimes tribunal for Sierra Leone to try crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leone law committed within its territory. But the measure stopped short of actually establishing the court or deciding its composition and functions. The sticking point seemed to be how the authority of the court should be shared between Sierra Leone's judicial system and neutral international experts. The Security Council asked the secretary-general to address these and other questions and produce a detailed blueprint for the court within thirty days. The blueprint—a draft statute for the special court—was published in October. The provisions regarding the court's jurisdiction, competence, fair trial guarantees, rules of procedure, and evidence all seemed to be satisfactory to assure that the court would receive a broad mandate to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities, that it would be backed by a strong international presence. The report that accompanied the draft statute emphasized the need for adequate funds.

Nevertheless, concerns remained as to whether the court would be free from political manipulation, and would try not only Sankoh and his comrades but also leaders of other fighting factions, including those supporting the government, who had committed heinous crimes against humanity. A structure that failed to establish a broad-based justice would in the long run gravely undermine a strong and impartial rule of law that would be essential to sustainable recovery. In addition, the statute would limit the temporal jurisdiction of the court to crimes committed since November 1996, yet unspeakable crimes were committed from the inception of the war in 1991.

One of the main causes of fighting in the DRC and Sierra Leone was the illegal diamonds-for-arms trades that rebel groups, as well as external allies, used to sustain continued fighting. Diamonds played a pivotal role in funding the fighting between the government and the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone. In recognition of this link, the Security Council passed Resolution 1306, which banned imports of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone for the next eighteen months, except those diamonds that were certified by the government. It also called for a five-person panel to examine sanctions violations and the link between trade in diamonds and small arms in Africa, with observations and recommendations to be presented by October 31, 2000.

In Resolution 1237, the Security Council decided to establish an independent inquiry into the breaking of sanctions against Angola's UNITA, which prohibited the sale or delivery of arms, military equipment, and petroleum products, and most importantly, the purchase of diamonds mined in areas controlled by UNITA. On March 10, the report of the panel of experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA was released: it was a ground breaking report in that it openly named sanction-breakers and established its own sources for information and investigation. The report cited two African presidents, Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo and Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, who openly broke the sanctions to aid UNITA, while it said President Omar Bongo of Gabon supplied UNITA with large amounts of fuel.

The report explicitly linked UNITA with the diamond-for-arms trade, stating that, "diamonds had a uniquely important role within UNITA's political and military economy. UNITA's ongoing ability to sell rough diamonds for cash and to exchange rough diamonds for weapons provide the means for it to sustain its political and military activities." The Security Council approved the report and called for tougher measures to restrict UNITA access to diamonds, fuel and arms. By July, the Security Council declared that UNITA's conventional war capacity had been destroyed and no longer posed an immediate threat to the Angolan government, citing UNITA's increasing difficulty in selling diamonds on the international market as a dominant factor in addition to rebel territorial losses on the battlefield. The writing of the report signaled the Security Council's growing interest in the illegal trading activities of UNITA and its supporters and became a deterrent to those that would break the U.N. sanctions against UNITA.

The report made thirty-nine recommendations, including that the Security Council should apply sanctions to those governments, officials, and enterprises that break sanctions against UNITA, and that the diamond certificate of origin system should be reformed. Despite its strong stance against sanction-busters and innovative and reasonable recommendations, the experts panel suffered from the lack of a centralized office to coordinate its work, not involving Interpol in its efforts, and by the failure of member states to share intelligence with the panel.

Badgered by the controversy regarding "conflict diamonds," De Beers Consolidated Mines, the dominant force in the international diamond industry, in July announced a radical shift from its seventy-year marketing strategy of manipulating prices by stockpiling to a new one of selling diamonds as branded luxuries. Essentially, the new strategy seemed to be a defensive response to protect De Beers' product from being tainted by conflict. Also in July, the International Diamond Manufacturers' Association and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, meeting at the World Diamond Congress in Antwerp, adopted a global certification scheme for rough diamonds in order to identify conflict diamonds. The congress also agreed that all rough diamonds would have to be shipped in sealed packages certified by the authorities in the exporting nations and verified by a new international diamond council, and that countries knowingly involved in illegal diamond trading should lose their export accreditation. Both De Beers and the congress pledged that they would cooperate with the United Nations to help curb illegal trade in diamonds. These were important announcements, but the fundamental issue remained verification. In the absence of an independent monitoring regime—nagging questions would persist.

European Union, Norway, and the Donor Community

As in previous years, the European Union (E.U.) and the international donor community in general remained almost exclusively concerned with corruption and economic reform issues at the expense of civil and political rights concerns—and in seeming indifference too to economic, social, and cultural rights. It was still evident that policies were driven by the "full belly" thesis that civil and political rights were luxuries that could be put aside until the economy reached a certain degree of success. As a result of the compartmentalization approach, little progress was made in tackling the core issues—authoritarianism, arbitrariness and brutalization of politics—at the heart of Africa's political and human rights crises. International donor policy also continued to be undermined by the recurrent problem of inconsistency and double standards in the application of aid and human rights policies. For example, during 2000, donors demonstrated far less enthusiasm and determination in championing human rights issues in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, or Zambia than in their approach regarding the issue of good governance and human rights in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Liberia. This tended to reinforce the perception that human rights was a tool used by donors against their "enemies" and ignored in respect of their "friends."

The largest aid and trade agreement between developed and developing countries, the fourth Lomé Convention, expired in February 2000. A new, more ambitious twenty-year partnership agreement was signed in June in Cotonou, Benin, between the E.U. and seventy-seven countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (the ACP bloc). The Cotonou Convention, replacing Lomé, included a clause stipulating that individual countries that were seriously corrupt would face sanctions,

including the withholding of aid. A new procedure was also foreseen for consultation and the adoption of measures where human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law were violated, placing the primary responsibility with the state concerned to take measures to rectify the situation. A separate Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement between the E.U. and South Africa (which, as a middle-income country, did not qualify for full Lomé/Cotonou terms) was also agreed upon in February 2000, cutting tariffs and liberalizing trade, after years of negotiations.

The Portuguese Presidency of the E.U. during the first six months of the year promised particular attention to deepening cooperation with the African continent. But apart from the African-European Summit in Cairo on April 3-4, 2000, little was delivered. The summit itself was fairly neutral on human rights concerns save for a formal declaration that the parties "recognize the need to provide for greater inclusion of civil society in all areas of our partnership. In this context, we emphasize the need for greater participation of the citizen in decision-making concerning the management and the allocation of resources, whilst respecting the diverse and complementary roles of the State, decentralized local authorities and the other society actors concerned."

Otherwise the priority issue for the African participants was debt relief, and they seemed to have given short shrift to human rights and related governance issues.

France took the E.U. Presidency during the second half of 2000, promising a follow-up to the Cairo Conference and proposing that priority be given to developing dialogue with the sub-regional organizations. But the French E.U. Presidency remained relatively muted on virtually all the major flashpoints in Africa, with the exception of Ivory Coast. France's reaction to the coup in that country was read as evidence that France would no longer unconditionally support loyal but corrupt incumbents in its former colonies. France did not intervene to save Ivory Coast's president, Henri Konan Bédié, whose party reportedly cheated in the 1995 presidential elections and had arbitrarily changed the constitution to thwart his main rival. Analysts observed that if France did not intervene in the Ivory Coast, their most important economic partner in Africa, it was unlikely that they would do so to support the likes of Omar Bongo of Gabon or President Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo. France also lashed out at General Gué's government of the Ivory Coast, following the barring of Ouattara from the presidential polls.

Britain's involvement in Africa was most dramatically marked by its armed intervention in Sierra Leone, following the collapse of the Lomé Peace Process in May 2000. British paratroopers were deployed after hundreds of U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage by the RUF. The troops evacuated British nationals and established a sense of stability in the country. Britain provided U.N. forces with intelligence and logistical support, along with training and equipment. In September, eleven British troops were taken hostage and a rescue team was deployed to free them. Hundreds of British forces remained stationed in Sierra Leone throughout the year, but under a bilateral agreement with the Sierra Leonean government, not under U.N. command. Their primary responsibility was to train a reconstituted Sierra Leonean army.

Following its high level of engagement in Sierra Leone, Britain took a leading role in the international community's response to the use of conflict diamonds in fueling wars in Africa. In June, the British government introduced a draft U.N. Security Council resolution banning the trade of diamonds from Sierra Leone which were not certified by the government. In June Peter Hain, minister of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, hosted a meeting of officials from diamond importing and marketing countries.

Next to the war in Sierra Leone, Britain was most outspoken with regard to the violence associated with Zimbabwe's presidential election and land redistribution there. Throughout the year, Britain criticized President Robert Mugabe's government for failing to uphold rule of law in the country. In May, Britain placed a national arms embargo on Zimbabwe because of the possibility that imported weapons would be used in the conflict in the DRC. Zimbabwe demanded that Britain fund its land reform in accordance with the 1979 Lancaster House Independence Agreement. However, the British government stated it would only finance a land redistribution policy that adhered to the transparent principles agreed upon during an international land conference in 1999.

The Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway maintained their tradition of engagement with Africa. All three countries froze or suspended government-to-government aid to Zimbabwe on the basis of good governance concerns, and to Ethiopia and Eritrea, as a result of the ongoing hostilities between the duo. Assistance to NGOs continued, often focusing on human rights and democratization programs. Denmark, however, continued its development assistance to Zimbabwe and Eritrea on the grounds that there was a greater chance of promoting democracy and human rights through development partnership and dialogue. All four countries also maintained their high profile on human rights and governance issues in dialoguing with African governments. However, Uganda, Zambia, and Ethiopia seemed to get gentler treatment than Zimbabwe or Eritrea. Moreover, economic interests could trump human rights concerns. Once Norwegian oil firms obtained lucrative footholds in Angola's ultra-deep offshore fields, Norwegian comment on Luanda's human rights abuses became muted. The Netherlands government agreed to send some seven hundred peacekeepers to the Horn of Africa to take part in the United Nations mission to monitor the cease-fire agreement that ended the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Making bold pledges about debt relief turned out to be easier than acting upon them. Despite the high sounding declarations at the 1999 June Cologne Group of Seven (G-7) summit to enhance coordinated efforts to "support deeper, broader and fast debt relief," by mid-2000 only nine African countries had experienced any reduction in their debt payments—way off the G-7 target of writing off U.S.\$100 billion of debt by the end of 2000. To help breathe new life into international debt relief efforts, Britain in July announced a special plan to provide extra money to help countries that stopped fighting and instead used their resources to combat poverty. Ahead of the G-7 summit, the E.U. and the ACP group agreed a deal to allow the release of U.S.\$1.04 billion for global debt relief for the world's poorest countries. In its communiqué at the Okinawa summit, the G-7 conceded that the dilemmas of debt, health, and education were inextricably linked, and the heart of the economic difficulties facing the poorest countries. The Okinawa communiqué also for the first time addressed the need to combat diseases. It set three global targets to be achieved by 2010: to reduce the number of HIV infected young people by 25 percent; to reduce tuberculosis deaths, and prevalence of the disease, by 50 percent; and to reduce malaria by 50 percent.

China

In October 2000, nearly eighty ministers of foreign and economic affairs from forty-four African countries assembled in Beijing for the first China-Africa Cooperation Forum. China, making a fresh bid to emerge as a leader of the developing world, and building on a six-nation African tour undertaken by President Jiang Zemin in 1996, promised debt relief and business deals to those attending. In a passage clearly aimed at human rights interventions of the sort undertaken by NATO in Kosovo, the communiqué declared that "no country or group of countries has the right to impose its will on others, to interfere, under whatever pretext, in other countries' internal affairs, or to impose unilateral coercive economic measures on others." While affirming the universality of human rights, the communiqué went on to state that "each country has the right to choose, in its course of development, its own social system, development model and way of life in light of its national conditions. Countries, that vary from one another in social systems, stages of development, historical and cultural background and values, have the right to choose their own approaches and models in promoting and protecting human rights in their own countries. Moreover, the politicisation of human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionalities on economic assistance should be vigorously opposed to as they constitute a violation of human rights."

U.S. Policy Towards Africa

The United States dedicated its month as President of the Security Council, January 2000, to African crises. During this "Month of Africa," various issues were discussed, from the refugee situation to the crises in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This emphasis on Africa was reinforced by President Clinton's trip to Nigeria and Tanzania at the end of August—an unprecedented second visit to the continent. But these interventions only obscured a lack of commitment to promoting human rights and accountability when dealing with crises in Africa. The Clinton administration did make strides in bringing African issues into more mainstream U.S. policy, as exhibited by the record number of U.S. government agencies engaged in Africa, although African issues rarely galvanized high-level attention. In crisis after crisis, the administration continually failed to integrate human rights into its policies on economic development and regional security. Although a rhetoric of human rights concerns remained on the U.S. agenda, trade and economic concerns as well as international terrorism continued to take precedence over human rights. While administration officials rarely mentioned their prior emphasis on Africa's "new leaders" or their support for the Lomé Accord ending the Sierra Leone peace process despite its blanket amnesty, the effects of these short-sighted policies were seen in the diminished credibility of U.S. Africa policy.

During his 1999 trip to Africa, Clinton avoided Nigeria as a sign of disapproval of its military dictatorship. Yet as he praised Nigeria's transition to a democracy in August 2000, Clinton's rhetoric focused more heavily on economic growth than human rights. Rewarding Nigeria for its democratic accomplishments, the U.S. promised to quadruple aid to the country. The U.S. also promised funding to build partnerships between the U.S. government, Nigerian government, oil companies, and the residents of the oil-producing areas in the hopes of resolving the ongoing conflict affecting oil production. Central to his visit, however, was Clinton's appeal to the Nigerian government to increase oil production in order to drive down world oil prices, then at an all-time high. After leaving Nigeria, Clinton visited Tanzania to witness the signing of the Burundi Peace Agreement. Prior to his visit, Clinton had sent a special envoy to Burundi to support the mediation effort. However, the U.S. did not push for prompt, effective justice to punish serious crimes committed during the war as part of the peace process.

After the United Kingdom, the U.S. made the greatest efforts to engage with the crises in Sierra Leone. The U.S. condemned the taking of UN hostages by the RUF rebels and asked that they be released, but did not commit to any actions against the RUF. The U.S. also discussed with the UN the prospect of expanding the rapid reaction force to Sierra Leone, but remained reluctant to put its troops at risk, and would not commit personnel for peacekeeping operations. Instead, the U.S. undertook the task of training and equipping additional battalions of Nigerian peacekeepers. In the Security Council, the U.S. was a leading force behind efforts to establish a special tribunal for Sierra Leone. It also pledged support for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as creating a reintegration program to train and educate rebel soldiers.

The U.S. also took the initiative with efforts to eradicate the use of illicit diamonds to fuel civil wars in Africa, declaring support for tighter measures to control the diamond sectors in all affected countries and in the international diamond trade, but warned that those efforts should not damage the markets of stable, democratic, diamond-producing states. The U.S. provided technical and financial support in the establishment of the Sierra Leone Commission on the Management of Strategic Resources, which was supposedly responsible for the management of the country's diamond sector. In July, representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, Belgium and the Diamond High Council met with officials in Sierra Leone to establish a diamond certification scheme in hopes of limiting the amount of RUF-controlled diamonds that made their way into the market. At this writing, Congress was hearing testimony on a bill that would block the import of conflict diamonds into the United States. With regard to illicit diamonds in Angola, the U.S. supported a UN resolution strengthening the implementation of sanctions against UNITA in an effort to further limit the export of diamonds and import of military supplies. There was disapproval expressed during the year over the unsafe environment for the press in Angola. However, such efforts were greatly outweighed by much more forthright lobbying of U.S. economic interests, and official criticism of other Angolan government rights abuses was muted by its embassy in Luanda. In addition, the Clinton administration encouraged the government to find a peaceful solution to the country's civil war. Reacting to the continuing humanitarian disaster, the U.S. committed U.S.\$38 million to support humanitarian relief efforts and an additional U.S.\$2 million for UNHCR assistance programs in northern Angola.

The U.S. expressed repeated concern over the Sudanese government's bombings of civilian targets, especially in areas where relief efforts were being conducted. The United States' engagement increased with the appointment of a special U.S. envoy who traveled to Khartoum to discuss reducing human rights abuses, improving humanitarian response, and renewing regional peace efforts. The United States continued to assert that the IGAD peace initiative offered the best hope of ending the war.

In March, the U.S. sent a special envoy on a two-week mission to support the mediation efforts of the OAU in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. However, brokering the peace agreement largely fell on the shoulders of the OAU, despite its recent history of close relations with both Ethiopia and Eritrea. The U.S. supported a UN resolution to establish a mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea consisting of one hundred military observers until January 31, 2001. The U.S. condemned the coup in Ivory Coast and the exclusion there of many of the candidates in the presidential elections slated for October. All bilateral assistance and arms transfers were suspended until democracy was restored.

The U.S. position regarding HIV/AIDS in Africa advanced appreciably this year. The U.S. signed a U.S.\$10 million agreement with the Southern African Community to fund a variety of programs, one of them an assessment of the impact of HIV/AIDS on sexual development. The Clinton Administration promised to request U.S.\$332 million over the next two years to combat HIV/AIDS in Africa and globally. The U.S. also announced an HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention program in Angola that would cost U.S.\$3 million over three years. The U.S. introduced a resolution in the UN that would allow for voluntary testing and AIDS education for UN peacekeepers. However, in July, the U.S. announced that U.S.\$1 billion in annual loans to finance the purchase of anti-AIDS drugs would be available to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Many African nations responded coolly to the proposal, expressing concern that the loans would just add to their debt burden.

The U.S. promoted a plan to the G-7, which was designed to provide up to U.S.\$90 billion in additional debt relief to developing countries. The primary beneficiaries would be African countries. In addition, the U.S. pledged U.S.\$500 million in debt relief and an additional U.S.\$120 million toward the promotion of democracy. But for all the soaring speeches and high-blown sentiment, performance fell far short of the expectations generated. The House of Representatives approved funding for debt relief to meet the Clinton administration's request of U.S.\$225 million, but the measure flopped as the U.S. Senate bill earmarked a paltry U.S.\$75 million for debt.

Despite high expectations that the year 2000 would bring greater international attention and resources to Africa, the major international powers remained at the sidelines during the worst episodes of human rights abuses and violations. Starting in January, the United Nations and the United States pledged greater levels of interest and support in African affairs, and vowed to do more to help their African counterparts. Africa had never garnered this much attention from the international community and its prospects for growth and development seemed brighter. However, as little was done during the year to fulfill these bold pledges, it very quickly became evident that business would remain as usual for Africa in the international arena. Furthermore, E.U. and U.S. policies lacked the desired balance between economic rights on the one hand and political and civil rights on the other, while the United Nations was unable to ameliorate any of the devastating conflicts that continued to plague the continent. The slow pace of debt relief promised by the United States and the E.U. did little to alleviate the health and education issues that burdened many African countries, nor did it appear that the pace of debt relief would increase in the near future. Moreover, the international community failed not only on its pledges for African development and debt relief, but accomplished very little in stemming the spread of AIDS despite the havoc

that the pandemic was wreaking across Africa. Ultimately, numerous statements to the contrary notwithstanding, it remained clear that Africa was a low priority for the United States, the E.U. and to some extent, the United Nations. Africa remained trapped in the basement of global priorities.

The Work of Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch continued to focus on identifying the root causes of deplorable human rights violations in Africa. Human Rights Watch also dedicated significant resources toward improving relationships with local human rights groups and exploring ways of working together.

Human Rights Watch stepped up a three-track approach to expanding cooperation with local African nongovernmental organizations, striving to develop relationships with them based on interdependence, long-term commitment, and solidarity. A key strategic goal was to increase local NGOs' influence throughout the human rights movement in Africa by facilitating their access to Human Rights Watch's wide range of expertise.

First, in the context of massive human rights violations in the Great Lakes area, Human Rights Watch implemented a Great Lakes NGO field initiative to strengthen the research, networking, and advocacy capacity of NGOs. Second, Human Rights Watch promoted an African Fellows program that trained experienced human rights activists. The program developed the skills of those activists by exposing them to international partners, advanced research methodologies, and the international advocacy arena. Last, Human Rights Watch remained committed to protesting abuses against human rights activists in Africa.

Human Rights Watch continued to cover all of sub-Saharan Africa and expanded monitoring of French-speaking countries, but focused intensively on a nucleus of countries: Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia. Additionally, the Africa division undertook cross-country, thematic research on arms flows, resources and corporate responsibility, national human rights commissions, the rights of children and women, refugees and the internally displaced, and prisons. Human Rights Watch maintained field offices in Kigali and Freetown—in Rwanda and Sierra Leone respectively—and created a new field office in Bujumbura, Burundi.

The Africa division fielded investigative missions to Angola, DRC, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia, and also collaborated with the Arms, Children's Rights and Women's Rights divisions in their work on Angola, DRC, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, and Tanzania.

Concerned that noncombatants, refugees, and internally displaced persons were under severe attack, the Africa division published numerous reports and briefing documents on Angola, Burundi, DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone to raise international awareness.

Moreover, given the sporadic nature of high-level international attention devoted to Africa, it was especially important to ensure that Human Rights Watch policy recommendations focus on political rights issues as well as security and economics. Human Rights Watch remained active in advocating for aid conditionality at the World Bank Consultative Group (CG) meetings for Zambia. In July, Human Rights Watch launched a report at the CG meeting in Lusaka to encourage donors to continue to make balance of payments support conditional upon improvements in human rights practices. Human Rights Watch's information formed the basis of policy recommendations to guide donors' aid programs to these countries, and made clear recommendations to the governments in question.

The Africa division devoted significant resources toward advocacy during the year, especially targeting the United States and British governments, the UN, and the E.U. The Africa division's advocacy efforts focused on Angola, Nigeria and the crises in the Great Lakes, particularly Burundi and DRC, where it played a major role in providing information and analysis about a range of human rights abuses.

Human Rights Watch was called to testify before U.S. congressional committees on four occasions, dealing with the situation in Sudan and the ongoing crisis in the Great Lakes. Human Rights Watch held numerous briefings for congressional staff about its research and implications of U.S. policy. These analyses were also presented to administration officials on numerous occasions in official roundtables and in a series of meetings held with officials of the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Pentagon.

In regular meetings, briefings, and submissions at the UN, Human Rights Watch advocated for human rights. The organization continuously expressed concerns to the Security Council and the Secretary-General about events in Sierra Leone. Human Rights Watch underlined the need for the UN to establish a criminal process to bring gross abusers of human rights to justice, to strengthen the UN mandate and capacity to protect civilians in Sierra Leone, and to address violations of the UN arms embargo by Sierra Leonean rebels. Human Rights Watch remained active in pressing the E.U., the OAU and the Commonwealth to focus on human rights issues, especially those with a bearing on Angola, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.

Human Rights Watch focus on the need for accountability for human rights abuses stressed the need for justice at the national and international level in order to stop the cycles of violence in Africa. The Africa division worked with intergovernmental organizations, governments, and local human rights activists to compel abusers to adhere to internationally recognized human rights standards.

ANGOLA

Human Rights Developments

Angola's civil war continued. There was little sign of greater respect for human rights as the violations of the laws of war for which this conflict has been notable continued. Both the government and the rebels, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), have been responsible for these violations. The number of internally displaced persons grew to an estimated 2.5 million, approximately 20 percent of the total population of Angola. Road access remained restricted throughout the country; only coastal roads and routes within security perimeters of major provincial cities were usable by humanitarian agencies. More than 70 percent of all humanitarian assistance was delivered by air because of insecurity on the roads.

An Angolan army counteroffensive pushed UNITA out of its strongholds in the central highlands of Angola in late 1999. In late October 1999, the government showed film footage of its control of the important UNITA bases at Bailundo and Andulo. Throughout late 1999 and for the first four months of 2000, the government continued to enjoy a string of successes. On December 24, government forces captured UNITA's former headquarters at Jamba. The government claimed that it had captured 200 UNITA soldiers during the fighting. It said 400 had been captured during fighting for Caloi, which was taken by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) on December 10. The government claimed to have destroyed more than 90 percent of its fighting capacity, while seizing 15,000 tons of weapons, munitions, twenty-seven tanks, seven artillery emplacements, thirty missiles, and other equipment from the rebels.

During the first quarter of 2000, the government appeared to be in the ascendance on the battlefield and UNITA appeared disoriented, its actions limited to sporadic guerrilla attacks. As the year progressed, this changed, with UNITA adapting back to guerrilla attacks and high-profile hit-and-run ambushes on main roads. On April 30, a UN World Food Program convoy was attacked 95 kilometers inland from Lobito, in an area supposedly cleared of UNITA forces. The identity of the attackers remained in doubt.

THE LEVEL OF UNITA VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY AS UNITA'S TACTICS CHANGED DURING THE YEAR. IN JANUARY, AS THE FAA APPROACHED CHINGUAR TOWN, UNITA EMBARKED UPON A KILLING SPREE, AIMED AT ENSURING THAT RESIDENTS WOULD NOT BE CAPTURED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. SOME 140 SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED. UNITA WAS ALSO REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN LOCALITIES SUCH AS CAMAVILO IN LUNDA NORTE, KATCHINGU IN HUAMBO, AND QUIMBELE IN UIGE.

DELIBERATE MUTILATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN COMMONPLACE IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT, BUT THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS INCREASED DURING THE YEAR, WITH UNITA FORCES REPORTEDLY CUTTING OFF EARS AND HANDS. THE PURPOSE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TO SEND A WARNING TO OTHERS NOT TO BETRAY UNITA, OR TO ATTEMPT TO FLEE TO AREAS CONTROLLED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. IT WAS A RESPONSE TO THE REBELS' GREATER ISOLATION AND BATTLEFIELD LOSSES. ACCOUNTS OF TORTURE WERE NOT COMMONPLACE BUT WERE SUFFICIENT TO SUGGEST THAT THE REBELS USED TORTURE TO ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY FROM INDIVIDUALS THOUGHT TO HAVE MILITARY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS.

UNITA INCREASED ITS FORCEFUL RECRUITMENT OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS IN ITS WAR EFFORT. IN AMBUSHES ON MAIN ROADS, UNITA FORCES KILLED AND LOOTED, BUT ALSO CAPTURED CIVILIANS AND FORCED THEM TO WORK FOR THEM. THIS APPEARED INTENDED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE CONTINUED FLIGHT OF PEOPLE OUT OF UNITA'S GRIP, BUT VIOLENCE AND FORCED RECRUITMENT WERE ALSO SAID TO HAVE BEEN IN RETALIATION FOR "NOT FOLLOWING ORDERS," WHEN UNITA DEMANDED THAT RESIDENTS ABANDON VILLAGES. SIMILARLY, UNITA RETALIATED AGAINST VILLAGES WHO CONTINUED TO CULTIVATE LAND NEAR AREAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD RECENTLY TAKEN OVER. CONSCRIPTION OF CHILDREN CONTINUED TO BE COMMONPLACE WITH BOYS AND GIRLS AS YOUNG AS TEN SEIZED AND TRAINED AS SOLDIERS BY THE REBELS.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT CONTINUED TO BE DENIED IN ALL AREAS CONTROLLED BY UNITA. A PERMIT FOR TRAVEL EVEN TO THE NEXT VILLAGE WAS DEMANDED BY THOSE IN COMMAND. IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, UNITA WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR FORCED DISPLACEMENT AS IT LOST OR CAPTURED TERRITORY, AND ITS FORCES CONTINUED TO LOOT AND DESTROY PRIVATE PROPERTY. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND AID WORKERS WERE ESPECIALLY TARGETED DURING UNITA'S OPERATIONS. ON AUGUST 9, THE U.N. STRONGLY CONDEMNED AN ARMED ATTACK ON CATETE WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF A HUMANITARIAN WORKER AND THREE OTHER CIVILIANS.

AFTER MANY MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS, FIVE RUSSIAN PILOTS WERE RELEASED AT THE ZAMBIAN BORDER IN JUNE. HOWEVER, UNITA OFFICIALS SAID A BRITISH AND A SOUTH AFRICAN DIAMOND MINE WORKER MISSING AFTER A UNITA ATTACK IN NOVEMBER 1999 WERE DEAD. ON AUGUST 19 DE BEERS ANNOUNCED IT HAD SUSPENDED ITS DIAMOND EXPLORATION AT ITS SITE IN CAMBULO, LUNDA NORTE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT FOLLOWED AN ATTACK BY UNITA ON ANOTHER DIAMOND MINE NEAR CAMAFUCA DURING WHICH SEVEN WORKERS WERE ABDUCTED AND A SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY CONSULTANT KILLED.

IN SEPTEMBER, AN ARMED UNITA UNIT DESTROYED A TOTAL/ELF/FINA OIL WELL NEAR SOYO, IN THE NORTHWEST OF THE COUNTRY. MEANWHILE, A FACTION OF THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE CABINDA ENCLAVE (FLEC) KIDNAPPED THREE PORTUGUESE AND ANGOLAN NATIONALS WORKING FOR A CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IN CABINDA PROVINCE.

THERE WERE NUMEROUS ALLEGATIONS OF CONTINUED ABUSES BY GOVERNMENT FORCES, ALTHOUGH THESE WERE FEWER THAN THOSE REGARDING UNITA. THE GOVERNMENT'S LATE 1999 AND EARLY 2000 OFFENSIVES INCLUDED A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY, BURNING VILLAGES AND KILLING CIVILIANS, PARTICULARLY IN CUANDO CUBANGO AND LUNDA SUL PROVINCES. GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY EXECUTED VILLAGERS. IN AT LEAST ONE LOCATION IN LUNDA SUL, A MASS GRAVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMED WAS HOLDING VICTIMS OF UNITA'S EXCESSES WAS IN ALL PROBABILITY THE RESULT OF SYSTEMATIC EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS BY THE GOVERNMENT.

IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, ALLEGATIONS OF RAPE BY GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS INCREASED. SOLDIERS BROKE INTO HOUSES AND RAPE WOMEN, OR RAPE WOMEN THEY ENCOUNTERED WORKING IN THE FIELDS. THESE OCCURRENCES WERE WIDESPREAD NEAR MILITARY CAMPS. RAPE WAS ESPECIALLY COMMONPLACE DURING *batidas*, HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES, WHEN UNITS ARRIVED IN AN AREA, AND ORDERED LOCAL PEOPLE TO COLLECT FOOD AND NON-FOOD ITEMS FOR THEM AND TO HELP TRANSPORT LOOTED GOODS. THOSE WHO REFUSED TO DO SO WERE OFTEN BEATEN AND SOMETIMES RAPE. THESE SEARCHES AND FORAGING OPERATIONS WERE ESPECIALLY COMMON IN AREAS RECENTLY OCCUPIED OR REOCCUPIED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES, SUCH AS LARGE AREAS OF BIE, HUAMBO AND UIGE PROVINCES. THE U.N. REPORTED THAT IN JUNE SOME ARMY AND LOCAL POLICE ELEMENTS WERE ACCUSED BY LOCAL NGOs OF PERPETRATING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, INCLUDING THE KILLING OF SUSPECTED UNITA SYMPATHIZERS IN LUNDA NORTE, LUNDA SUL, MALANJE, AND MOYICO PROVINCES.

THE RENEWED CONFLICT, AND ACCOMPANYING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND VIOLATIONS OF LAWS OF WAR, WERE FUELED BY NEW FLOWS OF ARMS INTO THE COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH ARMS PURCHASES BY THE GOVERNMENT SIGNIFICANTLY DECLINED. UKRAINE, RUSSIA AND ISRAEL APPARENTLY REMAINED THE GOVERNMENT'S SUPPLIERS OF CHOICE. THE ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES CONFIRMED IN MAY THAT IT HAD EXPORTED WEAPONS WORTH \$46.5 MILLION TO ANGOLA SINCE 1997, INCLUDING TWENTY-SEVEN AIRCRAFT. THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DELIVERED A NUMBER OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN EARLY 2000 THAT WERE PURCHASED THROUGH AN OIL-BACKED LOAN. IN MID-SEPTEMBER SHIPMENTS OF WEAPONS FROM THE UKRAINE WERE UNLOADED AT LUANDA PORT.

A SERIES OF UNITED NATIONS EMBARGOES ON UNITA REMAINED IN FORCE, AND THE U.N.'S SECURITY COUNCIL'S SANCTIONS COMMITTEE ON ANGOLA PRODUCED A FIFTY-FOUR-PAGE REPORT IN MARCH ON UNITA SANCTIONS-BUSTING. (SEE ARMS.) IT WAS PUT TOGETHER BY AN INDEPENDENT TEN-PERSON PANEL OF EXPERTS, MANDATED IN MAY 1999 TO INVESTIGATE SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS. THE REPORT CONTAINED DETAILED NEW INFORMATION, INCLUDING EVIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT GNASSINGBE EYADEMA OF TOGO AND PRESIDENT BLAISE COMPAORE OF BURKINA FASO WERE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN SUPPORTING UNITA. THE REPORT ALSO DOCUMENTED CLAIMS THAT RWANDA WAS AN IMPORTANT LOCATION FOR GUNRUNNING AND DIAMOND TRADING WITH UNITA, AND THAT ITS GOVERNMENT HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THIS AND WAS PROVIDING PROTECTION. LIBREVILLE IN GABON HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT REFUELING LOCATION FOR SANCTIONS-BUSTING PLANES AFTER THEY HAD BEEN INSIDE UNITA AREAS. IT WAS FOUND THAT MOST OF THE WEAPONS IMPORTED BY UNITA WERE FROM BULGARIA. UNITA'S ARMS WERE BELIEVED TO BE FUNDED LARGELY BY THE ILLICIT TRADE IN DIAMONDS. IT ALSO APPEARED THAT UNITA HAS HAD A GENERAL AVERSION FOR BANKS AND NORMAL BANKING CHANNELS, ALTHOUGH ITS LEADERS HAD USED CREDIT CARDS. AS ALREADY NOTED, THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE FOUND THAT AIR TRANSPORT HAS BEEN THE LIFELINE TO UNITA.

BOTH ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND UNITA REBEL FORCES CONTINUED TO USE ANTIPERSONNEL MINES (SEE THE ARMS DIVISION ENTRY BELOW). THE NUMBER OF MINE VICTIMS WAS UP SHARPLY IN 1999 (FROM 103 IN 1998 TO 195 IN 1999 IN LUENA ALONE). THERE WERE WORRYING REPORTS THAT ANGOLANS TRAINED IN HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING HAD BEEN EMPLOYED TO PLANT NEW MINES.

IN LUANDA AND ALONG THE COAST, AREAS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, THERE WAS GREATER TOLERANCE FOR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT RIGHTS, AND A SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE POLICE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THERE WAS AN ONGOING CAMPAIGN OF HARASSMENT AGAINST INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS.

THE PRIVATELY OWNED MEDIA EXPANDED ITS EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR TO INFORM ANGOLANS ABOUT PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CRITICIZE MALADMINISTRATION AND CORRUPTION, AND VOICE A VARIETY OF OPINIONS. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO THESE EFFORTS BY USING POWERS UNDER THE LAW, AND ALSO BY GOING BEYOND THESE POWERS, TO STIFLE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. IN JULY, THE GOVERNMENT INTRODUCED A DRAFT MEDIA BILL THAT ADVOCATED HARSH SENTENCES FOR DEFAMATION.

AT LEAST SIX JOURNALISTS WERE CONVICTED OF LIBEL OR DEFAMATION BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AFTER NOVEMBER 1999 AND FACED POSSIBLE IMPRISONMENT. AT THIS WRITING, THEY WERE ALL AWAITING THE RESULTS OF APPEALS. AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES FAILED TO CONFORM TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW.

ON DECEMBER 10, THE DIRECTORS OF *Folia 9* AND THE PRIVATELY OWNED WEEKLY NEWSPAPERS *Agora* AND *Actual*, WERE ORDERED BY THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SELECTIVE CRIMES IN THE NATIONAL DEPARTMENT FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (DNIC) TO WITHHOLD STORIES THEY WERE ABOUT TO PUBLISH. THESE CONCERNED A REPORT BY THE BRITISH ORGANIZATION GLOBAL WITNESS, SAYING THE GOVERNMENT HAD USED ITS OIL WEALTH CORRUPTLY. *Folia 9* AND *Actual* SUPPRESSED THE TEXT OF THE ARTICLE, LEAVING BLANK PAGES, AND *Agora* PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE APPROVED BY THE DNIC, BUT WAS FORBIDDEN TO MENTION THE POLICE ACTION. IN CONTRAST, THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED MEDIA PUBLISHED DETAILED REJECTIONS OF THE GLOBAL WITNESS REPORT.

THE LUANDA PROVINCIAL COURT CONVICTED JOURNALISTS RAFAEL MARQUES AND AGUIAR DOS SANTOS OF DEFAMING PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS ON MARCH 31. BOTH WERE SENTENCED TO SIX MONTHS' AND THREE MONTHS' IMPRISONMENT RESPECTIVELY AND ASKED TO PAY A LARGE FINE. BOTH WERE GRANTED BAIL AND HAVE APPEALED THEIR SENTENCES.

Journalists outside Luanda suffered more. Isaias Soares in Malanje and Andre Mussamo and Isidoro Natalicio in Kwanza Norte province faced harassment. Mussamo was arrested in N'dalatando on December 2, held in incommunicado detention for two weeks, and detained for a further three months. He was put on trial on May 29 for obtaining "state secrets" and revealing them. He was acquitted on June 2.

On February 19, 2000, the opposition Angolan Party for Democratic Support and Progress (PADPA) led protests against a 1,600 percent rise in the price of fuel. The president and secretary general of PADPA were arrested and accused of not obtaining official permission to demonstrate although this is not required for a peaceful assembly under Angolan law. Despite the arrests, the demonstrators protested outside the Luanda Provincial Government buildings on February 23 and were dispersed by police who beat some of them. Police armed with rifles surrounded a second demonstration on February 24 and arrested ten of those present, including the leaders of two opposition parties. Many of the demonstrators were beaten, three of them badly. On February 25, the police apologized for the arrests. On March 11, there was another demonstration against the fuel price and against the authorities' attacks on freedom of expression and assembly. This demonstration proceeded peacefully and there were no arrests.

On March 29, the Episcopal Conference of Catholic Bishops of Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe issued a pastoral letter appealing to the government not to dismiss dialogue and to grant a general amnesty in order to assist national reconciliation. The bishops also appealed for a greater respect for human rights. Angolan church leaders have since continued to seek a negotiated peace. In June, they organized a march for peace that culminated in an open-air ecumenical service in Luanda with the participation of other members of civil society and of political parties, with the exception of the ruling party and government.

The churches' advocacy on this issue resulted in a slight shift in the government position on negotiations. On June 19, President dos Santos reaffirmed the validity of the Lusaka Protocol and indicated that UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and his supporters could be "forgiven" if they renounced war.

Defending Human Rights

Open discussion about rights abuses became more acceptable in government areas, and a range of church groups and local and international NGOs were visibly promoting the respect of human rights. Although a local NGO was launched in June that attempted to document and expose appalling prison conditions in Luanda, there was little action of this kind by other local NGOs. In December 1999, Human Rights Watch launched its report, *Angola Explained*, in Luanda, the first ever public release of a detailed report of government and UNITA's human rights abuses in Angola. Some two hundred people, including government officials, parliamentarians, including the speaker of the national assembly, as well as diplomats, members of church groups and NGOs attended. In September, the Committee to Protect Journalists visited Angola, heading a delegation that included Human Rights Watch, and discussed the draft media bill with senior government officials, journalists and NGOs. Meanwhile Amnesty International continued to be denied an official invitation to visit the country.

The Role of the International Community

On April 3, as part of a larger agreement between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the government of Angola to reform the economy, the IMF and government reached an agreement to monitor oil revenues that would be supervised by the World Bank. Overall, oil revenues comprise 92 percent of Angola's exports, between 70 and 90 percent of government revenues from 1994-1999, and over 50 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This agreement was a positive first step that could help establish transparency and accountability within the government of Angola. (See Business and Human Rights.)

United Nations

The UN's relationship with the government improved, mostly due to the efforts of Canada's ambassador to the UN, Robert Fowler, to the efforts of the Angola Sanctions Committee he led, and to the release of a much publicized report on UNITA sanctions-busting in March. A second, smaller panel of experts was to have been appointed in May, but was finally formed only in late July following wrangling over nominations.

In February, the government officially approved the status of mission agreement for the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) and pledged to support the office. With the end of the UN peacekeeping mandate in Angola, the lead responsibility for UNOA within the UN Secretariat was transferred in January 2000 from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Department of Political Affairs. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced on July 31 that he had appointed Mozambican Mussagy Jeichande as the head of the up to thirty-strong UNOA. He arrived in Luanda to take up his post on October 1.

The UN's ten-strong human rights division continued to support a number of institutional capacity-building efforts with the government and held a number of workshops. There were also efforts by the division to survey the role of multinational oil companies in the defense of human rights. The Human Rights Division was also measuring human rights awareness and understanding among the population in general. So far, research showed that Angolans knew their rights better than they knew the mechanisms for exercising them. Division chief Nicholas Howen resigned in March and had not been replaced at the time of writing.

European Union, Norway, and Canada

The European Union (EU) continued to be divided by sectoral and strategic interests. Commercial interests, particularly oil and trade, remained the prime issues of engagement and eroded the impact of periodic human rights demarches. A common EU policy document on human rights in Angola never reached the public domain after discord amongst the EU partners and a serious watering down of the draft. Portugal, the former colonial power and a member with Russia and the U.S. of the "Troika" monitors in the peace process, continued to be unable to voice human rights concerns because of the divisive nature of Angolan issues in its domestic politics. Canada continued to engage through its efforts on the UN sanctions committee, even after July when Robert Fowler moved to another diplomatic post.

United States

Angola remained the U.S.'s second largest destination for investment and third largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa in 2000. Petroleum was the defining issue, with projections that within ten years fifteen percent of the U.S.'s oil consumption would be Angolan. This strategic relationship resulted in a warming of relations with a string of visits between Luanda and Washington D.C. of senior officials. U.S. policy shifted toward support of trade and commerce while issues such as human rights were downplayed. Although some U.S. interventions on freedom of expression abuses produced results, human rights issues were usually eclipsed by the higher priority given commercial interests. Underpinning the deepening of this relationship was the U.S.-Angola Bilateral Consultative Commission which met several times, focusing on trade and investment.

BURUNDI

Human Rights Developments

A peace agreement offered hope of ending a seven-year-long civil war, but combat between the largely Hutu rebel forces and the Tutsi-dominated government forces increased after its signing in August. Early in the year, fighting was worst in the south and east and, more sporadically, around Bujumbura, the capital. In August and September rebels continued pressure in the south and east, stepped up attacks near and in Bujumbura, and began combat in the central parts of the country. They targeted Tutsi civilians as well as Hutu who did not support their movements. Tutsi soldiers killed Hutu civilians, sometimes in reprisal for rebel attacks, sometimes because they suspected them of supporting the rebel movements. By October, more than a thousand civilians had been slain, thousands of others raped or otherwise injured, and hundreds of thousands displaced from their homes or deprived of their property. More than 120,000 persons had been slain since the war began in 1993.

Among the worst reprisal attacks by soldiers was the December 1999 slaughter of at least forty civilians at Kabezi and the late September 2000 killing of more than twenty civilians in the Bujumbura neighborhood of Kamenge.

Soldiers and former soldiers also attacked civilians with no apparent provocation. Several checking identity papers shot an unarmed member of parliament, Gabriel Gisabwama, in December 1999, and three soldiers and a former soldier shot and killed an Italian church worker at a roadblock in early October.

Rebels killed dozens of persons in ambushes on roads outside the capital. In one particularly serious ambush at Maseyo, they killed fifteen persons, including three children, and wounded twelve. In some incursions into the city, rebels seemed more intent on robbery than on killing, but in late September during their third attack at Mutakura, a poor, ethnically mixed neighborhood of the capital, they killed thirteen persons, including women and children.

Unidentified assailants killed and injured dozens of civilians in August and September through ambushes of vehicles, attacks on their homes, and a grenade thrown in the Buzenzi market in Bujumbura.

In January, former South African president Nelson Mandela assumed the role of mediator in the peace negotiations, replacing former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, who died in late 1999. From his first meeting with the nineteen delegations representing the Burundian government and various political parties, Mandela sounded the moral tone that would dominate his efforts. Throughout the year he condemned such government abuses as forcibly regrouping civilians in camps and jailing persons unjustifiably. In September, he condemned the rebels for ignoring a proffered cease-fire and for continuing attacks on civilians.

In late August, supported by the presence of President Bill Clinton and other international leaders, Mandela pushed most of the nineteen delegations into signing a peace accord. The rest signed a month later, but many reserved approval of one or more of the articles. Even more important, the two major armed movements making war on the government refused to sign because they had been excluded from early stages of negotiations by Nyerere. The two, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CND-FDD, usually called just FDD) and the Forces for National Liberation (FNL) of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU), later refused to join the talks, even at Mandela's urging.

The Burundian war became increasingly intermeshed with the war in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Burundian rebels allied with Congolese opponents of the Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and Burundian army soldiers cooperated with the RCD and Rwandan troops. Both Burundian rebels and Burundian soldiers attacked civilians in the DRC. (See Democratic Republic of the Congo.) Burundian rebels also attacked from Tanzania, leading to insecurity at the border and occasional skirmishes between Burundian and Tanzanian soldiers. During the course of the year, the rebels apparently grew in numbers and obtained new arms and other equipment, some of it said to have been furnished by Congolese authorities eager to support groups that challenged the RCD and Rwandans. Hundreds of Rwandan Hutu opponents of the Rwandan government, including former Rwandan army soldiers and militia members, also joined in the Burundian war. The Rwandans provided important support to the FNL until February 2000, when cooperation broke down and the FNL killed more than a hundred of the Rwandan allies.

The war began after soldiers of the minority Tutsi group killed Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected president who was from the majority Hutu group. In the weeks immediately after, Hutu, sometimes under the direction of officials or party leaders, killed tens of thousands of Tutsi, and the Tutsi-led army slaughtered tens of thousands of Hutu, sometimes in reprisal, sometimes in places where there had been no attacks on Tutsi. The army permitted civilians to resume control, but the government was paralyzed by violence from extremist Tutsi militia and from Hutu opposition groups that took up arms. Major Pierre Buyoya, who had governed before the election of Ndadaye, took power in a coup in 1996, pledging to restore order. He established a "partnership" with elements of the opposition and began negotiations with the rebels, but he also oversaw first use of "regroupment camps," a practice extended in September 1999 to the region surrounding the capital.

The government claimed to be protecting civilians by regrouping them, but it aimed primarily to sever the links between rebels and their civilian supporters. By early January 2000, soldiers using force and threats had moved some 350,000 civilians into the camps around Bujumbura, where they lived in inhumane conditions. In the process, the soldiers shot and killed at least twenty civilians and injured scores of others. At first, they forbade humanitarian workers access to the camps, leaving the displaced with no food, water, or help in building shelters. Later they allowed humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance, but several sites were so difficult to reach that relief workers could provide residents with little or no aid.

Soldiers on a number of occasions selected camp residents whom they suspected of rebel sympathies and beat them to obtain information or to force them to join the government side. During such beatings, soldiers often tied suspects tightly with their arms behind their backs and sometimes suspended them in the air. In some cases, they beat the suspects to death. In other cases, persons arrested by soldiers were taken to military installations and have not been seen since.

Soldiers allowed camp residents to work their fields only irregularly, making it difficult for them to produce crops to supplement the meager food deliveries. They frequently exacted unpaid labor from residents and forced both adults and children to accompany them as guides or porters, including through areas where there was a high risk of rebel attack. Civilians, including children, were sometimes killed or injured on these work details. Soldiers supposedly protecting several camps raped women or coerced them into providing sexual services against their will. Soldiers and national policemen looted and destroyed the homes and other property of camp residents and sometimes stole goods from them within the camps, notably at Kavumu on May 7.

Soldiers were rarely held accountable for their abuses. In an exceptional case, one soldier was sentenced to death for having killed six and wounded seven civilians at Ruvaga camp. A commission of inquiry into the looting at Kavumu had not published a report months afterwards.

Rebels on several occasions launched attacks on Burundian soldiers from inside or near regroupment camps, exposing camp residents to crossfire. In attacks at Kavumu and Kabezi in February and Kinyankonge in May, at least six civilians were killed and twelve wounded. In March, rebels fired on a mixed group of soldiers accompanied by child porters and wounded three children. Rebels sometimes required camp residents to provide them with money, food, or other goods. On April 23, rebels raided Rutiba camp and killed one resident who balked at meeting their demands.

In January President Buyoya responded to heavy international criticism by announcing that the government would close the regroupment camps, but only after President Mandela evicted a similar promise from him in June did authorities move effectively to disband the camps. By October, most of the camps around Bujumbura were closed, but officials continued using "temporary" regroupment to make it easier for soldiers to "cleanse" areas of rebels. A substantial number of civilians were killed in many of these operations. In late July, soldiers allegedly killed fifty-three civilians, including eighteen women and sixteen children, in the eastern province of Rutigi and in August they reportedly slaughtered several dozen more at Nyambwe near Bujumbura.

Political leaders and ordinary people insisted upon justice for past massacres. For many Tutsi, this meant justice for slaughter of Tutsi in late 1993, which was termed "acts of genocide" by a panel established by the U.N. Security Council, and for subsequent killings. For many Hutu, it meant justice for Hutu killed by Tutsi soldiers and civilians since 1993, but also for the massive slaughter of tens of thousands of Hutu in 1972. Into this debate President Mandela introduced the idea of freeing "political prisoners," including not only those jailed solely for their beliefs, but also those guilty of crimes of violence who had acted for political or ideological reasons.

The FDD adopted the closing of regroupment camps and the freeing of "political prisoners" as preconditions to beginning negotiations with the government. Although the first condition was largely met, the second was not and the FDD took this as a pretext for continuing combat.

The Arusha Agreement provided for both an international commission of inquiry into past killings and a national truth and reconciliation commission. It called for an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, but this institution would be established only after the international inquiry was done.

A new code of penal procedure went into effect in January 2000 that for the first time guaranteed the accused access to legal counsel before trial. It also strengthened restrictions on preventive detention and provided greater protection against physical abuse of detainees. Even as authorities introduced the new law, they recognized that implementing it required more resources than they had. In fact, the reforms were not widely implemented during the year, but judicial authorities did liberate some two hundred detainees against whom there was little proof or who had been detained for long periods of time. Some 9,000 remained in jail, the majority of them Hutu. Most were accused of crimes related to the 1993 massacres and had not yet been tried. Conditions of detention remained miserable due to overcrowding, poor nutrition, and lack of medical services. The International Committee of the Red Cross, absent from Burundi for several years after the killing of three of its delegates, returned in 1999 and immediately brought improvements in jail conditions.

Defending Human Rights

The Burundian Human Rights League, Iteka, continued its strong programs of monitoring abuses and education concerning human rights and undertook a campaign to establish an international criminal tribunal for Burundi. The Association for the Defense of Burundian Prisoners (ABDP) assisted prisoners both in preparing their cases for court and in improving the material conditions of life in the prison. It also drew public attention to an important case where a detainee was tortured and beaten to death and sought to bring the responsible officials to trial. To assist the backlog in the judicial system, Iteka provided transport to witnesses and complainants and ABDP transported judicial personnel to courts often many miles from their homes.

In general, human rights monitors worked without difficulty, but in a number of cases soldiers or officials excluded them from areas of alleged abuses, supposedly to protect them from harm. Following publication of information critical of the government, two human rights workers received a series of threatening phone calls, but there was no indication that these had been officially inspired.

The government established a National Human Rights Commission in April to monitor the situation of human rights generally and to ensure that governmental bodies observe human rights. The commission included representatives from the president, the vice-president, and the ministers of defense, justice, communications, and human rights.

The Role of the International Community

The international community focused on ending the war, in part because it understood how unstable the entire region was, in part because it was determined that Burundi not suffer a genocide like that which devastated neighboring Rwanda—with a population similarly divided on ethnic lines. President Clinton's brief stop to encourage signing of the Arusha Agreement underlined the importance the U.S. gave to ending combat in the region. The U.N. Security Council followed the diplomatic process closely, twice receiving direct reports by former President Mandela. The OAU, the E.U., and various individual governments, like the United States, all provided high-level diplomatic support to the peace process throughout the year and many donors helped pay its hefty expenses.

The U.S., like others, downplayed the need for justice as potentially impeding a settlement. At the same time they hoped to keep open the option of some form of international accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. To improve judicial proceedings within Burundi, the U.S. provided some U.S. \$3 million to support Burundian nongovernmental organizations under the Great Lakes Justice Initiative.

Donors gave humanitarian aid, but, except for France and Belgium, they did not resume the development aid that had been cut when an embargo was imposed after Buyoya's 1996 coup. President Mandela tried to push the immediate renewal of assistance, but donors refused at a September meeting because a cease-fire had not taken effect. The government faced bankruptcy early in the year, but the World Bank gave \$35 million to stabilize the economy.

Most international actors, including the U.S., condemned the regroupment camps and demanded their closure. After several months, however, the Belgians implicitly accepted the camps and stressed merely the need to improve conditions for residents. When President Buyoya suggested that some regroupment camps might be transformed into "villages," the European Commission delegate immediately warned that no E.U. aid would be given without evidence that affected people favored this move.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights began the year with a strong statement condemning the human rights violations inherent in the regroupment policy, a position that was reiterated by the special rapporteur for Burundi, Marie-Therese A. Ketta Boucoum, in her report to the commission in February. The special rapporteur, named in 1999, visited Burundi only briefly in late 1999, but spoke out clearly against killings and other abuses by both military and rebels.

The field office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights reduced its staff in late 1999 due to a security alert and did not substantially increase its personnel in 2000 after the security situation improved. Handicapped also by budget cuts, the office worked largely for improvements in the judicial system. It did not publicize any abuses that it documented, although it did address some of them with the authorities. Although the field office at one time circulated reports confidentially among the diplomatic community, it apparently stopped doing so in mid-1999.

Relevant Human Rights Watch Reports:

Emptying the Hills: Regroupment in Burundi, 7/00
Neglecting Justice in Making Peace, 4/00

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)

Human Rights Developments

Congo entered its third year of a devastating war in August, with no end in sight. The conflict pitted the government of President Laurent Kabila and allied troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia against the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), fronting for forces sent by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. In the northern Equateur province, the better organized Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) also received significant military support from Uganda. Rwanda and Uganda invoked national security concerns for intervening in the Congo, citing the presence of exiled insurgent groups bent on destabilizing their respective countries. As the conflict settled into a protracted stalemate, it became increasingly clear that the two nations' economies were directly boosted by the exploitation of natural resources in areas of the DRC under their respective control. Myriad external actors, the ready availability of small arms, and ethnic mobilization by local warlords favored the resurgence of rural militias in eastern Congo. Locally known by the generic name of Mai-Mai, these autonomous militia groups fought primarily to repel what they perceived as foreign occupation of their homelands.

None of the actors fully respected their commitments under the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement signed in July and August 1999. Rebel factions and their foreign backers and government troops showed little inclination to respect basic norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in their treatment of civilian populations. The fighting destroyed what was left of Congo's public services and infrastructure after decades of misgovernment under former President Joseph Mobutu, and brought the already moribund economy to a standstill.

Indiscriminate attacks, extrajudicial executions of civilians, rape, and large-scale destruction of civilian property characterized the conduct of the belligerents. Collective punishment for suspected loyalty to rival antagonists generated many of the civilian killings, as did localized interethnic strife fueled by the broader war. Perpetrators from all parties enjoyed total impunity.

By midyear, upward of 1.3 million Congolese were displaced, and another five million completely or partially separated from their traditional supply routes, mainly because of the generalized insecurity. Those uprooted by the war were deprived of access to humanitarian services by the same factors that caused their flight and isolation. From January to September, the number of Congolese refugees in neighboring countries, including Uganda, grew from some 130,000 to an approximate 220,000.

Using the war as a pretext, President Kabila's government continued to freeze its democratization agenda, and actively sought to derail the internal political dialogue with the rebels, opposition parties, and civil society groups provided for in the 1999 Lusaka Accord. Taking aim at these targets, on August 21 the government inaugurated a Constituent and Legislative Assembly/Transitional Parliament whose members it handpicked without consulting the opposition or civil society organizations.

Seeking to capitalize on the serious fallout between Rwanda and Uganda and the increasing unpopularity of the rebel RCD in eastern Congo, the government also gave contradictory signals about its readiness to cooperate with U.N. observers. During three days of government-orchestrated protests in early June, hundreds of demonstrators threw stones at the headquarters of the U.N. Mission to the Congo (MONUC).

The human rights situation throughout the country continued to deteriorate. On February 19, the government decreed a general amnesty for all Congolese prosecuted or condemned for crimes against the internal or external security of the state. More than two hundred people in detention were accordingly released in a matter of weeks. However, as Human Rights Watch pointed out in a letter to President Kabila in March, the government failed to free hundreds of eligible political and security detainees. Furthermore, the government continued to respond to challenges to its ongoing ban on political activities and free expression of opinion with arbitrary detention and stiff prison sentences, helping to fill detention centers and prisons that optimists had hoped the general amnesty would empty. Security agencies particularly targeted vocal opposition parties and groupings for repression. They arrested leaders and militants of the radical Innovative Forces for Unity and Solidarity, dispersed gatherings of the newly formed Collective for the Survival of Democracy, and detained for varying periods dozens of members of the main opposition parties, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, and the Unified Lumumbist Party.

In January and February, the government violated its own pledge to the United Nations not to carry out the death penalty by executing nineteen people condemned to death by the special court of military order. Established in 1997 by presidential decree, ostensibly to restore discipline in the army, the court increasingly became an effective tool for political repression, notably to punish outspoken civilian critics of the government. On September 12, the court found four journalists guilty of "high treason" and "publication of articles hostile to the government." It sentenced two of them to two years in prison, and condemned the others to one year's imprisonment, with six months suspended.

Several competing security agencies zealously enforced the government's restrictions on political activities and free expression, constantly alternating roles in arresting, interrogating, and detaining suspects. This practice kept the door wide open for rampant abuses: compelling testimonies indicated the continual use of torture, in particular in police stations and in places of detention controlled by the military. Former detainees complained to Human Rights Watch about beatings, sexual abuse, humiliating treatment, and deprivation of food, sleep, or family visits. Victims of torture and ill treatment who protested to the government said that there was no follow-up to their complaints, indicating the prevalence of a culture of total impunity.

An investigation in March by Human Rights Watch in areas controlled by the mainstream RCD-Goma rebel faction, which is backed by Rwanda, documented a pattern of involvement of the rebels and their Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) backers in civilian killings and other extrajudicial executions. These were often conducted in retaliation for earlier raids by the Mai-Mai and Rwandan Hutu fighters, commonly called Interahamwe, operating in eastern Congo against the Tutsi-dominated RPA and its local allies. Human Rights Watch documented the killing of thirty people in a February 5 attack by the RCD and its RPA allies on the village of Kilambo in North Kivu. RCD rebels and Rwandan soldiers tied up men, raped their wives in front of them, and then killed them. In May, the RCD similarly killed at least thirty villagers in Katogota, South Kivu. Human Rights Watch also collected evidence that corroborated reports by a local rights group, Heritiers de la Justice, that RCD soldiers in late 1999 sexually tortured and buried several women alive in Mwenga, reports which the RCD vehemently denied. RCD soldiers also attacked civilians in towns, and routinely arrested and tortured RCD opponents and civil society leaders, often detaining them in secret places, including in Rwanda.

The Mai-Mai and Hutu fighters also committed atrocities against the civilian population, particularly communities identified with the Tutsis. The Mai-Mai reportedly killed dozens of fleeing civilians in late August in Shabunda territory. Hutu militiamen reportedly attacked civilians in Kainzi-Biega national park in early September. Burundian Hutu and Mai-Mai fighters jointly attacked Congolese Tutsi communities in the Rutzu plain and the Haut Plateau areas of South Kivu.

Uganda hastily trained and equipped thousands of young Congolese, many of them children, to build armed wings for its local allies, the Liberation Movement for the Congo (MLC), which controlled Equateur province by mid-1999, and the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), which unconvincingly claimed

to control northeastern areas in Congo along the Ugandan border. While the MLC enjoyed a measure of popularity among the estimated ten million inhabitants of Equateur, the RCD-ML and its newly trained armed wing had splintered into at least three factions by midyear, largely along ethnic lines. Frequent leadership dispute in the RCD-ML exacerbated ethnic tensions and re-ignited a deadly interethnic war in the region of Bunia between the the agriculturalist Lendu people and the pastoralist Hema, who are identified with the Tutsi and the Ugandan Hema. At least seven thousand people were killed, and another 200,000 were displaced in less than a year. Sparked in mid-1999 by individual disputes over land tenure between the two groups, the conflict flared up when Ugandan officials around the same time unilaterally decreed the creation of a province in the disputed area, and placed mostly Hema officials in control of its administration. Leaders of the RCD-ML told Human Rights Watch and the Kampala press on various occasions that commanders and soldiers of the Ugandan army frequently took part in that conflict on the side of the Hema, mainly to earn lucrative payments from Hema farm owners and businessmen. In August Human Rights Watch wrote to RCD President Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and to President Museveni of Uganda calling for an investigation into the role of the Ugandan army in recruiting children and manipulating ethnic tensions in the region.

Rwandan and Ugandan forces fought particularly destructive battles for the control of Kisingani in early May, and again in early June. Some seven hundred civilians were killed, and another one thousand were seriously wounded as the nominal allies indiscriminately clashed with heavy artillery and automatic weapons in the city. The fighting cut off the supply of electricity and water and caused widespread damage to civilian property.

Defending Human Rights

As Congo's vibrant human rights and civil society movement attempted to build a genuine grassroots movement for durable peace, it faced persistent persecution, both from the government and the rebels fighting to topple it. On January 16, security forces of the RCD-Goma arrested Immaculée Biruhaka, president of the women's group Promotion and Support of Women's Initiatives (PAIF), and her colleague Jeannine Mukanyirwa, PAIF's vice president. The two, and other women held like them at the infamous "Bureau 2" detention center in Goma, were whipped with a piece of fire. The brief detention of the two activists was apparently linked to Mukanyirwa's leading role in organizing a peace movement with a view to bringing together groups from government and rebel held areas. In late January, RCD-Goma authorities arrested three civil society leaders in Bukavu, in South Kivu and accused them of organizing for a planned general strike to protest the lack of payment of wages, taxation by the Rwandans, and the continuing presence in eastern Congo of Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Despite the arrests and threats by the RCD against several suspected protest leaders, the strike took place peacefully on January 31 in Bukavu. In late April, Rwandan security forces arrested Bruno Bahati, a leading member of the Coordination of Civil Society in South Kivu, on the Rwandan-Ugandan border after finding a Kinshasa newspaper in his possession. He was detained in Kigali for a while and was later transferred to Goma. Women's rights groups in North and South Kivu made of International Women's Day, March 8, an event to mark women's grieving for their husbands and relatives killed in the war. For their suspected role in organizing the event in Goma, RCD authorities summoned and threatened a women's activist, Zita Kamungirwa, and pressured the employer of another one, Marie-Jeanne Mbachui, into suspending her from her job.

RCD-Goma authorities often broadly accused dissenting church and civil society leaders of inciting ethnic hatred, but never prosecuted specific cases, preferring instead to use detention, repeated summons, and internal exile to silence opponents. In late August, the RCD authorities banished four leading civil society activists from Bukavu for three weeks after accusing them of having passed information to the international press. In September, the rebels allowed Mgr. Emmanuel Katolikio, bishop of Bukavu, to return to the city after seven months of banishment to his hometown in North Kivu. They accused him of fomenting ethnic hatred after he criticized rebel authorities in his Christmas prayer. The bishop's sudden death of a heart attack in early October shocked the population and deepened its distrust of the RCD. In clamping down on the resulting unrest in Bukavu, RCD soldiers briefly detained thirteen human rights activists and publicly beat them.

In Kinshasa, the government similarly restricted the freedom of expression and movement of civil society groups. Alleging that they were in contact with the rebels, the government in late May detained for weeks Félicien Malanda Nsumu and Georges Kazimbika, respectively the secretary and financial officer of the national umbrella group for developmental organizations. In early June, the government prevented representatives of civil society and the political opposition from leaving the capital to attend preparatory talks for the inter-Congolese dialogue in Cotonou, Benin.

The Role of the International Community

Southern African Development Community

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) tried to spearhead the regional peace efforts in a war that drew three of its member states to the side of its beleaguered member, the Congo. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia proved ineffective in pressing the Congolese government to comply with the 1999 Lusaka cease-fire agreement at a SADC summit meeting on August 7, and again on August 14 at a summit of the parties to the agreement.

United Nations

The Security Council in an August 6, 1999 resolution authorized the deployment for three months of ninety U.N. military liaison personnel to the capitals of the belligerent states. Their mission was to establish contact with the Joint Military Commission formed by the belligerents to police the implementation of the truce. From January 24 to 26, the council held intensive deliberations on the Congolese crisis attended by seven African heads of state. This prepared the ground for Security Council resolution 1291, extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to August 31, and authorizing its expansion to include a 500-strong military observer force plus another 5,537 troops for logistical and security backup. The council authorized the mission to take action to protect U.N. personnel and infrastructure, and civilians facing imminent threats of attack, and on October 13 extended its mandate to December 15.

While the ground was laid for a peacekeeping mission to the Congo soon after the parties agreed to disengage, the U.N. showed less resolve in moving to the deployment phase, principally blaming the parties to the conflict for failing to live up to their commitments. MONUC also encountered other crippling hurdles, as it was starved of resources, and member states were slow in pledging troops for it.

A Security Council mission to the region in early May pressed for the full cooperation and support of the belligerents for MONUC as a condition for its deployment, but at the time of writing these conditions had not been met. The council on June 16 demanded that Rwanda and Uganda "which have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the DRC, withdraw their forces from Congolese territory, and that the other parties to the conflict adhere to the timetable of the cease-fire agreement. The council also declared that Rwanda and Uganda should make reparations for the loss of life and property in Kisingani during their clashes there.

Roberto Garretón, the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights for the DRC, visited the country from August 13 to 26 at the invitation of the government. Leaders of the Liberation Movement for the Congo (MLC) and the mainstream RCD-Goma faction also received the special rapporteur in their respective headquarters of Gbadolite and Goma. In a powerful message to the RCD, the rapporteur inaugurated a workshop for the training of human rights monitors in which participants from several rebel-controlled cities were able to take part. The U.N. human rights high commissioner's field office in DRC, and its branch office in Goma, played

active roles in monitoring the human rights situation in government and rebel areas. Solidarity with and support for the beleaguered Congolese human rights movement was an important aspect of the commission's interventions, in addition to its advocacy role with government and rebel authorities.

European Union

Provided that the signatories respected their own accord, the European Union remained committed to supporting the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, promising assistance for the resettlement of the war displaced, fostering national reconciliation in the DRC, and supporting the country's rehabilitation plans. Indicative of this stance was the E.U.'s August boycott of the opening ceremony of the DRC's Constituent and Legislative Assembly on the grounds that the institution was not compatible with the national dialogue provided for by the Lusaka Agreement.

At a meeting with Ugandan government officials in mid-May, during which donors were due to confirm pledges they made during the Donor Consultative Group meeting in Kampala in March, the E.U. warned that the conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisenkani could jeopardize donors' budgetary support for both countries. In addition to the demand that the two countries end the situation they created in Kisenkani, the E.U. appeared to make Uganda's compliance with the Lusaka Agreement a condition for the release of its budgetary support to the country.

A meeting of E.U. foreign ministers in Brussels in May decided to increase the E.U.'s economic assistance to the DRC and Burundi as an incentive for the peace processes there. However, the ministers failed to reach a consensus on the imposition of an arms embargo on the Great Lakes region, with some member states arguing that any such embargo would always be violated. This left member states with only the June 1999 E.U.'s presidential statement, which called on them to strictly adhere to the E.U.'s own Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and recalled that, under the E.U. code, countries agree not to authorize arms exports that might "aggravate existing tensions or armed conflicts in the country of final destination" or risk fueling human rights abuses. The Great Lakes and Central Africa region qualified for a strict imposition of an arms embargo under these guidelines.

Uganda's involvement in recruiting and training thousands of Congolese children, and in deploying them to battlefronts in their own country, completely escaped the attention of the European Parliament when it passed its strong July 6 resolution condemning the use of child soldiers by rebels in Uganda. The Parliament strongly condemned the abduction and induction of children by the Lord's Resistance Army, and Sudan's role in supporting that rebel group, and called on the E.U. Commission to support rehabilitation efforts of demobilized children in Uganda.

United States

The U.S. repeatedly strongly supported the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and the deployment of MONUC, as well as the convening of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. In February, President Clinton lauded the Lusaka agreement, saying that "[i]t is more than a cease-fire; it is a blueprint for building peace. Best of all, it is a genuinely African solution to an African problem." The U.S. at the same time strove to reconcile its mediation effort with the preservation of its privileged relations with Rwanda and Uganda and its broader objective of containing President Kabila. An August 16 Department of State release exposed the inherent contradictions of the approach, asserting that "[e]xcept for the Congolese government, all parties to the conflict have affirmed their collective desire to put in place the conditions for the full implementation of the Lusaka Agreement." True, the Kabila government at the time publicly said it refused to abide by the agreement and obstructed the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The government also denied MONUC permission to land at Mbandaka, and to deploy observers to Mbuti Mayi. However, the MLC and RCD rebels mirrored that refusal by blocking the mission's access to certain areas under their respective control. The highly publicized withdrawal of Ugandan troops from Kisenkani in June was in turn followed by the airlifting of sizable Ugandan reinforcements to shore up the MLC against a punishing government offensive. The State Department statement only strengthened the perception in the region that U.S. policy was far from evenhanded.

The U.S. defined its interests in the DRC as the upholding of regional stability, and the prevention of the resurgence of genocide and mass killings in Central Africa. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa of the International Relations Committee on February 15, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, narrowly equated the prevention of genocide with the neutralization of the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe militia, who were implicated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and remained at large in eastern Congo. A more objective reading of the situation in the region, by Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer, later identified other actors involved in perpetrating war crimes there. Scheffer led a government team on an August 24-27 trip to Kinshasa, Kisenkani, Goma, and Butembo in eastern Congo to investigate allegations of such crimes. According to an August 29 Department of State statement, Scheffer's team collected information that pointed to violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups supplied by the RCD government, Congolese rebel movements, and the armies of the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. Such strong findings put to a real test the U.S. rhetorical commitment to justice for victims of rampant violence in the Congo and its stated determination to take concrete steps to end the culture of impunity prevailing in the region. Secretary Albright gave an eloquent example of such pledges when she vowed before the Security Council during the "Month of Africa" on January 24 "[t]here is no rationale of past grievance, political allegiance or ethnic difference that excuses murder, torture, rape or other abuse. Here, today, together, we must vow to halt these crimes and to bring those who commit them to justice under due process of law." Months later, there was little progress to this end in the Congo.

The U.S. maintained a modest level of economic assistance to the DRC in FY 2000: U.S. \$10 million in development aid through NGOs; \$13 million in humanitarian assistance; \$15 million in food aid; and \$3 million under the Great Lakes Justice Initiative. The U.S. contributed an additional \$1 million for the Joint Military Commission, and reserved an additional \$1 million for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Although it would commit no troops to MONUC, the U.S. government made significant financial contributions to the mission, totaling an estimated 25 percent of the total UN cost of \$164 million in FY 2000, and an estimated 25 percent of the mission's budget for FY 2001 which stood at \$378 million at this writing.

Relevant Human Rights Watch Reports:

EASTERN CONGO RAVAGED: KILLING CIVILIANS AND SILENCING PROTEST, 5/00

THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA

Human Rights Developments

PRIME MINISTER MELES ZENAWI TOLD THE ETHIOPIAN PARLIAMENT IN EARLY JULY HIS GOVERNMENT HAD SUCCESSFULLY ATTAINED ITS THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES FOR THE YEAR: THE RECAPTURING OF DISPUTED TERRITORY IN ITS WAR WITH ERITREA, HOLDING GENERAL ELECTIONS, AND COMBATTING DROUGHT. IN PURSUING THESE TASKS, THE GOVERNMENT HAD MORE OFTEN THAN NOT IGNORED HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS DESPITE ITS PROFFERED COMMITMENT TO SUCH STANDARDS.

ETHIOPIA ON MAY 12 LAUNCHED A MASSIVE ATTACK AGAINST ERITREA AND SUCCESSFULLY RETOOK DISPUTED TERRITORIES THAT ERITREA HAD OCCUPIED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, WHILE SERIOUSLY WEAKENING THE MILITARY CAPACITY OF ITS FORMER ALLY. THE TWO COUNTRIES ON JUNE 19 AGREED TO A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT BROKERED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU). THE TWO-YEAR CONFLICT WAS ESTIMATED TO HAVE KILLED AND WOUNDED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS AND UPROOTED NEARLY A MILLION PEOPLE. DISPLACED ERITREANS FLEEING THE FIGHTING CREDIBLY REPORTED THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ETHIOPIAN ARMY IN LARGE-SCALE DESTRUCTION AND LOOTING OF CIVILIAN PROPERTY, THE HARASSMENT OF CIVILIANS, PARTICULARLY MEN OF MILITARY AGE, AND IN A HIGH INCIDENCE OF RAPE.

BY EARLY 2000, ETHIOPIAN AUTHORITIES, CITING BROAD THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, HAD FORCIBLY EXPELLED SOME 70,000 ETHIOPIANS OF ERITREAN PARENTAGE TO ERITREA. THE GOVERNMENT ARBITRARILY SEIZED THOSE OF ERITREAN DESCENT, HELD THEM IN HARSH DETENTION CONDITIONS AND ALLOWED NO CHALLENGE TO THEIR EXPULSION. BY SUMMARILY DENYING THE NATIONALITY RIGHTS OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THOSE EXPELLED, MOST OF WHOM WERE LIFELONG ETHIOPIAN CITIZENS, THE CAMPAIGN IN EFFECT RENDERED THEM STATELESS. IT DIVIDED FAMILIES, FORCIBLY SEPARATING MANY FROM SPOUSES AND CHILDREN WHOSE ETHIOPIAN NATIONALITY WAS NOT CHALLENGED, AND EXPROPRIATED THEIR PROPERTIES.

AN ESTIMATED FORTY THOUSAND ETHIOPIAN RESIDENTS OF ERITREA RETURNED TO ETHIOPIA UNDER DURESS IN THE MONTHS THAT FOLLOWED THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. ERITREAN AUTHORITIES INTERNED THOUSANDS OF ETHIOPIAN RESIDENTS UNDER HARSH CONDITIONS IN THE WAKE OF ETHIOPIA'S OFFENSIVE IN MAY, CITING UNSPECIFIED THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE NEED TO PROTECT THE INTERNEES FROM ANGRY MOBS. BY THE END OF JUNE, IN ADDITION TO THE TENS OF THOUSANDS WHO HAD FLED AT THE ONSET OF THE WAR, SOME 4,600 ETHIOPIAN RESIDENTS LEFT ERITREA AFTER THEIR RELEASE FROM WEEKS OF INTERNMENT. THEIR REPATRIATION OCCURRED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), ACTING AS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTED NEUTRAL INTERMEDIARY. ERITREA ALSO REPATRIATED SEVERAL THOUSAND ETHIOPIAN RESIDENTS WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH THE ICRC AND THEIR GOVERNMENT.

THE WAR WITH ERITREA FURTHER FUELED THE ONGOING LOW-LEVEL ARMED INSURGENCIES IN OGADEN REGION AND IN THE STATE OF OROMIA. IN THESE TWO AND SEVERAL OTHER REMOTE REGIONS, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO HOLD UNDER HARSH CONDITIONS, AND WITHOUT CHARGE OR TRIAL, THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE IT SUSPECTED OF SYMPATHIZING WITH INSURGENTS.

THE OGADEN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ONLF), THE OROMO LIBERATION FRONT (OLF), AND THE SOUTHERN SIDAMA LIBERATION FRONT (SLF) IN A JOINT MAY 16 STATEMENT CHARGED THAT FAMINE AFFECTING THEIR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN STATES WAS THE RESULT OF "DELIBERATE NEGLIGENCE" FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE THREE FRONTS COMPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORCIBLY RECRUITED THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN FROM THEIR REGIONS TO USE THEM AS "MINE SWEEPERS" AND "CANNON FODDER" IN ITS WAR WITH ERITREA. INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS AND NGO WORKERS WHO INTERVIEWED ETHIOPIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN ERITREA SAID MANY WERE UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN, AND REPORTED TESTIMONIES THAT TENDED TO CORROBORATE CHARGES OF COERCIVE RECRUITMENT AND POOR TRAINING.

THE OLF BLAMED THE GOVERNMENT FOR IGNORING A PEACE PROPOSAL IT HAD TABLED IN FEBRUARY, AND ACTIVELY PURSUED IN JULY AND SEPTEMBER THE UNIFICATION OF SEVERAL OROMO ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS UNDER ONE UMBRELLA TO "INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OROMO OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT." THERE WAS NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF CLAIMS BY THE OLF IN AUGUST, AND BY THE ONLF IN SEPTEMBER, THAT THEY HAD INFLICTED HEAVY CASUALTIES ON GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN SEPARATE CLASHES. THE OLF CLAIMED IN EARLY JUNE THAT GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS ARRESTED TWO HUNDRED PEOPLE IN MALKA JABDU, A SMALL VILLAGE NEAR THE SITE AT WHICH A TRAIN FERRYING MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM THE PORT OF DJIBOUTI TO THE CAPITAL ADDIS ABABA WAS DERAILED IN MAY BY A LANDMINE EXPLOSION FOR WHICH THE OLF CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY. COMING UNDER GOVERNMENT SUSPICION OF ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE WAR EFFORT, MANY MEMBERS OF THE OROMO COMMUNITY FLED VARIOUS FORMS OF HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION TO SEEK ASYLUM IN NEIGHBORING KENYA AND ELSEWHERE.

ELECTIONS WENT AHEAD ON MAY 14, TWO DAYS AFTER ETHIOPIA LAUNCHED ITS LARGEST MILITARY OFFENSIVE AGAINST ERITREA SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. THE GOVERNMENT DENIED CLAIMS THAT THE TIMING WAS MEANT TO GIVE AN ADVANTAGE TO ITS RULING COALITION, AND SAID IT NEEDED NO SUCH ASSISTANCE TO WIN THE ELECTIONS. THE GOVERNMENT'S ASSERTION APPEARED WELL-FOUNDED IN VIEW OF THE LEVEL OF CONTROL IT EXERTED ON THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION TO FEDERALISM. INDEPENDENT OPPOSITION PARTIES AND COALITIONS OF ETHNICALLY BASED GROUPS OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO FACE SEVERE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS THAT LIMITED THEIR ABILITY TO FREELY COMPETE IN ELECTIONS. THE OPPOSITION TO THE EPRDF ALSO SUFFERED FROM INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL WEAKNESSES AND FREQUENT DIVISIONS AMONG ITS MEMBERS, BUT SEVERAL OPPOSITION PARTIES AND INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES COMPETED IN THE MAY 2000 ELECTIONS. STILL, EPRDF AFFILIATES WERE THE SOLE CONTESTANTS IN OVER 50 PERCENT OF THE CONSTITUENCIES IN THE CONTEST FOR THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT, EIGHT OF THE NINE REGIONAL COUNCILS, AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE CAPITAL AND THE SECOND LARGEST CITY. THE EPRDF SCOOPED A PREDICTABLE 95 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE, AND ITS MEMBERS AND SATELLITE PARTIES WON CONTROL OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES. ON OCTOBER 10, IN ITS FIRST SITTING, THE NEW PARLIAMENT REELECTED MELES ZENAWI PRIME MINISTER FOR A FIVE-YEAR TERM.

ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AND VIOLENCE MARRIED THE MAY ELECTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN RURAL AREAS. THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING GROUP ETHIOPIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (EHRCC) REPORTED ELECTION RELATED INCIDENTS OF ABUSE OF OPPOSITION CANDIDATES AND SUPPORTERS, INCLUDING KILLINGS, THE ARBITRARY DETENTION OF OPPOSITION CANDIDATES AND THEIR TRANSFER OR DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT, AND INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE WOUNDING OF OPPOSITION SUPPORTERS BY GUNSHOTS. EHRCC ALSO REPORTED IN FEBRUARY THAT ETHIOPIANS OF ERITREAN DESCENT WHO REMAINED IN THE COUNTRY COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE MAY ELECTIONS BECAUSE AUTHORITIES QUESTIONED THEIR CITIZENSHIP. IN EARLY MARCH, BEYENE PETROS, CHAIRMAN OF THE OPPOSITION SOUTHERN ETHIOPIAN PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC COALITION (SEPPDC), ACCUSED THE RULING EPRDF OF SUBJECTING MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY TO ARBITRARY ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT. AFTER THE POLLING STARTED, PETROS COMPLAINED THAT POLICE HAD KILLED SEVEN SEPPDC SUPPORTERS WHO WERE PROTESTING AGAINST ELECTORAL FRAUD OUTSIDE TWO POLLING STATIONS IN THE SOUTH. RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS OF IRREGULARITIES AND VIOLENCE, THE ELECTION BOARD NULLIFIED ELECTION RESULTS IN SIXTEEN DISTRICTS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION AND ORGANIZED FRESH ELECTIONS A MONTH LATER.

THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO RESTRICT THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS. TWENTY-SEVEN ETHIOPIAN JOURNALISTS LIVED IN EXILE AT THIS WRITING, HAVING FLED THEIR HOMELAND DUE TO REPEATED ARRESTS AND ILL-TREATMENT IN DETENTION. AMONG THE LATEST TO FLEE, IN FEBRUARY, WAS DAWIT KEBEDE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE AMHARIC WEEKLY *Fiameta*, AND MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ETHIOPIAN FREE PRESS JOURNALISTS' ASSOCIATION (EFPJA). THE GOVERNMENT ONLY RECOGNIZED EFPJA IN MARCH, SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATION FIRST SUBMITTED ITS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.

EIGHT REPORTERS REMAINED BEHIND BARS. FOUR HAD BEEN IN CUSTODY FOR UP TO TWO YEARS BEFORE BEING SENTENCED TO ONE YEAR IMPRISONMENT, AND THEY REMAINED IN CUSTODY ON NEW CHARGES. TAMRAT GEMEDA, OF THE WEEKLY *SEIF NEBELBALL*, AND TESFAYE DERESSA, GORJIMA BEKELE, AND SOLOMON NEMERA, OF *URJI*, WERE ARRESTED IN OCTOBER 1997 FOR PUBLISHING "FALSE INFORMATION" FOR THE PROMINENCE GIVEN BY THE TWO PAPERS TO OROMO ISSUES AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OLF AND THE GOVERNMENT. THE FOUR FACED NEW CHARGES OF MEMBERSHIP IN TERRORIST MOVEMENTS. THE GOVERNMENT HELD ANOTHER THIRTY-ONE JOURNALISTS ON A SHORT LEASH DURING 2000, HAVING RELEASED THEM ON VERY HIGH BAIL PENDING COURT HEARINGS.

In mid-August, sudden increases in printing costs, by more than a third, put additional pressures on some thirty-six private publications as well as the government press. The private newspapers went on strike from September 11-17, and warned that the high production costs could eventually force them out of print. They urged the government to reduce taxation on imported paper and other print inputs.

Defending Human Rights

The Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCC) openly monitored and reported on the human rights situation in the country. Several civic organizations, including EHRCC, the Ethiopian Economic Association, the Inter-Africa Group, and the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce convened panel discussions that allowed EPRDF and opposition candidates to air their programs before urban voters, mainly in the capital. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association conducted training for women candidates. EHRCC critically analyzed the polling operations in its public statements and reports and denounced abuses when they occurred.

These freedoms continued to be denied to the Human Rights League, which was founded in 1997. Not only did the government refuse to register it, but it arrested eight of its board members shortly after they applied for registration and confiscated its office records and equipment in 1999. Garuma Bekele, executive secretary of the league, and also editor of *Urji*, and Addisu Beyene, secretary of the Oromo Relief Association and prominent rights advocate, together with some fifty other prominent Oromo civic leaders, remained in jail since their arrest in October 1997. Their trial for conspiracy with the OLF continued in camera. Family members were banned from attending the trial, although they could visit the prisoners. Fear of repression forced other groups, such as the Ogaden Human Rights Committee, to conduct their monitoring activities clandestinely, and to report their findings abroad.

There was some progress toward the establishment of national and international institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights. Days before the end of its five-year tenure, the outgoing parliament in July unanimously approved bills establishing the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the office of the ombudsman. Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, said during a visit in October that her agency would open a regional office in Addis Ababa to work with the countries of the Horn of Africa and the OAU.

The Role of the International Community

Organization of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) took the lead in mediating the conflict from the onset, with the backing of the United States and the European Union. In its attempts to prevent yet another round of deadly fighting, the OAU convened intensive talks from April 29 to May 5 aimed at bringing the two parties to agree on a document for the implementation of its peace plan, Ethiopia having rejected earlier technical arrangements to this end. Despite the mediators' efforts, the talks again failed to resolve the core disagreements between the two parties. Ethiopia's major offensive of May 2000 was clearly meant to break the impasse. Not only did the offensive lead to Eritrea's withdrawal from all disputed border territories, but it placed Ethiopian troops in firm control of undisputed territories inside Eritrea. Ethiopia gained considerable leverage as a result of this military advantage and the pressures resulting from the flight of at least a million Eritrean civilians ahead of the fighting. The terms of the cessation of hostilities accord signed on June 18 thus appeared to reflect Ethiopia's position of strength.

The accord provided for the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force in a temporary security zone, twenty-five kilometers inside Eritrea along the entire border, a time frame for the neutral demarcation of the bitterly disputed borders, and the conclusion of a permanent cease-fire. The accord reaffirmed the two parties' acceptance of the OAU Framework Agreement and the Modalities for its implementation as endorsed by the OAU summit in July 1999. The framework agreement provided a basis for addressing the human rights and humanitarian problems that the conflict had created, committing the two parties to "put an end to measures directed against the civilian population and to refrain from any action which can cause further hardship and suffering to each other's nationals." They also agreed to "addressing the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population, particularly those persons who had been deported." The OAU in collaboration with the U.N. was to deploy human rights monitors "in order to contribute to the establishment of a climate of confidence between the two parties" under the terms of the Framework Agreement.

Unfortunately, the terms of the cessation of hostilities agreement and the relevant U.N. Security Council resolution regarding its implementation appeared to focus primarily on technical considerations, namely the redeployment of the two parties and the demarcation of the border. In contrast to its active role in the mediation process, the OAU proved itself far less assertive when it came to the definition of formal mediation and arbitration mechanisms to address the human rights and humanitarian consequences of the conflict.

United States

The U.S. continued to give a high priority to the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, two of its closest allies in the continent. It engaged the two parties in direct talks, while providing vital technical and logistical support to the OAU mediation effort. Susan Rice, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, devoted significant portions of her time to the conflict. Anthony Lake, the U.S. lead mediator since October 1999, and a former national security advisor, shuttled between the two capitals several times during the year, coordinating his efforts closely with the OAU and the U.N.

The administration maintained an active behind-the-scenes role in its efforts to prevent the resumption of the fighting, while refraining from making public statements, including addressing the human rights situation. The Department of State issued statements in March and May calling on the two nations to remain "fully engaged" in the OAU peace process, and on June 10 the U.S. expressed strong support for what was then still a proposal for the cessation of hostilities. Once the accord was signed, the U.S. pursued this active involvement in the peace process by hosting indirect talks between Ethiopian and Eritrean "technical experts" in early July 2000 during which the two sides discussed the substantive issues of border demarcation and compensation for the damages resulting from the war. Quiet diplomacy remained the rule, even after the U.S. sent Ambassador Richard Bogosian, Special Assistant to the Greater Horn, to the region to raise human rights and humanitarian issues with both parties.

Because their intensive involvement had failed to prevent the latest round of deadly fighting, the role of the U.S. policy makers came under harsh scrutiny. Critics faulted the Clinton administration for failing to apply direct pressures on the two parties as reflected in its reluctance to press earlier on for a U.N. arms embargo, or to use its influence to slow the flow of bilateral and multilateral financial aid to the two countries at a time when they were spending hundreds of millions of dollars on arms purchases. Administration officials defended themselves by arguing that an arms embargo would have led the belligerents to discontinue their participation in the peace talks, and that cutting the meager U.S. aid going to vital sectors in their economies would have only punished the neediest people in both countries.

The U.S. used its leverage only sparingly and as a last resort in its efforts to press for restraint. Ethiopia continued to benefit from the International Military Education and Training program, at a cost of U.S. \$395,000 in FY 2000, with the only limitation being that the training could not be conducted in Ethiopia. By contrast, the U.S. froze the training of Ethiopian troops within the U.S.-led peacekeeping training program under the African Crisis Response Initiative. The U.S.

development assistance to Ethiopia remained largely unaffected, at \$40.9 million in development aid and child survival funds. Ethiopia was also the recipient of \$14.9 million in non-food donations, and \$330.4 million for food aid.

European Union

The E.U.'s position remained one of repeated condemnations of the major outbreaks of fighting, and sustained expressions of support for the OAU peace process. The E.U. gave a hint of why it had limited its involvement to this support role at the occasion of its appointment, on the eve of 2000, of a special envoy to the Horn of Africa, Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Rino Serri. This step, the E.U. said, was meant "to bolster the OAU effort and help the E.U. countries to come up with a better understanding and interpretation of the situation."

The African, Caribbean and Pacific and E.U. Joint Assembly (A.C.P.-E.U.) sent a parliamentary delegation led by the assembly's vice-president John Alexander Corrie to the Ethiopian and Eritrean capitals in mid-December 1999 to advocate for a negotiated settlement of the conflict under the OAU process, obviously to no avail. The ban on arms sales that the European Council of Ministers had imposed on Ethiopia and Eritrea in March 1999 remained effective.

The E.U. made substantial monetary and in-kind donations for the relief of civilians affected by drought and the conflict in both countries. These donations, together with aid provided bilaterally by E.U. member states, placed the E.U. as the top donor of food aid to Ethiopia, a position it has continually occupied in the past twenty-five years. However, the conflict led to significant reductions in the E.U.'s development cooperation with the two countries. The European Commission declared on May 19, 2000, that as a result of the tightening of conditions for the disbursement of credits of the Structural Adjustment Support Programs that it financed, the latter had not disbursed any budgetary support to Ethiopia since January 1999. An aide official told leaders of both nations during a trip to the region in early October that the E.U. was ready to reestablish cooperation with them if they consolidated their peace settlement. The E.U. had suspended its economic cooperation with them after they went to war.

United Nations

The U.N. Security Council fully backed the OAU peace process. Responding to a transient but ominous flare-up in the fighting, members of the Security Council on March 14 called on Eritrea and Ethiopia to cooperate "fully and urgently" with the OAU and to participate constructively in its efforts to settle the dispute between them. With clear signals in early May that fighting was about to resume, the Security Council extended the itinerary of its special mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to include Addis Ababa and Asmara. The mission found the differences between the two sides, "while real, were relatively small and manageable and could be resolved by intensive negotiations over time." Days after it left the region, fighting resumed with rare intensity over these differences. In reaction, the Security Council in its unanimous resolution 1298 of May 17, which the U.S. sponsored, finally imposed a formal embargo on arms sales to the two parties for a year. The belated U.N. embargo was destined to have little effect in the short and medium runs, coming as it did after both countries had amassed huge stocks of arms and munitions. A timid call by the council in February 1999 to member states to immediately end all arms sales to both sides obviously had failed to achieve the desired results.

In early July, the U.N. secretary-general dispatched an advance team to the region to pave the way for the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping mission. Based on the recommendations of the team, the Security Council on July 31 decided to establish a U.N. mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) of up to one hundred military observers and support staff in anticipation of a larger mission. The council authorized 4,200 troops for UNMEE in mid-September, and said member states were cooperating in offering troops and resources for the mission. By late September, some forty military observers were taking positions along both sides of the disputed border, and another group of military observers was to be dispatched to the mission area by mid-October.

In a remarkable omission, the advance team dispatched by the U.N. to prepare for UNMEE did not include a representative of the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, and the resulting mission structure had no human rights component, although a component was provided for in resolution 1320 (2000), which established the mission. The persistence of reports of wide-scale human rights abuses by both parties, even after the cessation of hostilities, appeared to have led the U.N. secretary-general to announce, on September 19, that he intended to establish a "small" component within UNMEE to follow human rights issues.

KENYA

Human Rights Developments

The promised constitutional reform process, which could have brought greater democratization in Kenya, remained stalled as the government of President Daniel arap Moi continued to block progress. This left in place a deeply flawed political system with power concentrated in the presidency, insufficient checks on the executive branch, a lack of accountability for government officials, and the barring of independent parliamentary candidates in a political party environment fraught with infighting and divisions. The political crisis was paralleled by a marked deterioration in the economic situation, caused in large part by state mismanagement and corruption. The standard of living for the average Kenyan continued to drop, and the year was characterized by electricity rationing and water shortages in the capital Nairobi and other cities.

The modalities of the constitutional reform process remained unresolved. In the face of an opposition boycott, the ruling party controlled parliament pushed through President Moi's plan to control the outcome. A parliamentary committee of twenty-seven was created, composed of fourteen ruling party parliamentarians with the remaining thirteen from the combined opposition, to draft the constitutional reforms. In opposition to this, a civil society initiative, the Upunguamano group, led by the religious sector including the Catholic Church, the Protestant National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Muslim Supreme Council of Kenya, and the Hindu Council of Kenya, appointed a set of commissioners to carry out a more broad-based consultative process. As of October 2000, neither set of commissioners had embarked on the task of gathering citizens' views on the substance of a new constitution.

Although the Upunguamano initiative slowed down President Moi's attempts to push through a new constitution of his own choice, there was no resolution by year's end. All sides were aware that the stakes were high. The outcome of this issue, which promised to grow in urgency with the national election's approach by 2002, would serve as a critical juncture in Kenya's history. The existing constitutional provisions did not permit President Moi to seek another term in office and if unchanged would bring to an end his tenure of over two decades.

High-ranking government and ruling party officials continued to use the state machinery to obstruct freedom of association and assembly for the opposition. Though many more political opposition gatherings were able to take place, police officers continued to interfere with and violently disperse participants in violation of the laws relating to public meetings. The use of state-sponsored and protected gangs to break up meetings and rallies of government critics

continued. In October, President Moi banned countrywide rallies called by Mungano wa Mageuzi (Peoples Movement for Change), a coalition group of opposition and civil society organizations.

Complaints of police harassment, use of excessive force, torture, and deaths in custody were frequent. In October, a 127-page internal police report titled, "Report of the Committee on the State of Crime in Kenya 1997 to 1999," was leaked to the press. The report, the result of a two-year study conducted by a five-person police team to study problems in the police force, concluded that the police force was unable to address crime due to poor management, corruption, a break down in discipline and a disregard for rules.

The situation was no better in the prisons. The impunity of state agents was highlighted in August with the brutal clubbing to death by prison warders of six prisoners who were apprehended as they attempted to escape. The public outcry forced the government to announce that it would carry out an investigation into "dereliction of duty" by the prison authorities. The legal community continued to complain of corruption and political control in the judiciary, which has always been used by the government for political ends.

A wide array of independent and outspoken newspapers were able to publish relatively freely. But the biggest gains for freedom of expression in Kenya were made by the coming on line of several newly licensed independent television and FM radio stations (some of which had pending applications dating as far back as 1992). The growth of the independent broadcast sector resulted in a notable expansion in the airing of differing opinions, particularly on radio. These licences were, however, restricted principally to broadcasting in urban areas and rural broadcasting remained as restricted as before. Nor was this free expression without danger. The minister of home affairs threatened retaliation against the hard-hitting political satire group Reddykulls which appeared on the Nation TV station.

Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons remained unable to return after being driven from their homes in state-sponsored attacks since 1991 directed against members of ethnic groups perceived to support the political opposition. The authorities continued during the year to fail to provide adequate security to those who sought to return to their homes under assurances of safety, nor were land titles restored to those who were wrongfully deprived. Nor had the government held those responsible for the violence accountable. In 1999, a Presidential Commission on the Ethnic Clashes wound up after eleven months of hearing evidence, including from Human Rights Watch, about the violence between 1991 and 1999. As of October 2000, the commission's findings had still not been released, though the completed report had been submitted to the president over a year before.

Defending Human Rights

A wide array of local human rights organizations were engaged in monitoring human rights in Kenya. Although these organizations were able to function, they periodically came under attack from the government for their work. The risk that human rights defenders faced was highlighted on August 24 when Father John Kaiser, a well-known human rights activist, was found dead by the side of the road shot in the head. The brutal murder was carried out at night by unidentified persons on the Naivasha Road, some fifty miles outside Nairobi. A Catholic parish priest in the Rift Valley area and a U.S. citizen, Kaiser had worked in Kenya for thirty-six years and had been an outspoken critic of state-sponsored "ethnic" violence and other rights violations. Most recently, he had brought attention to a case in which two girls had allegedly been raped by a local politician, and had helped furnish the evidence that the Federation of Women Lawyers in Kenya (FIDA) used to institute a private prosecution against Julius Sunkuli, minister of state in the office of the president. Following the murder of Kaiser, FIDA officials reported anonymous death threats over the telephone. In November 1999, the immigration department had refused to renew Kaiser's work permit, normally routine for foreign priests working in Kenya, until pressure was brought by the church and human rights groups which accused the government of trying to silence the priest. In 1999, the Law Society of Kenya had honored Kaiser with its annual human rights award. Kaiser was the fifth priest to have been killed since 1994 either by police or by unidentified gunmen. In none of these cases have the perpetrators been held accountable.

There were some hopeful efforts in 2000 to strengthen the weak mandate and capacity of the government's Human Rights Standing Committee. The Standing Committee, a marginal and largely ineffective body, was founded by the president in 1996 in response to donor pressure. By law, its members were appointed by the president, it reported only to him, action was decided by him, and only the president could remove its members. In 2000, after two years, the attorney general finalized a proposed bill to provide greater powers to the committee, including subpoena powers, financial autonomy through the parliament instead of the attorney-general's office, and security of tenure. In March 2000, a consultative workshop, funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), was held to discuss the draft National Commission on Human Rights Draft Bill with relevant representatives from government and civil society groups as well as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The proposed law had not been passed by parliament as of October 2000.

The Role of the International Community

The international donor community remained almost exclusively concerned with corruption and economic reform issues at the expense of human rights concerns. As a result, the government continued to make great efforts to give the appearance of economic reform, but did little toward improving human rights. The year was dominated by the government's wooing of the international financial institutions for the resumption of lending which had been suspended in 1997.

Increased concern on the part of donors and the international financial institutions about Kenya's precarious and worsening economic situation prompted the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to restore funding that had remained suspended for three years due to concerns about corruption and "key governance criteria." In a momentous decision in July, the IMF pledged a U.S.\$190 million three-year loan and the World Bank pledged a U.S.\$150 million loan for budget support. The renewal of this assistance was strictly conditioned on stated reforms including audited public accounts, civil service retrenchment, strengthening of accountability institutions (namely the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority and the Office of the Controller and Auditor-General), and the enactment of an Economic Crimes Bill and Code of Ethics for public servants. Notably absent were any conditions that would have required the government to address governance criteria such as respect for the rule of law and judicial independence. The government's lack of commitment to genuinely addressing rule of law issues was underscored in October when the draft Economic Crimes Bill (a requirement of the renewed funding) it issued contained provisions that allowed the government to selectively apply the law, allowing high-ranking government officials to evade prosecution on corruption charges.

As expected, the international financial institutions' decision cleared the way for aid from other countries and institutions that had been similarly withheld. One of the first to respond was the United Kingdom (U.K.), a traditional ally of President Moi, whose minister for international development Clare Short announced the immediate release of some U.S. \$42 million (U.K. £30 million) in budget support for civil service reform. The European Union (E.U.) followed suit with U.S. \$30 million for the power sector, and the African Development Bank pledged U.S. \$50 million for infrastructure maintenance. It was also expected that the renewed IMF aid would allow Kenya to reschedule her debt payments and to push for a Consultative Group meeting for bilateral donors to make new pledges for project aid.

The approach of the international community—in considering corruption and economic reform measures as wholly distinct from good governance issues such as political accountability and other rights—fell short of addressing the key issue, absolute executive control, which was at the heart of Kenya's political crisis. The Dutch government was the only government that remained firm about the link, reiterating that all bilateral development assistance to Kenya would end by 2002 due to "bad governance, human rights abuses, and impeded democratization."

United States

ALTHOUGH HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS REMAINED ON THE U.S. AGENDA, TRADE AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TENDED TO TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS. AS DID OTHER DONORS, THE U.S. FOCUSED ITS ATTENTION ON CRITICIZING CORRUPTION. IN 2000, U.S. DEVELOPMENT AID TO KENYA TOTALLED U.S.\$34.95 MILLION, INCLUDING \$5.85 MILLION FOR POLITICAL REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION, \$10.7 MILLION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, AND \$18.4 MILLION FOR WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HIV/AIDS PROGRAMS. APPROXIMATELY TWO-THIRDS OF THIS AID WAS ALLOCATED TO PROGRAM ASSISTANCE DIRECTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. FOLLOWING THE MURDER OF FATHER JOHN KOISER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AGENTS WERE SENT TO HELP THE KENYAN POLICE TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE AND SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT PLEDGED THAT THE U.S. WOULD FOLLOW THE CASE CLOSELY.

LIBERIA

Human Rights Developments

GIVEN THE BACKGROUND OF A BRUTAL SEVEN-YEAR CIVIL WAR, LIBERIA'S TRANSITION PROCESS WAS SLOW AND SHAKY. THREE YEARS AFTER A U.N.-SUPERVISED ELECTION BROUGHT FORMER FACTION LEADER CHARLES TAYLOR TO POWER, THE SITUATION REMAINED INSECURE DESPITE PROGRESS TOWARD DEMILITARIZATION, THE REABSORPTION OF MANY EX-COMBATANTS INTO SOCIETY, AND A DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MILITARY CHECKPOINTS. IN 1999, THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY DESTROYED A HUGE CACHE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION COLLECTED DURING THE DISARMAMENT PERIOD. ADDITIONALLY, THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS RETURNED TO THEIR HOME AREAS, DESPITE THE SEVERE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP THEY ENCOUNTERED. STATE INSTITUTIONS, WHICH HAD ALL BUT CEASED TO FUNCTION, WERE BEING RESTARTED, ALBEIT WITH MAJOR PROBLEMS. FOR SOME IN LIBERIA, THESE SIGNS, HOWEVER SMALL, INDICATED TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER IN THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LACK OF RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW THREATENED TO UNDERMINE PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE. TAYLOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REGULARLY OPERATED WITH LITTLE OR NO ACCOUNTABILITY OR TRANSPARENCY, FURTHER EXACERBATING THE DIVISIONS AND RESENTMENTS FUELED BY THE WAR. STATE INSTITUTIONS THAT COULD PROVIDE AN INDEPENDENT CHECK ON THE TAYLOR ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AS THE JUDICIARY, THE LEGISLATURE, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, AND THE COMMISSION ON RECONCILIATION REMAINED WEAKENED AND COWED BY THE EXECUTIVE.

THE VOLATILITY OF THE SITUATION WAS UNDERScoreD BY FIVE SERIOUS OUTBREAKS OF FIGHTING SINCE THE 1997 ELECTIONS. BARELY A YEAR AFTER THE WAR ENDED, THERE WERE TWO OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN MONROVIA IN 1999 IN WHICH STATE SECURITY FORCES BATTLED WITH FACTION LEADER ROOSEVELT JOHNSON'S OFFICIALLY DISBANDED UNITED LIBERATION MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IN LIBERIA (ULIMO-J) AND HIS PREDOMINANTLY ETHNIC KRAHN SUPPORTERS. IN APRIL AND AUGUST 1999, LIBERIAN REBELS OPERATING FROM NEIGHBORING GUINEA CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN LOFA COUNTY, NORTHERN LIBERIA. ALTHOUGH NOT CONFIRMED, THE REBEL ATTACKS WERE THOUGHT TO BE LED BY FORMER FIGHTERS FROM THE ULIMO-K FACTION WHO WERE LARGELY ETHNIC MANDINGOS. THE FIGHTING RESULTED IN CIVILIAN DEATHS AND DISPLACEMENT, FORCING THOUSANDS OF LIBERIANS AND SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEES TO FLEE.

IN JULY 2000, ANOTHER INVASION WAS LAUNCHED BY A GROUP CALLING ITSELF LIBERIANS UNITED FOR RECONCILIATION AND DEMOCRACY (LURD) FROM THE GUINEA BORDER INTO LIBERIA, RESULTING IN FIGHTING AND DISPLACEMENT YET AGAIN IN LOFA COUNTY. THESE PERIODIC ERUPTIONS OF VIOLENCE CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONTINUING DESTABILIZATION OF THE SUBREGION, AND WITHIN LIBERIA ASSUMED AN ETHNIC DIMENSION AS THE GOVERNMENT INDISCRIMINATELY BLAMED MEMBERS OF THE KRAHN AND MANDINGO COMMUNITIES FOR THE ATTACKS.

ONE OF THE MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN 2000 WAS THE COMPLETE IMPUNITY WITH WHICH THE SECURITY AND POLICE FORCES OPERATED. FOLLOWING HIS INAUGURATION, PRESIDENT TAYLOR REJECTED THE PEACE ACCORD PROVISION THAT PROVIDED FOR A TRANSPARENT RESTRUCTURING OF THE SECURITY FORCES BY THE WEST AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. INSTEAD, FORMER TAYLOR FACTION FIGHTERS WERE PLACED IN THE SECURITY AND POLICE FORCES WITHOUT SERIOUS EFFORTS TO PROVIDE TRAINING OR TO MEET PLEDGES TO INCORPORATE MEMBERS FROM THE OTHER FACTIONS. FORMER TAYLOR FIGHTERS HAVE ALSO BEEN PERMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO CREATE SECURITY FIRMS FOR HIRE BY PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES.

THERE WERE REGULAR REPORTS OF HARASSMENT, EXTORTION, MISTREATMENT, KILLINGS, "DISAPPEARANCES," AND TORTURE BY MEMBERS OF THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES WHO ACTED WITH COMPLETE IMPUNITY. SINCE TAKING OFFICE, PRESIDENT TAYLOR CREATED TWO EXTRALEGAL ELITE SECURITY FORCES KNOWN AS THE ANTI-TERRORIST UNIT (ATU) AND THE SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICES (SSS). THESE SECURITY UNITS HAD NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR EXISTENCE, WERE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, AND WERE ONLY ACCOUNTABLE TO PRESIDENT TAYLOR. HEADED BY, AND HEAVILY STACKED WITH, FORMER TAYLOR-FACTION FIGHTERS, THESE SECURITY FORCES WERE REGULARLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ABUSES AGAINST THE POPULATION. OTHER NEW SECURITY FORCES INCLUDED AN ARMED BORDER PATROL FORCE UNDER THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE'S BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION SPECIFICALLY TO MAN THE BORDERS AND THE CREATION OF AN ELITE FORCE WITHIN THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE, THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION (SOD).

ETHNIC KRAHN AND MANDINGO PEOPLE, HISTORICALLY SEEN TO BE ALLIED WITH THE REPRESSION OF THE FORMER DOE GOVERNMENT AND WITH ANTI-TAYLOR FACTIONS DURING THE WAR, WERE PARTICULARLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO HARASSMENT AT THE HANDS OF THE STATE SECURITY APPARATUS. FOLLOWING THE VIOLENCE IN MONROVIA IN 1999, KRAHN WERE TARGETED FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS, HARASSMENT, AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CRIMINAL CHARGES. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE LOFA COUNTY INCURSIONS IN 1999, SECURITY FORCES KILLED, TORTURED, AND MISTREATED CIVILIANS, PARTICULARLY MEMBERS OF THE MANDINGO ETHNIC GROUP. DURING THE INCURSIONS AND COUNTER-ATTACKS IN LOFA COUNTY, HUNDREDS WERE KILLED AND THOUSANDS OF CITIZENS AS WELL AS SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEES WERE FORCED TO FLEE THE AREA. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE ALLEGED ABUSES BY THE SECURITY FORCES WERE INVESTIGATED BY THE GOVERNMENT, IN ALL CASES SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE TREATED LENIENTLY OR EXONERATED. SINCE THE 1999 AND 2000 REBEL INCURSIONS IN LOFA COUNTY, MANDINGO RESIDENTS REMAIN AFRAID TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES.

INDEPENDENT VOICES WERE INCREASINGLY SILENCED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN A BID TO STEM PUBLICITY AND CRITICISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT. JOURNALISTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS CAME UNDER INCREASING ATTACK BY PRESIDENT TAYLOR AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THROUGH THREATS, PHYSICAL ASSAULTS, AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CRIMINAL CHARGES. IN MARCH, SUAH DEDE, HEAD OF THE LIBERIAN PRESS UNION WAS BRIEFLY DETAINED WITHOUT CHARGE AFTER GIVING A RADIO INTERVIEW CONDEMNING THE CLOSURE OF TWO RADIO STATIONS. IN APRIL, ISAAC REDD, RADIO BROADCASTER ON THE STATE RADIO STATION, WAS DETAINED AND HELD WITHOUT CHARGE FOR SEVERAL DAYS BY THE POLICE. HE WAS LATER ACCUSED OF SPEAKING AGAINST THE PRESIDENT AND CHARGED WITH "CRIMINAL MALFEASANCE." IN AUGUST, A FOREIGN NEWS FILM TEAM—DAVID BARRIE, TIM LAMBON, GUGULAKHE RODEBE, AND SORIOUS SAMURA—who WERE IN LIBERIA TO FILM A DOCUMENTARY, WERE ARRESTED, CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE, AND DETAINED FOR A WEEK. THE FILM TEAM HAD BEEN GIVEN OFFICIAL PERMISSION TO FILM IN LIBERIA, BUT WERE ARRESTED AND ACCUSED OF FILMING IN RESTRICTED AREAS AND SEEKING TO DAMAGE THE COUNTRY'S IMAGE BY FALSELY LINKING PRESIDENT CHARLES TAYLOR TO DIAMOND SMUGGLING. THEY WERE RELEASED FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE.

AWARE THAT A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION RELIED ON THE RADIO FOR THEIR NEWS, THE GOVERNMENT SILENCED INDEPENDENT RADIO BROADCASTING. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED RADIO STATION PROVIDED THE ONLY NEWS BROADCASTS HEARD BY MOST LIBERIANS. TWO INDEPENDENT RADIO STATIONS CAME UNDER ATTACK IN MARCH 2000: STAR RADIO AND RADIO VERITAS, THE RADIO STATION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. STAR RADIO WAS FORCIBLY CLOSED BY GOVERNMENT SECURITY, ACCORDING TO THE POLICE DIRECTOR, FOR "HOSTING OF POLITICAL TALK SHOWS, NEWS, INTERVIEWS AND PROGRAMS THAT HAVE DAMAGING POLITICAL EFFECTS THAT TEND TO UNDERMINE THE PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF LIBERIA." SOME FIFTEEN POLICE RAIDED THE OFFICES, ASSAULTED TWO JOURNALISTS, AND RANSACKED AND SEALED THE OFFICES WITHOUT GIVING A REASON. STAR RADIO HAD ALREADY BEEN REQUESTED A FEW MONTHS EARLIER BY THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TO PROVIDE TWO COPIES OF THEIR DAILY BROADCASTS BEFORE THEY WERE Aired AND WERE ACCUSED OF PUTTING NEGATIVE

reports on the internet. Radio Veritas was closed down for several days by the government on the grounds that it was making "political" broadcasts rather than religious ones. At the time of publication, Star Radio remained closed.

The internal conflicts within Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea continued to spill over the borders, further destabilizing the region. In 2000, the Liberian government was accused of fueling the war in neighboring Sierra Leone by helping the Sierra Leonean rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a charge it strenuously denied. President Taylor, in turn, accused Sierra Leone and Guinea of providing a safe haven to Liberian rebels intent on destabilizing his government. In September 2000, tensions rose between Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, each accusing the other of supporting rebel activity. A crisis in the region was prompted when Guinean President Lansana Conte publicly accused refugees of rebel activity against his government, resulting in round-ups, detentions, and violence against Sierra Leoneans and Liberians in Guinea.

Voluntary repatriation of Liberian refugees from neighboring countries continued. While many thousands of Liberian refugees were able to return to Liberia without fear of political persecution, some members of the Mandingo and Krahn communities continued to have valid fears. In 2000, there were still some 100,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea and over 95,000 in Ivory Coast. Of those, some 15,000 Krahn in Ivory Coast were deemed by UNHCR to have a well-founded fear of persecution and were being assisted to remain and integrate with local communities in Ivory Coast. The situation for Liberian refugees in Guinea remained difficult:

July 2000 insurgent attack from the Guinea border into Liberia prevented refugee return and Liberian refugees in Guinea were subjected to violence in September 2000. UNHCR was planning to end its repatriation assistance to Liberian refugees by the end of 2000. After that, assistance would be provided only inside Liberia for rehabilitation of infrastructure in areas that people were likely to return to. UNHCR planned to close its Liberia operation by March 2001.

Defending Human Rights

President Taylor and other high-ranking government officials continued to attack human rights groups for publicizing abuses and blamed the human rights community for the withholding of international aid. Human rights lawyers who represented perceived government critics also came under attack. Human rights activists continued to flee the country fearing government reprisal for their work. In December 1999, James D. Torh, the executive director of a children's rights organization, Fore-Runners of Children's Universal Development, was detained and charged with sedition for a speech he made. According to the indictment, Torh was charged for allegedly telling students, among other things, that "[President Charles] Taylor is running this government from his pocket and that those who voted for this government must repent that it is failing" and "we are prepared to tell whoever that is in power that it is time of the Liberian people to stand up and tell you to step down." Torh was released on bail after five days and fled the country.

Despite these attacks, the nongovernmental human rights community continued to expand its activities. In contrast, the National Human Rights Commission created by the government in 1997 was virtually inactive. Only three of the five mandated members were appointed by the senate, and the commission's chair remained outside the country for much of the year.

The Role of the International Community

Diplomatic missions, although still few, began to reopen in Liberia. In 2000, there were a dozen or so missions or embassies in Monrovia, including those of Burkina Faso, Egypt, the European Union (EU), Ivory Coast, Libya, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and the United States (U.S.). Most international donors were wary about giving direct assistance to the Taylor government, conditioning this on improvements in microeconomic reporting, fiscal discipline, and respect for human rights. Most foreign aid was given through international relief organizations or local civil society groups.

The international community remained concerned by evidence of Liberian support for Sierra Leonean rebels by a flow of diamonds—for-arms through Liberia. It focused on pressuring the Taylor government to withdraw its support to the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which was subject to a UN embargo on trafficking in arms and diamonds, its primary source of wealth. The link between the Taylor government and the RUF dated back to the Liberian civil war when Taylor headed the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The NPFL and RUF provided military and other support to each other through the years in a relationship that continued after the election that brought Taylor into office. Charges were subsequently made that the Taylor government was facilitating arms transfers to the RUF in return for Sierra Leonean diamonds. Over the last two years, official annual diamond exports by Sierra Leone dropped to half, to U.S.\$30 million. In the same period, diamond exports by Liberia—a country that possesses relatively few diamond fields—rose to U.S.\$300 million.

In late July, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering delivered a blunt warning to President Taylor that Liberia would be subjected to sanctions if it did not halt support to the RUF. Several days later, at UN Security Council hearings on Sierra Leone diamonds on July 31, the U.S. again threatened sanctions against Liberia and Burkina Faso for illegal diamond and arms trafficking which it said was fueling the war in Sierra Leone. The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, stated that the U.S. had evidence showing that President Taylor and senior RUF leaders had personally taken large commissions for facilitating illegal diamond and arms transfers. In October, the U.S. acted on its threats by imposing a visa ban on President Charles Taylor and senior members his government. U.S. President Bill Clinton noted: "[t]he absence of any positive response from the [Taylor] government leaves little choice but to impose these restrictions," and added that the policy would not be reviewed until Liberia ended its support for the RUF.

The EU also took a strong stance regarding the Taylor government. In July, following U.K. allegations that President Taylor was selling weapons to the RUF in return for diamonds, the EU suspended approximately U.S. \$50 million in aid to Liberia as a signal to the Taylor government to cut its support to the rebels in Sierra Leone. The only government that generously gave direct aid to the Liberian government in 2000 was the government of Taiwan, in return for Liberia's diplomatic support at the UN.

United Nations

The UN Department of Political Affairs retained a small UN Peace-Building Support Office (UNPBS) following the withdrawal of the UN observer mission in July 1997, to serve as a focal point and coordinate post-conflict UN peace-building activities in Liberia as well as to provide advisory services to the government in defining post-conflict priorities, to raise international funds for Liberia, and to coordinate and liaise between the government and the international community.

This unit remained under the leadership of Representative of the Secretary-General Fely Downes-Thoms and maintained a low profile. It was not prominent in raising human rights issues. A UN Security Council arms embargo against Liberia since 1992 remained in place, but there was little evidence of its effective enforcement.

MOZAMBIQUE

Human Rights Developments

FLOODS, CAUSED BY TWO CYCLONES AND RECORD RAINS IN EARLY 2000, WERE THE WORST IN LIVING MEMORY. OVER 200,000 PEOPLE WERE DISPLACED BUT INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS AVOIDED SERIOUS LOSS OF LIFE. DESPITE THE FLOODS, MOZAMBIQUE WAS RANKED AS AMONG THE WORLD'S FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMIES DURING THE YEAR. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WERE NOT AS DRAMATIC.

THE FLOODS FOLLOWED PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ON DECEMBER 3-5, 1999, WHICH WERE RATED AS FREE AND MOSTLY FAIR. PRESIDENT JOAQUIM CHISSANO WAS SWORN IN AGAIN ON JANUARY 15, HAVING WON 53.3 PERCENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE AGAINST 47.7 FOR HIS RIVAL, AFONSO DLAKAMBA. IN THE VOTING FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CHISSANO'S RULING FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF MOZAMBIQUE (FRELIMO) SCORED 49 PER CENT AND TOOK 133 OF THE 250 SEATS, AGAINST 39.91 PERCENT AND 117 SEATS FOR DLAKAMBA'S MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE (RENAMO)-LED OPPOSITION COALITION. THE PARTIES' REGIONAL STRENGTH ROUGHLY MATCHED THAT SHOWN BY THE 1994 ELECTIONS. FRELIMO MADE SOME GAINS IN THE NORTH BUT RENAMO KEPT CONTROL OVER LARGE AREAS THERE AND IN THE CENTER. IN THE SOUTH, WHERE THE RENAMO VOTE WAS INSIGNIFICANT IN 1994, IT DID SLIGHTLY BETTER. THE 5.3 MILLION VOTES CAST REPRESENTED 74 PERCENT OF REGISTERED VOTERS, DOWN FROM THE 88 PERCENT TURNOUT OF 1994.

RENAMO AT FIRST REJECTED THE DECLARED RESULTS, THEN GRUDGINGLY ACCEPTED THEM WHEN THE SUPREME COURT DECLINED ITS SUIT, THEN OPENLY CONTRAVENED THE LAW GOVERNING PARTY ADMINISTRATION BY DECLARING IT HAD MOVED ITS HEADQUARTERS TO BEIRA, A PARTY STRONGHOLD. THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, REPORTS OF INTIMIDATION BY RENAMO AND FRELIMO SUPPORTERS INCREASED.

BEIRA WAS PARTICULARLY TENSE IN FEBRUARY FOLLOWING THE OVERNIGHT DISTRIBUTION OF LEAFLETS BY RENAMO SAYING CHISSANO WAS "A THIEF" AND CALLING FOR A DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY ALONG THE EAST-WEST LINE OF THE SAVE RIVER. RIOT POLICE WERE DEPLOYED AND A NUMBER OF ARRESTS OF RENAMO SUPPORTERS FOLLOWED.

THE MOST SERIOUS INCIDENT WAS ON MAY 5, WHEN A GROUP OF ONE HUNDRED PEOPLE LED BY SENIOR RENAMO FIGURES IN THE DISTRICT, ARMED WITH CLUBS AND BUSHKNIVES, ATTACKED A POLICE STATION IN THE LOCALITY OF AUBE IN ANGOICHE DISTRICT WITH THE INTENTION OF STEALING WEAPONS. THE POLICE SAID THEY OPENED FIRE IN SELF DEFENSE, KILLING FOUR ATTACKERS (RENAMO PUTS THE NUMBER OF DEAD AT EIGHT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE A FIGURE OF SIX DEAD). THE INCIDENT APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN PROVOKED BY A DISPUTE OVER PAYING TAX IN THE LOCAL MARKETPLACE AND THE ARREST OF A RENAMO SUPPORTER BY THE POLICE. A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED, INCLUDING RENAMO'S POLITICAL DELEGATE IN ANGOICHE DISTRICT, WHO WAS RELEASED ON BAIL ON MAY 19.

POLICE IN THE DISTRICT OF SANGA, IN NIASA PROVINCE, DETAINED AN OPPOSITION RENAMO SUPPORTER IN JULY FOR REPORTEDLY CONDUCTING A CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION, INCLUDING ARSON, AGAINST GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS. RENAMO IN TURN REPORTED A RISE OF ATTACKS AGAINST ITS SUPPORTERS AND PROVIDED HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WITH A LIST WHICH COULD NOT BE VERIFIED.

POLICE BEHAVIOR REMAINED THE SOURCE OF THE MAJORITY OF COMPLAINTS HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH RECEIVED FROM MOZAMBIQUE IN 2000. ARBITRARY DETENTION AND EXTORTION WERE ALSO COMMON ALLEGATIONS, WHILE PRISON CONDITIONS CONTINUED TO BE APPALLING. DESPITE PUBLICITY AND DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE, PRISONS SUCH AS THE PROVINCIAL FACILITY IN NAMPULE REMAINED BADLY OVERCROWDED. THE NAMPULE CIVIL PROVINCIAL PRISON WAS BUILT TO HOUSE SEVENTY-FIVE PRISONERS, AND AT THE TIME OF THIS WRITING HELD 482, OVER HALF OF THEM ON REMAND AWAITING TRIAL. THIS PRISON LACKED RUNNING WATER, FOOD, OR BLANKETS, AND THE PRISONERS RELIED UPON RELATIVES TO MAINTAIN THEM. OVERCROWDING WAS DUE TO A LACK OF RESOURCES AND SPACE BUT ALSO DUE TO AN OVERBURDENED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM.

MOZAMBIQUE CONTINUED TO PLAY A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE INTERNATIONAL BAN ON LANDMINES AND SERVED AS CO-CHAIR OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON MINE CLEARANCE. MOZAMBIQUE INTRODUCED U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 54/45B, WHICH WAS ADOPTED IN DECEMBER 1999. IN APRIL 2000, WORK BEGAN ON A NATIONAL LANDMINES SURVEY. ABOUT FIVE SQUARE KILOMETERS OF LAND WERE CLEARED OF MINES IN 1999, BRINGING THE OVERALL TOTAL TO 194 SQUARE KILOMETERS. DESPITE FEARS THAT THE FEBRUARY AND MARCH 2000 FLOODS WOULD RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN MINE CASUALTIES, THE NUMBER CONTINUED TO DECLINE, FALLING FROM 133 IN 1998 TO SIXTY CASUALTIES IN 1999. FOREIGN MINISTER LEONARDO SIMÃO ATTENDED THE WHOLE OF THE SECOND MEETING OF STATES PARTIES OF THE OTTAWA LANDMINE BAN TREATY, IN SEPTEMBER, THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIAL PRESENT FOR THE DURATION OF THE CONFERENCE.

WEAPONS LEFT OVER FROM THE CIVIL WAR REMAINED A PROBLEM, TOO. THE MOZAMBIQUE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES REPORTED IN SEPTEMBER THAT ITS "WEAPONS TO HOES" PROJECT HAD MET WITH SUCCESS, COLLECTING MORE THAN 55,000 WEAPONS FOR DESTRUCTION, AND THAT A SECOND PHASE OF THE PROJECT HAD BEGUN IN MAY.

Defending Human Rights

THE MOZAMBIQUE HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE CONTINUED ITS WORK TO MONITOR AND REMEDY POOR PRISON CONDITIONS AND BAD POLICING. THE LEAGUE HAD EXPANDED ITS WORK INTO THE PROVINCES AND HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN DRAWING DOMESTIC ATTENTION TO ONGOING ABUSES.

The Role of the International Community

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S PRIME FOCUS DURING THE YEAR WAS ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AT THE TIME OF THE FLOODS. FOR POST-FLOOD, RECONSTRUCTION EMERGENCY AID WAS QUICKLY DEPLOYED AND SOUTH AFRICA PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE, INCLUDING THROUGH HELICOPTER RESCUE OPERATIONS, WHILE WESTERN COUNTRIES PROCRASTINATED DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CRISIS. AS WITH HURRICANE MITCH IN CENTRAL AMERICA FIFTEEN MONTHS BEFORE, DEBT RELIEF QUICKLY BECAME A CENTRAL ISSUE. MOZAMBIQUE CONTINUED TO BE PART OF THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE, WHICH HAD REDUCED DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS BY ABOUT U.S.\$1 MILLION WEEKLY.

United States

UNITED STATES-MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS DETERIORATED OVER THE ELECTION PERIOD, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE U.S. ISSUED A STATEMENT IN DECEMBER 1999 SUGGESTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ELECTORAL FRAUD. A SUBSEQUENT WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE, QUOTING AN UNDISCLOSED SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SAYING THE GOVERNMENT PROBABLY WON BY FRAUD, RESULTED IN AN EVEN FROSTIER PERIOD. THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE FLOODING CRISIS LED TO A RAPID IMPROVEMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP AS U.S. MARINES WERE SENT TO ASSIST IN THE RELIEF EFFORTS. DURING 2000 THE U.S. CONTINUED TO BE THE LARGEST BILATERAL DONOR IN MOZAMBIQUE.

NIGERIA

Human Rights Developments

NIGERIA ENTERED A SECOND YEAR OF CIVILIAN RULE UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF (FORMER GENERAL AND MILITARY RULER) OLUSEGUN OBASANJO. YET THE NEW GOVERNMENT FAILED TO FULFILL THE HOPES RAISED BY THE ELECTIONS OF 1999. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PASSED ONLY FIVE BILLS DURING THE YEAR, AND WAS STRUCK BY REPEATED CORRUPTION SCANDALS, EVEN AS IT DEBATED NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION. ETHNIC AND COMMUNAL TENSIONS AMONG AND WITHIN NIGERIA'S THIRTY-SIX STATES WERE EXACERBATED BY THE LACK OF A DEMOCRATICALLY DRAFTED CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS THE HERITAGE OF MILITARY RULE—IN PARTICULAR, ONGOING SECURITY FORCE ABUSES. MORE POSITIVELY, THE GOVERNMENT AFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME BY SIGNING THE TREATY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN JUNE 2000.

THE SEVEN-MEMBER COMMISSION CHAIRED BY RETIRED JUDGE CHUKWUDIFU OPUTA, APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT OBASANJO ON BECOMING HEAD OF STATE TO INVESTIGATE PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, MADE LITTLE HEADWAY DURING THE YEAR. THE COMMISSION'S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES AND THE TRAINING OF ITS PERSONNEL WERE FUNDED BY DONORS WORKING WITH CIVIL

society groups. However, in October, the commission announced a series of public hearings to be held in five cities by February 2001. The Nigerian government brought charges in October 1999 against a number of members of the regime of General Sani Abacha, including his son Mohammed Abacha, for offenses including murder, attempted murder and conspiracy in relation to "death squad" activity, and theft of public funds.

Despite commitments to respect the rule of law, government agencies refused in some cases to honor court orders. In one case in late 1999, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency failed to release suspects granted bail by the Federal High Court for several months. Many laws continued to reflect their military origins and infringe on the rights of the Nigerian people, including the Public Order Act and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Decree.

The government continued a program of prison decongestion, but prison conditions remained life-threatening. In January 2000, the government announced that all prisoners awaiting execution for twenty years or more would be granted pardons, and that those awaiting execution between ten and twenty years would have their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Minister of State for Internal Affairs Alhaji Danjuma Goje stated in July that pretrial detainees represented over 70 percent of the prison population, and that 32,000 were currently incarcerated awaiting trial.

The Nigerian government recruited more than 33,000 officers to the police, in an effort to fulfil plans to nearly double the size of the force from its June 1999 strength of 135,000. But the force was still regulated by a colonial law first promulgated in 1943. In July 2000, civil society groups established a network on police reform to which government officials were invited.

There was some media harassment during the year. On January 19, 2000, more than fifty police invaded the International Press Centre, Lagos, and arrested everyone present, including several journalists, following a press conference given by the Odua Liberation Movement. Several individual journalists were detained for various periods throughout the year after reporting on alleged calls for a military coup, demands for ethnic self-determination, or protests at an increase in the price of fuel.

The rights of women in Nigeria were routinely violated. The Penal Code explicitly stated that assaults committed by a man on his wife were not an offense, if permitted by customary law and if "grievous hurt" was not inflicted. Marital rape was not a crime. Child marriages remained common, especially in northern Nigeria. Women were denied equal rights in the inheritance of property. It was estimated that about 60 percent of Nigerian women were subjected to female genital cutting. Cross Rivers and Edo States adopted legislation banning the practice and imposing criminal penalties; the governor of Rivers State announced that he would follow suit. Child labor, especially in domestic work, often completely unpaid, remained common. There were numerous reports of the organized trafficking of children between Nigeria and other West African countries, and of women within West Africa and between Nigeria and Europe. In February 2000, police announced the arrest of a Lagos-based businessman in connection with the sale of women and girls to Europe; in August, another man was arrested in Anambra State for trafficking children to other countries in West Africa.

Several states in northern Nigeria extended the application of Islamic Sharia law to criminal offenses or announced plans to do so. Sharia law punishments, including amputation and flogging, were imposed for offenses such as cattle theft and fornication, and local Islamic voluntary organizations worked with Sharia courts to enforce the Sharia laws.

Hundreds of people lost their lives in communal violence across Nigeria. In late 1999 and early 2000, there were riots in which the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC), a Lagos-based ethnic militia demanding devolution of power or even independence for the Yoruba southwest of the country, clashed with Hausas living and working in Lagos. A committee of the Lagos State Senate investigated the violence, and found that at least nine policemen, seven OPC members and 163 bystanders had lost their lives, and twelve police stations were burned down. Reports of the planned introduction of Sharia law led to clashes between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna in February 2000 and fresh violence in May. At least 700 people were killed in these disturbances and reprisal killings that followed in southeastern Nigeria, and thousands were displaced. Protracted communal and ethnic violence continued between the Aguleri-Umuleri (Anambra State), Ife-Moba/Keke (Osun State), and Jukun-Kuteb (Taraba State) communities.

The government response to this violence was often itself abusive. Speaking on national television in November 1999, President Obasanjo announced that police would be given orders to shoot on sight members of the OPC who refused to give themselves up. Police raids for suspected members of the OPC resulted in the arbitrary detention of hundreds of people and summary execution of dozens. In October, the presidency banned the OPC and ordered the arrest of its leaders, following further riots in which more than one hundred Hausas were killed by members of the ethnic militia. During the February riots in Kaduna, dozens were arbitrarily arrested and others shot by police. In April 2000, mobile policemen went on a rampage in the town of Suleja in Niger State and killed at least twenty civilians in a shooting spree following an attack by unarmed civilians on their post during communal riots protesting the appointment of a traditional leader. In July 2000, the governor of Anambra State stated that the "Bakassi Boys," a vigilante group also involved in anti-Hausa violence, had been renamed the "Onitsha vigilante services" and endorsed their activities. Although Minister of Police Affairs David Jemibiwon spoke out against the Bakassi Boys and other militias following this statement, he later seemed to back down from his position.

Ralph Uwazuruike, leader of an Igbo group called the Movement for the Actualization of the Biafran State (MASSOB), was detained for several days in April after he announced that the organization intended declaring the launch of a "new Biafra" on May 27. Uwazuruike was arrested again in August in Lagos, as he prepared to stage a demonstration at the U.S. embassy; in the same month, fifty-four MASSOB members were arraigned for treason.

The Nigerian government continued to deploy large numbers of soldiers and paramilitary mobile police across the oil-producing regions of the Niger Delta. As elsewhere in Nigeria, security force action was often indiscriminate, or targeted those who had done nothing but exercise their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association. The federal task force charged with protecting oil pipelines carried out several extrajudicial executions in oil-producing communities in Delta State. The victims were persons accused of vandalizing pipelines or the theft of petroleum products. In late November 1999, Nigerian soldiers moved into Odi, a community of perhaps 15,000 people in Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta, and engaged in a brief exchange of fire with a handful of young men, after the killing of twelve policemen there. They then proceeded to raze the town. The troops demolished virtually every building and killed dozens of unarmed civilians. In September 2000, President Obasanjo again threatened to deploy the army across the delta.

In March and April 2000, repressive force was once again used in Ogoniland, Rivers State, home of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), of which Ken Saro-Wiwa was leader before his 1995 execution. Paramilitary mobile police were deployed following disturbances in objection to development projects to be funded by Shell, killed at least one civilian, razed a number of buildings, and arrested several Ogoni activists, including Ledum Mitee, a MOSOP leader. President Obasanjo visited Ogoniland in September 2000.

In response to local demands for greater resource ownership and benefits, President Obasanjo introduced a bill to establish a Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). Conflict among the two houses of the National Assembly and the presidency meant that the bill had still not become law by September.

Defending Human Rights

Nigeria's numerous and sophisticated human rights groups were able to operate freely throughout the year. Indeed, civil society groups had a more ambitious legislative and reform program than the government.

THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (NHRC), CREATED IN 1996, HELD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, MOST OF THEM CO-SPONSORED BY NONGOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS. IN JUNE 2000, THE GOVERNMENT DISSOLVED THE BOARD OF THE NHRC AND APPOINTED NEW MEMBERS, AMID CONTROVERSY AS TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PROCEDURE.

The Role of the International Community

Bretton Woods Institutions

SEVERAL DELEGATIONS FROM WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) VISITED NIGERIA DURING THE YEAR. THE IMF ESTABLISHED A MONITORING PROGRAM AT THE CENTRAL BANK AND FINANCE MINISTRY AND IN JULY 2000 AGREED TO A U.S. \$1 BILLION STANDBY CREDIT FACILITY. IN MAY, THE WORLD BANK APPROVED THREE NEW PROJECTS TOTALING U.S. \$75 MILLION, THE FIRST SINCE 1993, TO ASSIST IN THE PROVISION OF UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION AND TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY, INCLUDING MEASURES AIMED AT INCREASING ITS TRANSPARENCY.

European Union and its Member States

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT GAVE SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT, EMPHASIZING THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE MILITARY, TACKLING CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC REFORM (LEADING TO DEBT RELIEF) IN ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CLARE SHORT VISITED NIGERIA IN MARCH AND COMMITTED £15 MILLION (U.S.\$21 MILLION) ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA IN 2000/2001 AND £25 MILLION FOR 2001/2002. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE MINISTER PETER HAIN VISITED NIGERIA IN JANUARY, AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JOHN PRESCOTT IN JUNE. BOTH HAIN AND HIGH COMMISSIONER GRAHAM BURTON (IN A NOVEMBER 1999 SPEECH) EMPHASIZED THAT DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE WAS THE ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS. PRESIDENT OBASANJO VISITED FRANCE IN FEBRUARY AND THE U.K. IN SEPTEMBER 2000.

IN SEPTEMBER 1999, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA, SPEAKING FOR THE E.U., PLEDGED A U.S.\$40 MILLION GRANT TO NIGERIA FOR 1999 AND A FURTHER \$30 MILLION FOR 2000, A LARGE PART OF WHICH WOULD BE PLOWED INTO PROJECTS IN THE NIGER DELTA. HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED ASSISTANCE FOCUSED ON STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY CAPACITY, JUDICIAL AND PRISON REFORM, REBUILDING THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA.

United States

IN AUGUST 2000, PRESIDENT CLINTON BECAME THE SECOND U.S. HEAD OF STATE TO VISIT NIGERIA. HE PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO RECOVER PUBLIC FUNDS LOOTED DURING THE ABACHA ERA AND FOR DEBT RELIEF, AND ASSISTANCE TO FIGHT HIV/AIDS. HE ALSO CALLED ON THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE OIL PRODUCTION IN AN EFFORT TO LOWER WORLD OIL PRICES. CLINTON DID NOT PUBLICLY RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS. THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK SIGNED A DEAL FOR U.S.\$1.2 BILLION IN LOAN GUARANTEES, AND CLINTON ANNOUNCED THAT NIGERIAN EXPORTS WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR DUTY-FREE TREATMENT UNDER THE GSP (GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES) PROGRAM.

MILITARY PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES INCORPORATED (MPRI), A VIRGINIA-BASED PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY, ADVISED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON REPROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES, AND A U.S. MILITARY TEAM WAS BASED IN NIGERIA FOR MOST OF THE YEAR. DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM COHEN VISITED NIGERIA IN APRIL 2000, AND ANNOUNCED A U.S.\$10.6 MILLION MILITARY AID PACKAGE, INCLUDING FUNDS TO REFURBISH AIRCRAFT AND TRAIN PILOTS. NIGERIA PARTICIPATED WITH FIVE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE U.S. WEST AFRICA TRAINING CRUISE IN NOVEMBER 1999, ALLOWING NIGERIAN NAVAL OFFICERS TO TAKE PART IN VARIOUS TRAINING EXERCISES. IN AUGUST, SEVERAL HUNDRED U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES BEGAN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FIVE NIGERIAN BATTALIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING WORK IN SIERRA LEONE.

SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT VISITED NIGERIA IN OCTOBER 1999 AND URGED NIGERIA TO COMPLETE THE POLITICAL REFORMS NECESSARY TO UNDERPIN THE RESTORATION OF CIVILIAN RULE, INCLUDING REPEAL OF REPRESSIVE LAWS, STRENGTHENING OF THE JUDICIARY, AND CONSOLIDATION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY. SHE ENDORSED EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE PAST ABUSES, AND STRESSED THE U.S. DESIRE TO SEE SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS IN THE DELTA BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW, NOT THE USE OF FORCE. ALBRIGHT ALSO PLEDGED TO "WORK WITH CONGRESS" TO TRIPLE OR QUADRUPE U.S. AID TO NIGERIA. U.S. AID FOR THE YEAR INCREASED FROM THE PREVIOUS U.S.\$7 MILLION CHanneled THROUGH NGOs TO U.S.\$170 MILLION, INVOLVING TWENTY-FOUR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. IN JANUARY, ALBRIGHT SINGLED OUT NIGERIA'S TRANSITION PROGRAM AS ONE OF FOUR CRITICAL U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN THE COMING YEAR. SEVERAL OTHER HIGH-LEVEL U.S. OFFICIALS VISITED NIGERIA DURING THE YEAR.

ALTHOUGH NIGERIA IN MARCH WAS DEEMED NOT TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 491 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT (FAA), THE ADMINISTRATION ISSUED A NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER FOR THE SECOND YEAR, THUS ALLOWING THE U.S. TO SUPPORT ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA IN SIX MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND TO RESTORE FAA AND ARMS CONTROL EXPORT ACT ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA. A FIVE-YEAR BAN ON FLIGHTS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND THE U.S. WAS LIFTED IN DECEMBER 1999, AND DIRECT FLIGHTS TO NIGERIA WERE SCHEDULED TO RESUME IN OCTOBER 2000.

THE U.S. ALSO LAUNCHED AN INITIATIVE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE NIGER DELTA BY PROMOTING DIALOGUE AMONG THE U.S. AND NIGERIAN GOVERNMENTS, RESIDENTS OF THE DELTA, AND U.S. OIL COMPANIES.

RWANDA

Human Rights Developments

THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THE PRESIDENT ALL QUIT THEIR POSTS UNDER PRESSURE WITHIN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE YEAR, LEAVING A SHRINKING CIRCLE OF POWER HOLDERS IN CONTROL OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. THE FORMER VICE-PRESIDENT, GENERAL PAUL KAGAME, WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT IN APRIL BY THE ASSEMBLY, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME OPENLY PRESIDED OVER THE GOVERNMENT HE HAD REPUTEDLY RUN FROM BEHIND THE SCENES SINCE 1994. KAGAME, FROM THE TUTSI MINORITY, REPLACED A HUTU PRESIDENT, THUS ENDING THE PRACTICE OF HAVING A MEMBER OF THE MAJORITY ETHNIC GROUP SERVE AS TITULAR HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC. A RESHUFFLE OF CABINET POSITIONS GAVE TEN OF EIGHTEEN SEATS TO KAGAME'S PARTY, THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF), VIOLATING THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE IN THE ARUSHA ACCORDS OF 1994.

THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT COMMUNAL OFFICIALS, NOW APPOINTED, WOULD SOON BE ELECTED. POLITICAL PARTIES EXIST IN RWANDA, GUARANTEED BY THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, BUT THE GOVERNMENT LIMITED THEIR IMPORTANCE BY SUCH MEASURES AS PROHIBITING PUBLIC MEETINGS. IN THE PROPOSED ELECTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES WILL NOT PRESENT CANDIDATES.

TWO OF THE THREE TOP OFFICIALS WHO LEFT THEIR POSTS IN EARLY 2000 ALSO LEFT THE COUNTRY, SAYING THEY FEARED FOR THEIR LIVES. THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER WAS THE LATEST OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT HUTU POLITICAL LEADERS TO CHOOSE EXILE. THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, JOSEPH KABUYE SEBARENTZI, HOWEVER, WAS THE FIRST LEADING TUTSI

politician to flee. His departure highlighted the rift between Tutsi survivors of the 1994 genocide and the RPF over such issues as jobs in the administration, military promotions, aid to genocide victims, and justice for the genocide.

Sebarentzi, reportedly accused by President Kagame of "inappropriate" political ideas, was said to favor the return of the former king, Kigeli Ndayindurwa, ousted in 1961 and now in exile in the U.S. Another genocide survivor accused of encouraging Tutsi soldiers to "desert to the king" spent nearly a year in jail without trial before being released. In February 2000, two soldiers and three civilians, all genocide survivors suspected of ties to the king, were kidnapped in Burundi and Tanzania where they had fled. Their Rwandan military captors forced them to return to the country, although those taken in Tanzania had been under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Some of them were reportedly tortured, but after months in jail without trial, all were released.

A presidential councilor linked to genocide survivors' associations was gunned down by men in military uniform in early March. No arrests had been made in the case by late in the year. When the brother of the deceased, vice-president of the survivors' association Ibuka, tried to leave Rwanda, police confiscated his ticket and passport and took him for questioning. After intervention by several foreign ambassadors, he was later permitted to leave the country. Other leading members of Ibuka also fled Rwanda, as did a number of Rwandan soldiers. Some forty university students, most or all of them Tutsi, left for Uganda in December 1999, denouncing the "dictatorial" nature of the government.

In the first part of the year, local authorities jailed dozens of persons in Nkusu and Bulinga communes on charges of supporting the king. Most were later released without trial.

Two leaders of the opposition Movement Democrat Republicain (MDR), the largest political party in Rwanda, were released from prison without trial: Bonaventure Ubulijoro, who had been detained since 1999, and Sylvestre Kamali, who was arrested in 1994. But a former member of the national assembly, Jean Mbanda, was jailed in June, shortly after publicly criticizing the RPF. He was accused of committing fraud six years before.

The Rwandan government fought armed opponents largely in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where its troops committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law. (See section on Democratic Republic of Congo). Its soldiers suppressed an insurgency in northwestern Rwanda in 1999 and 1999, with enormous civilian casualties. But small groups of insurgents resurfaced in Gisenyi prefecture in December 1999 to massacre thirty-one Tutsi at Tamiro and in May 2000 to kill nine persons at Rwerere. In May others killed three secondary school students and wounded three others in Kinigi and killed two local defense force members in Ruhondo, both in Ruhengeri. Insurgents recruited adherents, supposedly including children, to serve as combatants.

Soldiers reportedly killed civilians suspected of being insurgents in Rubavu, Ruhondo, Gicuye, and Karago communes and imprisoned many others, some of them in military facilities, like the Milpoc detention center in Gisenyi, where they suffered from harsh conditions and in some cases from torture.

In the southeast in midyear, several bodies were sighted floating down the Akagera River, and other persons were said to have "disappeared." Apparently reflecting fear of increased violence, more than three thousand mostly Hutu Rwandans from this region fled to Tanzania from April to July, twice the number for all of 1999.

Members of the local defense forces—young people recruited, trained, and armed by the government supposedly to defend their communities—killed more than a dozen people and raped and robbed many others in different parts of the country. Nominally under the supervision of local authorities, they in many cases escaped punishment for their abuses.

The government reportedly forcibly recruited men and children for the army and the local defense forces. Authorities freed some 300 military detainees and prisoners from Rilima and Kibungo prisons in mid-year, supposedly because they agreed to go fight for Rwanda in the DRC.

In 1999 and 2000 the government tried more persons accused of participating in the 1994 genocide than in the two years since trials began. The total tried by March 2000 was some 3,000, but more than 125,000 still languished in prisons. As in previous years, courts varied considerably in the regularity and thoroughness of their proceedings. Of those found guilty, some 14 percent were sentenced to death, a decrease from earlier years. The percentage of persons acquitted rose slightly to nearly 20 percent. The government repeatedly extended deadlines permitting the detention of persons without any case files, a practice otherwise forbidden by Rwandan law. In December 1999, a new deadline was set for June 2001. An estimated 19,000 persons were held without files, some of them detained since 1994.

In a case which drew international attention, Bishop Augustin Misago was acquitted of genocide charges in June. Arrested immediately after the former president accused him at a mass meeting in April 1999, the bishop was jailed for more than a year as the prosecution presented a flimsy case against him. Several persons acquitted of charges of genocide were attacked after their release and at least one of them was killed. Others were re-arrested soon after their release.

Three judges were arrested and charged with "genocide"—one of them for the second time—and a fourth was suspended from his post in November 1999 after having been previously arrested and freed for lack of proof.

Conditions in prisons were miserable and in some cases inhumane and life-threatening. The food supply was irregular in some central prisons and the government called upon families to bring food to detainees, a practice previously usual only for communal lockups. Delivering food to detainees imposed a substantial burden on households where there was only one adult, particularly where the prison was distant.

Throughout the year, the government promised an alternative form of communal justice, called *gacaca*, but late in the year the necessary legislation had not been passed. Although the program offered some hope of trying the accused more rapidly, it raised concerns about the rights of the accused, particularly because it provided no right to counsel. Although no *gacaca* law existed, authorities implemented a kind of *gacaca* in many prisons at the direction of the Ministry of Justice. There was no public explanation of how these sessions were conducted or what use would be made of their conclusions.

The government continued a program of forced "villagization." Although enforced less harshly than in preceding years, as late as midyear, authorities still required people to move against their will to government-designated settlements. Some homeowners were forced to destroy their houses before moving. Lacking the necessary resources to build new houses, hundreds of thousands of people lived in temporary shelters made of tree limbs, leaves, and pieces of plastic. Some cultivators were forced to cede their fields to serve as settlement sites. Many village residents had to walk miles further each day to reach their fields or sources of water and firewood than when they lived in their previous homes. Difficulty in reaching fields and insecurity over land tenure resulting from villagization caused a decline in agricultural production, which was further cut by drought. Toward the end of the year, serious food shortages threatened regions where villagization was most advanced.

The government permitted considerable press criticism on certain questions, but balked at negative comment on others. Three journalists fled the country in 2000, saying their lives were at risk because of reports they had published. One foreign journalist was threatened with expulsion for having filed a dispatch that displeased authorities, and several Rwandan journalists were questioned by police after publishing information critical of the government.

Defending Human Rights

The Rwandan League for Promoting and Defending Human Rights (La Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, LIPRODHOR) effectively documented abuses, particularly outside the capital, and monitored judicial proceedings related to the genocide. It also conducted a poll showing that 93 percent of the respondents favored the proposed *gacaca* system. LIPRODHOR, as well as other local human rights organizations, prepared to assist the *gacaca*

PROCESS, BOTH THROUGH TRAINING PROGRAMS AND BY MONITORING THE SESSIONS. THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC LIBERTIES (ASSOCIATION POUR LA DÉFENSE DES DROITS HUMAINS ET DES LIBERTÉS PUBLIQUES, ADL) CARRIED OUT A USEFUL STUDY OF VILLAGIZATION. THE REGIONAL UMBRELLA GROUP, LEAGUE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE GREAT LAKES (LA LIGUE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE DÉFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME DES GRANDS LACS, LDGL), BEGAN A CAMPAIGN AMONG ITS MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS TO END IMPUNITY IN THE REGION AND TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA INTO BURUNDI AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO.

THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ELECTED IN MID-1999, ORGANIZED WIDESPREAD PUBLIC EDUCATION EFFORTS AND WORKED QUIETLY TO RESOLVE SEVERAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING PROPERTY AND, MOST NOTABLY, TO PROTECT AND SECURE THE RELEASE OF JAILED TUSTI GENOCIDE SURVIVORS.

THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT MADE A DETAILED RESPONSE TO REPORTS PUBLISHED BY HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AN INITIATIVE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROMISING HAD THE RESPONSES BEEN COOLER IN TONE AND MORE FACTUAL IN CONTENT.

The Role of the International Community

International Justice

AT THE END OF 1999, A UNITED NATIONS INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION REPORTED HOW AND WHY THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS MEMBER STATES FAILED TO HALT THE 1994 GENOCIDE. SIX MONTHS LATER, A COMMISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) MADE THE SAME CRITICAL CONCLUSIONS AND PARTICULARLY CONDEMNED THE UNITED STATES FOR IMPEDING ACTION BY THE U.N. AND FRANCE FOR SUPPORTING THE GENOCIDAL GOVERNMENT. THE OAU REPORT ALSO EXAMINED ALLEGED RPF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN 1994. PRESIDENT KAGAME INITIALLY WELCOMED THE OAU PUBLICATION AS "A GOOD REPORT," BUT TWO MONTHS LATER, RWANDAN AUTHORITIES ATTACKED IT AS "BIASED."

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA COMPLETED TRIALS OF A FACTORY DIRECTOR AND A LEADER OF THE INTERAHAMWE MILITIA AND FOUND THEM GUILTY OF GENOCIDE. THE COURT FOUND A THIRD PERSON GUILTY AFTER HE CONFESSED TO HIS ROLE IN INCITING TO GENOCIDE OVER THE RADIO. STILL PLAGUED BY LENGTHY PROCEEDINGS, THE APPEALS AND TRIAL CHAMBERS ADOPTED REFORMS MEANT TO SPEED TRIALS. AN INTERNAL AUDIT FOUND THAT ALL BRANCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL NEEDED TO BECOME MORE EFFICIENT, BOTH IN TERMS OF TIME AND MONEY.

IN NOVEMBER 1999, THE APPEALS CHAMBER ORDERED THE RELEASE OF JEAN-BUSCO BARAYAGWIZA ON THE GROUNDS OF PROCEDURAL ERRORS BY THE PROSECUTION. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY SUSPENDED COOPERATION WITH THE COURT AND FOR A BRIEF PERIOD REFUSED A VISA TO THE CHIEF PROSECUTOR. IN EARLY 2000, THE APPEALS CHAMBER REHEARD THE CASE. THE PROSECUTOR ARGUED FOR REVERSAL ON LEGAL GROUNDS BUT ALSO STATED THAT PROSECUTIONS FOR GENOCIDE COULD NOT CONTINUE WITHOUT COOPERATION FROM THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. THE APPEALS CHAMBER REVERSED ITS DECISION, ALLOWING BARAYAGWIZA TO BE TRIED. IN LATE 1999, THE TRIBUNAL DECIDED TO RECEIVE AN OFFICIAL AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, AND IN 2000, JUDGES OF THE TRIAL CHAMBER VISITED RWANDA WHERE THEY WERE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT KAGAME. THESE DEVELOPMENTS, TOGETHER WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROSECUTIONS OF RPF MEMBERS FOR ALLEGED CRIMES, RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE TRIBUNAL.

SUCH DOUBTS WERE FUELED BY PUBLICATION OF A CONFIDENTIAL U.N. MEMORANDUM SUGGESTING THAT THE PREVIOUS PROSECUTOR HAD HALTED AN INVESTIGATION INTO RPF INVOLVEMENT IN DOWNING THE AIRPLANE OF PRESIDENT JUVENAL HABYARIMANA, THE CATALYTIC EVENT WHICH SET OFF THE GENOCIDE.

ANOTHER PRESS ACCOUNT REVEALED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TRIBUNAL WAS INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE RPF CRIMES. IN AUGUST, A BELGIAN INVESTIGATING MAGISTRATE OPENED A SIMILAR INQUIRY FOLLOWING A COMPLAINT FILED BY SEVERAL RWANDANS.

IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ELSEWHERE RELATED TO THE GENOCIDE, A SWISS APPEALS COURT REDUCED TO FOURTEEN YEARS THE LIFE SENTENCE OF A RWANDAN BURGOMASTER CONDEMNED IN 1999 FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. FRENCH JUDGES INVESTIGATED THE DOWNING OF HABYARIMANA'S AIRPLANE AND A CASE OF GENOCIDE AGAINST A RWANDAN PRIEST. IN CANADA, AN APPEALS COURT DELIBERATED ON THE MOTION OF LEON MUGESERA TO AVOID EXPULSION FROM THE COUNTRY FOR HAVING INCITED TO GENOCIDE IN RWANDA IN 1992. IN BELGIUM, A TRIAL BEGAN FOR TWO RELIGIOUS SISTERS AND TWO OTHERS ACCUSED OF GENOCIDE.

United Nations

THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL ACKNOWLEDGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY ALL SIDES IN THE WAR IN THE DRC. IT ASKED BOTH RWANDA AND UGANDA TO MAKE REPARATIONS FOR THE LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY DAMAGE INFLICTED ON CIVILIANS WHEN THEY FOUGHT EACH OTHER IN THE CONGOLESE CITY OF KISANGANI. IN ANOTHER RESOLUTION, THE COUNCIL DEPLORED THE DETERIORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EASTERN DRC, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN WHICH RWANDAN TROOPS PRESUMABLY WERE INVOLVED.

THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REMARKABLY ENOUGH SHOWED LESS CONCERN THAN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR SUCH COMBAT-RELATED ABUSES. BOTH THE COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MICHEL MOUSSALLI, COMMENDED THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FOR ITS PROGRESS, IGNORING ITS ABUSES IN THE DRC AND MINIMIZING THOSE INSIDE RWANDA.

European Union

THE EUROPEAN UNION (E.U.) AND ITS MEMBER STATES SAID LITTLE ABOUT RWANDAN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND CONTRIBUTED GENEROUSLY TO GOVERNMENT FUNDS. UNLIKE 1999 WHEN THE E.U. EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT ABUSES RELATED TO VILLAGIZATION, IN SEPTEMBER 2000 IT ADOPTED A COMMON POSITION THAT CRITICIZED NOTHING AND ENCOURAGED "THE ONGOING PROCESSES...OF PROTECTING AND PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS." IN MARCH, THE E.U. RESUMED DEVELOPMENT AID WHICH HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED IN 1994.

THE UNITED KINGDOM CONTINUED ITS TEN-YEAR PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE, WITH GRANTS OF SOME U.S. \$70 MILLION, WITH COOPERATION SECRETARY CLARE SHORT ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORTING THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND INITIALLY DENOUNCING CRITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS AS "POLITICAL PROPAGANDA." THE DUTCH, INITIALLY HESITANT TO LIST RWANDA AMONG ITS PRIVILEGED AID RECIPIENTS, DID SO IN 2000 IN CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND PROMISED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LUSAKA ACCORDS. BELGIUM PROFFERED AN OFFICIAL APOLOGY FOR ITS CONDUCT AT THE TIME OF THE GENOCIDE AND PROMISED INCREASED ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF HEALTH. GERMANY GAVE SOME U.S. \$6 MILLION FOR EDUCATION AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE. EVEN FRANCE, SEEN AS HOSTILE SINCE 1994, SENT ITS MINISTER OF COOPERATION TO RWANDA.

WHILE GOVERNMENTS AT HOME GENERALLY KEPT SILENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, DIPLOMATS FROM THE BELGIAN, GERMAN, SWISS, AND DUTCH EMBASSIES INTERVENED LOCALLY DURING THE YEAR TO ASSIST PERSONS WHOSE RIGHTS HAD BEEN ABUSED.

United States

GENERALLY VIEWED AS STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, THE U.S. THIS YEAR HELPED IT ACQUIRE THE ONLY ADVANCED RADAR IN CENTRAL AFRICA AND CUT THE RWANDAN DEBT TO THE U.S. BY 67 PERCENT. IT ALSO SIGNED THREE GRANTS TOTALING U.S. \$15.1 MILLION FOR ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNANCE, AND HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES.

LIKE THEIR EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES, U.S. EMBASSY STAFF FOLLOWED INDIVIDUAL CASES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE AND INTERVENED SEVERAL TIMES.

AMBASSADOR FOR WAR CRIMES DAVID SCHEFFER WORKED TO END IMPUNITY IN CENTRAL AFRICA, A GOAL SUPPORTED AT LEAST NOMINALLY BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADEIRAINE ALBRIGHT. AS THE YEAR ENDED, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WERE CONSIDERING POSSIBLE WAYS TO BRING VIOLATORS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TO JUSTICE.

THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, ALTHOUGH IN MAY 2000 IT POINTED OUT THE NEED FOR BETTER USE OF FUNDS. SENATOR RUSS FEINGOLD SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE THE ARREST OF SUSPECTED PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE BY ASKING THE U.S. SENATE TO ESTABLISH A REWARDS PROGRAM SIMILAR TO THAT SET UP FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR EX-YUGOSLAVIA.

Relevant Human Rights Watch Reports:

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 4/00

SIERRA LEONE

Human Rights Developments

THE LOME PEACE ACCORD SIGNED ON JULY 7, 1999 BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT (RUF) AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE COMMITTED THE REBELS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS IN EXCHANGE FOR REPRESENTATION IN A NEW GOVERNMENT. IT ALSO INCLUDED A CONTROVERSIAL GENERAL AMNESTY FOR ALL CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE WAR. DESPITE HOPES THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD BRING AN END TO THE ATROCITIES THAT CHARACTERIZED THIS BRUTAL NINE-YEAR WAR, ABUSES CONTINUED UNABATED.

THE NINE MONTHS FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT BROUGHT ABOUT A RELATIVE REDUCTION IN ABUSES AND FEW CASES OF THE RUF SIGNATURE ATROCITY—LIMB AMPUTATION—WERE DOCUMENTED. HOWEVER, SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS CONTINUED UNABATED. THE COLLAPSE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN MAY, AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SOME FIVE HUNDRED UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS SERVING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL), REVERSED THIS TREND. RENEWED CONFLICT USHERED IN INCREASES IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE RUF AND REBEL MILITIAS, INCLUDING LIMB AMPUTATION, AND A DISTURBING INTENSIFICATION OF ABUSES BY PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES.

THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS HAD BEEN MEASURED BY ENROLLMENT IN THE CORNERSTONE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) PROGRAM, WITH LITTLE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW. THE COLLAPSE OF THE PEACE PROCESS BROUGHT ABOUT A REASSESSMENT OF THE PROVISION FOR A GENERAL AMNESTY IN THE LOME ACCORD AND MOBILIZED NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL.

Rebel United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/ex-Sierra Leonean Army (AFRC/ex-SLA)

IN THE MONTHS FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE ACCORD, THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS REGISTERED BY UNAMSIL WERE REBEL ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS.

REBEL COMBATANTS FILTERING BACK INTO THE CAPITAL, FREETOWN, COMMITTED EXTORTION, CAR THEFT, ROBBERIES, AND OTHER ACTS OF LAWLESSNESS. THE AUTHORITIES DEMONSTRATED A RELUCTANCE TO INVESTIGATE OR TO ARREST REBELS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH CRIMES, IN PART FOR FEAR THAT SUCH ARRESTS MIGHT THREATEN REBEL COOPERATION WITH THE DDR PROGRAM.

FOLLOWING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN MAY, RUF FORCES INTENSIFIED THEIR ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS. THERE WERE FREQUENT REPORTS OF RUF ABUSES INCLUDING MURDER, WIDESPREAD RAPE, LIMB AMPUTATION, FORCED LABOR, ABDUCTION, AND LOOTING. MOST OF THESE ATTACKS OCCURRED IN THE CONTEXT OF RAIDING FOR FOOD. THERE WERE SEVERAL CASES OF LIMB AMPUTATION, EVEN OF WOMEN, ELDERLY, AND CHILDREN AS YOUNG AS TWELVE. WITHIN THE AREAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL, THE RUF CONTINUED TO USE INTIMIDATION TO IMPOSE A "TAXATION" SYSTEM, EXTORTING FOOD AND MONEY FROM CIVILIANS.

WHEN INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY A GOVERNMENT HELICOPTER GUNSHIP PROVOKED A MASS EXODUS OF CIVILIANS FROM AREAS UNDER RUF CONTROL, THE RUF RESPONDED BY BECOMING PARTICULARLY BRUTAL, SETTING OFF A FURTHER EXODUS OF CIVILIANS FROM RUF AREAS. THERE WERE ALSO MANY CASES OF FORCED LABOR WITHIN THE DIAMOND MINING AREAS OF KONO, AND THE RUF REPORTEDLY MURDERED CIVILIANS ACCUSED OF MINING WITHOUT ITS APPROVAL. ON MAY 9, ARMED MEN INSIDE THE HOME OF RUF LEADER FODAY SANKOH OPENED FIRE ON A CROWD OF CIVILIAN DEMONSTRATORS, KILLING NINETEEN.

STARTING IN MAY, THE RUF BEGAN CONSCRIPTING MANY CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, INCLUDING SOME GIRLS, AND SCORES OF CIVILIANS HAD THE LETTERS RUF CARVED INTO THEM WITH KNIVES OR RAZORS. IN MAY, RUF COMMANDERS IN MOKENI FORCED SOME FORTY DEMOBILIZED CHILD SOLDIERS LIVING WITHIN AN INTERIM CARE CENTER TO REJOIN THE RUF'S RANKS. FEAR OF CONSCRIPTION CONTRIBUTED TO THE FLIGHT OF THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS FROM REBEL-HELD AREAS. THE RUF FREQUENTLY USED "BUYING BACK" OF CONSCRIPTED YOUTH BY FAMILY MEMBERS AS ANOTHER TACTIC FOR EXTORTING MONEY.

MEMBERS OF THE AFRC/EX-SLA BASED AROUND THE OCCRA HILLS (FORTY MILES FROM FREETOWN) ALSO IMPOSED A REIGN OF TERROR ON VILLAGERS WITHIN PORT LOKO AND MASTAKA DISTRICTS. THESE SOLDIERS CARRIED OUT RAPE, MURDER, TORTURE, ABDUCTION, MASSIVE LOOTING, FORCED LABOR, AND INDISCRIMINATE AMBUSHES ALONG A MAJOR HIGHWAY. THE AFRC/EX-SLA MURDERED NUMEROUS CIVILIANS FOR NOT HAVING ENOUGH MONEY, FOR BEING UNABLE TO CARRY LOOTED ITEMS, OR FOR REFUSING TO HAVE SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH A COMBATANT. THIS VIOLENCE FORCED THOUSANDS OF VILLAGERS INTO CAMPS FOR THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED. THE SIERRA LEONEAN GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC COMMUNITY CEASE-FIRE MONITORING GROUP (ECOMOG), AND UNAMSIL FORCES MADE VERY FEW EFFORTS TO ACTIVELY PURSUE THE REBELS OR TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. THE ATTACKS ONLY ENDED IN SEPTEMBER AFTER AN OPERATION BY BRITISH PARATROOPERS TO FREE BRITISH AND SIERRA LEONEAN SOLDIERS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN HOSTAGE BY THE AFRC/EX-SLA.

THOUSANDS OF ABDUCTED PRISONERS CONTINUED TO BE HELD IN REBEL AREAS. BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, THE AFRC/EX-SLA RELEASED SEVERAL SMALL GROUPS OF PRISONERS, BUT CONTINUED TO ABDUCT OTHERS. AT THIS WRITING, SOME FOUR THOUSAND CHILDREN REGISTERED BY UNICEF AS MISSING DURING THE WAR HAD YET TO BE LOCATED. THE VAST MAJORITY WERE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN ABDUCTED BY THE RUF.

Government Forces

THE COLLAPSE OF THE ACCORD BROUGHT ABOUT A MARKED INCREASE IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. THESE INCLUDED RAPE, EXTORTION, THE SIERRA LEONEAN ARMY'S INDISCRIMINATE USE OF A HELICOPTER GUNSHIP, AND THE KILLING OF RUF PRISONERS BY MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE (CDF) MILITIAS, THE LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL OF WHICH WERE THE KAMAJORS.

THE SIERRA LEONEAN GOVERNMENT CAUSED MASSIVE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DISPLACEMENT THROUGH HELICOPTER GUNSHIP ATTACKS DURING MAY AND JUNE AGAINST REBEL STRONGHOLDS IN MOKENI, MAGEBURAKA, AND KAMBIA. THE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF THE GUNSHIP AGAINST MARKET PLACES CAUSED AT LEAST THIRTY CIVILIANS DEATHS.

THE TRIBALLY BASED CDF MILITIA BECAME CONSIDERABLY LESS DISCIPLINED. EXTORTION AND BRUTALITY BY CDF MILITIAMEN AT CHECKPOINTS BECAME ROUTINE. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN HAD BEEN VERY UNCOMMON AMONG CDF MILITIAS UNTIL RECENTLY, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE BELIEF THAT A WARRIOR'S POWER WAS DEPENDENT UPON SEXUAL ABSTINENCE. HOWEVER, NUMEROUS CASES OF SEXUAL ASSAULT WERE DOCUMENTED THIS YEAR, INCLUDING GANG RAPE BY KAMAJOR MILITIAMEN AND COMMANDERS. THERE WERE SEVERAL CASES OF CDF MILITIAS RANSACKING VILLAGES AND COMMANDERING CARS FROM CIVILIANS AND AID AGENCIES. THERE WERE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF CDF MILITIAS TORTURING AND KILLING SUSPECTED RUF REBELS. CDF MILITIAMEN ROUTINELY INTIMIDATED AND THREATENED POLICEMEN ATTEMPTING TO ENFORCE THE RULE OF LAW. IN KENEMA IN SEPTEMBER THE POLICE CHIEF WAS BADLY BEATEN BY KAMAJORS PROTESTING THE ARREST OF ONE OF THEIR MEMBERS ON DRUG CHARGES.

FOLLOWING THE MAY CRISIS, THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE DETAINED HUNDREDS OF SUSPECTED REBELS AND THEIR COLLABORATORS UNDER THE 1991 STATE OF EMERGENCY ACT. THE NAMES OF ONLY 121 OF THEM WERE LATER MADE PUBLIC BY THE GOVERNMENT, AS REQUIRED UNDER THE ACT. SEVERAL HUNDRED MORE WERE HELD ILLEGALLY, INCLUDING AT LEAST

thirteen children. In August, 173 detainees were released as a gesture of good will toward the RUF, while ninety-two remained in custody. The government had yet to authorize the International Committee for the Red Cross to work within jails and detention facilities.

Women

While there was a relative reduction in most classes of gross human rights abuses in the months following the Lome Accord, sexual assault against women and girls, particularly by members of the RUF and AFRC/EY-SLA, continued unabated. There were numerous cases of rape of children as young as ten. Commanders from all government and rebel factions were involved in perpetrating and ordering sexual abuse, and the authorities made little effort to protect women.

Children

Children continue to be subjected to all forms of violence and be recruited as combatants by both rebel forces and to a lesser extent the CDF. Several children were murdered by the RUF and at least two suffered limb amputations. Numerous girls, as young as ten, were subjected to sexual abuse both in Sierra Leone and as refugees in Guinea. Children were abducted from villages and off of buses by rebel forces, and used as forced labor to carry looted goods, as sexual slaves for male combatants, and for work in the diamond mines. Over 1,700 child combatants were demobilized before the collapse of the peace process, but from the May collapse to this date, only 115 had been registered. While some eight hundred children were reunified with their families between January and August, some four thousand children were still registered as missing (most abducted by rebel forces).

Internally Displaced People and Refugees

Following the May crisis, both RUF abuses and the indiscriminate use of the government helicopter gunship caused a mass exodus of some 330,000 civilians from behind rebel lines. Of these, 15,000 fled across the border to Guinea. Once out of RUF territory, civilians were often captured and accused of being rebel sympathizers by government militias which sometimes beat them, extorted money, and murdered them. Following a government offensive in the Kono region in August, thousands of civilians attempting to flee into Guinea were denied entry. After pressure from UNHCR, some women, children and elderly refugees were allowed to enter into Guinea. In September, some five thousand Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea were rounded up and detained in response to cross-border attacks into Guinea from Sierra Leone and Liberia. There were reports of several deaths, widespread rape, and massive looting during the attacks. Some 390,000 refugees in Guinea continued to be subject to frequent intimidation by the Guinean military and civilian militias.

Humanitarian Workers and Journalists

Aid workers and their beneficiaries came under frequent attack by the RUF and to a lesser extent by pro-government militias. Following the crisis in early May, aid workers were forced to withdraw from RUF-held areas and had access to less than half of the country. The RUF attacked and looted feeding centers, threatened local and expatriate doctors with death, abducted aid workers, and, in one case, raped malnourished beneficiaries.

Rebel forces killed one Sierra Leonean and two foreign reporters in May. The Sierra Leonean was shot on May 9 when RUF combatants inside the house of leader Foday Sankoh opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators, and two foreign reporters were killed on May 27 in a rebel ambush on their convoy near Rogberti Junction. It was not known if they were targeted for being journalists or because Sierra Leonean soldiers accompanied them. An editor from a local paper was detained in May after being accused of being an RUF collaborator. Several other journalists reported being beaten or detained.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) mandated to be established within ninety days of the signing of the Lome Peace Accord had yet to be set up. Following the May crisis, activity toward establishing the TRC was officially frozen by the UN Office of Human Rights. UN and other organizations struggled to determine whether the TRC was still relevant following the resumption of hostilities, and if so, what its relationship would be with the proposed Special Court.

In July 1999, the special representative of the secretary-general added a reservation to the Lome Accord, stating that the UN did not recognize amnesty insofar as it applied to crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, the UN made no effort to pursue justice for such crimes until the hostage crisis in May. The crisis and the apprehension of Foday Sankoh put justice squarely on the international agenda. In June, the Sierra Leonean government asked for UN assistance to establish a court in Sierra Leone with a mix of local and foreign prosecutors and judges. The RUF remained the target, and there were concerted efforts to retain the Lome amnesty for other parties to the conflict.

The U.S. eventually took the lead in the Security Council and drafted a proposal for a special court for Sierra Leone that would not be an organ of the Security Council, and would thus avoid time-consuming UN bureaucracy. On August 14, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1315, authorizing the secretary-general to enter into negotiations with the government to establish an independent, special court to bring perpetrators of the most serious violations of international humanitarian law to justice. On October 5, the secretary-general submitted a report with recommendations and proposals for the establishment of the special court, which was under consideration by the Security Council. The report proposed the court be a hybrid using both international and Sierra Leonean law, judges and prosecutors. It also included a controversial proposal to put child soldiers between fifteen and eighteen years of age on trial and proposed that the jurisdiction should extend back to November 30, 1996, the date of Sierra Leone's first peace agreement.

Treaties

This year, Sierra Leone ratified the Rome Statute to establish an International Criminal Court and enacted legislation to make the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its protocols a part of Sierra Leonean law.

Defending Human Rights

Most of the some twenty human rights organizations that operated in Sierra Leone worked exclusively in the capital Freetown and lacked proper funding, expertise, and institutional support. In the months following the signing of the Lome Peace Accord, these groups did very little monitoring of continuing human rights abuses and instead focused on human rights education for the public.

After the May crisis, these groups became somewhat more vocal and active in both monitoring and advocacy, and several groups called for the establishment of an international war crimes tribunal.

The formation of an autonomous, quasi-judicial national Human Rights Commission as provided for in the Lome Accord made only limited progress. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights sent a consultant to assist the government in shaping and drafting the legislation for the commission, but

Parliament had yet to consider a draft. UNAMSIL blamed the lack of progress on the breakdown in the peace process and lack of personnel within its own human rights section.

Meanwhile, the preexisting governmental body, the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR), effectively did no monitoring, documentation of human rights violations, or advocacy, and neglected to take a public stand on the war crimes tribunal.

The Role of the International Community

The RUF's capture of U.N. peacekeepers and subsequent resumption of hostilities unleashed a wave of international condemnation against the RUF for having precipitated the collapse of the peace process. However, frequent violations that gave rise to the crisis had gone largely ignored for months by key members of the international community who did more to appease rebel leaders than confront them.

The moral guarantors of the Lome Accord: the U.N., OAU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Government of Togo, all failed to condemn or apply requisite pressure on the RUF and ex-SLA/AFRC for their repeated attempts to delay and frustrate the peace process, for their continued acts of lawlessness and human rights violations against civilians.

Following the resumption of hostilities, most international actors acknowledged the importance of using military force to disarm the RUF, which occupied over 60 percent of the country. However, members of the international community demonstrated little willingness to do so themselves. With the U.N. unwilling to stiffen its mandate from peacekeeping to peacemaking, and without any international body willing to commit troops, the task of pressuring the RUF back to the negotiating table was left to the underfunded, under-trained, and poorly led Sierra Leonean Army.

The collapse of the peace process forced most key members of the international community to reassess their respective policies toward Sierra Leone, but military objectives remained clearer than political goals. The collapse of the peace process effectively rendered obsolete most key provisions of the Lome Accord, including disarmament, the amnesty, the transformation of the RUF into a political party, and the inclusion of the RUF and AFRC in the government. Despite this, the U.N., U.S. and U.K. insisted that the Lome Accord must form the basis for any future peace.

Attacks on Guinean villages by RUF and Liberian forces that began in September, highlighted fears that the war could spread beyond Sierra Leone's borders.

United Nations

In May, the killing of at least ten and capture of some five hundred United Nations peacekeepers precipitated a collapse of the Sierra Leonean peace process, and forced the United Nations to reassess the viability of the 1999 Lome Peace Accord, the efficacy of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, and the future of U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Prior to May, the RUF and rebel factions repeatedly delayed and frustrated the implementation of the peace process, especially after UNAMSIL attempted to deploy into the diamond-producing areas.

Contributing countries demonstrated minimal political will to change the mandate from peacekeeping to peace-enforcing. Instead, the Security Council responded to UNAMSIL's weaknesses by mandating successive increases in troop strength: from the original 6,000 in October 1999, to 11,000 in February (Resolution 1209), to 13,000 in May (Resolution 1299). The secretary-general's sixth report on UNAMSIL recommended a further increase in troop strength to 20,500.

Internal divisions within the military and political leadership of the mission worsened the crisis. In his July 5 report on UNAMSIL, Kofi Annan said there had been "a serious lack of cohesion within the mission." In part due to these problems, contributing countries were divided on whether or not to support the mission, the largest and most expensive in the world, at a projected \$792 million for 2000-2001.

In response to problems within UNAMSIL and growing insecurity within the region, an eleven-member Security Council delegation visited Sierra Leone and four other West African countries in October. Their report reaffirmed the need to maintain military pressure on the RUF, yet failed to resolve differences over the need for a more aggressive mandate. On several occasions, UNAMSIL failed to aggressively interpret the part of their mandate that allowed for the protection of civilians "under threat of imminent physical violence." In June, Kenyan UNAMSIL troops abandoned the northern town of Kabbala while under attack by the RUF. Jordanian UNAMSIL troops failed to adequately secure the strategic Freetown-to-mile 91 highway from frequent attacks and ambushes on civilian vehicles by the AFRC/ex-SLA. Civilians described being robbed or abducted by the militias within view of the peacekeepers.

The human rights section under the UNAMSIL mission was mandated in January to have fourteen human rights monitors, but it never operated with more than nine and functioned without a permanent chief. They conducted regular and thorough monitoring missions but put out few press releases and lacked a regular channel for disseminating information.

On July 5, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1306, which imposed an eighteen-month ban on the trade in rough diamonds from Sierra Leone that did not have a government certificate, in a bid to prevent the RUF from funding its war. It also mandated setting up a five-person panel of experts to look into possible violations of sanctions and the link between the trade in diamonds and arms. The panel, which did several fact-finding missions to the region, was to present its findings by October 31.

ECOWAS and ECOMOG

In the first several months of 2000, ECOWAS, despite its position as one of the moral guarantors of the Lome Accord, did little to pressure the RUF to comply with its provisions. ECOWAS nations were openly dissatisfied with the lack of U.N. financial support for ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone, and with the U.N. decision to deploy U.N. peacekeepers to facilitate the implementation of the accord instead of funding ECOMOG troops.

Following the collapse of the peace process, ECOWAS heads of state directly blamed and condemned the RUF and, in an emergency summit in Nigeria on May 10, announced their decision to use every means possible to defend Sierra Leone's government. They followed this up on May 29 by endorsing a proposal made by ECOWAS defense ministers and chiefs of staff to send an additional three thousand troops to Sierra Leone, on the condition that the United Nations would pick up the cost. At this writing, ECOWAS troops, mostly from Nigeria, were being trained by the United States. ECOWAS also called for UNAMSIL's mandate to be changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and called for the force to be headed by a West African.

Organization of African Unity

In May, the secretary general of the Organization of African Unity strongly condemned the killing and abduction of U.N. peacekeepers and the resumption of hostilities and backed up an ECOWAS resolution to deploy three thousand ECOMOG troops. In June, OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim appointed South African Ambassador to Ethiopia Kingsley Mamabolo as his special envoy to Sierra Leone. In July, a mini-summit on Sierra Leone was held during the OAU summit in Lome, Togo, between the OAU, ECOWAS, and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In August, OAU Secretary General Salim visited Sierra Leone and donated U.S.\$250,000 to the disarmament, demobilization, and rearmament program and other institutions.

The European Union, United States, and United Kingdom

European Union

In May, the European Union issued a declaration condemning the RUF for attacks on UNAMSIL personnel and the violation of the Lomé Accord. A May 23 resolution by the European Parliament condemned the "assumed participation of Burkina Faso, Liberia and Togo," in support for the RUF and their involvement in illicit diamond smuggling. In June, the E.U. expressed its concern that continued violations of arms embargoes in Sierra Leone and Angola were contributing to the continuation of these conflicts. Also in June, E.U. foreign ministers suspended aid to Liberia because of its support for the RUF rebels. In September, the E.U. General Affairs Council reaffirmed its support for the Lomé Accord as the basis for future peace in Sierra Leone, and expressed its willingness to help the United Nations and Sierra Leonean government set up a special tribunal.

Since 1995, the European Commission had given Sierra Leone more than 94 million euros (U.S. \$90 million) for development and rehabilitation projects over five years. Since the beginning of the year, an additional 12 million euro (U.S. \$10 million) was administered through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) for emergency humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, and for Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea.

United Kingdom and United States

The United Kingdom and United States continued to play a pivotal role in political and military developments in Sierra Leone. The collapse of the peace process prompted both countries to intensify their military engagement with and on behalf of Sierra Leone, while political issues were effectively put on hold.

United Kingdom

When Freetown, the capital, was briefly threatened by the RUF in May, the U.K. deployed over five thousand military personnel, including six hundred ground troops, to secure key strategic areas, and to advise and support both UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leonean Army. Although the bulk of U.K. forces were withdrawn by mid-June, two hundred soldiers remained in the country in order to strengthen a training team already involved in restructuring the Sierra Leonean Army before the May crisis. A further sixty advisers (to increase to ninety) were mostly deployed within the Sierra Leonean Defense Headquarters, and played a key role in advising and directing military operations.

During a June 9 visit, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook acknowledged that Britain was making a long-term commitment to Sierra Leone, and on October 10, further military assistance, including a hundred additional trainers, equipment for the Sierra Leone Army, an offer to provide officers to fill staff appointments at UNAMSIL headquarters, and an offer to provide a rapid reaction force of up to five thousand troops was announced.

After the renegade "Westside Boys" rebel faction took eleven British soldiers hostage from the training team on August 25, British forces were deployed and mounted an operation to free them. During the September 10 operation, one British soldier and some twenty-five Westside Boys were killed.

U.K. assistance to Sierra Leone since March 1999 was over GBP 70 million, including the funding of demobilization camps and humanitarian assistance. In coordination with the Commonwealth Secretariat, the U.K. provided funds for training and administration of the Sierra Leonean police, including the provision of the inspector general.

United States

Until the hostage crisis in May, U.S. policy toward Sierra Leone failed to attract high-level attention within the administration. Most U.S. officials continued to defend the amnesty under Lomé, despite the February report by David Scheffer, ambassador at large for war crimes issues, who reported the ongoing atrocities and abuses, and acknowledged the inadequacy of mechanisms for accountability.

U.S. policy subsequently became more active. The U.S. worked to get the United Nations behind a more robust peacekeeping response to the crisis, and played a key role in moving the Security Council and the Sierra Leonean government toward the creation of a special court for Sierra Leone. During a July visit by Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering to West Africa, and in the testimony of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke before the Security Council hearings on diamonds in Sierra Leone, the U.S. publicly accused Liberia and Burkina Faso of supporting the RUF, and threatened sanctions against them.

In August, the U.S. launched a substantial operation to train and equip up to seven West African battalions, largely Nigerian, for duty with UNAMSIL. The administration stated that all participating troops would be vetted in accordance with U.S. law, which prohibits assistance to military units that have been responsible for serious human rights abuses.

In October, the U.S. hardened its position towards Liberia for its continued support of the RUF by imposing a visa ban on Taylor and other Liberian officials, their families, and close supporters.

The U.S.'s total humanitarian and emergency contribution in 2000, including grants to NGOs and aid agencies, was U.S. \$55 million. In July the U.S. announced a \$20 million aid package for training Nigerian and Ghanaian troops to strengthen the U.N. effort in Sierra Leone.

SOUTH AFRICA

Human Rights Developments

President Thabo Mbeki completed his first year as president of South Africa, leading a government dominated by the African National Congress (ANC), though the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) remained a junior partner. In July, a new opposition political party was formed, the Democratic Alliance, which brought together the National Party, the old party of government, and the Democratic Party, its former parliamentary opposition. The ANC's partners in a longstanding "tripartite alliance," the Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), seriously challenged the government, not only on its neoliberal economic policies, but also on President Mbeki's expressed doubts as to the link between HIV and AIDS. Local government elections on the basis of new municipal boundaries were scheduled for December 2000, after delays caused by opposition from traditional leaders, many of them IFP-aligned, to the new boundaries and the proposed role of chiefs in the new structures.

In January, the National Assembly passed four important acts required under the 1996 constitution: the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act. In May, the National Assembly passed legislation giving protection to "whistle blowers" disclosing information in the public interest. In a groundbreaking September judgment, the Constitutional Court found that the government had an obligation under the constitution to provide short-term housing for several hundred

people evicted from their homes and in desperate need. In January 2000, South Africa ratified the OAU Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Respected former truth commissioner Fajal Randeru was appointed "inspector general of intelligence" in April 2000, with responsibility for ensuring respect for the constitution by the intelligence services.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) continued hearing applications for amnesty. By the end of 1999, the amnesty committee had resolved 6,037 cases, or 91 percent of all applications received. It had granted amnesty in 568 cases and refused amnesty in 5,287 cases, while 815 matters remained outstanding. Victims' groups expressed concern at the delay in making payments of reparations, in accordance with the recommendations of the TRC's 1998 report. Although R30 million (U.S. \$4.2 million) had been paid out to 10,000 victims by June 2000, the total required to fulfil the recommendations was approximately R3 billion (U.S. \$420 million). The trial on charges ranging from drug trafficking to murder of Wouter Basson, a chemical weapons expert with the old South African army, continued throughout 2000. Among the revelations of the trial was the apartheid government's involvement in the murder of hundreds of members of the Namibian liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), set up in 1997 to investigate or oversee the investigation of complaints against the police, reported 681 deaths in custody or as a result of police action during the year to March 2000, a slight decrease on the previous year. The number of complaints lodged with the ICD increased by 50 percent. VelaPhi Kwela, a senior investigator with the ICD, was shot dead by unknown gunmen in July, while on his way home from the ICD provincial office in Durban. In July, two police filmed by a BBC TV crew brutally assaulting suspected car thieves were convicted of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, fined the equivalent of U.S. \$600 and \$900, and given suspended sentences. According to a report of the auditor-general released in May 2000, payments to police members suspended on disciplinary charges amounted to more than R21 million (U.S. \$3 million) during the financial year ending March 31, 1999, only R6 million less than the budget for the ICD over the same period. According to police statistics, 212 police were killed during 1999, eighty-one while on duty.

The first hundred police officers were appointed to the new "Scorpions" detective unit within the office of the national director of public prosecutions in January; they were sent for training by Scotland Yard in the U.K. and by the FBI in the U.S. Legislation setting out the powers of this unit was debated in parliament in September.

Overcrowding in prisons continued to worsen: on April 30, 2000, the prison population was 172,271 (of whom 63,964 were awaiting trial), against approved accommodation for 100,384 inmates. More than five thousand of the prisoners awaiting trial had been held in prison for more than a year. At an estimated 416 inmates per 100,000 citizens, South Africa had one of the highest incarceration rates in the world. In September, the government announced that about 11,000 prisoners awaiting trial on lesser offenses would be released. Assaults on prisoners by warders and other prisoners remained serious problems, including widespread prisoner-on-prisoner rape. In March, the minister of correctional services signed a contract with a private company, the Ikwezi Consortium, to design, build, and operate a maximum security prison in Bloemfontein, the first such contract in South Africa. In April, president Mbeki appointed Judge Johannes Fagan to head the judicial inspectorate. In April, the director-general of the Public Service Commission told parliament in a management audit report that the government had lost control over the department, detailing incidents of corruption, intimidation, organized crime, sexual harassment, and rape.

Hundreds of children were held in prison, despite a formal government commitment that detention should be a last resort for juveniles: on May 31, there were 4,253 children in prison, of whom 2,519 were unsentenced and 1,734 sentenced. Conditions of overcrowding for children were particularly severe at Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town, where 300 children aged fourteen to seventeen were held awaiting trial in March. An interdepartmental task team was appointed to address this issue, but the number was only reduced to 208 by September. The Cape High Court ruled in July that the children should be immediately examined by a doctor and given medical and psychological care. The government stated that there was insufficient alternative accommodation to hold the children, many of them charged with serious offenses.

A report of the national prosecuting authority revealed a backlog of more than 190,000 court cases in July. The national Directorate of Public Prosecutions deployed "rescue teams" to clear case loads at problematic courts. In February, Minister of Justice Pennele Maduna released a ten point plan to bring fundamental changes to the justice system, including the creation of specialized courts and improved prosecution services.

Former Ethiopian president Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam visited South Africa from Zimbabwe, where he was living, in late 1999 for medical treatment. Despite appeals to arrest him and bring him to justice for human rights crimes committed while he was head of state, the government refused to do so. The government also did not accede to a request for Mengistu's extradition by the Ethiopian government. In September, the government deported a Rwandan to Kenya, despite being informed that he was indicted by the Arusha tribunal in connection with the 1994 genocide.

Violence against women, including sexual violence, remained a very serious problem. The Domestic Violence Act and the Maintenance Act came into force in December 1999, improving the system for the award and enforcement of court orders restraining perpetrators of violence in the home and the collection of maintenance payments from absent fathers. An interdepartmental steering committee led efforts to train magistrates, prosecutors, and police in the new laws. The justice ministry hosted a three-day workshop on sexual offenses in February.

"Taxi violence" between rival operators of minibus taxis continued: reports continued to implicate members of the police in this violence. Attacks focused on the Golden Arrow bus company operating in Khayelitsha, a Cape Town township, had led to the deaths of at least four bus drivers, a taxi driver, and two passengers by the end of July, as well as dozens of injuries. In an attempt to halt the killing, the western Cape government cordoned off the entire township for twenty-four hours in August, and the police made several arrests. Continuing a two-year series, a number of bomb explosions occurred in Cape Town during the year, the most serious a blast at a bar on November 29, 1999, in which forty-eight people were injured. Police alleged that members of the vigilante group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) were responsible. In September, a Cape Town magistrate who had heard some cases involving PAGAD was shot dead in what appeared to be a planned assassination. Violence also continued to plague KwaZulu-Natal, and several ANC and IFP leaders were killed in what appeared to be political assassinations. One of the worst incidents occurred in November 1999, when eleven people were killed in a shoot-out at a taxi-rank in Empangeni. In July 2000, police shot dead ANC MP Bheki Mkhize at his home near Ulundi during an operation they claimed was a search for illegal weapons. The ICD immediately began an investigation; three public order policemen were arrested and charged with murder.

The government brought a new Refugee Act into force in April 2000, which addressed several concerns about defects in the existing system, while failing to provide asylum seekers with the right to a hearing before those who would adjudicate their case. The government also published a heavily criticized draft migration bill. A very high percentage of people arrested during a police "operation crackdown" in February and March were "suspected illegal immigrants," leading to severe overcrowding at the detention facility where foreigners without papers were held pending deportation. Many of those detained had asylum claims pending, had been granted refugee status, or were South African citizens. Several government officials made statements implying that all undocumented foreigners were involved in criminal activities. In December 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that homosexual couples must be given the same rights to naturalization under immigration law as heterosexuals: in June 2000, the court ruled that a restrictive section of the Aliens Control Act relating to the grant of temporary residence permits to spouses of South African citizens was invalid, and that the government must grant such permits unless good cause existed to refuse.

Defending Human Rights

South Africa's vigorous human rights community continued to monitor adherence to national and international standards. Occasional government hostility to NGO criticism was counteracted by strong collaboration in government-NGO partnerships elsewhere. The constitutionally guaranteed South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) criticized the government in its annual report for often ignoring its recommendations. The Commission on Gender Equality faced substantial internal difficulties during the year, and several key staff resigned. The government reduced the size of the much-criticized Youth Commission in June.

In November 1999, the SAHRC released an interim report on racism in the media, based on two methodologically controversial research papers, and requested responses from the industry. When little response was forthcoming, the commission decided to subpoena editors and others to appear before it, provoking an outcry that this threatened freedom of expression. A compromise was agreed by which the subpoenas were withdrawn and editors voluntarily attended hearings on media racism in March and April 2000. The commission published a final report in August that was less critically received, and made recommendations to reduce racism in the media. In September, the commission hosted a high-profile conference on racism in preparation for the UN World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Forms of Intolerance, to be held in South Africa in 2001.

The Role of the International Community

United Nations

In January 2000, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child considered South Africa's first report to that body. The committee welcomed legal reforms and steps taken to implement them, but expressed concerns about a number of areas, including the juvenile justice system, especially the holding of children in adult detention facilities. South Africa chaired the tenth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Vienna in April 2000. UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers Dato Comaraswamy visited South Africa in May, on a fact-finding mission during which UN technical aid to South Africa was also discussed.

The office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, under a project in operation since April 1999, offered technical assistance to South Africa. A manager for the project was based at the SAHRC's headquarters in Johannesburg. In addition, the Pretoria office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees gave logistical and other support to the SAHRC's work on xenophobia.

South Africa continued to receive substantial international donor funding: an estimated R.760 million during the 1999/2000 financial year (U.S.\$110 million) and R.900 million (U.S.\$116 million) in 2000/2001.

United States

President Mbeki visited the U.S. in May, his first state visit. The U.S. Agency for International Development's Program for South Africa focused on six strategic areas, including democracy and governance, as well as law enforcement. In May, USAID pledged U.S.\$250 million for social development programs over the next five years.

European Union

Under the terms of an "in principle" agreement in December 1999, the E.U. Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa pledged continued funding until September 2003 of human rights and development projects with funds from the European Commission's Programme for Reconstruction and Development in South Africa. Individual E.U. member states also made bilateral contributions to human rights initiatives. In June 2000, E.U. foreign ministers approved a 995 million euro (U.S. \$940.7 million) program. Several European ministers traveled to South Africa during the year. A Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement between the E.U. and South Africa was finally agreed in February 2000, cutting tariffs and liberalizing trade, after years of negotiations. President Mbeki visited the U.K. in May, and attended the third annual meeting of the U.K.-South Africa Forum.

The Commonwealth

In November 1999, South Africa hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Durban; in August the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association met in Cape Town. A number of Commonwealth governments provided assistance for human rights projects, including the Australians and the Canadians.

Relevant Human Rights Watch Reports:

A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights, 10/00

SUDAN

Human Rights Developments

The government of Sudan remained a gross human rights abuser, while rebel groups committed their share of violations. In the seemingly endless seventeen-year civil war, the government stepped up its brutal expulsions of southern villagers from the oil production areas and trumpeted its resolve to use the oil income for more weapons. Under the leadership of President (Lt. Gen.) Omar El Bashir, the government intensified its bombing of civilian targets in the war, denied relief food to needy civilians, and abused children's rights, particularly through its military and logistical support for the Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which held an estimated 6,000 Ugandan children captive on government-controlled Sudanese territory. As for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the principal armed movement of the south and of all Sudan, its forces continued to loot food (including relief provisions) from the population, sometimes with civilian casualties, recruit child soldiers, and commit rape. On both sides, impunity was the rule.

Sudan's human rights record of gross abuses was one factor in the General Assembly vote in October that denied a Security Council to Sudan, nominated by the Organization of African Unity, and instead granted the African seat to Mauritius.

In Khartoum and other government-controlled areas, the Islamist government's repression of political opponents continued. While some openings in civil liberties occurred, and one major opposition party, the Umma Party, returned from exile, these openings did not appear to be uniformly applied. The Umma Party sought more human rights guarantees before it would participate in presidential and legislative elections that the government announced for December 2000.

The government's outreach to exiles appeared to grow out of the internal power struggle within the ruling Islamist party, the National Congress (previously the National Islamic Front or NIF), which the president controlled. Expulsion of the Hassan al Turabi faction led him to create a new political party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), which felt the heat of arrests and injuries in anti-government demonstrations.

Negotiations to end the war appeared fruitless, whatever the forum or venue. The parties remained stalled on the issues of the relation of religion to the state and self-determination. Sudan's Arab and African, Muslim and non-Muslim population is spread between nineteen major ethnic groups and 597 subgroups speaking Arabic and more than 115 indigenous languages.

Government Abuses

Torture and impunity remained a government policy. Security forces continued a campaign of harassment, intimidation, and persecution targeting political opponents and human rights defenders by means of arbitrary searches and arrests, followed by incommunicado and protracted arbitrary detention without judicial review. Security used "non-detention" as a ploy as in prior years: it ordered individuals to report to security headquarters early in the morning and sit there all day, doing nothing. They were released at night but ordered to return the next day.

Two Catholic priests and more than eighteen other defendants who had been tortured to confess to charges of sabotage and conspiracy in 1999 were pardoned in January 2000. Their credible allegations of torture were not investigated. Islamic student militias operating under the protection of the security forces abducted and tortured a number of student activists. Security agents enjoyed de jure and de facto immunity from prosecution. Despite formal complaints by families of torture victims and the U.N. special rapporteur for Sudan, the government did not seriously investigate any cases. A doctor at Atbara hospital demanded an investigation into the torture he suffered at security's hands, but government officials disavowed responsibility, downplaying torture as a personal act committed by security agents whom the state cannot control.

Some sixty or more PNC members were arrested by security and blamed for fomenting a series of September demonstrations where deaths and destruction of public property occurred, as in western Fashir, where one woman student was killed and fourteen injured (as were five police) in a street protest against utility shortages and nonpayment of teachers' salaries.

Press-gang military recruitment of young men and underage boys from buses and public places continued. Demonstrators in Khartoum and other cities participated in anti-conscription protests that damaged government property and banks. Authorities responded with what appeared to be excessive force, killing several students and unemployed.

Conditions in Omdurman Women's Prison remained shocking: chronic overcrowding, lack of sanitation, diseases, and death from epidemics among children who lived with their mothers. The government annually pardoned women, temporarily easing overcrowding before bringing in the next batch of prisoners: in 2000, the government pardoned more than 700 women. These included more than 500 mostly poverty-stricken, illiterate southerners convicted of brewing and selling alcohol to help their families survive.

Public Order Police frequently harassed women and monitored women's dress according to the government's stereotype of Islamic correctness. Public Order Courts remained the state's primary weapon against women striving for freedom and equality: women received summary justice in these courts, often followed immediately by flogging, without effective right to appeal.

In September 2000, the governor of Khartoum State decreed that women would be banned from some public service jobs such as gas station attendant and restaurant and hotel employee. Security forces tear-gassed and beat women demonstrating against the decree, arresting twenty-six of them for trial by Public Order Courts. Even the government-created unions protested and the court suspended the decree in September pending a judicial hearing.

The nongovernmental press exercised more freedom despite arrests of journalists. In March 2000, security authorities held five journalists and a poet for questioning over articles deemed "anti-government" and critical of the armed forces. In August, security forces arrested two journalists from private newspapers, both of which had been shut down several times in 1999 for accusing the government of corruption.

In an encouraging development, in July the government issued exit visas to some political party leaders, advocates, and activists to attend a convention in Kampala, Uganda, also attended by NDA and civil society members, on the future of Sudan and human rights in transition. Representatives of the Masalit in western Sudan denounced new attacks on their people, and on the Dagu, Fur, and Zaghawa, by Arab militias armed, supported, and given immunity from prosecution for their acts by the government. In July, reported massacres of these Africans by Arab militias claimed nineteen, sixteen, and five victims in different incidents.

The government pursued its policy of harassment of Christian churches and believers. Apostasy, or conversion by Muslims to another faith, remained a capital crime. The accelerated top-level discourse of jihad to encourage enlistment for the war against the infidels in central, east and southern Sudan sustained a climate of intolerance.

About twenty security officers stormed and searched the Catholic Combani College compound in July 2000. In early July, a Mexican clerical student was detained and suffered abuse at the hands of security. The Khartoum state government continued to destroy Christian structures such as chapels, schools, and clinics that served the southern population in the city's vast slums. Two of the four million Khartoum residents were people displaced from other parts of the country, most of whom struggled to survive in the informal economy.

War-Related Abuses

Government of Sudan

Fighting spread further into the southern area of Western Upper Nile, inhabited mainly by the African Nuer. The government continued its campaign of creating a cordon sanitaire around new oil fields by forcibly displacing the Nuer population. In addition to aerial bombardment and scorched-earth attacks by government troops, the government armed Nuer proxies to fight against anti-government Nuer. The government routinely banned U.N. relief aircraft from Western Upper Nile on security grounds, although its military campaigns produced tens of thousands of freshly displaced civilians, who were burned and looted out of their homes by pro-government Nuer militia and the government army.

The government's 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement with former rebel forces, headed by Nuer ex-rebel leader Riek Machar, unraveled when Machar, claiming the government had materially breached the agreement, resigned in January 2000 from the government and returned to the bush. He formed a new rebel group. Many Nuer commanders, without Machar's presence, had reached a degree of unity at a conference at Naat, Upper Nile, where on November 4, 1999, they announced they were fighting against the government. That ended in July, when Machar's new rebel group fought in the oil fields against the Nuer troops of Peter Gatdet, who was by then allied with the SPLA. Machar's troops had apparently accepted government arms again.

The warlord syndrome, where human rights were rarely recognized by the local toughs, spread in Upper Nile wherever local commanders could secure direct government funding and arms, serving as government militias.

The Mine Ban Treaty, signed by Sudan in 1997, remained unratified and the government did not destroy antipersonnel landmines as required. It continued to use landmines in some areas, such as the eastern front. The government refused the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to those detained in connection with the conflict; failure to acknowledge holding rebel soldiers prisoner pointed to a continuing government policy of secret summary executions.

The government announced that its new oil revenue, constituting 20 percent of its 2000 revenue, would be used for defense, including an arms factory near Khartoum. Defense spending in dollars increased 96 percent from 1998 to 2000. Not coincidentally, government use of air power and bombing increased.

When SPLA violations of the cease-fire in Bahr el Ghazal temporarily halted the movement of the government's military train, the government counterattacked by bombing not only the cease-fire area, but also the rest of the south, the Nuba Mountains, and the eastern front. In July, 250 bombs hit civilians and their infrastructure in the attacks, which set a new high, according to conservative calculations based on U.N. relief reports. In August, government forces stepped up targeting of relief, health, and school facilities, apparently aiming to deter or shut down the U.N.-led humanitarian operation in the south, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). And despite promises to stop the bombing in September, more government bombs in October hit Catholic church facilities in different locations in Equatoria.

The government bombed a school in the Nuba Mountains in February, killing fourteen, mostly children and one teacher. Although the government gave permission for U.N. needs assessments in the rebel areas of the Nuba Mountains in 1999, only two were completed before the government put a halt to the activities, in the middle of a vaccination campaign.

The government also armed tribal militias of the Arabized Baggara tribes (the murahleen of western Sudan) for use as proxy fighting forces against the Dinka civilian base of the SPLA in Bahr el Ghazal. Although slave-taking became their trademark, the murahleen conducted few successful slave raids in 2000 because the SPLA deployed forces in northern Bahr el Ghazal and armed the Dinka boys guarding the cattle camps. Even so, the government continued to use the murahleen to guard the military train to Wau, from which they attacked villages and looted cattle and food.

Meanwhile, those captured in prior years remained in slavery-like conditions, forced to work hard for no pay; physical punishment and verbal and sexual abuse were common. The numbers of those still in captivity were estimated by different groups to be from 5,000 up. The government denied all slavery allegations, but in May 1999 set up the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC) to address abduction and forced labor. Its members included James Agwäre, a Dinka nongovernmental activist experienced in locating and retrieving Dinka children from slavery. Although the committee retrieved slaves from their owners through local political/tribal intervention, its work was marred by the detention of Agwäre himself several times by local authorities. The government's deliberate decision to not record the identity of the abductors or forced labor owners, let alone prosecute anyone involved, was a serious setback in the fight against abuse of women and children. All the while, Western anti-slavery groups continued to redeem slaves by the thousands, notwithstanding UNICEF's denunciation of the buying of human beings for any purpose.

At an international conference on war-affected children in Canada in September, the Sudanese government was condemned in strong language by the former UNICEF Deputy Director Stephen Lewis, who claimed the government routinely lied to and manipulated the donors. He denounced Sudan's broken promises to facilitate the release of some 6,000 Ugandan children held in LRA camps inside Sudan. His remarks received a standing ovation. Sudan and Uganda agreed in October that the LRA would be disbanded and its camps moved 1,000 kilometers from the Ugandan border, and that the abducted Ugandan children would be returned. Uganda agreed to halt support for the SPLA.

SPLA and Other Rebel Groups

Despite church peacemaking efforts between the Didinga of Chukudum in eastern Equatoria, and the Bor Dinka who dominated the SPLA garrison in Chukudum, hostilities continued. Sometime after the August 1999 cease-fire, the SPLA assigned commanders of local origin to the garrison, but the local population remained reluctant to return to their homes and fields because of the landmines that the SPLA promised to remove but did not.

Even though SPLA leaders promised to stop their troops' looting, the confiscation of relief food from civilians by SPLA soldiers and officers continued. In March 2000, an SPLA commander in Bahr el Ghazal took the entire contents of a relief warehouse, valued at \$500,000, according to an investigation carried out by the SPLA's relief arm and international relief agencies. Several looting incidents, at or after relief food distributions, occurred in eastern Equatoria. When angry civilians on one occasion tried to prevent the SPLA from taking the food, the soldiers fired into the crowd, killing several.

In 2000, negotiations on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the SPLA's Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in SPLA territory—in which the SPLA sought to impose new demands and operating conditions on relief organizations—foundered. Some eleven of forty NGOs operating in SPLA territory refused to sign for fear of compromising their neutrality and safety. They had to withdraw from that territory by the SPLA deadline of March 1, 2000. The SRRA's executive director claimed he did not care if 50,000 or 100,000 southerners died as a result of the NGO pullout. In later months, several nongovernmental organizations signed the MoU or restarted operations in SPLA territory. Some NGOs did not return. Meanwhile the E.U. withheld funding from NGOs who signed the MoU.

Visitors to rebel areas continued to see armed youth who looked younger than eighteen. Cooperation with UNICEF's program for demobilization of child soldiers was uneven. One SPLA commander remobilized several hundred boys when UNICEF failed to provide promised school books and other supplies for the boys. On the eastern front, visitors received credible complaints from military and civilian victims that the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), an NDA member, committed abuses against its soldiers accused of spying or defecting to another rebel group, including summary executions, torture, and detention of prisoners in a pit in the ground. The allegations were denied by the SAF.

Defending Human Rights

While one organization, the National Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy, continued in outspoken defense of political detainees and others, no other independent human rights organization existed in government-controlled areas until a small group, operating with a commercial rather than nonprofit license, started up low profile in mid-2000. Independent attorneys defended those tried for sabotage, conspiracy, and related charges but the judicial system remained useless for security cases. Churches attempted to defend their parishioners' rights, and the Dinka committee retrieving enslaved Dinka children continued its work, under government CEAWC sponsorship. Women's groups, usually considered less threatening, were organized on a small scale and made their voices heard when the Khartoum governor attempted to ban some women's work.

Human rights monitors operated in the SPLA areas of the Nuba Mountains, but there were no human rights organizations in southern rebel-held areas. The Nairobi-based South Sudan Law Society and women's organizations such as Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi (SWAN) raised human rights issues in various forums. The Sudan Human Rights Association, based in Kampala, monitored conditions at Sudanese refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda. The new Sudan Council of Churches in Nairobi (encompassing churches working in rebel areas of Sudan) conducted one other peace and reconciliation meeting, but was slow to reinforce the Nnuli agreement of 1999.

The Role of the International Community

United Nations

The U.N. continued its massive emergency assistance program for Sudan under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan. Several organizations withdrew from OLS in protest of its failure to take a lead in negotiating access on their behalf with the SPLA in the MOU controversy among other things. OLS remained severely underfunded due to donor fatigue. Several U.N. agencies on occasion protested in press statements or quietly the government's denial of humanitarian access and government bombing of relief and other civilian facilities.

In April 2000, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights expressed concern about human rights violations in Sudan by the government and SPLA. It renewed the mandate of the special rapporteur on human rights in Sudan. In October, the General Assembly voted against Sudanese membership on the Security Council and for the membership of an African country with a more credible human rights record, Mauritius.

European Union members continued to urge that greater engagement and a less confrontational approach on human rights would lead to improvements. E.U. countries rushed to do business in the petroleum sector, despite government of Sudan statements that oil development would be put to military use.

But in July, the European Parliament issued a declaration condemning the LRA and the government of Sudan for sponsoring it, and in August the E.U. Presidency issued a declaration expressing deep concern about the government bombing of civilian targets in the south. The ACP-E.U. Parliament also issued a resolution condemning Sudan and the SPLA for human rights violations.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom continued to monitor human rights and raise human rights issues with the government. Domestically, it denied many Sudanese applicants political asylum and issued a visa application form for Sudanese that sought to curb their right to apply for political asylum once they reached the U.K. That form was withdrawn with an apology after being widely denounced. The U.K.'s international commerce agency touted Sudan as a country suitable for investment until the Foreign Office, under pressure, reminded the agency of Sudan's human rights problems.

United States

The United States government's policy of isolating the Sudan government diplomatically proved unworkable. The U.S. worked successfully for months, however, on a unilateral campaign to deny Sudan a seat on the U.N. Security Council.

Congressional conservatives sponsored one-year legislation that permitted the president, at his discretion, to provide food aid to the military members of the NDA, of which the SPLA constituted the largest force. In February 2000, President Clinton declined to authorize food aid to the NDA.

Harry Johnston was appointed U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan in 1999 with a mandate to focus on three areas: human rights, humanitarian issues, and peace negotiations. One of the benchmarks the U.S. administration proposed to the Khartoum government for improving relations was that it call a halt to bombing civilians. While Johnston was still in Khartoum with this message, the government bombed a hospital in the south sponsored by a U.S. nonprofit religious group.

A 1997 executive order imposing stiff sanctions on all financial transactions between U.S. and Sudanese persons and entities remained in effect. The State Department's annual human rights report accused both government and opposition forces of human rights abuses.

A divestment campaign against Talisman Energy Inc., a Canadian company engaged in production and development of oil in Western Upper Nile, was endorsed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The U.S. government balked at another tactic, denial of the use of U.S. capital markets to Sudan and its business partners.

Canada

Canadian church groups and NGOs waged a struggle to force the government to impose sanctions on all Canadian companies doing business with Sudan. Canada's Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, announced in October 1999 that he would send a human rights team to investigate whether oil development, and specifically Talisman Energy Inc., had caused an increase in human rights abuses and exacerbated the conflict. If so, he threatened, the Canadian government would consider imposing sanctions on its companies operating in Sudan. In February 2000, the human rights team headed by John Harker responded affirmatively to both questions after visiting north and south Sudan and Canadian operations there. Sanctions, however, were never imposed.

ZAMBIA

Human Rights Developments

The situation in Zambia improved over the year. The government of President Frederick Chiluba implemented a number of promised economic reforms and promised to quicken the pace of greater democratization. As in past years, abuses of freedom of assembly and association, freedom of expression, and the government's lack of action against torture undermined the more meaningful economic reforms.

The government continued to promise its bilateral donors that it wanted to improve its rights record and there was some progress even while it showed indifference or hostility to public protests at home. Early in May 2000, Minister of Legal Affairs Vincent Malambo met donors to report on the implementation of the government's National Capacity Building Program for Good Governance. Malambo presented a slightly revised document and also discussed the findings of four consultative meetings. Many of the fundamental human rights challenges that Zambia faces were recognized. Minister Malambo met on June 19 with a number of local nongovernmental organizations to discuss their participation in the July 2000 consultative group meeting.

For the first time the consultative group meeting was held in Lusaka, on July 17 and 19, following a full day of consultation on human rights and governance issues on July 16. It was a watershed event. Minister of Finance Katele Kalumba invited civil society groups, including Human Rights Watch, to attend the full meeting, including closed sessions with bilateral donors.

Restrictions on the freedom of association remained in force outside the meeting, where police arrested an opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) member of parliament and nine other constituency officials on July 16 for holding an "unlawful meeting" on June 14.

Opposition parties, NGOs, and other civic interest groups were regularly denied permission to assemble or had their meetings canceled on public security grounds. The ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), in contrast, continued to hold meetings, rallies, and pro-government demonstrations without permits.

Under Zambia's Public Order Act, any group of citizens wishing to hold a public demonstration must notify the police seven days before the demonstration. However, the police abused the law and arbitrarily determined when a gathering could or could not take place. Breaches of the law's provisions on lawful assembly

CARRY A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF SEVEN YEARS IMPRISONMENT. ON MAY 7, 2000, INSPECTOR-GENERAL SAILUS NGANGULA SAID THE POLICE WOULD CONTINUE TO ARREST PEOPLE HOLDING PROCESSIONS WITHOUT PERMITS SINCE DISREGARDING THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT COULD "CREATE ANARCHY" IN ZAMBIA.

OPPOSITION PARTIES, NGOs AND OTHER CIVIC INTEREST GROUPS HAVE REGULARLY BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO ASSEMBLE OR HAD THEIR MEETINGS CANCELED ON PUBLIC SECURITY GROUNDS. THE RULING MOVEMENT FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY (MMD), IN CONTRAST, CONTINUED TO HOLD MEETINGS, RALLIES, AND PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT PERMITS.

ON JANUARY 13, 2000 A JOINT OPPOSITION UPND, UNITED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY (UNIP), AND ZAMBIA ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS (ZAP) DEMONSTRATION IN NDOLA, TO DEMAND THE REINSTATEMENT OF STRIKING DOCTORS WHO WERE DISMISSED, WAS CANCELED AFTER POLICE AT THE LAST MINUTE REVOKED ITS PERMIT. THE AUTHORITIES DEPLOYED RIOT POLICE AT NDOLA CENTRAL HOSPITAL TO ENSURE THE RALLY DID NOT GO AHEAD. ON JANUARY 16, 2000, POLICE IN SOLWEZI ARRESTED AND CHARGED OPPOSITION UPND LEADER ANDERSON MATOKA, SOLWEZI MAYOR LOGAN SIEMENA, AND TWENTY OTHER SENIOR UPND PARTY OFFICIALS ON A CHARGE OF HOLDING A PUBLIC MEETING WITHOUT A PERMIT. MATOKA WAS ARRESTED AT A FUND-RAISING BRAAI (BARBECUE) FOR ADDRESSING THE MEETING. ACCORDING TO THE UPND, THE ARREST WAS DOUBLY ARBITRARY IN THAT POLICE HAD GRANTED UPND NORTHWESTERN PROVINCE CHAIRPERSON WEBSTER MAKONDO PERMISSION TO HOLD THE BRAAI FROM 5:00PM UNTIL LATE. ACCORDING TO A PRESS REPORT, POLICE CHIEF HUDSON BEENZI MAINTAINED THAT WHILE A PERMISSION TO HOLD A BRAAI WAS GIVEN, THIS DID NOT AUTHORIZE MATOKA TO ADDRESS THE GATHERING. THE OPPOSITION UPND CLAIMED THAT THE POLICE REFUSED IT PERMISSION TO HOLD RALLIES IN LUSITV, CHIRUNDU, STAVONGA AND CHIBOMBO DISTRICTS IN JUNE AND IN SHESHEKE IN JULY.

ATTACKS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BY THE ZAMBIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE CONTINUED IN 2000. SIX JOURNALISTS FROM THE PRIVATELY OWNED *Post* NEWSPAPER WERE DETAINED IN MARCH 1999 FOR PUBLISHING A STORY HEADLINED "ANGOLA WORRIES ZAMBIA ARMY." THE STORY CRITICIZED ZAMBIA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY AND PREPAREDNESS IN THE FACE OF A POSSIBLE MILITARY ATTACK FROM ANGOLA. ALL THE REPORTERS, INCLUDING EDITOR-IN-CHIEF FRED M'MEMBE WERE LATER CHARGED WITH "ESPIONAGE." TWO OF THE JOURNALISTS, LUBAST KATUNDU AND AMOS MALUPENGA, WERE ON LEAVE AT THE TIME OF ARREST WHILE RUEBEN PHIRI AND MUKALYA NAMPTO WERE OUT OF THE COUNTRY. THEIR CASE WAS TAKEN BEFORE THE HIGH COURT ON APRIL 16, 1999 AND ON NOVEMBER 1, 1999, TWELVE OTHER *Post* JOURNALISTS APPEARED BEFORE THE HIGH COURT IN LUSAKA ON A CHARGE OF ESPIONAGE. ALL TWELVE PLEADED NOT GUILTY TO THE CHARGE AND WERE AT LIBERTY ON BAIL. ON AUGUST 18, THE STATE DROPPED CHARGES AGAINST ALL THE JOURNALISTS EXCEPT EDITOR-IN-CHIEF FRED M'MEMBE. AN UNEXPLAINED FIRE ON SEPTEMBER 3 AT THE *Post* OFFICES DAMAGED SOME EQUIPMENT WORTH U.S.\$500,000.

ON JANUARY 24, 2000, FOLLOWING PRESSURE FROM THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, THE PRIVATELY-OWNED RADIO PHOENIX ANNOUNCED IT WAS DISCONTINUING A LIVE PHONE-IN PROGRAM, "LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK: THE DOCTOR'S STRIKE." THE PROGRAM WAS SPONSORED BY HUMAN RIGHTS NGO AFRONET TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR STRIKING RESIDENT DOCTORS TO AIR THEIR GRIEVANCES. FOLLOWING AFRONET'S PUBLIC COMPLAINTS ABOUT THIS INCIDENT, THE PROGRAM WAS RESTARTED A FEW DAYS LATER, BUT IT WAS PRERECORDED, EDITED, AND THE PHONE-IN WAS DISCONTINUED.

ON JANUARY 4, 2000, AFTER FIFTY-FOUR-YEARS RESIDENCE IN ZAMBIA, SIXTY-TWO-YEAR-OLD ASIAN AND A BRITISH NATIONAL, MAJID TICKLAY, WAS DEPORTED WITH ONE HOUR'S NOTICE TO BRITAIN AFTER HIS LETTER TO THE *Post* APPEALING TO ZAMBIANS OF ASIAN ORIGIN TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN POLITICS WAS PUBLISHED. THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS, PETER MACHUNGWA, ANNOUNCED IN A PRESS STATEMENT THAT TICKLAY HAD BEEN DEPORTED FOR "SOWING MESSAGES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE ETHNIC DIVISIONS, HATRED, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND ANARCHY AMONG THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY." HE WAS DEPORTED UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION ACT, WHICH GIVES THE MINISTER DISCRETIONARY POWERS TO DEPORT PERSONS WHOSE PRESENCE IS DEEMED "INIMICAL TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST."

TEDDY NONDO CONTINUED TO SERVE AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION DESPITE ACCUSATIONS THAT HE TORTURED SUSPECTS IN 1997. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION RECOMMENDED, IN ITS MARCH 30, 1999 REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE OF DETAINEES FOLLOWING THE 1997 COUP ATTEMPT, THAT OFFICERS ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE OF TORTURE, INCLUDING NONDO, BE RETIRED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, BUT ADVISED AGAINST INSTITUTING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. ARTICLE 15 OF THE ZAMBIA CONSTITUTION FORBIDS TORTURE. A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EVIDENCE OF TORTURE WAS HEADED BY HIGH COURT JUDGE JAPHET BANDA, WHO HAD HIMSELF SENTENCED TO DEATH FIFTY-NINE OF THOSE ACCUSED, ON THE BASIS OF CONFESSIONS ALLEGEDLY RENDERED UNDER TORTURE. IT BEGAN HEARINGS IN LATE 1999. ALL THOSE NAMED IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TORTURE REPORT DENIED THE CHARGE DURING HEARINGS. THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PRESENTED ITS COMPLETED REPORT TO PRESIDENT CHILUBA IN LATE JULY, BUT THE REPORT'S FINDINGS HAD NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC.

Defending Human Rights

IN EARLY 2000, HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs CAME UNDER INCREASING ATTACK FROM THE GOVERNMENT. ON JANUARY 31 MMD CHAIRPERSON FOR INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY VERNON MWAANGA WARNED THAT AFRONET AND THE ZAMBIA INDEPENDENT MONITORING TEAM (ZIMT) WERE A "DANGER TO DEMOCRACY" AND COULD FACE DEREGISTRATION IF THEY CONTINUED "THEIR IRRESPONSIBLE CONDUCT." ON FEBRUARY 2, THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING SERVICES, NEWSTEAD ZIMBA, WARNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE "DRASTIC ACTION" AGAINST TWO NGOs IF THEY DID NOT END THEIR "BETRAYAL" OF ZAMBIA. THE RELATIONSHIP WITH HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs IMPROVED LATER IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING. AFRONET PUBLISHED ITS THIRD DETAILED HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT IN 2000.

The Role of the International Community

THE WORLD BANK'S FIRST EVER CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING IN ZAMBIA IN JULY PROVIDED GREATER TRANSPARENCY, DUE TO GOOD TEAMWORK BETWEEN ZAMBIA'S BILATERAL DONORS, A NEW MORE OPEN TEAM AT THE WORLD BANK, AND SOME POLITICAL RISK TAKING BY THE MINISTER OF FINANCE. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WERE OPENLY DISCUSSED AS INTEGRAL TO THE LARGER CONCEPT OF "GOOD GOVERNANCE" DURING THE MEETING, AND NGO OBSERVERS ATTENDED FOR THE FIRST TIME. SWEDEN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, DENMARK, AND THE U.S. DELIVERED STRONG SPEECHES PUSHING FOR A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. SURPRISINGLY, THE NETHERLANDS WAS MUTED IN VOICING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS. ZAMBIA'S COOPERATING PARTNERS INDICATED THAT THEY HAD PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE SLIGHTLY OVER U.S. \$1 BILLION (WITH U.S. \$355 MILLION FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND IN SUPPORT OF ZAMBIA'S ECONOMIC REFORM AND POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS). A NUMBER OF DONOR COUNTRIES RETAINED PERFORMANCE-RELATED BENCHMARKS FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RELEASE.

THE U.S. WAS NOT A MAJOR DONOR TO ZAMBIA. ITS MAIN FOCUS WAS ON ZAMBIA AS A COUNTRY WITH THREE UNSTABLE NEIGHBORS: ANGOLA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC), AND ZIMBABWE. THE U.S. ALSO CONTINUED TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT FREDERICK CHILUBA'S MEDIATION EFFORTS IN THE WAR IN THE DRC.