FESCI and the Rise of Pro-Government Youth Groups and Militias
The outbreak of civil war in September 2002 helped spawn a number of pro-government youth groups and armed militias, both urban and rural. The leaders of many of these new organizations cut their political teeth in FESCI, and several of them continue to maintain a loyal following within FESCI’s membership today.55 Together, these groups are often referred to in national discourse as “the patriotic galaxy.”56
At the center of the “patriotic galaxy” is former FESCI leader Charles Blé Goudé, pictured below, and his Young Patriots pro-government youth group.57 Blé Goudé played a crucial role in mobilizing the “young patriots” in Abidjan during and after the war, organizing pro-government demonstrations in 2003-2006 that paralyzed Abidjan for days at a time, often under the complacent and perhaps complicit eye of government security forces. As described in more detail below, the lines between pro-government groups like FESCI and those headed by its former leaders, such as Blé Goudé’s Young Patriots, are often blurred both because individuals are often members of more than one group, as well as the fact that “patriotic” demonstrations and other activities involving these groups often draw members from a variety of organizations within the “patriotic galaxy.”58
At the height of the crisis, members of the “patriotic galaxy” often congregated around “agoras” or street parliaments, where hundreds of individuals assembled to listen to orators who rallied the crowd with ultranationalist, anti-colonialist, and pro-FPI rhetoric.59 Diatribes were directed at the perceived enemies of the FPI-led government, which, over the course of the Ivorian crisis, have alternated between the rebels, political opposition parties such as the RDR, the French, and the United Nations.60 Many of the “patriotic” speakers who have animated the agoras are or have been members of FESCI.
Former FESCI leader, and current head of the Young Patriots pro-government youth group, Charles Ble Goudé, leads a demonstration wearing a red ribbon reading “Licorne out,” March 18, 2005 in Abidjan, demanding the departure of French troops from its former colony. Similar speeches were frequently made in the years following the outbreak of war in public fora known as “agoras” or street parliaments. © 2005 AFP
Though they are not formally part of the state-security apparatus, especially in the years immediately following the war, members of these groups played an active role in matters of national security, including manning checkpoints on main roads in government-controlled areas, checking civilian identification, and generally taking on tasks usually carried out by uniformed government security forces.61 These groups have also been used by government officials to violently suppress opposition demonstrations, stifle the press and anti-government dissent, foment violent anti-foreigner sentiment, and attack rebel-held villages in the western cocoa- and coffee-producing areas.62 In almost all cases, crimes perpetrated by these groups benefit from total impunity.
Since signature of the Ouagadougou peace agreement in March 2007, political tensions throughout Côte d’Ivoire have ebbed, leading pro-government groups such as the Young Patriots to tone down their once vitriolic rhetoric and cease public protest. However, should political tensions rise once again, particularly in the lead-up to presidential elections, many political observers fear that these groups will immediately resume the activities for which they became notorious.63
In contrast to the armed militia groups operating primarily in western Côte d’Ivoire, pro-government youth groups tend to be less overtly militarized in their equipment and dress. While some members do possess arms, they do not typically carry them openly or patrol with them. Because they are not formally armed, they will not benefit from Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. They have in common with the armed militias, however, a strong devotion to President Gbagbo and his ruling FPI party and a shared sense that they have risen up to defend the institutions of the republic against the rebellion’s armed assault.
55 In addition to FESCI, pro-government youth groups that acquired special prominence after the outbreak of civil war include the Young Patriots (Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes Patriotes, COJEP); the youth wing of the ruling FPI party (JFPI); The Union for the Total Liberation of Côte d’Ivoire (Union pour la Liberation Totale de la Côte d’Ivoire, UPLTCI); and African Solidarity (Solidarité Africaine, SOAF), among others. The Young Patriots are headed by Charles Blé Goudé, leader of FESCI from 1998-2001. Eugene Djué of the UPLTCI headed FESCI from 1994-1995. Navigué Konaté, the head of the JFPI was once a FESCI member. SOAF is headed by Jean-Yves Dibopieu, who led FESCI from 2001-2003.
56 For an analysis of the language and phenomenon of “patriotism,” the badge of self-identity most often used by members of pro-government youth groups in Côte d’Ivoire, see Richard Banégas, “Côte d’Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and Other African Modes of Self-writing,” African Affairs, 105/421 (2006).
57 Despite its name, the word “young” is used quite loosely. Human Rights Watch has interviewed “young patriots” who were in their late 30s and early 40s.
58 Human Rights Watch interviews with students and former FESCI members, Abidjan, August, September, and October 2007.
59 The most famous Agora on which all others are modeled is known as the “Sorbonne,” named after the famous Parisian university. Located in downtown Abidjan, it operates as a sort of Speaker’s Corner for patriotic discourse. For more details on the Sorbonne and other agoras, see Aghi Bahi, “La ‘Sorbonne’ d’Abidjan: rêve de démocratie ou naissance d’un espace public?,” Revue africaine de sociologie (Abidjan), Vol. 7, No. 1 (2003).
60 For verbatim examples of these harangues, see Richard Banégas, “La France et l’ONU devant le ‘parlement’ de Yopougon. Paroles de ‘jeunes patriotes’ et régimes de vérité à Abidjan,” Politique africaine, No. 104 (December 2006).
61 This was particularly true for armed militia groups operating in Côte d’Ivoire’s volatile western cocoa-producing regions. The largest pro-government militia operating in the west and southwest is known as the Greater Western Liberation Front (Forces de Liberation du Grand West, FLGO). Other militias in the west have included the Ivorian Movement for the Liberation of Western Ivory Coast (Mouvement pour la liberation de l’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, MILOCI); the Patriotic Alliance of the Wê (Alliance Patriotique Wê, AP-Wê); and the Union of Patriots for the Resistance of the Far West (Union des Patriotes Pour la Résistance du Grand Ouest, UPRGO). Most recruits are supporters of President Gbagbo’s FPI party. Many also come from the President’s ethnic Bété group, the related Attié, Abey and Dida groups, or from the Wê and Krou tribes. Western diplomats and Ivorian government officials alike often refer to these and other militia groups as “parallel security forces.”
62 Human Rights Watch has documented the proliferation of pro-government militia groups and their role and power in earlier work. See Human Rights Watch, “Côte d’Ivoire – Militias Commit Abuses with Impunity,” November 27, 2003, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/11/27/Côtedi6541.htm; Côte d’Ivoire – Country on a Precipice: The Precarious State of Human Rights and Civilian Protection in Côte d’Ivoire; Côte d’Ivoire: ‘My Heart is Cut’: Sexual Violence by Rebels and Pro-government Forces in Côte d’Ivoire.
63 Human Rights Watch interviews with United Nations officials and representatives from a local human rights organization, Abidjan, March 26 and 27, 2008.