IV. Field Engagement

A. Overview

Resonance with affected communities is critical to the court’s success. Justice can have immeasurable benefits to ensuring that victims obtain redress and to helping increase respect for the rule of law, especially in war-torn societies. But these benefits cannot be realized unless efforts to hold perpetrators to account are understood and appreciated among affected communities. At the same time, with the International Criminal Court based far from where the crimes that it tries were committed, the court runs the risk of seeming remote and of little consequence to the communities most affected.

Within this context, efforts by the ICC to make its work accessible and meaningful to affected communities are essential. The reality that the ICC will conduct only a limited number of trials in each situation that it investigates makes such efforts all the more important. There are a range of specific activities, addressed elsewhere in this report, through which the ICC can effectively maximize its impact with local populations. These include outreach, communications, and participation by victims in the judicial process.346 A crucial way to facilitate such activities and to bridge the gap between the ICC’s base in The Hague and affected communities is through “field engagement.” Field engagement encompasses both a substantive, sustained ICC presence in or as close as possible to situation countries and an approach by the ICC that prioritizes effective interaction with affected communities in court policy and practice.

As important as it is, field engagement involves major logistical and security obstacles. These include the remote location of target communities, lack of infrastructure, poor transport options, limited communication networks, and general insecurity in situations of ongoing conflict. The fact that the court lacks the deep-rooted familiarity of a national court poses additional challenges.347 With the court operating in polarized communities that are in or recovering from conflict, those who are threatened by the court can be expected to do their utmost to tarnish it. Aside from the need to respond to such misinformation, hostility to the court’s work may also create security risks for staff and others associated with the ICC. These varied challenges are only intensified by the ICC’s unprecedented involvement in multiple complex situations at the same time.348

Since its establishment, the ICC has made gradual, but very positive progress toward developing proper policies and practice with regard to field engagement. At the same time, further enhancements are needed. Given the challenges, this is likely to be a longer-term effort. Political and financial support from states parties is also essential. The following section details developments in the court’s field engagement to date and makes recommendations where we believe particular changes should be made.

B. Field offices: Key to ICC contact with affected communities

Human Rights Watch believes that one of the most important ways to ensure that the ICC has adequate interaction with affected communities is through the establishment of ICC offices in situation countries, ideally both in capitals and closer to affected communities. If security circumstances make this impossible, such offices should be located as close as possible to the situation country.

Field offices can support and enable efficient work by Hague-based ICC staff when they travel to the country. But field offices also can dramatically enrich the breadth and quality of ICC activities vis-à-vis affected communities. Given the complex and varied cultures, contexts, and languages encompassed by the multiple countries in which the ICC operates simultaneously, a “one size fits all” approach will not be effective. At the same time, it is simply not possible for staff in headquarters to gain deep knowledge of every country situation. Field offices are, thus, key to enable strategies that are properly tailored to the situation.349 Field-based staff, especially national staff, can have a more nuanced understanding of the environment in each country. They can also conduct activities on a far more consistent and regular schedule than if Hague-based staff are solely responsible for the work.

Field offices can, moreover, serve as a much needed “face of the ICC” in situation countries. As a place that affected communities can look to for basic information about the ICC and as a point of contact with the court, field offices can help the ICC to become less of an abstract, far-flung notion. Field offices also will be well placed to contribute to efforts by the court to leave a legacy in the countries where the court is active, such as through targeted initiatives to promote positive complementarity.350

1. Establishment and functioning of field offices: A slow beginning

Much of the early thinking at the ICC was that field offices were unnecessary. Especially within the Office of the Prosecutor, it was felt that investigation activities in-country could be conducted effectively with trips from The Hague. It was also felt that investigators would move relatively quickly from investigations in one situation to the next, making field offices an extraneous expense. It was, furthermore, believed that an ongoing field presence could compromise confidential and sensitive investigative and witness protection work by making the court too visible. To avoid this anticipated detrimental impact, the OTP favored the ICC having a “low-profile” during investigations, which included avoiding an on-the-ground presence.351 As a result, field offices were not proposed in any of the ICC’s initial budgets.352

The OTP’s thinking began to shift, however, as the difficulty of conducting operations without an ongoing field presence and support became clear. The ability to react quickly to developments in the field—for example in investigations and witness protection—came to be seen as one important basis for having field offices. Joint reconnaissance missions conducted by the OTP and Registry to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda in August 2004 seemed to have helped solidify OTP support for field offices.

Following this shift, the ICC’s first field offices were set up beginning in 2005. Although the ICC’s proposed budget for 2005 did not include field offices, the Registry prepared a last-minute proposal following the reconnaissance missions. 353 Given the late nature of the request, it was not approved by the Assembly of States Parties. However, the assembly signaled that the court’s newly established contingency fund could be used for this purpose, paving the way for the establishment of field offices.354 A field operations section of the Registry was also created in 2005.355

Because of the hard work of Registry staff, field offices have been established in the face of steep logistical obstacles. These included the challenge of moving equipment and setting up communications networks in sometimes remote areas. For northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, offices were established in the respective national capitals, Kampala and Kinshasa. For Darfur, it was not possible to open a field office in-country, and, thus, a field office was established in Abeché in neighboring Chad, where many refugees of the Darfur conflict have fled. Offices were later established in Bunia, DRC, and N’djamena, Chad. Most recently, the ICC opened a field office for its fourth situation in October 2007 in Bangui, Central African Republic.

Initially, field offices were viewed primarily as a way to support sensitive activities, namely investigations and witness protection. However, the work conducted by field-based staff has expanded over time. This was partly the result of increased support by states parties for the Registry’s primary role in handling the court’s administrative and logistical needs in the field and the recognition of the importance of outreach in situation countries.356 As a result, the court has gradually recruited international and local field-based staff to work in the field offices on the following areas: outreach; victims’ participation; the Trust Fund for Victims; witness protection; investigative support; and assistance to ICC staff, including high-level officials, who travel from The Hague. An international field office manager and rotating international security officers also work in each of the field offices.

Efforts to establish the offices began slowly, and the operations and staffing were initially quite limited. Although staff were hired in 2006, it was only in 2007 that staffing became more substantial. This is partly because funds for certain positions requested in the 2006 budget only became available in mid-2006, funding for other positions was not requested until the 2007 budget, and the difficulty of finding qualified staff for field-based positions.357

There have been many positive effects of the opening of field offices. To cite only a couple of examples, staff based in the field have been invaluable to the distribution and collection of victims’ participation forms and contact with potential victim participants.358 They also have been a key source of information as to questions that are likely to arise from local populations in regard to victims’ participation and court outreach activities.

Unfortunately, field offices have not always been visible. Consistent with the OTP’s “low-profile approach” and also concerns over security of court staff, the field offices have operated rather secretly until recently. The court did not publicize the existence of field offices or publicly identify the offices at their locations.359 We can appreciate the legitimate need to maintain secrecy in investigations and to ensure security for ICC staff and witnesses or those who may be associated with the ICC. There is, nevertheless, a real tension between reaching affected communities and maintaining a more discrete presence.

The lack of public profile of field offices has frustrated local civil society. In Bunia, for example, some nongovernmental organization representatives in April 2007 referred to the ICC field office there as “Guantanamo” because of its secrecy, isolation, and a perceived bunker mentality.360 In Chad, the low-profile strategy had been so pervasive that as of mid-2007 refugees and even operations people who worked with refugee camps generally did not know an ICC field office existed in Abeché.361 In Kampala, civil society and journalists in March 2007 expressed dismay and frustration at what they perceived to be an unduly guarded and secret approach to ICC operations in Uganda.362

Over time, the OTP has fortunately moved toward acceptance of a more public function for ICC field offices. This is partly because, with a wider range of staff working in the field offices performing a variety of functions (like outreach), it became more difficult to conduct confidential activities there. It is also increasingly recognized that conducting confidential activities in one location makes them more vulnerable to being monitored.363 Court staff have made adjustments to some aspects of the offices to facilitate public and confidential activities being conducted on the same premises, mostly by sectioning off certain spaces. Overall, however, it is accepted that especially confidential or sensitive activities should be conducted off-site in private and varied locations.364

2. Enhancing the contribution and effectiveness of field offices

The move toward field offices in or near ICC situation countries as a regular feature of ICC policy and practice is extremely positive. Earlier in the court’s life, some had suggested that regional offices might be a satisfactory approach (such as one field office for the Great Lakes region in Africa). Given the unique context of each country situation, in our view having field offices for each situation far better equips the court to meet its needs.

Drawing from experience to date, the field operations section of the Registry has developed a “generic model” to guide the set up of new offices. The model is clearly helping to streamline the process of identifying proper spaces and making the offices operational;365 the court’s recent establishment of a field office in the Central African Republic took place very quickly.366

Human Rights Watch believes that that experience indicates that several additional measures are needed to make the offices as effective as possible. As discussed below, these relate to promoting greater accessibility of field presences, to appointing proper heads of field offices, and to increasing conceptualization and development of court policy and practice from the field.

In addition, adequate resources are needed for field offices to be established and to function properly. Funds are needed not only for staff to conduct programming but also to secure equipment, to employ support staff, and to install proper infrastructure. Field offices also require a certain amount of budgetary flexibility in order to respond to developments that are difficult to anticipate. For example, the N’djamena office experienced looting recently following instability so that it requires new equipment as a result.367 As is the case currently in the CAR, there may also be dramatic price fluctuations in basic services provided to field offices, such as electricity, which can further affect the budget for operations.

a. Creating more publicly accessible spaces

The trend toward ICC field offices serving as a “face of the ICC” in situation countries is positive. Indeed, the court’s Strategic Plan for outreach notes that “for outreach purposes, the field office should be visible to and accessible by the general public and particular groups.”368 Nevertheless, while the ICC has field offices in or close to all situation countries, most are far away from affected communities. In Uganda, where the only field office is located in the capital, the crimes were committed in the northern part of the country, and most victims are based in the north. Given widespread poverty in the displaced camps in which the affected communities tend to live, the several hours distance by vehicle to reach the field office makes visits by ordinary people very unlikely. Another issue is that the offices in capitals tend to be located in quieter residential areas of cities, which are more difficult to reach than city centers. Moreover, drop-in visits are not encouraged.369

Restrictions on locations and visiting arrangements are due in part to legitimate security and other concerns. It can be much easier to evacuate from offices in capitals than in remote locations.370 Offices in or near capitals are also an important base of activity for relations with government officials, key to securing needed cooperation in the court’s activities.371 Offices that are not as close to where abuses were committed are also less vulnerable to threats from those hostile to ICC operations. In addition, it may be difficult to find premises that meet the court’s needs—the court requires a large tract of land that could house not only a central field office but also mobile homes for confidential activities, for example—in city centers. Further, maintaining security in city centers can also be more difficult.372 These considerations may make it impossible to open field offices closer to affected communities.

Given these practical difficulties, we encourage ICC staff to think creatively about how to promote an accessible field presence as close as possible to affected communities. One idea is for ICC staff to consider opening small public outposts in certain locations as a way to create a more public presence close to affected communities without having to face the entire range of obstacles to creating a full office. The focus of such an outpost could be on those activities where proximity to particular populations is most important, like outreach and victims’ participation. This initiative would be particularly valuable in a place like Gulu, the main town in northern Uganda.373 Another possibility could be developing a regular schedule of visits by outreach staff to locations where affected communities are based, such as where there are clusters of refugee camps in Chad. By doing so, word could travel that ICC staff are available to respond to questions on certain days, which might facilitate interested persons reaching court staff. Separate outposts might also be valuable in locations where a field office is already established, but security considerations do not permit public access and drop-in visits.

We also encourage ICC staff to regularly assess the security situation where affected communities are based and to revise plans regarding field offices in such locations over time. When the ICC begins its field operations in a country, a high degree of caution in operations is merited. Evaluations may change, however, as the security situation improves or staff have a more nuanced understanding of the environment. A number of people with whom we spoke in Uganda in March 2007, for example, flagged the substantially improved conditions in Gulu in the previous year.

b. Enhancing the role of field-based staff

While field staff conduct crucial activities, their autonomy and opportunities to show leadership can be quite limited. Field-based staff tend to function more as those who implement policies instead of conceptualizing and developing plans, which are currently devised at ICC headquarters in The Hague.374

There is logic behind a substantial amount of policy- and decision-making being made in The Hague. The highest-level staff are based at headquarters, and Hague-based staff are better placed to develop overarching analyses based on activities taking place in multiple locations. Generating policies and initiatives in The Hague also helps to ensure consistency across situations and to ensure that activities meet requirements established in judicial decisions (in relation to victims’ participation, for example).

Nevertheless, as discussed earlier in this section, much of the court’s activity vis-à-vis affected communities requires a tailored approach that is culturally and politically relevant. For example, facilitating victims’ participation in Uganda—which has a common law legal tradition where victims are generally not involved in judicial proceedings—demands a very different strategy than for the DRC, which has a civil law legal tradition where victims may be actively involved.375 Field-based staff are better placed to grasp the elements of the local context, which enables them to have important ideas to make programming effective. This applies not only to outreach and victims’ participation but also to a full range of court activities in the field including investigations and witness protection.

Within this context, Human Rights Watch believes that there is a need for more of a two-way flow of ideas between staff in The Hague and in the field on policy and practice. Some recent efforts to enable field-based staff to provide greater substantive contributions are welcome. For example, we understand that Hague-based staff are looking to their field-based colleagues to help shape situation-specific outreach plans based on consultations with local civil society.376 This is precisely the kind of approach that is needed, and we urge ICC officials to consider additional areas where field-based staff can be integrated into the conceptualization of relevant work both in and beyond outreach.

Of course, effective decentralization requires enhanced and strategic dialogue between The Hague and the field offices, which is not necessarily easy to arrange. Coordinated and effective interaction likely can only develop over time and would benefit from the development of guidelines on ways to promote proper consultation and decision-making. Effective interaction also can be enhanced through occasional visits to The Hague by field-based staff and regular visits to the field by supervisors in The Hague. Consideration should also be given to enhancing responsiveness to communications from the field to headquarters; we understand that field-based staff have sometimes experienced long delays in hearing back on possible projects. Relatively prompt turnaround is needed to advance effective work.

The court’s operational center of course should remain in The Hague. At the same time, field-based staff could be an excellent force in creating effective situation-specific plans to advance their unit’s objectives. In certain instances, this might be aided by recruiting more senior-level staff for field-based positions.

c. Having a head of office

Human Rights Watch believes that field offices also would benefit strongly from having a proper “head of office.” Currently, each field office has a “field office manager.” Field officer managers are currently mid-level posts at the P-3 level.377 The functions of the managers have focused primarily on logistical and operational issues.378 Some ICC staff have expressed an interest in having a proper head of each of the field offices, who could play more of a representational role for the court and of an analytical role vis-à-vis political developments. To date, the field office managers have not, for the most part, performed these functions, apparently due in part to the lack of seniority of the position, to the profile and background of the managers, and to a lack of agreement at the court about a more substantive position.

Based on our field research, Human Rights Watch strongly supports the creation of a head of office position for the field offices. A head of office would be better placed to conduct needed functions in addition to administrative and logistical support currently provided. For example, a head of office would have more authority to coordinate effectively among field-based staff representing different units and organs in The Hague. The channels of communication for field-based staff have been generally “vertical” to date: staff in the field communicate almost exclusively with their department colleagues and supervisors in The Hague. Even when office-related coordination issues inevitably arise between different organs in the field, communication travels up to The Hague and back down to field-based staff. 379 This issue has arisen repeatedly with regard to sharing the limited number of vehicles at each office for different activities and with staff visiting from The Hague. While such an issue may seem minor, it can have important implications for planning, undertaking, and completing important operations such as investigating or conducting site visits to affected communities. A head of office would not have any role in the substantive work of field-based staff but would rather have the authority to quickly resolve such practical concerns as they arise.

A head of office should also have the authority to take steps to avoid certain problems altogether, such as those created by multiple missions from The Hague simultaneously. A head of office would as well be better positioned to overcome logistical and other challenges that have unsurprisingly arisen in navigating the complex machinery in The Hague from the field. Welcome efforts are underway to address such issues, which include ensuring adequate employment conditions for national local staff, for example ensuring their security in the event of an evacuation (evacuation policies only apply presently to international staff380). A head of office could help, however, further ensure such matters are addressed efficiently and satisfactorily.

Perhaps most importantly, a head of office could interact more fully with relevant representatives on the ground. These include diplomats, United Nations agencies, other intergovernmental organizations and humanitarian groups, and service providers. By interacting at a high level with relevant interlocutors, a head of office could help enhance communication and coordination by such actors with the ICC. This could in turn heighten positive perceptions of the court, which can be seen as a complex institution that is difficult to navigate by staff from intergovernmental organizations and humanitarian agencies in the field. Through relationships with such actors, a head of office could also obtain information necessary to facilitate ICC requests for cooperation, including notice of staffing changes in government ministries. Furthermore, the resolution of specific issues would benefit from the substantial formal or informal contacts that cannot be effectively sustained from The Hague.381

To fulfill these tasks, a head of office should have not only experience in management and administration but also adequate stature and expertise to establish important relationships with partners on the ground. The different organs of the court of course have different mandates and some might express concern over having one person represent all of these. Nevertheless, as in the case of the UN liaison office for the court, it is possible to have a head of office who serves all organs.382 It would be useful to draw on experiences from the liaison office in developing a head of office position for field offices. Of course, the OTP, which has a division dealing with cooperation, could continue to operate independently.383

C. In situ proceedings

The Rome Statute expressly provides for the possibility of holding proceedings elsewhere than the seat of the court in The Hague.384 We see holding proceedings in situation countries, known as in situ proceedings, as a crucial way to generate progress on a range of important objectives for the court in relation to affected communities: media coverage of ICC activity, focus and debate on the ICC’s work, a sense of what the proceedings involve, and greater respect for rule of law and human rights.

Human Rights Watch has seen in the work of hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, that a court’s proximity to where the crimes were committed can significantly enhance local interest and attention among the media and public. This is despite the fact that only a relatively small number of people actually attend proceedings. At the same time, holding proceedings in situ can bring a whole new array of security and logistical challenges that must be overcome.

Holding any proceedings in situ seemed very abstract in the early years of the court’s life, especially with a trial nowhere near underway in The Hague. However, the court and states parties have increasingly recognized the importance of in situ proceedings, and the court has taken steps toward this goal. At the 2005 session of the ASP, African states parties expressed that “trials should, as much as possible be carried out in the localities or region where the crime took place.”385 The ICC’s Strategic Plan issued in mid-2006 also rightly recognized that “[h]olding proceedings closer to situations where the crimes occurred may increase the accessibility of proceedings to affected populations, the efficiency of the Court’s different activities and the extent to which the Court can fulfill its mission.”386 The ICC’s proposed budget for 2007 also included for the first time analysis of potential costs associated with holding hearings in situ.387

It should be noted that a number of steps must be taken to hold proceedings in situ. Under rule 100 of the court’s rules of procedure and evidence, first, the prosecutor, defense, or a majority of the judges must file an application or recommendation to the ICC president. The Presidency then must consult with the state where the court would sit. If the state agrees, a decision to hold proceedings in situ must then be made by two-thirds of the judges.388

Recently, the court took concrete measures toward holding certainproceedings in situ in the trial of Thomas Lubanga.389 Trial Chamber I, before which the trial will take place, commissioned a feasibility study on holding some of the trial in the Democratic Republic of Congo.390 The judges also invited views from the prosecution and defense on this issue. Notably, the OTP favored holding certain proceedings in situ and the defense did not oppose them provided certain issues could be addressed satisfactorily, namely: ensuring the presence of the accused, maintaining access by the defense to evidence, and avoiding delay.391

Following these steps, we understand that increasingly, the court began to seriously consider holding the opening of the trial in situ. In fact, the Registry conducted a number of reconnaissance missions to identify a suitable location and developed a protocol to conduct court proceedings in situ.392 This possibility was foreclosed, however, when the DRC minister of justice wrote to the court that the ICC could not hold proceedings in the proposed location as it “could lead to ethnic tensions in an area … considered to be potentially unstable.”393

Efforts by the court to hold certain proceedings in situ in the Lubanga trial are very welcome. The good faith effort by the Chambers and Registry staff is extremely valuable as well to laying the groundwork for future in situ initiatives. In this regard, we encourage the ICC and the DRC to draw lessons from the Lubanga in situ initiative to guide future efforts to hold in situ proceedings in other cases. For example, there may need to be greater consultation with government officials in situation countries to achieve consensus on a particular location and political support for in situ proceedings. We also encourage the ICC judges to think proactively about opportune moments to hold in situ hearings in the future, including in the Lubanga trial.

D. High-level visits by ICC officials to the field

In addition to the measures described above, visits by high-level ICC officials are an important aspect of field engagement. Such visits allow for proper evaluation of the court’s field operations. They also raise the ICC’s public profile due to the media coverage that they attract. They further help to demonstrate to affected communities the court’s attention to their views and their experiences.

In 2006 the then ICC registrar initiated the practice of making visits to the field. He first visited Chad and Uganda, where he met with a range of actors, including civil society groups, traditional and religious leaders, and media.394 In 2007 the registrar returned to Chad and also visited the DRC with the deputy prosecutor.395 During this mission, activities were expanded to include direct outreach with affected communities at refugee camps in eastern Chad. In 2006 the ICC prosecutor also visited the DRC, where he met with interlocutors including senior government officials and local civil society.396 In the past year, the ICC registrar and prosecutor have each visited the Central African Republic.397 The executive director of the ICC Trust Fund for Victims has also made visits to Uganda and the DRC.398 At this writing, Silvana Arbia, the new ICC registrar, had already made visits to Uganda and the DRC within weeks of taking office in April 2008; Human Rights Watch welcomes her initiative in this regard.

These visits have been extremely positive. Local civil society and the media have closely tracked these visits, and members of the general public who participated in events associated with these visits expressed keen interest in the ICC’s work. When the prosecutor arrived in Bangui during his April 2008 visit to the Central African Republic, for example, he was greeted by a cheering crowd. Over 250 people, mostly interested citizens, attended the meeting to pose their questions concerning the process and role of the ICC. Many traveled long distances from the provinces to see him, with some even making the journey twice because the original meeting date was postponed.399 Such interactive visits should be conducted regularly and should be envisioned as another important component of effective field engagement.

346 See generally Parts V and VII, below.

347 For example, the ICC’s legal proceedings—and the language of those proceedings—may be unfamiliar to local populations. There are some communities within the country situations under ICC investigation for whom impartial criminal justice is an alien concept altogether. In those communities, the ICC is faced with the dual challenge of informing people about the criminal accountability process, in addition to the ICC’s role in it.

348 Security concerns are not merely theoretical. The ICC has had to close offices in the DRC and Chad for periods due to instability. The ICC also has had to evacuate staff from field offices at different points. Human Rights Watch interviews with ICC staff, July 17 and 23, 2007 and with ICC staff, The Hague, April 22, 2008.

349 We discuss the importance of field-based staff in connection with investigations in Part II.C.1.c.ii, above, outreach in Part V.C.2.d, below, and witness and victim protection in Part VI.C.5, below.

350 As described above, see Part II.D, positive complementarity refers to ways that the ICC can actively encourage domestic efforts to investigate and prosecute grave crimes. See Parts VI(B)(1)(a-b) and (2), below for a discussion of steps that ICC staff can take to help build national capacity in a number of areas, including investigation of sexual crimes, witness protection, and mental health services. It is of course very early for the court to focus on legacy efforts, and there is still much to be done to make its primary operational phase more effective. Nevertheless, over the longer term, field-based staff will be in the strongest position to undertake legacy efforts, such as through targeted interaction, outreach, and trainings with those in the domestic justice sector.

351 For some indications of this approach, see Jess Brevin, “Justice Delayed For Global Court, Ugandan Rebels Prove Tough Test; African Politics, Tactical Fights, Hamper Chief Prosecutor; No Trial Date in Sight Who Will Arrest Mr. Kony?” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2006, (accessed May 19, 2008); OTP, “Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003 – June 2006),” September 12, 2006, (accessed May 5, 2008), para. 98 (“OTP Activities Report”); ASP, “Sixth Diplomatic Briefing of the International Criminal Court: Compilation of Statements,” The Hague, March 23, 2006, (accessed May 12, 2008), p. 6.

352 See ASP, “Budget Appropriations for the First Financial Period and Financing of Appropriations for the First Financial Period,“ Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.12, (accessed May 15, 2008); ASP, “Program Budget for 2004 and Related Documents,” in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Second session, New York, September 8-12, 2003, ICC-ASP/2/10, Part II, (accessed May 15, 2008); ASP, “Draft Programme Budget for 2005,” ICC-ASP/3/2, September 6-10, 2004, (accessed May 15, 2008).

353 See, for example, Bruno Cathala, ICC Registrar, “Address by Registrar Bruno Cathala,” address to ASP, The Hague, September 6, 2004, (accessed May 8, 2008); see also ASP, “Proposed Programme Budget for 2006,” in Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Fourth session, The Hague, November 28 - December 3, 2005, ICC-ASP/4/32, Part II, (accessed May 6, 2008), para. 160 (“Proposed Programme Budget for 2006”).

354 See ASP, “Report of the Third Session of the Assembly of States Parties (6-10 September 2004),”
(accessed May 13, 2008) p. 65, para. 241(3); and ASP, “Programme Budget for 2005,” in Official Records of the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Third Session, The Hague, September 6-10, 2004, ICC-ASP/3/25, Part II A1-A6, (accessed May 8, 2008 ), para. 8. Notably, however, in light of the court’s under spending of the planned budget for 2005, it did not turn out to be necessary for the court to resort to the contingency fund in 2005 to finance the nascent field offices.

355 ASP, “Proposed Program Budget for 2006,” para. 266.

356 For some indication of this evolution, see ASP, “Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties,” Resolution ICC-ASP/5/Res.3, (accessed June 4, 2008), pp. 343-344; ASP, “Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the work of its sixth session,” ICC-ASP/5/1, November 23 to December 1, 2006, (accessed May 13, 2008), paras. 54, 58-59; ASP, “Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the work of its fifth session,” ICC-ASP/4/27, November 28 to December 3, 2005, (accessed May 14, 2008), para. 48.

357 See ASP, “Proposed Programme Budget for 2006”; and ASP, “External audit and Proposed programme budget for 2007,” in Official Records of the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Fifth session, The Hague, November 23 to December 1, 2006, ICC-ASP/5/32, Part II, (accessed May 14, 2008), for example paras. 176, 259. At the same time, some positions in the various field offices are still vacant. For example, the ICC is facing difficulties finding a P-2 outreach coordinator for the Kinshasa field office and has faced difficulties hiring staff for the Abeché office. Human Rights Watch interviews with ICC staff, The Hague, November 17, 2007, and April 22, 2008; and with ICC staff, July 23, 2007.

358 See Part VII.D.1-2, below.

359 Human Rights Watch interviews with ICC staff, February 28, March 1, July 17, and July 23, 2007.

360 Human Rights Watch interview with representative of local civil society, Bunia, April 30, 2007.

361 Human Rights Watch interviews, eastern Chad, July 2007.

362 Human Rights Watch group interview with two Ugandan journalists, Kampala, March 3, and representatives of Ugandan civil society, March 8, Gulu, and separate interviews with representatives of Ugandan civil society, Kampala, February 26-27, and Gulu, March 7, 2007.

363 Human Rights Watch interviews with ICC staff, The Hague, November 7, 2007, and April 22, 2008.

364 Sectioning of some spaces has been done in conjunction with some of the field offices moving locations. Human Rights Watch interviews with ICC staff, March 1 and 7, and July 23, 2007, and with ICC staff, The Hague, April 22, 2008.

365 Human Rights Watch interview with ICC staff, The Hague, April 22, 2008.

366 Although not yet fully staffed, the office was established five months after the formal investigation was opened. “The Registrar Inaugurates the ICC Field Office in Bangui,” ICC press release, ICC-20071018-253-En, October 18, 2007, (accessed May 14, 2008); Human Rights Watch interview with ICC staff, The Hague, April 22, 2008.

367 Human Rights Watch interview with ICC staff, The Hague, April 22, 2008.

368ASP, “Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court,” ICC-ASP/5/12, September 29, 2006, (accessed June 5, 2008), para. 77.

369 Human Rights Watch interviews with ICC staff, July 23, 2007, and with ICC staff, The Hague, April 22, 2008.

370 Human Rights Watch interview with ICC staff, July 23, 2007.

371 See Part VIII.C.2, below.

372 Human Rights Watch separate interviews with two ICC staff, March 1, 2007.

373 Indeed, members of Ugandan civil society emphasized to Human Rights Watch the need for greater ICC presence in northern Uganda. Human Rights Watch separate interviews with three representatives of Ugandan civil society, Gulu, March 6 and 7, and Lira, March 12, 2007.

374 Human Rights Watch separate interviews with representatives of civil society, Kampala, March 2, and Kinshasa, July 14, 2007.

375 See Part VII.D.2, below.

376 Human Rights Watch interview with ICC staff, The Hague, November 15, 2007. See also Part V.C.2.d, below.

377 ASP, “Proposed Programme Budget for 2006”; ASP, “Proposed Programme Budget for 2007 of the International Criminal Court,” ICC-ASP/5/9, August 22, 2006, (accessed May 6, 2008) (“Proposed Programme Budget for 2007”).

378 See, for example, ASP, “Proposed Programme Budget for 2006,” para. 331.

379 Human Rights Watch interview with ICC staff, March 1 and May 1, 2007.

380 Human Rights Watch interview with ICC staff, March 1, 2007, and with ICC staff, The Hague, April 22 and May 13, 2008. Other issues include ensuring prompt payment of reimbursements and acquisition of necessary equipment.

381 See, for example, ASP, “Option paper by the Bureau on the establishment of a New York Liaison Office,” in Official Records of the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Fourth session, The Hague, November 28 to December 3, 2005, ICC-ASP/4/6, (accessed May 6, 2008), para. 3.

382 Ibid., Annex, page. 5.

383 See Part II.A.1, above.

384 Rome Statute, art. 3(3).

385 Prof. J.A. Ayua, solicitor general of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Permanent Secretary, “Nigeria Statement on behalf of the African states parties to The Rome Statute of the ICC,” Fourth Session of the ASP, The Hague, December 3, 2005, (accessed November 6, 2006). See also Sabelo Sivuyile Maqungo, “Statement on behalf of African Member States to the International Criminal Court Statute before the General Assembly,” New York, October 9, 2006, (accessed October 27, 2006).

386 ASP, “Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court,” ICC-ASP/5/6, August 4, 2006, (accessed April 30, 2008), p. 7. For more on the ICC ‘s Strategic Plan, see discussion in Part I.B, above.

387 ASP, “Proposed Programme Budget for 2007,” p. 189.

388 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 100.

389 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC, Case No. 01/04-01/06, Hearing Transcript, September 4, 2007, p. 4.

390 Ibid.

391 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing Transcript, February 13, 2008.

392 Human Rights Watch meeting with Registrar, The Hague, March 12, 2008, and interview with ICC staff, The Hague, April 22, 2008.

393 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing Transcript, March 12, 2008, p.4. As explained by Judge Fulford in a hearing on March 12, 2008, “the particular location under consideration was, on all of the information we received, clearly the – the best in terms of holding a hearing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was … the only real viable option. The hearing – a hearing in the Congo can only take place with the consent of the government, which now has not been given for that location, and in the result the entirety of this trial will be conducted in this courtroom in The Hague.”

394 “Registrar visits Chad and Uganda,” ICC Newsletter, July 2006, (accessed May 5, 2008).

395 “Registrar visits Chad as part of the Court’s Outreach strategy,” ICC Newsletter, April 2007, (accessed May 5, 2008).

396 “ICC Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor visit Kinshasa,” ICC press release, ICC-CPI-20060410-131-Fr, April 10, 2006, (accessed May 5, 2008).

397 “Media Advisory: ICC Prosecutor visits Central African Republic to meet with victims and local population,” ICC press release, ICC-CPI-OTP-20080121-MA002-ENG, January 21, 2008, (accessed May 5, 2008).

398 “Director of the Trust Fund met with victims’ communities in Uganda,” ICC press release, ICC-PR-070613-223_En, June 13, 2007, (accessed May 5, 2008). Representational visits of senior ICC officials are also discussed in Parts I.B (president) and II.A.1 (prosecutor), above, and in Part V.C.1, below.

399 Human Rights Watch email correspondence with civil society representative, May 15, 2008.