publications

Prosecutors

Prosecutors to Take the Lead in Investigating and Managing Cases

PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED

One of the key criticisms directed toward national and international prosecutors in the post-March 2004 period was that they failed to engage properly with their new responsibilities under the criminal procedure code to take the lead in investigations and to direct the work of the police in support of those investigations.26 Even though this failure could have been partly explained by insufficient preparation and training, judges and officials we interviewed blamed prosecutors—national ones in particular—for being passive and, in the words of one official, “transferring what police give them, [without doing] any investigations.”27

Human Rights Watch’s recent research indicates that national and international prosecutors now appear to take a more active role in investigating and managing cases, and in cooperating with the police.28 This is largely because the Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI) has trained national and international prosecutors to understand their role under the new procedure code, emphasizing the importance of taking the lead and developing effective cooperation with the KPS.29 A senior KJI official told Human Rights Watch that while the impact of the training has yet to be formally assessed, preliminary observations indicate that training for prosecutors has improved their professionalism and understanding of their own role.30

Improved Collaboration between National and International Prosecutors

PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED

National and international prosecutors have been criticized for failing to collaborate with one another, with each group dealing with separate portfolios. As the March 2004 cases demonstrate, this can impede effective investigations. Lack of collaborative efforts also makes it harder for national prosecutors to acquire the skills necessary for leading complex cases involving organized crime or political violence.

Collaboration has been hampered by UNMIK’s decision in 2003 to locate all international prosecutors (and judges) in Pristina, supposedly in order to reduce costs and streamline communication within UNMIK.31

There have been informal efforts to increase the level of consultation between the national and international prosecutors, as well as the police. According to a local prosecutor interviewed by Human Rights Watch, informal cooperation between international and local prosecutors is now commonplace, but international prosecutors “still have the last word in deciding which authority should handle the case and are not really obliged to follow [local prosecutors’] recommendations.”32

International prosecutors can take over a case from a local prosecutor on their own initiative, as well as in response to a request from a local prosecutor.33 According to a local prosecutor interviewed by Human Rights Watch, it is not unusual for local prosecutors to disagree with decisions by international prosecutors to take over a case.34

At this writing, a pilot training program is underway, aimed at addressing the gap between the national and international prosecutors. A US-funded mentoring scheme in the Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office (KSPO) began in the spring of 2007, in which national prosecutors work with the lead international prosecutor. Emphasis is placed on mentoring and co-working schemes with selected national prosecutors in Pristina, although the plan is to replicate the scheme outside Pristina in the future.35 Even though such pilot schemes are welcome and contribute to forging better collaboration between international and national prosecutors, such collaboration must become commonplace for the situation to improve significantly.

As with the police, the fundamental tension between entrusting national prosecutors with sensitive portfolios on the one hand and protecting data and witnesses on the other remains unresolved. The reluctance on the part of international prosecutors to involve national prosecutors in “sensitive” investigations makes it difficult for them to develop the capacity to take on such investigations.




26 Human Rights Watch, Not on the Agenda, p. 45.

27 Ibid., p. 46.

28 Human Rights Watch interview with an UNMIK Department of Justice official, Pristina, July 18, 2007, and Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a national prosecutor, January 22, 2008.

29 Human Rights Watch interview with an international prosecutor, Pristina, July 18, 2007.

30 Human Rights Watch email correspondence with a senior official of the Kosovo Judicial Institute, February 5, 2008.

31 Human Rights Watch interview with an UNMIK Department of Justice official, Pristina, July 17, 2007.

32 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a local prosecutor, January 22, 2008.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Human Rights Watch interview with an international prosecutor, Pristina, July 18, 2007.