

EAST TIMOR: THE COURTS-MARTIAL

Between May 29 and June 6, 1992, nine soldiers and one policeman were tried by military or police courts in Bali for their role in the massacre in East Timor on November 12, 1991 when the Indonesian army opened fire on a crowd of unarmed demonstrators. The trials were open to diplomatic observers and the press; the sentences were light, ranging from eight to eighteen months. The courts-martial do not portray the Indonesian army in a favorable light, but neither do they pierce the secrecy surrounding how the shooting started or what happened to the bodies of those killed. The glimpse they offer into military behavior on November 12 is a carefully managed one, which serves to strengthen the "official version" of events, but even the Indonesian press is openly skeptical of that version. As far as the Indonesian government is concerned, the case against the military is now closed. Asia Watch calls on the international community to continue to press the Indonesian government for a full accounting of military actions before, during and after the demonstration.

Background

On November 12, Indonesian troops turned their guns on thousands of East Timorese who had marched from a church on the waterfront of Dili, the capital, to a cemetery in the Santa Cruz area of the city where a supporter of East Timorese independence, Sebastiao Gomes, had been buried two weeks earlier.¹ The Indonesian government initially maintained that only 19 had died; a government commission later raised the death toll to "about 50"; 90 were reported missing; and the number of wounded "exceeded 91."² Unofficial estimates put the death toll well over 100, with many of the victims dying of beatings or other abuse suffered after the shooting. To this day, no one knows what happened to the missing, or to the bodies of those killed; only 19 graves were ever officially found.

The courts-martial in Bali of soldiers implicated in the massacre appear to represent the final chapter in the Indonesian government's moves to account for the killings, the last in a series of measures designed to defuse international outrage, but which also strengthened President Suharto's image as a master manipulator and exposed rifts in the Indonesian army. None of the steps taken by the government appear to have been aimed primarily at uncovering the truth.

¹ For a full description of events on November 12, see Asia Watch, "East Timor: The November 12 Massacre and Its Aftermath," Vol.2, No. 26, December 12, 1991.

² "Advance Report of the National Commission of Inquiry into 12 November 1991 Incident in Dili," unofficial translation distributed by Indonesian embassy in Washington, December 26, 1991.

The first major step was President Suharto's appointment of a National Commission of Inquiry (*Komisi Penyelidik Nasional* or KPN) on November 18. Members of the commission were hampered by military obstructionism, the fear of witnesses to come forward to testify and the team's own lack of independence. On December 26, they produced a short "advance report" which blamed the victims but criticized army excesses. The report noted three different versions of how the troops opened fire: troops in anti-riot formation aimed directly into the crowd; shooting started in self-defense after fighting erupted; and the shooting came from unorganized security forces who were neither in proper formation nor proper uniform. It made no attempt to assess the relative validity of the three versions.³

The second step was the highly publicized sacking of two senior military commanders on December 28, Major General Sintong Panjaitan, commander of the KODAM IX/Udayana regional military command based in Bali, and Brigadier General Rudolf Warouw, commander of operations (Pangkolakops) in East Timor.

The third step was President Suharto's instruction to the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, Edy Sudradjat, to appoint a Council of Military Honor (*Dewan Kehormatan Militer*) to investigate military behavior on November 12 and recommend appropriate disciplinary action. The Council was in operation from January 2 to February 20, 1992 and on February 27, it issued a press release, announcing that six officers had been disciplined, including three dismissed from the army altogether, two removed from their jobs in the army bureaucracy but kept on active duty, and one temporarily reassigned but kept on active duty.

Although the names of the officers were never made public, the March 14 issue of *Editor* reported that the three "honorably discharged" were probably General Warouw, Colonel Gatot Purwanto, assistant to Warouw for intelligence, and the Sector C commander responsible for Dili, Colonel Binsar Aruan. The officer temporarily removed from his position may be Sintong Panjaitan, now at Harvard University to study business.

The Council release said that eight others, including four officers, would be prosecuted, according to the press release, and five other officers would be further investigated.⁴ In fact, the entire Operations Command headed by Warouw was purged, with every single one of the six assistants transferred out of East Timor after the massacre. The commanders of the district-level KODIM and the sub-regional KOREM were also moved out.⁵

The government's failure to move forward with the prosecutions promised in the Council's press release became a new focus of international criticism, particularly as dozens of East Timorese independence

³ See Asia Watch, "Asia Watch Criticizes Commission Report on East Timor," Vol.4, No.1, January 3, 1992.

⁴ Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Markas Besar, Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, "Penjelasan Kepala Staf TNI-AD Tentang Hasil Kerja Dewan Kehormatan Militer dan Rencana Tindak Lanjut," February 27, 1992.

⁵ Besides Gatot Purwanto and Binsar Aruan, those purged include Assistant for Operations Colonel Dolfi Rondonuwu; Assistant for Logistics Colonel Sutopo; Assistant for Territorial Affairs Colonel Michael Suwito; Assistant for Planning Colonel Tutut Subari; Commander of Korem 164 Colonel J.P.Sepang who was also Deputy Operations Commander under Warouw; and Lieutenant Colonel Wahyu Hidayat of KODIM 1627.

supporters were behind bars in Dili and Jakarta, some of them facing subversion charges, for participating in non-violent demonstrations. Most had no access to friends, family or lawyers.⁶

A military spokesman promised in early May that the courts-martial would take place before Indonesia's quinquennial exercise in heavily-controlled parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 9. When they finally began on May 29, the campaign domestically and events in Yugoslavia and Thailand internationally diverted public attention. The verdicts came as something of an anticlimax, in part because the country was otherwise occupied, but also because all those tried were junior, and their testimony contained few revelations.

The Courts-Martial

The nine soldiers and one police officer prosecuted can be divided into three groups: five enlisted men who were all based at the KODIM and who allegedly on their own fired on demonstrators; officers associated with Battalion 303 whom the KODIM commander sent to the demonstration and who failed to prevent their men from firing; and two men accused of assaulting wounded demonstrators. The nine soldiers were accused of violating Article 103 of the military code by disobeying or exceeding orders; the police corporal was charged with assault.

All five of the enlisted men tried had been stationed at KODIM 1627. Three of them, First Sergeants Udin Syukur and Aloysius Rani and Master Sergeant Petrus Saul Mada, all testified at their trials that they had been ordered by the KODIM commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wahyu Hidayat, not to leave the KODIM as long as the demonstration was underway, but they disobeyed after an Indonesian officer, Major Gerhan Lantara, and an East Timorese soldier, Private Dominggus, were brought to the KODIM, bleeding from their wounds after having been stabbed by demonstrators. (The stabbing incident occurred early on in what was otherwise a non-violent march.)

Udin took a G-3 rifle; when he returned to the KODIM, it was missing two bullets. He said he fired the rifle after one of the demonstrators threatened him with a knife.⁷ Sergeant Rani said he grabbed a weapon and went to the Santa Cruz cemetery by taxi, where he fired on a demonstrator carrying a Fretilin flag. He told the court he had been overcome with emotion after seeing the two wounded soldiers at the KODIM. All three sergeants said they rushed out of the KODIM so quickly that they did not have time to put on their uniforms and arrived at the cemetery in a state of partial dress.

Privates Mateus Maya and Afonso de Jesus were East Timorese stationed at the KODIM who were assigned to drive Major Gerhan to the hospital. They were never at the Santa Cruz cemetery but allegedly fired on demonstrators en route to the hospital.

The five enlisted men were tried in Rindam (Resimen Induk Daerah Militer) Udayana in Tabanan, Bali (see Appendix 1).

⁶ See Asia Watch, "Asia Watch Calls for International Monitors at Trials of East Timorese," Vol. 4, No.2, January 9, 1992.

⁷ "Dua Perwira dan Tiga Bintara ABRI Dihukum dalam Kasus Dili", *Kompas*, June 4, 1992.

The second group consists of the three second lieutenants: Sugiman Mursanib (spelled Mursanip in the court documents); John Harlan Aritonang and Handrianus Eddy Sunaryo. Mursanib, who joined the army in 1965, was the head of the social and political section of the KODIM (Kasi Sospol), and under normal circumstances, reported directly to Hidayat, the KODIM commander. The night before the massacre, he had been out all night on "sweeps." He was back at the KODIM in the morning, without having slept, and it was only some 10 minutes after the demonstrators had passed by the KODIM headquarters that Colonel Hidayat ordered him to lead a three-platoon force company totalling 72 men in all from the KODIM to follow and disperse the marchers.⁸ Aritonang, who previously had been decorated for capturing a Fretilin leader, Maukalo, and Sunaryo led platoons II and III respectively from Battalion 303; the third platoon was from Brimob 5486.

Without putting on his uniform, Mursanib rushed out; one fault that was cited in his trial was that while the Brimob unit, presumably with some training in riot control, was at the front when the force left the KODIM, Mursanib moved the two army platoons to the front near the cemetery.

It was at the cemetery that Mursanib gave the orders, supposedly to Lieutenant Aritonang, to advance. He in turn was receiving orders via radio from Colonel Binsar Aruan, the now-sacked commander for the Dili area. Both Aritonang and Sunaryo gave orders to their troops to advance, and when they heard firing from other forces at the cemetery, they opened fire too. Aritonang testified that he tried to prevent his men from firing but to no avail. It was later found that six men from his platoon had fired 60 bullets. Sunaryo was faulted for not having recognized that the order from Mursanib was only meant for Aritonang's platoon. Five of his men also opened fire and shot 33 bullets.⁹ Aritonang, according to one press account, was cited for failing to give the orders to his troops to get in formation.¹⁰ He was also charged with failing to control his subordinates, as were Sunaryo and Mursanib. The Brimob platoon leader, First Lieutenant (Police) Rudolf A. Rodjo, was not charged.

All three officers in the second group were tried by the Military Court III-4 in Denpasar, Bali.

Two men make up the last group. Lieutenant Yohanes Alexander Penpada, 48, the deputy intelligence officer for KOREM 164, was sentenced to eight months for disobeying orders. He had been assigned to report on how the demonstration developed, but after he learned about the stabbing of Gerhan Lantara, his superior, he testified that he got a ride back to the KOREM and went from there to his home. He picked up his pistol and went back to the cemetery where injured demonstrators were still lying. He said he slapped one on the face, but he denied firing the pistol. Penpada was sentenced to eight months by Military Court III-4.

Police Corporal Marthin Alau, 35, the man who slashed the ear of a demonstrator, has been named in an eyewitness report as having deliberately killed two other demonstrators. Those killings did not come up at his trial. Alau told the court members of his family had been killed by Fretilin. He was sentenced to 17

⁸ "2 Pama ABRI Dijatuhi Hukuman 26 Bulan Penjara", *Sinar Pagi*, June 4, 1992 and personal communication from Indonesia.

⁹ "Letda SM Dalam Kasus Dili Mulai Dimahmilkan," *Suara Karya*, June 3, 1992.

¹⁰ "Dua Perwira dan Tiga Bintara ABRI Dihukum dalam Kasus Dili," *Kompas*, June 4, 1992.

months in a trial that took place in the regional police headquarters in Bali.

Penpada and Alau were the only two persons indicted for involvement in attacks on demonstrators that took place after the shootings: the KPN report indicated that of the 91 wounded acknowledged as having been taken to the Wira Husada Military hospital, 49 were injured by stabbing or blunt instruments.

What Do the Courts-martial Reveal?

Taken together, the trial testimonies paint a picture of a sloppy, ill-prepared, ill-informed, poorly disciplined and poorly led army, with some soldiers reacting spontaneously to the stabbing of their colleagues and others apparently panicking amid sounds of shooting at the cemetery.

It is not a pretty picture of the Indonesian armed forces, but it is also a partial and misleading one. One of the eyewitnesses to the massacre testified that troops in dark brown uniforms opened fire methodically. Those uniforms would have been Brimob police, but no Brimob member was indicted. The soldiers from the Battalion 303 platoons testified to firing taking place before and after they themselves stopped shooting. The company led by Lieutenant Mursanib appears to have been one of the two companies sent as reinforcements after it became clear that the demonstration was larger than anyone expected; its dispatch to the scene was clearly a last-minute undertaking. But which troops were already there when Mursanib's men arrived, and why have they not been named or indicted? The June 13 issues of two of the leading newsweeklies in Jakarta, *Tempo* and *Editor* openly raise the question of who the unnamed "uncontrolled forces" (*pasukan liar*) were which were at Santa Cruz when Mursanib and his men arrived.

Even if some spontaneous firing took place after the initial attack, there was no spontaneity about the cover-up afterward, and no new information was produced by the trials about who gave orders to dispose of bodies from Santa Cruz and from the morgue at the military hospital.

The "spontaneous reaction" theory is only one of a number of possible ways of explaining the massacre and not necessarily the most plausible. This is not to assert that the ten men lied; even assuming their testimony was the unvarnished truth, they represent only a very small part of a very complex whole. The question arises as to how these men were singled out for prosecution.

If, as some observers believe, the ten men were tried because they were named in the KPN report (and Asia Watch cannot confirm that they were, since the full report has not been made public), two facts must be kept in mind: most East Timorese were terrified of giving testimony to the KPN, and the local military tried to obstruct the team's investigation. Individuals would have been identified either because East Timorese were willing to name them; because the local military wanted them prosecuted; or because their involvement was too obvious to be ignored.

Shortly after the massacre, Asia Watch obtained an eyewitness account of the stabbing of Private Dominggus, an East Timorese whom a group of demonstrators regarded as having betrayed his own people by serving with the Indonesian army. A similar animosity might have made witnesses testify to the involvement of Mateus Maya, Afonso de Jesus and Marthin Pereira Alau.

Battalion 303 came in for close scrutiny immediately after the massacre and was the first ordered transferred out of Dili, in late November 1991. Colonel Binsar Aruan, with whom the convicted Lieutenant Mursanib was in constant communication at the cemetery, was one of the officers sacked in the aftermath of

the killings. Given the prominent presence of 303 soldiers at Santa Cruz, a few key indictments may have been inevitable -- and Mursanib was clearly visible in the video footage shown around the world.

The three sergeants at the KODIM who rushed out half-dressed after Gerhan Lantara was brought in bleeding, and the behavior of Lieutenant Penpada in reaction to the wounding of his superior are the core of the spontaneity theory.

A different theory has been put forward by the editors of *Indonesia*, the journal published by Cornell University. In the April 1992 issue, the editors suggest that a local mafia had been established by middle-ranking Indonesian officers who had no real prospect of promotion and every reason to milk East Timor while they could through business deals, speculation and racketeering.¹¹ The operational commander for East Timor at the time of the massacre, Brigadier General Rudolf Warouw, had embarked on a campaign to clean up corruption in the military shortly after he took office in December 1989, angering the mafia bosses in the process, according to the Cornell analysis. These bosses, working with local Apodeti (pro-integration) supporters had as a major goal the downfall of Warouw and the popular governor of East Timor who supported him, Mario Carrascalao. A key figure in this operation would have been Lieutenant Coronel Prabowo, President Suharto's son-in-law, whose links to Apodeti were well-established. According to this theory, these middle officers working with Apodeti would have had an interest in using the demonstration on November 12 to discredit Warouw and thus leave their business operations intact. Governor Carrascalao himself has suggested that the demonstration was the result of collaboration between these two forces, but both the demonstration and the response, domestic and international, were beyond what the plotters could have imagined. The Cornell analysis stresses the significance of the mass purge of the "all influential officers in the East Timor apparatus, at the Korem level and within Dili itself, striking right at the heart of the mafia..."¹²

The prominent role of the KODIM and the indictment of the East Timorese might lend support to this theory, but a more rigorous investigation of KODIM and KOREM commanders, Hidayat and Colonel J.P. Sepang would be necessary to test it. Both have been replaced since the massacre; neither appeared as witnesses at the courts-martial, although Hidayat submitted written testimony.

The Charges and Verdicts

The nature of the charges suggest that the investigations of the men involved were not thorough. The indicted men served as witnesses in each other's cases; there were no civilian witnesses called, except in the case of Corporal Alau where the victim whose ear had been slashed appeared at the trial. Even given the reluctance to testify for fear of reprisals, surely a few of the 49 wounded by stabbing or clubbing and afterwards brought to the military hospital might have been able to identify their attackers.

In preparing this report, Asia Watch has not had access to the Indonesian military code. But a comparative perspective from the United States may be instructive. To bring a charge of murder or manslaughter against a soldier in the U.S., there would have to be evidence that the defendant deliberately

¹¹ "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," *Indonesia*, No.53, April 1992, pp.6-9.

¹² Ibid, p.8

or through negligence killed a particular victim. Given the way the demonstrators were massed and the lack of witnesses willing to testify, even if the military tribunals had been fair, it might have been difficult to match victims to perpetrators. It is also true that if a platoon leader had been accused of failing to control his subordinates, it is possible that charges would not have been brought against the subordinates.

But a host of lesser charges, ranging from assault with a dangerous weapon to willfully discharging a firearm, could have been brought against soldiers who fired into a crowd in such a way as to have been likely to produce bodily injury or death. If the three non-East Timorese enlisted men who allegedly rushed to the cemetery after seeing Major Lantara wounded had urged each other to go, a charge of conspiracy could have been brought in connection with one of the charges mentioned above. In the U.S., a charge of assault with a deadly weapon in the context of a large demonstration with a perceived threat of violence against security forces could produce a sentence of four years; the maximum would be eight years. Such extrapolations to a different legal system in a radically different political context have admittedly only limited use, but the outrage against the light sentences of eight to eighteen months seems justified. It is also worth noting that no dishonorable discharges would take place in the U.S. without a court-martial. The peremptory dismissal of senior officers without any kind of judicial procedure may be another way of suppressing evidence.

The leniency of the sentences also raises questions about how far the testimony of those wounded was sought in the prosecutions of the military or whether the prosecution made any attempt to establish a linkage between the pro-integrationists who incited a brawl in front of the Motael Church on October 28 and the shooting that occurred in Santa Cruz on November 12. The fact that the ten men indicted lend credence to the "spontaneous reaction" theory may reflect the lack of political will on the part of the military prosecutors (*oditur*) to dig deeper.

Trials of East Timorese Civilians

The sentences given the soldiers are inevitably being compared with those handed down to East Timorese civilians in Dili and Jakarta. There are 13 trials underway in Dili, five in connection with the Motael Church incident of October 28 and eight in connection with the November 12 demonstration. As of mid-June, only two verdicts had been handed down. Juvencio de Jesus Martins, 30, received a sentence of six years, 10 months for taking part in clandestine meetings of resistance supporters to prepare for the visit of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation. Filomeno da Silva Pereira, 34, was accused of taking part in the same meetings and reproducing a cassette of a speech by East Timorese guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmao. He was given a term of five years and eight months in prison. The sentences requested in the other cases ranged from four years to life.

In a case still in process, Carlos dos Santos Lemos, aged 31, is facing a ten-year sentence for taking photographs during the November 12 demonstration, allegedly on assignment as a journalist for Fretilin. Dos Santos intended to send the photographs to Australia, Portugal and Japan, according to the prosecutor, in order to attract support for the independence movement. Dos Santos is also accused of being a member of the Freilin Executive Committee and as such, taking part in underground meetings to plan the November 12 demonstration. He is being defended by court-appointed lawyer, Ponco Atmono, S.H., a Dili resident.

Five other East Timorese accused of planning or taking part in a demonstration in Jakarta on November 19 to protest the Dili massacre a week earlier already have been sentenced. Two were tried on

subversion charges and received sentences of nine and ten years respectively. Three others who took part in the demonstration received terms ranging from six to thirty months. A complete list of those on trial and the sentences sought by the prosecution appears as Appendix 2.

The government's xenophobia and determination to punish those seen as having fuelled the international outcry, evident in the dos Santos case, was also evident in the trials of Fernando Araujo and Joan Freitas da Camara in Jakarta. While both were accused of contacts with Fretilin through the East Timorese students' organization, RENETIL, the judges focused on their contacts with foreign organizations and the fact that they had received donations of money from Australia and England. An Asia Watch report on the Jakarta trials is forthcoming.

Conclusions

The courts-martial help give the Indonesian government an appearance of even-handedness. Indeed, journalists in Jakarta were speculating in February, just before the Council of Military Honor's press release was issued, that an equal number of civilians and military would be prosecuted. They were right: the five students in Jakarta and eight resistance supporters in Dili due for trial in connection with the November 12 massacre and subsequent protests matched the eight officers and men scheduled for indictment and five others under investigation noted in the Council release. (The police corporal and one of the two East Timorese privates were apparently not included in the Council's formulation.)

But justice is not the same as even-handedness. The fact that any investigation and any courts-martial at all took place is a step forward for the Indonesian government and should be recognized as such, but there has been no real accounting for the deaths and disappearances that took place on November 12. None of those convicted in late May and early June started the shooting; none organized the disposal of bodies or planned the cover-up which stressed the factor of spontaneity. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the courts-martial were stage-managed for international consumption, particularly when documents which might shed further light on events in Dili, such as the full KPN report and the full report of the Council of Military Honor, have been kept under wraps.

The Indonesian government should be pressed for a fuller response to the Dili massacre. The July 16 meeting in Paris of a new World Bank-led consortium of donor countries which provide aid to Indonesia is one opportunity to do so; the August meetings of the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations (New York) and the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Geneva) are two more; and the Non-Aligned Movement summit in September in Jakarta is a fourth. The United Nations meetings would be particularly appropriate fora to press for the release of a confidential report submitted to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali by his personal envoy, Amos Wako, who visited East Timor in February to assess the aftermath of the massacre and wrote what insiders characterize as a blistering critique of the Indonesian government.

Embassies in Jakarta should continue to ask questions about the dead and missing. They should express concern over the cruel and unusual punishment meted out to East Timorese civilians in Jakarta and Dili. They should make it clear to their counterparts in the Indonesian government that they have reservations about the way the courts-martial were conducted, in terms of who was selected for trial and as witnesses. They should strongly urge the publication of the full KPN and Council of Military Honor reports.

The Indonesian press clearly does not believe the official version of what happened on November 12; the skepticism of the international community should be no less.

APPENDIX I

The Courts-Martial

1. Pvt. Mateus Maya
Sentenced to 8 months on May 30, 1992.
2. Pvt. Afonso de Jesus
Sentenced to 8 months on May 30, 1992.
3. 1st Corporal (Police) I.P. Marthin Alau, 35
Sentenced to 17 months.
4. 1st Sgt. Aloysius Rani
Sentenced to 18 months on June 3, 1992.
5. 1st Sgt. Udin Syukur
Sentenced to 18 months on June 3, 1992.
6. 1st Sgt. Petrus Saul Mada
Sentenced to 12 months on June 3, 1992.
7. 2nd Lieut. Sugiman Mursanib, 48
Sentenced to 14 months on June 3, 1992.
8. 2nd Lieut. John Aritonang, 26
Sentenced to 12 months on June 3, 1992.
9. 2nd Lieut. Handrianus Eddy Sunaryo
Sentenced to 12 months on June 5, 1992.
10. 2nd Lieut. Yohanes Alexander Panpada, 48
Sentenced to 8 months.

APPENDIX II

TRIALS OF EAST TIMORESE CIVILIANS

NAME	PROSECUTION REQUEST	SENTENCE
A. In Jakarta:		
1. Fernando de Araujo		9 years
2. Joao Freitas da Camara		10 years
3. Virgilio da Silva Gutteres		2 yrs, 6 mos.
4. Agapito Cardoso		10 months
5. Dominggus Bareto		6 months
B. In Dili, in connection with November 12:		
1. Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, 29	life	
2. Francisco Miranda Branco, 41	15 years	
3. Jacinto des Neves Raimundo Alves, 34	8 years	5 years, 8 mos.
4. Filomeno da Silva Pereira, 34	10 years	6 years, 10 mos.
5. Juvencio de Jesus Martins, 30	10 years	
6. Carlos dos Santos Lemos, 31	10 years	
7. Bonifacio Mago		not yet on trial
8. Saturnino Da Costa Belo		not yet on trial
C. In Dili, in connection with October 28:		
1. Boby Xavier, 18		4 years
2. Joao dos Santos, 23	not yet requested	
3. Aleixo da Silva alias Cobra, 22		4 years
4. Jacob da Silva		?
5. Bonifacio Bareto		?

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News from Asia Watch is a publication of Asia Watch, an independent organization created in 1985 to monitor and promote internationally recognized human rights in Asia. The Chair of Asia Watch is Jack Greenberg and the Vice Chairs are Harriet Rabb and Orville Schell. Sidney Jones is Executive Director.

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