publications

II. Background

Political History

Developments in Papua8 can be seen as a litmus test of Indonesia’s tolerance for political dissent and of the civilian leadership’s ability to control the military. In Papua, isolated from the rest of the archipelago, Indonesia’s policies are played out with little oversight or scrutiny.

Occupying the western half of the island of New Guinea, Papua makes up more than one fifth of Indonesia’s total land area and is roughly the size of France. Papua is home to an estimated 2.5 million people. While this is only a fraction of Indonesia’s overall population of 220 million people, the region assumes disproportionate importance in national-level policy discussions not only for political reasons but also because of its size and resource wealth. The Freeport McMoran gold and copper mine in Papua alone provides Indonesia with 1.6% of its national GDP.

When Indonesia gained independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the region remained a Dutch territory. In the 1950s, the Dutch began a decolonization process; in 1961, an elected council comprised mostly of indigenous Papuans commissioned the creation of a national anthem and flag. On December 1, 1961, the Morning Star flag was flown beside the Dutch tricoleur for the first time. Full independence was envisioned for 1970.

Indonesia, however, viewed the decolonization process as a Dutch effort to create a puppet state within its rightful boundaries. Nearly all of Indonesia's nationalist leaders viewed all Dutch possessions in the region, as well as the Portuguese colony of Timor and British possessions on Borneo and the Malay Peninsula, as rightful parts of Indonesia. On December 19, 1961, Indonesia's then President, Soekarno, launched a campaign to “return” West Irian to Indonesia. Skirmishes between Dutch and Indonesian forces escalated tension in the region and the Dutch government, under strong international pressure, abandoned its plans for West Irian. On August 15, 1962, the Netherlands and Indonesia signed a U.S.-brokered agreement in New York, under which West Irian was brought under a temporary U.N. trusteeship, the UNTEA, in October 1962, then transferred to Indonesia on May 1, 1963.

Under the New York Agreement, Indonesia was required to hold an Act of Free Choice (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat, or Pepera) to enable the inhabitants of West Irian to determine their own future. This was held in July 1969 but, according to many Papuans and independent observers, was far from free.9 Some 1,022 Papuan representatives, reportedly hand-picked by Jakarta, were convened under Indonesian military supervision, and asked to choose whether or not they wanted integration with Indonesia. The result was unanimously in favor of integration. Papuans assert that there should have been a referendum conducted on the basis of one-person-one-vote, though the procedure had not been specified in the New York Agreement, which called for all adults to participate in an act of self-determination “in accordance with international practice.”10

According to Indonesia, the method used was appropriate given the formidable geographic terrain and what they saw as the low level of social, economic, and cultural development then existing in West Irian. A Bolivian diplomat, Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, and sixteen support staff oversaw the process for the United Nations; on September 6, 1969, Ortiz-Sanz reported to the U.N. Secretary General: “I regret to have to express my reservation regarding the implementation of Article XXII of the Agreement, relating to the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the inhabitants of the area. In spite of my constant efforts, this important provision was not fully implemented and the Administration exercised at all times a tight political control over the population.”11 Despite this report, the United Nations General Assembly accepted the results in Resolution No. 2504, adopted on November 19, 1969, with thirty abstentions and no negative votes. In September 1969, West Irian was officially incorporated as the twenty-sixth province of Indonesia; Indonesia renamed it Irian Jaya in 1973.12

The results of the referendum are still contested in Papua today and form the basis for much of the historical antipathy towards Jakarta and the resoluteness of the independence movement.

Segments of the Papuan population have been demanding independence for decades, but, until recently, resistance to Indonesian rule was limited to small units of guerillas loosely organized under the names Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) and National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN). The armed insurgents have mostly staged hit and run attacks on Indonesian military posts and, on a few occasions, have taken hostages to draw attention to their cause. Most notoriously, in 1996 an OPM group kidnapped and held hostage for four months twelve members of an international scientific expedition to the area.13

The armed insurgency, while low-level and sporadic in nature, serves as a permanent irritant to Jakarta: many in the national government and the armed forces see Papua as the front line in efforts to destroy Indonesia’s territorial integrity. In November 2006 the armed groups convened under a united umbrella framework to hold a First Congress of the West Papuan National Liberation Army (TPN-PB). In this meeting they renewed their commitment to “prepare for the war against colonialism, imperialism, and global exploitations which is about to begin in West Papua,” and announced that “armed resistance to the Indonesian Army (TNI) begins from this instant and will continue until such time as we have reclaimed the sovereignty of our people and our country.”14 It is not clear whether this statement was representative of the views of all factions of the OPM/TPN.

Since the fall of former President Suharto a broad independence movement has also emerged encompassing various religious denominations, students, and other civil society groups.  Their activities have mainly involved non-violent resistance to authorities in Papua through flag raisings, mass mobilization for demonstrations, and self-declared “national” congress meetings to form political manifestos for an independent Papua. Raising the Morning Star banner to symbolize an independent Papua has been the most common form of non-violent protest by Papuans for thirty years.

The Catholic, Protestant, and Anglican churches and Islamic leaders have also been at the forefront of a movement to declare Papua a “Land of Peace” whereby dialogue is sought with Jakarta officials to come to a peaceful solution for all Papuans.15

In October 2001 Jakarta granted Papua a large degree of autonomy,  legally enshrined through the Special Autonomy Law referred to above. However, regulations implementing key parts of the law were slow in coming and the establishment of the Papuan People’s Council (MRP), a key provision in the Special Autonomy Law, did not happen until 2005.16

Human Rights Background

Indonesian authorities have responded to the long–running, low-level armed insurgency in Papua with militarization of the region and often harsh and disproportionate responses to dissent or criticism. For nearly thirty years, from 1969, when the territory was formally incorporated as part of Indonesia, until October 1998, five months after the fall of former President Soeharto, Papua was formally designated a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM). Under DOM, in effect in Papua far longer than anywhere else in Indonesia, security forces were given free reign to combat resistance to Indonesian rule.

As documented by Human Rights Watch and others, government counterinsurgency operations during the period targeted not only armed groups but also civilian opposition groups, all with almost complete impunity. As a result, the independence movement was driven underground, local groups reported a stream of atrocities, and fear was pervasive. As elsewhere in Indonesia, civilians suffered disproportionately during army operations.17 The number of civilian casualties is not known; no comprehensive independent investigation has ever been attempted. In late 1999, the director of ELSHAM told a newspaper he had documentation of 921 deaths resulting from military operations conducted in various parts of Irian Jaya between 1965 and 1999.18 Many Papuans believe the actual number is at least several times that figure. Counterinsurgency efforts and associated fear are also believed to have repeatedly led thousands of people to flee their villages and, given the harsh conditions prevailing in much of Papua, have reportedly led to several episodes in which large numbers of people died from disease, malnutrition, or starvation.

Arrests of political activists and opposition leaders during the Soeharto era in Indonesia have been well documented. Soeharto and his military ran a police state whose tentacles reached into virtually all islands and villages of the archipelago. Journalists were often arrested and magazines were banned. It was unlawful to make statements deemed insulting to the president and legal restrictions on free expression were strictly enforced.19

After the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, it was hoped by many that Indonesia would enter an era of liberalization, in which fundamental human rights principles, such as freedom of expression and association, would be respected. While there have been distinct improvements in human rights protections in Indonesia on a number of fronts since May 1998, the progress has been less than hoped for, particularly on a number of freedom of expression issues, and conditions in Papua in this sense are reflective of larger, ongoing concerns.

Current Papuan demands are themselves rooted, among other things, in past military abuses and pervasive mistrust. Support for independence has also been fueled by loss of ancestral land to development projects and the influx of migrants from other parts of Indonesia seeking employment and land. The large migrant population—migrants form a majority in many coastal cities and towns—has caused tensions with a growing population competing for few jobs. Many Papuans feel discriminated against and marginalized in their own land.

There has been little movement by post-Soeharto governments to address past or contemporary human rights violations. This has had a significant impact on public sentiment towards Jakarta, as many abuses remain fixed in the public consciousness. These include extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, and torture during police raids on student dormitories in Abepura, Papua, in December 2000, and during operations by BRIMOB (Police Mobile Brigade) units in 2001. The official response to the assassination of prominent Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay in 2001 has also deepened cynicism. In 2003 seven low-level special forces (Kopassus) soldiers were found guilty, not of murder, but of mistreatment and battery leading to Eluay's death. The stiffest sentence was only three-and-a-half years. The chief of staff of the army, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, called the men heroes for the killing of a “rebel.”20 No further investigations have been undertaken into who ordered or financed the killing in the first place.




8 The Indonesian territory of Papua occupies the western half of the island of New Guinea. Originally one province in the republic, in 2003 it was controversially divided into two new provinces. The new province of West Irian Jaya now occupies the western part of the region with a new provincial capital of Manokwari. The new province in the eastern half is still called Papua, with the provincial capital remaining Jayapura. Plans for a proposed third province named Central Irian Jaya, have been postponed. For the purposes of this report we refer to the two provinces collectively as Papua.

9 John Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969, (UK: Routledge Curzon, 2003); P.J.Drooglever, Act of Free Choice: The Papuans of Western New Guinea and the limitations of the right to self-determination, Amsterdam, 2005.

10 “Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian),” signed at UN Headquarters, New York, August 15 1962 (New York Agreement). Article XVIII of the agreement states: “Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the United Nations Representative and his staff, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements will include. . .the eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals, to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice, who are resident at the time of the signing of the present Agreement and at the time of the act of self-determination. . . ."

11 Report by the Representative of the Secretary-General in West Irian, submitted under Article XXI, Paragraph 1, of the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian). UN Document No. A/7723. The New York Agreement had called for UN experts to remain in the territory from the time of the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia to the Act of Free Choice to assist with preparations for the vote. However, no UN representative was present from May 1, 1963 to August 23, 1968 due to the temporary withdrawal of Indonesia from the UN.

12 “Assessment for Papuans in Indonesia,” Minorities at Risk, December 31, 2003, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=85005 (accessed January 2, 2007).

13 “OPM Information,” Inside Indonesia, Digest 02, January 30, 1996; “AI Report 1997: Indonesia and East Timor,” Amnesty International, 1998; “Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua,” International Crisis Group, September 2002.

14 “Report on the decisions of the first congress of the West Papuan National Liberation Army (TPN-PB),” Press Release, the West Papuan People’s Representative Office, P.O. Box 1571, Port Vila, Republic of Vanuatu, November 16, 2006.

15 “Geneva Appeal on West Papua: Papua Land of Peace,” Faith Based Network on West Papua, April 2005;”Papua: Land of Peace?” Franciscans International, April 7, 2005.

16 For more information on this issue see “ Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue,” Asia Briefing Paper, International Crisis Group, March 23, 2006; “Dividing Papua: How not to do it,” Asia Briefing Paper, International Crisis Group, April 9, 2003.

17 Human Rights Watch, “Death in Custody Increases Fear in Papua,” New York, April 17, 2003; Human Rights Watch, “Investigate Death of Papuan Leader,” New York, November 11, 2001; Human Rights Watch, “Violence and Political Impasse in Papua,” New York, Vol. 13, No. 2 (C) July 1, 2001; Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Papua,” New York, 1999-2000, Vol. 12, No.2 (C); Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Irian Jaya,” New York, December 28, 1998, Vol. 10, No. 8 (C).

18Menghitung Korban, Menarik Dukungan," Tekad No. 5/Tahun II, November 29 – December 5, 1999.

19 Human Rights Watch, “Academic Freedom in Indonesia: Dismantling Soeharto Era Barriers,“New York, 1998; Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International joint report, "Release Prisoners of Conscience Now!," June 1998; Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Press Closures in Indonesia One Year Later," Vol. 7, no. 9 (C), July 1995; Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia), "Students Jailed for Puns," Vol. 5, no. 5, March 1993; Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia), "Anatomy of Press Censorship in Indonesia," Vol. 14, no. 12, April 1992; Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia), "Indonesia: Criminal Charges for Political Caricatures," May 13, 1991; Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia), "Indonesia's Salman Rushdie," April 10, 1991.

20 M. Rizai Maslan, “The Theys Murder Verdict: The TNI View,” www.detik.com (accessed April 23, 2003).