<<previous  |  index  |  next>>

V. Establishing AMIS II-E

With support from its international partners, NATO and the United Nations, the African Union finalized preparations to launch AMIS II-E on July 1, to be completed at the end of September 2005. In many ways, this expanded mission was challenged with the high expectations associated with being the first all-African peace support mission.⁶² The A.U. viewed AMIS II-E in particular as “a test of its capacity to bring peace and security to the continent” in addition to its ability to effectively absorb contributions from the international community.⁶³

A. AMIS II-E structure

On April 25, 2005, a meeting of the A.U. Peace and Security Council’s Military Staff Committee (MSC) evaluated the conclusions and proposals of the March 2005 joint assessment.⁶⁴ Applauding AMIS II efforts where deployed and acknowledging “prevailing constraints” afflicting the mission, the resultant MSC report found that although security had improved “relatively,” the level of violence and compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement were still unacceptable.⁶⁵ Like the March 2005 assessment, the Committee concluded that the mission was overstretched at its current strength and would therefore require further expansion along with the appropriate additional logistical support. However, it criticized the proposal arising from the March assessment (for 5,887 military personnel, 1,560 civilian police, plus necessary support staff, to be deployed in full by August⁶⁶) as lacking “basic elements of a balanced military force… required to deal with the situation in Darfur.”⁶⁷ The MSC instead found that a more realistic military component would be comprised of 6,171 troops in addition to a civilian police component of 1,560 personnel. The number of MilObs Group Sites was to increase from fifteen to twenty-nine. The revised force structure, as presented by the MSC to the P&SC and included in the enhanced plan adopted by the P&SC, is included in Annex 2 of this report (Figure 1).⁶⁸

B. AMIS II-E deployment

The DITF created a deployment schedule for the enhanced AMIS mission as outlined by the MSC proposal.⁶⁹ Along with aid from international partners, the DITF determined the strategic airlifting of the military protection force for AMIS II-E, as shown in Annex 2 of this report (Figure 2). Each of the eight battalions would be deployed to its sector within periods ranging from about seven to fifteen days. AMIS police were primarily expected to be transported via civilian channels.⁷⁰

 While the deployment of the first five battalions was consistent with the original DITF schedule, the mission met delays prior to the full deployment of the third Nigerian contingent. Citing logistical difficulties including a lack of aviation fuel,⁷¹ the DITF presented a revised schedule, moving the original completion deadline from September 30 to October 22, 2005. By late December 2005, 6,964 AMIS personnel were deployed, including 5,645 of 6,171 military personnel and 1,320 of 1,560 civilian police. At this point, AMIS was reportedly waiting on the deployment of an additional 768⁷² personnel from South Africa to complete the mission’s protection force component.⁷³ 

Other setbacks were also experienced during this period with the deployment of the civilian police component of the enhanced A.U. mission. In several sites, including Abu Shok and Kalma, AMIS II-E was confronted by a delay in the construction of offices and accommodation,⁷⁴ and complications with local subcontractors of mission contractor Uniteam further delayed progress and deployment.⁷⁵ By September 12, 2005, the DITF reported eighteen of thirty civilian police stations completed by Uniteam in Nyala and Zalingue.⁷⁶ At this point, the DITF Head of Police was scheduled for an assessment mission to check and verify the logistical problems cited as delaying the deployment of the remaining civilian police. Also in late September, DITF reported that 618 MilObs were on the ground. ⁷⁷

(For a chart of AMIS deployment and expansion in the period July 2004 to July 2005, see Annex 2 of this report, Figure 3.)

C. Support to AMIS II-E

Following a second joint assessment mission with the A.U. in early May 2005, the United Nations Security Council expressed its support for AMIS, emphasizing approval of the mission’s effectiveness where deployed despite continuing hostilities observed by the DPKO. The U.N. Security Council called on the international community to increase coordination of its assistance to the A.U. during the mission’s anticipated expansion, understanding that a short-term solution to the Darfur crisis—accompanying a long-term political solution—would require an enhanced A.U. Mission in the region. The U.N. Secretary-General proposed U.N. aid contributions in the form of technical assistance and training programs to improve AMIS operational capacity during its expansion.⁷⁸ Likewise, NATO offered training opportunities to support this next phase of the A.U. Mission.⁷⁹

Also in May, following an international donors pledging conference, the European Union stated its support for the upcoming expansion of AMIS, agreeing on May 28, to “lend all possible support to military, police and civilian efforts.” This included the provision of technical assistance, military observers, training as required, strategic and tactical transportation, and aerial observation, “if required by the AU.”⁸⁰ The conference, which included the E.U., U.S. and other donors, also saw significant pledges from other international partners.

Funding and in-kind contributions, including training

The May conference provided AMIS II-E with an estimated budget of U.S.$312 million, primarily composed of in-kind pledges. As shown in the table in Annex 2 of this report (Figure 4), many of the initial pledges to AMIS II-E arising from the May donors conference were for logistical support, in-kind contributions, and training opportunities for A.U. personnel, and. it soon became clear that cash needs had been somewhat marginalized during the pledging exercise. A.U. officials praised the generous provision of “aircrafts, transport…accommodation and military hardware,” while lamenting that “only a fraction [about a quarter] of the cash needed” had been offered, much less provided, to sustain the mission.”⁸¹ By August, officials announced that the A.U. was experiencing an urgent shortage of funds sufficient to support the full deployment of AMIS II-E, let alone a possible follow-on mission,⁸² particularly if there remained no political solution to the Darfur crisis.⁸³ It was anticipated that the mission might face difficulties paying its troop’s salaries within three months if the international community failed to provide the cash necessary to finance sustained operations, estimated at an additional U.S.$173 million.⁸⁴ Current estimates suggest that to sustain the mission until March 2006, AMIS must close a funding gap of U.S.$4.6 million.⁸⁵

(See “Prognosis,” below, for the implications of the reported absence of committed funding beyond March.)

As part of E.U., U.N. and NATO assistance to the expanded A.U. Mission, a number of key training exercises were conducted during the months from July to October 2005, several of which addressed the deficiencies noted in the mission earlier. In addition to U.N. communications assistance and APC training provided by Canada, AMIS received a two-phase capacity-building program from NATO to train some thirty military officers in peace support operations, as well as a NATO training program for DITF to enhance coordination and military planning.⁸⁶

On August 28, AMIS II-E completed a Map exercise (MAPEX) supported by the U.N. with cooperation from the E.U. and NATO.  This training program sought to enhance the capacity of AMIS personnel in managing complex peacekeeping operations.  It focused particularly on effective planning and coordination, including the sharing of key operational information (these were identified as key weaknesses by previous assessments as well as the post-exercise briefing). In addition, the briefing identified a need for “clear understanding of responsibilities” at all levels of command as well as training in essential functions for the civilian police component.⁸⁷

This training, coupled with the creation of a Joint Operations Centre, common in UN or similar peace support operations should have enhanced AMIS capacity to manage the mission and its forces. However, it appears that the creation of a Joint Operations Center has not been completed or is not being proceeded with.⁸⁸  The failure to establish the Center is not good for a mission already under stress to carry outs its mandate and tasks, and reflects poorly on AMIS leadership.

Sudan Government Obstruction of Assistance

By mid-September, the DITF reported having 647 vehicles on the ground, expecting the remaining 170 AMIS II-E vehicles to be delivered by the end of the month.⁸⁹ However, in early October, A.U. Special Envoy for Sudan Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe complained that 105 APCs donated by Canada “were sitting in a dock in Dakar… because the AU had not received Sudanese government permission to bring them into Sudan.”⁹⁰ Following an escalation in violence, including the killing of AMIS soldiers in the October incident at Nyala mentioned above, Kingibe blamed this delay in part for severely limiting the mission’s ability to respond effectively to the hostilities.⁹¹ By December, all 105 APCs were in theater with parts and training for gunnery and driving.⁹²

Additionally, difficulties in acquiring Sudanese visas for CivPol trainers contributed to holding up deployment of the 1,560-strong CivPol component of AMIS II-E.⁹³

Operating Environment

As of October 2005, the Sudanese government continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity against those civilian populations perceived to be linked to the rebels because of shared ethnicity. Despite repeated demands from the international community, including the U.N. Security Council, there has been no serious action to disarm the militias, end impunity, or support the African Union’s efforts to protect civilians.  Instead, the Sudanese government continues to pursue a variety of steps that further entrench and consolidate the ethnic cleansing that it and its militias have committed. Impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity is pervasive.⁹⁴ AMIS is operating in an environment that reflects a broad failing by the Sudanese government to reverse “ethnic cleansing” in Darfur. Instead of disarming the militias, Khartoum has incorporated them into security, police and military forces. The Sudanese leadership continues to implement policies that permit continuing attacks on civilians, and perpetuate a climate of fear and intimidation through structural and institutional abuse throughout Darfur carried out by military and paramilitary forces, militia groups and civilian officials.

The months from September 2005 to January 2006 have witnessed a deteriorating situation in Darfur.⁹⁵  Some U.N. agencies have pulled out, and the activities of humanitarian agencies have been severely restricted by the escalation of ceasefire violations, violations of humanitarian law, and human rights abuses. Violence has included banditry, small scale attacks on villages and IDP camps and direct attacks against A.U. personnel.⁹⁶ The government of Sudan was reported to have used helicopter gunships at the time of several Janjaweed attacks in October 2005, which resulted in the deaths of over thirty civilians. The A.U. also alleged that government forces participated on an attack against an A.U. compound in Tawika in October 2005.⁹⁷ On September 19 two Rwandan protection force troops were shot at allegedly by members of the Janjaweed militia while inspecting a reported violent incident.⁹⁸ Also in September, three Nigerian protection force troops and their two civilian drivers were killed, while thirty-eight AMIS personnel were abducted.⁹⁹ Reports even emerged that the Sudanese government had been painting its vehicles white, the color of AMIS vehicles, resulting in restrictions being imposed on AMIS patrols by the opposing rebel movements.¹⁰⁰

Prior to these recent attacks many saw AMIS—though limited—as a “beacon of security” for both IDPs and humanitarian agencies.¹⁰¹ Direct attacks on AMIS personnel have critically altered the security dynamic and its demands on the AU mission in Darfur. These ceasefire violations led A.U. Special Envoy Kingibe to highlight once again the serious disconnect between the expectations of the HCFA and the commitment displayed by all parties. After fourteen months of regular ceasefire violations, A.U. Special Envoy Kingibe stated that he could “conclude no good faith…from any party” and urged that those involved recognize a “clear need to review rules of procedure and joint commission.”¹⁰² The ceasefire violations often involve attacks on and abuses of civilians and demonstrate the parties’ lack of good faith not only in meeting their commitments to observe and monitor the ceasefire but to protect civilians.

Kingibe’s connection between the mission’s operating difficulties and the ceasefire commission structure is appropriate. Although the context in which the CFC was initially conceived has changed dramatically, the Commission itself has not evolved accordingly. Thus, the impression that ceasefire reporting is a structural or procedural issue unrelated to AMIS performance in protecting civilians is largely mistaken. Understanding the ceasefire monitoring and reporting process—and how its initial conception reflects many of the same behaviors and attitudes carried over to the successor mission—is essential in understanding how AMIS relates to civilians in Darfur. It highlights the role of each of the parties in hindering investigations, which relates directly to transparency, accountability and most importantly, credibility with civilians. Due to a pervasive lack of respect for the ceasefire agreement, the structure of the CFC is largely irrelevant to AMIS’s current operating environment, hindering its response capabilities and blocking its civilian protection capacity. If the AU cannot investigate and identify perpetrators of attacks because of structural problems with the Commission and continuous violations, impunity will persist and civilians will continue to not fully trust the A.U. and its authority in bringing their attackers to justice. The Ceasefire Commission is a good example of the rough enhancement of AMIS in Darfur and the institutional delay in implementing adjustments to meet changing demands on the mission’s operations.  The resulting procedural problems have been responsible for many of the practical hindrances outlined below in planning and reporting violations—including those in which civilians are targeted or victimized. Furthermore, the March 2005 assessment found that more effective use of the CFC and its work could—if integrated properly with the mission’s Police, Military and Humanitarian components—improve force operations including proactive planning for contingency requirements.¹⁰³

In addition to the internal constraints affecting AMIS operations, the humanitarian crisis also poses challenges for and highlights the limitations of the AMIS force.  Inextricably tied to this is the requirement to protect civilians in what is a very complex environment. First, there are over 280 IDP locations housing over 1.88 million IDPs and roughly 35-40 vulnerable population centers. Second, there are about 50 major NGOs throughout Sudan and all the U.N. agencies, and their numerous sub-sites, represented in Darfur. The AMIS force cannot protect all the IDPs simultaneously, and not all need simultaneous protection, but IDPs who move out of camps and back to villages need protection, as do the routes they take, and not all routes can be protected simultaneously. Last, humanitarian efforts need a modicum of protection to ensure secure delivery of relief, although not all agencies agree to have direct protection. AMIS II-E must prioritize threatened areas and groups against resource constraints.