IV. Failed Government Policies and ResponsesWhen Thaksin Shinawatra was elected prime minister in 2001, he flatly dismissed any suggestion that ethnic Malay Muslim insurgency might have been reactivated. His government took the view that shootings, acts of arson, bombings, and raids on government arsenals in the southern border provinces were caused by banditry or turf wars between criminal gangs, or by influential people with vested interests in creating instability and undermining the governments credibility, which, they assumed, made it possible to resolve the problem quickly.36 It was this assessment, and a desire to put his own people in placeparticularly by enhancing the role of the police (Thaksin is a former police officer) at the expense of the armythat led Thaksin to dissolve the SBPAC and CPM 43 in 2002. The leading role and authority that the army had in managing the southern border provinces was transferred to the police. The special security policy dating from Gen. Prems premiership in the early 1980s (see above), which reflected the regions unique characteristics, was also discontinued. Major changes in personnel and the transfer of most authority from the army to the police resulted in the politicization of security policy and the weakening of intelligence gathering and analysis regarding the identity of separatist groups, as well as the scale and trajectory of their violence. On the ground, the dissolution of SBPAC and CPM43 sparked fears among the ethnic Malay Muslim population that the government had taken away a vital safeguard that for many years had ensured their protection from being abused and exploited by local Thai officials. A sense of fear and resentment became palpable after the government launched an anti-drug campaign that quickly evolved into a violent and murderous war on drugs in 2003. Prime Minister Thaksins Order 29/2546, signed on January 28, 2003, called for the absolute suppression of drug trafficking by stating that, if a person is charged with a drug offense, that person will be regarded as a dangerous person who is threatening social and national security.37 In the ensuing weeks, the government gave governors and police chiefs in each province targets for the number of arrests of suspected drug traffickers and the seizures of narcotics. Countrywide between February and May 2003, 2,598 alleged drug offenders were shot dead in apparent extrajudicial killings;38 many of these killings appeared to be based on blacklists prepared by police and local government agencies. A member of the National Human Rights Commission told Human Rights Watch that throughout the countryparticularly in the more lawless southern border provincesthese lists were used by police and local authorities to settle local disputes and, at the same time, score political points with the government.39 As blacklisted suspects had no mechanism by which to challenge their inclusion on a list, and with the increasingly intensified climate of fear, many ethnic Malay Muslim villagers turned to separatist militants to seek protection from imminent threats of blacklisting, arbitrary arrest, disappearance, and extrajudicial killing.40 Asor (not his real name), who recruits and oversees activity of BRN-Coordinate separatist militants in Narathiwat, told Human Rights Watch that Thaksins disregard for human rights, evidenced most notably in the war on drugs, gave the separatists a much-needed boost in renewing their insurgency:
Asor added that he has used the consequences of Thaksins abusive anti-drug campaign to show ethnic Malay Muslims that they cannot expect protection or justice from government officials:
Ding (not his real name), who became a militant in the BRN-Coordinate network in 2003, told Human Rights Watch that at every turn of Thaksins anti-drug policy, Thai officials treated Islam and the ethnic Malay population with contempt and prejudice, forcing him to decide to fight back:
Thaksins response to the January 4, 2004 raidThe Thaksin governments approach to the south was seriously challenged by a new round of militant violence that began in January 2004. On the morning of January 4, 2004, more than 50 armed men stormed weapon depots of the Fourth Engineering Battalion at the Narathiwat Rajanakarin Camp and took a large cache of assault rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, pistols, rocket-propelled grenades, and other ammunition.44 The attackers killed four Buddhist Thai soldiers, while they rounded up soldiers who were ethnic Malay Muslim and told them to perform shahadaan Islamic profession of faith to reaffirm their conviction as a Muslimand leave the army.45 One militant reportedly shouted, Patani Merdeka! Patani Merdeka! (Free Patani!).46 Elsewhere in Narathiwat, arsonists simultaneously attacked 20 schools and three police posts. The next day, several explosions took place around Pattani. Within a week, it appeared that the Thai government was not in a position to stop a new series of shootings, explosions, and arson attacks taking place all over the southern border provinces. The resurgence of violence badly affected public confidence and pressured Thaksin to admit on January 6, 2004, that [t]he attack signaled to the government that they [militants] are professional and well trained, and do not fear the authorities.47 The prime minister ordered his deputy, Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and other senior officials, including Defense Minister Gen. Thammarak Isarangura, Interior Minister Wan Muhamad Noor Matha, and Army Chief Gen. Chaisit Shinawatra, to rush to the region, giving them a seven-day deadline to identify and capture those responsible for the attacks.48 Under Thaksins instructions, Thai authorities responded to the quickly deteriorating situation with full force. Alongside massive mobilization of the security forces to the southern border provinces, on January 5, 2004, martial law was extended to cover every district of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Soldiers and police were authorized to search and arrest without a judicial warrant. Suspects arrested under martial law were now allowed to be detained for up to seven days without charge. Thaksin assigned the police to take a leading role in key aspects of counterinsurgency operationsranging from intelligence gathering and analysis to making arrests and conducting interrogations. A number of police investigation teams, led by the Crime Suppression Division (CSD), and army Special Warfare teams were dispatched to comb through villages, tadika, ponoh, private Islamic colleges, rubber plantations, orchards, and mountains in the southern border provinces in an attempt to recover the stolen weapons and capture those responsible for the January 4 raid. They quickly resorted to extrajudicial means and human rights violations to meet the deadlines and objectives set by Thaksin. For example, CSD police were implicated in the arbitrary arrest and torture of Asae Manor in March 2004 in connection with the investigation on the raid on the Narathiwat camp. According to Asae Manor:
On March 11, 2004, Somchai Neelapaijit, chairman of Thailands Muslim Lawyers Association and vice-chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Lawyers Council of Thailand, submitted a letter to the National Human Rights Commission and the Senate making detailed allegations about how the police, particularly CSD police, had tortured five suspects in the investigation of the January 4 raid. He wrote:
(For information on the enforced disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit the day after he wrote that letter, see Human Rights Watchs March 2007 report It Was Like Suddenly My Son No Longer Existed.) Tension created by abusive measures of the security forces continued to grow, especially after many tadika, ponoh, and private Islamic colleges in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat were listed by the security agencies as being involved in the insurgency.51 Some schools were searched, and teachers and students were photographed, fingerprinted, and profiledin some cases more than onceafter Thaksin made a statement directly accusing some ponoh of being a breeding ground for separatist militants.52 A number of teachers and students of tadika, ponoh, and private Islamic colleges were also arrested, disappeared, or extrajudicially executed, resulting in heightened tension between the ethnic Malay Muslim community and the Thai government to the point that religious leaders in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat announced the suspension of cooperation with Thai authorities after accusing the security agencies of heavy-handedness and insensitivity to Islamic practices.53 The Krue Se and Tak Bai incidentsAgainst the backdrop of rising tension in the southern border provinces, separatist militants stepped up their attacks, targeting government officials, Buddhist monks and civilians, and local Muslims suspected of collaborating with Thai authorities. In many cases, separatist militants sought to justify their violent actions as retribution for state-sponsored abuses and the prevailing culture of impunity. They have particularly cited the infamous incidents at Krue Se Mosque, in which on April 28, 2004, security forces stormed Pattanis historic mosque, which militants had taken over, and killed all 32 men inside despite a clear order from the government to end the stand-off through peaceful means,54 and at Tak Bai, where on October 25, 2004, security forces were responsible for the deaths of at least 86 demonstrators in Narathiwats Tak Bai district, most of whom suffocated after being piled into the back of trucks to be transported to army camps many miles away.55 The Krue Se incident and another 10 militant attacks that took place almost simultaneously in Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla on April 28, 2004, are imbued with powerful symbolism of martyrdom; Muslim men, young and old, armed primarily with machetes, charging against a hail of bullets from Thai security forces. It is perceived as a wake-up call to the ethnic Malay Muslim community to join the new phase of struggle to liberate Patani Darulsalam. Krue Se mosque also embodies ethnic Malay Muslim identity in the context of invasion, occupation, and suppression by the Thai state. In addition, the date April 28 commemorated the Dusun Nyur uprising (April 26-28, 1948), in which Thai security forces rounded up and murdered hundreds of ethnic Malay Muslim villagers in Narathiwat. In other words, it can be said that the April 28 incidents constituted a careful orchestration of violence designed to resonate with historical memories of ethnic Malay Muslim victimization. This message was reinforced when Thai security forces brutally cracked down in Tak Bai. The culture of state-sponsored abuses and impunity continues, for the ethnic Malay Muslim community, to reinforce propaganda messages used by separatist groups, including BRN-Coordinate. Adding to that, the ethnic Malay Muslim community in the three southern border provinces was frustrated by Thaksins policy to continue militarization. The troops deployed there in increasing numbers were viewed with contempt as invaders and occupiers. An integrated military-police-civilian command, the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPBC), was created to coordinate counterinsurgency operations and introduce conciliatory solutions. But the Thai authorities emphasized the use of force with little regard for ensuring the safety of the civilian population or protecting basic rights. The vast majority of security personnel sent down to the southern border provinces were trained in rudimentary conventional combat, without the needed understanding of counterinsurgency tactics or of the ethno-religious complexity of the situation. The rules of engagement were not properly and effectively spelled out to the troops, leaving many of them with a conviction that they were licensed with special powers under security laws to resort to extrajudicial measures and excessive force in non-combat situations. Their tactical planning also failed to cope with village-based and urban insurgency favored by BRN-Coordinate. Failed reconciliation attempts, the coup, and escalating violenceThe problem of state-sanctioned abuses and impunity as evident in the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, as well as numerous allegations of arbitrary arrests, torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, has largely obstructed any attempts of the Thai government to reach out in a spirit of reconciliation to the ethnic Malay Muslim population. At the same time, the rhetorical quality of the Thaksin governments commitment to solving the problems of political differences and widespread injustice was shown by its approach to specific recommendations for a way forward; a proposal Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisang put together from a series of consultations with government officials, security personnel, local residents from the ethnic Malay Muslim and Buddhist Thai communities, religious leaders, politicians, businessmen, and civil society groups in the southern border provinces has never been implemented although the Thai government agreed with it in principle in April 2004. Thaksin reportedly said the planwhich called for martial law to be lifted; the dispatch of police and soldiers to the region to be slowed down; and investigation and transfer of government officials and security personnel found responsible for abuses or involved in disputes with local residentsreflected the viewpoints of local Muslims and did not address all aspects of the problems in the south, and if adopted would compel the security agencies to revoke their plans.56 In the aftermath of the Tak Bai incident, 144 university lecturers from around the country submitted an open letter to Thaksin on November 14, 2004, calling for the government to review its policy regarding the southern border provinces, and turn its attention to peaceful means and civil society participation. Thaksin responded by encouraging people from all over Thailand to send paper birds as a peace message to the southern border provinces. In total more than 100 million paper birds were air dropped on December 5, 2004.57 But the reality on the ground remained unchanged; in that month alone, there were 183 violent incidents in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. In March 2005 the Thaksin government invited former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to chair a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), endorsing his full freedom to appoint capable and knowledgeable persons from various sectors to serve as members of this commission. The NRC was officially set up by the Prime Ministers Office Order Number 104/2548 to find a long-term solution to the problem related to security and development, in order to bring about true reconciliation, peace and justice.58 The NRC was allowed to operate unhindered in the southern border provinces. However, Thaksin undercut its efforts with, for instance, controversial remarks suggesting that the NRC lacked a comprehensive understanding of the situation.59 Such remarks, together with an absence of consultation between Thaksin and the NRC, created public doubt about the governments commitment to a reconciliatory approach. The NRC sharply criticized Thaksins approval of the Executive Decree on Government Administration in Emergency Situations in July 2005. The decree, which was later ratified by the parliament, undermined or revoked many key safeguards against human rights abuses. The NRC expressed concern about the decrees sweeping powers to authorize a state of emergency, arrest and detain suspects without charge, restrict movement and communication, censor the media, and deny access to redress for victims of abuses by government officials and security personnel.60 NRC Chairman Anand complained publicly that the decree was contrary to the principle of reconciliation and instead condoned abuses, bordering on becoming a license to kill.61 The human rights community in Thailand and abroad also raised similar concerns. Human Rights Watch wrote an open letter to Thaksin on August 4, 2005, expressing concern that the decree allowed authorities to detain suspects for 30 days or longer in unregistered safe houses. The legislation also created the possibility that detainees may be held in secret, undisclosed, or inaccessible locations where monitoring is impossible and there is no judicial oversight or access to legal counsel or family. Such measures heightened the risk of arbitrary, disproportionate, and indefinite limitations on fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution of Thailand and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).62 In June 2006 Thaksin assigned Army Chief Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin to lead the governments counterinsurgency efforts. However, the police and provincial authorities continued to report directly to Thaksin and operate with minimal coordination among themselves and with the army. Gen. Sonthi was not only isolated by Thaksin, but also singled out for blame. Gen. Sonthi, just three months after being given his assignment, said: Soldiers all of us, privates and generals, are risking our lives everyday I dont want to see political interference [in counterinsurgency operations], and politicians putting all the blame on field officers.63 His view was echoed by moderate ethnic Malay Muslim leaders in the southern border provinces, who commented that the Army Chief might be unable to carry out the task if he could not get full support from the government.64 On September 19, 2006, Gen. Sonthi led a bloodless coup that ousted the Thaksin government. The coup provided an opportunity for a new policy to be implemented in the southern border provinces after years of criticism from the army regarding Thaksins failure to understand the gravity of the situation. Gen. Sonthi and other leaders of the coup (now called the Council for National Security or CNS) selected Gen. Surayud Chulanont to become Thailands interim prime minister. Gen. Surayud was sworn in on October 1, 2006, with an inaugural speech noting that problems in the southern border provinces were primarily rooted in the lack of justice.65 The government has since embarked on a set of new initiatives to win back the support of the ethnic Malay Muslim population and to improve the governments counterinsurgency capability. On November 2, 2006, Gen. Surayuds public apologies to the assembly of ethnic Malay Muslims in Pattani were televised throughout the country, saying: I have come here to apologize to you on behalf of the previous government and on behalf of this government. What happened in the past was mostly the fault of the state.66 He also announced the reestablishment of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), to help investigate and take action against complaints from the ethnic Malay Muslim population concerning corrupt, abusive, or inept government officials.67 This initiative has been followed by a number of actions and pledges from the governmentincluding the dropping of charges against some 58 Tak Bai protestors; a renewed commitment to solve the disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit; the abolition of blacklists; and a willingness to implement some aspects of sharia (Islamic law). The government of Gen. Surayud stated that the newly resurrected SBPAC would make it possible to end abuses associated with security personnel and the culture of impunity, allowing the government to build confidence and trust with the ethnic Malay Muslim population.68 However, lawyers and human rights defenders working in the southern border provinces criticized the government for failing to apply this policy in practice. The SBPAC is struggling with how to reach out to the ethnic Malay Muslim community, because it lacks the necessary resources and cannot effectively address the question of abuses and injusticesomething Gen. Surayud pointed out earlier as the underlying factor contributing to problems in the southern border provinces.69 There exist widespread doubts about the credibility of the SBPAC because it is placed under the direct control of the armys Internal Security Operation Command, given that the army is directly implicated in the deaths and injuries of hundreds of ethnic Malay Muslim men in the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, and there has been no accountability for these deaths to date. The Human Rights Watch report It Was Like Suddenly My Son No Longer Existed (March 2007) documented the use of enforced disappearance and other extrajudicial measures by the security forces to create an impression of successful operations and meet unrealistic targets set by the government in Bangkok. Human Rights Watch has also raised concerns with Thai authorities through public and private channels regarding excessive use of violence by the security forcesboth regular and volunteer unitsagainst the civilian population in the ethnic Malay Muslim community.70 Since 2004, however, there has been no accountability for the governments involvement in the alleged violations of human rights. The army and police have not pursued criminal prosecutions of their personnel either under criminal law or military law. Similarly, the Justice Ministrys Department of Special Investigation and the National Human Rights Commissioncharged with investigating extrajudicial killings and other human rights violationshave failed to carry out full and impartial investigations. The ethnic Malay Muslim population continues to believe that there can be no justice for them; in short, the atmosphere on the ground is not different from when Thaksin was in power. This situation has been reinforced by the governments decision to maintain the enforcement of the draconian Emergency Decree, which gives the security forces blanket immunity from being held accountable for their misconduct and abusive behavior.71 The common scene after each report of alleged arbitrary arrests or killings by the security forces of ethnic Malay Muslims in the southern border provinces is one of angry villagers, mostly women and children, blocking the roads or gathering in front of a police station or a security post to demand the release of suspects or the immediate withdrawal of responsible security units. This may be the case even where the arrest was lawful or the killing justifiable. Leaflets are often distributed or graffiti is painted on the road affirming that the protests are in response to state-sponsored abuses against ethnic Malay Muslims. Separatist militants in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have recently left similar messagesasserting the actions are in revenge for the killings of ethnic Malay Muslimsnext to the bodies of Buddhist Thai victims the militants have shot, hacked, or burned to death.72 Many arson attacks on schools and ambushes of the army and police are also justified by separatist militants in this way.73 For example, on October 14, 2005, a note was found near the severed head of Song Sangpetch, a 68-year-old Buddhist farmer, in Pattanis Mayo district. According to eyewitnesses, that note said: You killed our innocent people. I will kill your innocent people.74 In contrast to the Thaksin government, the new government and CNS appear to comprehend the gravity of the separatist insurgency in the south. For almost two years the army has been known to be seeking to establish dialogue with various separatist militants with an aim to negotiate a political settlementeven without support from the government. Lieut. Gen. Vaipot Srinual, then commander of the Armed Forces Security Center, said the idea of engaging in dialogue with key separatist groups has been discussed among military officers for some time. Negotiation is one of the options we have in seeking a peaceful solution, but the question is how to get it to work, he said.75 The most recent negotiation attempts took place in September 2006 with former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, honorary consul at the Thai Consulate in Langkawi, acting as facilitators.76 However, meetings only involved GMP, PULO, BRN-Congress, and Bersatuthe older generation of separatist militants, not those responsible for the current violence. Unsurprisingly, participants from these separatist groups were not able to answer Thailands demands to implement a one-month ceasefire (later reduced to two weeks) as a show of good will and a sign of command and control. Loh (not his real name), who oversees activity of separatist militants of BRN-Coordinate in the southern border provinces and acts as liaison with the elders in Malaysia, told Human Rights Watch that his group was not interested in the dialogue and could not accept the armys blueprint known as the Joint Peace and Development Plan for South Thailand, which required that separatist groups drop their demand for an independent Islamic state:
Declaration of Patani Darulsalam Fighters Malayu Muslims of Patani Darulsalam We, the fighters of Patani Darulsalam, have officially declared war with Siamese infidels since January 4, 2004. We will not stop until we can liberate our homeland. We raided their military camps, robbed their weapons, attacked their troops, and burned their schools. We will weaken them, and destroy them. To liberate Patani Darulsalam, we will fight to the end until we win our territory and sovereignty back from Siamese infidels. There will be no negotiation with our enemy. We will not accept any compromise. We will not debate in the parliament. We have support from you, Malayu Muslims of Patani Darulsalam, and we are having advantage over Siamese infidels. We will completely destroy the vices that corrupt our society of Malayu Muslims. We will destroy the economic, political, and education system of Siamese infidels here. We will destroy their military strength. We will purge all Siamese infidels out of our territory to purify our religion and culture. We will end the rule of Siamese infidels and return our territory to Malayu Muslims of Patani Darulsalam We will deliver justice according to religious principles. We will give lasting peace to Malayu Muslims of Patani Darulsalam. We will establish our country, as a Muslim country, to be recognized internationally. In doing all these objectives, we will be praised by God.
36 Rahimmula, Crisis in the Southern Border (วิกฤติการณ์ชายแดนใต้), pp. 29-31. 37 Prime Ministers Order dated January 28, 2003. 38 Human Rights Watch interview with National Human Rights Commissioner Wasan Panich, Bangkok, November 21, 2006. 39 Ibid. 40 Senate Committee on Armed Forces Presentation, Parliament Radio Broadcast (Thai), March 14, 2006; Maj. Gen. Nanthadet Meksuwan, Secret Operations to Put Out Southern Fire (ปฏิบัติการลับดับไฟใต้) (Bangkok: Ruam Duay Chuay Kan Publishing, 2006), pp. 35-36. 41 Human Rights Watch interview with Asor, Narathiwat, July 25, 2006. 42 Ibid. 43 Human Rights Watch interview with Ding, Narathiwat, July 25, 2006. 44 The Fourth Army Region, responsible for Thailands southern provinces, estimated that at least 50 people were involved in the raid. Weapons stolen were 366 M16 assault rifles, two M60 machine guns, 24 pistols, seven rocket-propelled grenades and four rocket launchers. Thai News Agency Broadcast (Thai), January 6, 2004. 45 For detailed accounts of the raid, see Supalak Ganjanakhundee and Don Pathan, Peace on Fire (สันติภาพในเปลวเพลิง) (Bangkok: Nation Books, 2004), pp. 16-30. 46 Ibid. 47 "Separatist Troubles: Bt1 M Reward Offered," The Nation, January 7, 2004. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=2&id=91475&date=2004-01-07 (accessed January 7, 2004). 48 Ibid. 49 Human Human Rights Watch interview with Asae Manor, Narathiwat, May 25, 2004. 50 Letter submitted by Somchai Neelapaijit to the Senate, dated March 11, 2004 (copy on file with Human Rights Watch). 51 International Security Operation Command (Fourth Region, Second Division), Specific Report Regarding the Involvement of Ponoh in Insurgent Movements, (รายงานการศึกษาเฉพาะกรณีเรื่องความเกี่ยวพันของโรงเรียนปอเนาะกับขบวนการโจรก่อการร้าย), January 2004. 52 Schools linked to attacks: PM, The Nation, January 11, 2004, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=2&id=91676&date=2004-01-12 (accessed January 20, 2004). 53 Muslim boycott born of a long history of distrust, The Nation, February 10, 2004, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=11&id=93282&date=2004-02-10 (accessed February 11, 2004). 54 On April 28, 2004, more than 100 separatists conducted 11 coordinated attacks on government buildings and security installations in Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla. The attacks culminated in a high-profile siege on the historic Krue Se Mosque in Pattani. By 6 a.m., Thai security forces began to encircle the mosque. Countermanding General Chavalits instructions to exhaust all means of negotiation, Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, deputy director of ISOC, ordered the mosque to be seized by force at 2 p.m. The resulting death toll included all 32 men hiding inside. In July 2004 the government-appointed commission of enquiry concluded that the tactic of laying siege to the mosque, surrounding it with security forces, in tandem with the use of negotiation with the assailants, could have ultimately led to their surrender. However, to date the government has yet to initiate criminal investigations into the event. For details of the incident, see Final report of the government-appointed Independent Commission of Enquiry into the Facts about the Krue Se Mosque Case, July 26, 2004. 55 On October 25, 2004, during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, the security forces violently dispersed demonstrators in front of Tak Bai district police station in Narathiwat, using water cannon, teargas, batons, and live bullets. Seven protesters died from gunshot wounds to the head. Around 1,300 men were arrested and loaded into army trucks to be taken to Inkayuth Camp in Pattani for questioningmany were kicked and hit with batons and rifle butts as they lay face down on the ground waiting, with their hands tied behind their backs. They were then stacked in trucks up to five or six layers deep and prohibited from moving or making noise. When all the trucks had arrived at Inkayuth Camp, 78 detainees were found suffocated or crushed to death. For details of the incident, see Final Report of the government-appointed Independent Fact-Finding Commission on the Fatal Incident in Tak Bai District, Narathivat Province, December 17, 2004.
56 Piyanart Srivalo and Samacha Hunsara,PM 'Backs Away' from Plan, The Nation, April 10, 2004, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=2&id=96894&date=2004-04-10 (accessed April 10, 2004). 57 Piyanart Srivalo, Thais Are United on the South, Says Thaksin, The Nation, December 3, 2004, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=3&id=109534&date=2004-12-03 (accessed December 3, 2004). 58 Prime Ministers Office Order Number 104/2548 (Thai) issued on March 28, 2005 by Thaksin Shinawatra. 59 Suphon Thanukrit, Govt Must Do More, Anand Says, The Nation, July 3, 2005, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=3&id=118066&date=2005-07-07 (accessed July 20, 2005). 60 Piyanart Srivalo and Satien Wiriyapanpongsa, Anand Slams Govt As Editors Up in Arms, The Nation, July 19, 2005, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=2&id=118572&date=2005-07-19 (accessed July 20, 2005). 61 Special Broadcast on TV Channel 11 (Thai), televising the debate between NRC Chairman and Thaksin about the Executive Decree on Government Administration in Emergency Situations, July 18, 2005. 62 Letter from Human Rights Watch to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Emergency Decree Violates Thai Constitution and Laws, August 4, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/08/04/thaila11592.htm. 63 Press conference by Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin at Army Headquarters, September 1, 2006. 64 Army Chief Welcome in Restive South, The Nation, June 21, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.news.php?clid=3&id=30006963 (accessed June 30, 2006). 65 Special broadcast on TV Channel 11 (Thai), televising the inaugural speech of General Surayud, October 1, 2006. 66 Special broadcast on TV Channel 11 (Thai), televising General Surayuds speech from CS Pattani Hotel, Pattani, November 2, 2006. 67 Ibid. 68 Human Rights Watch interviews with lawyers and human rights defenders (names withheld) in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, November and December 2006. 69 Ibid. 70 See, for example, Thailand: Government-Backed Militias Enflame Violence, Human Rights Watch news release, April 18, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/18/thaila11792.htm. 71 The Emergency Decree gives authorities sweeping powers to declare a state of emergency, arrest and detain suspects, restrict movement and communication, censor the media, and deny access to the Administrative Court and to redress for victims of abuses by government officials and the security forces. The enforcement of this law has to be extended every three months by a meeting of National Security Council (NSC) and subsequently endorsed by the government to remain in effect. 72 Human Rights Watch interviews with BRN-Coordinate members in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, November and December 2006. In Tak Bai district, for example, separatist militants threatened to kill 10 Buddhist Thaisboth government officials and civiliansin retaliation for any ethnic Malay Muslim killed by the security forces. 73 Ibid. 74 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitnesses (names withheld), Pattani, May 23, 2006. 75 Don Pathan and Ganjanakhundee, Sonthi Makes a Needed Overture in the South, The Nation, September 5, 2006. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.news.php?clid=11&id=30012780 (accessed September 20, 2006). 76 Don Pathan, Talks Vital to Restore Peace in the South, The Nation, September 20, 2006. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.news.php?clid=2&id=30020044 (accessed September 21, 2006). 77 Human Rights Watch interviews with Loh, March 2007. |