Fujimori, along with fifty-seven other individuals, has been charged with the killings of fifteen people, including one child, in the Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima in November 1991, and of nine students and one professor at the University of La Cantuta, in the outskirts of Lima, in July 1992. Both sets of killings were allegedly carried out by a special squad of military and intelligence officers known as the Colina Group. Fujimori advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, former SIN Director Julio Salazar Monroe, and numerous alleged members of the Colina Group are currently on trial for these crimes and for other assassinations and disappearances from the early 1990s that have been attributed to the Colina Group.10
The available evidence indicates that the Colina Group was set up intentionally within the military and intelligence systems to conduct operations of elimination of suspected subversives, with the knowledge and approval of high-level officials.
In interviews that were broadcast on national television in 2003 and incorporated into Fujimoris criminal case, Army Major Santiago Martin Rivas, who has been charged as being Colinas chief of operations, stated that in 1991 Fujimori ordered the implementation of a counter-terrorism policy handbook that Martin Rivas himself drafted, which established a state policy of physical elimination of subversives. Since that time Martin Rivas (now facing criminal charges for his membership in the Colina Group) has recanted the statements he made implicating Fujimori, claiming that the recordings of them were fabricated. He now claims he was never a member of the Colina Group, and has even gone so far as to deny the Colina Groups existence.
According to Martin Rivas original statements, in June 1991, the high command of the army held a meeting to discuss their new strategy to combat terrorism.11 Martin Rivas had drafted a policy handbook outlining the new strategy, and he presented it at the meeting. Martin Rivas claimed that the policys basic principle was that of combating terrorism through low-intensity warfare, which he described as including military operations of reply to each subversive attack, as well as the physical elimination of terrorists.12 Martin Rivas claimed that at the meeting the army decided to adopt this approach to its fight against Shining Path, and submitted the policy to Fujimori for his approval. According to Martin Rivass 2003 claims, it was on this basis that Fujimori ordered that the plan be followed.13
Martin Rivas asserted that it was as a result of his and others work on the counter-terrorism policy that on June 25, 1991, Fujimori sent a memo to the Minister of Defense, in which he asked that several individuals receive special recognition for their services. Fujimori followed up on July 30 with another memo in which he stated that to stimulate these individuals, and because of their successful special intelligence operations, he wished to issue a special recognition of their services for purposes of promotions. Both memos listed, among others, several individuals who have subsequently been linked to the Colina Group.14
Undermining claims that the Colina Group did not exist or was not part of the military structure, numerous official documents that have been found in army intelligence records specifically refer to the Destacamento Colina. Such records also include 1991 orders that various alleged Colina members, as well as weapons and equipment, be placed at the disposal of lieutenant colonel Fernando Rodriguez Sabalbeascoa (criminally charged with being the head of Colina).15 These records strongly support the view that the Colina Group, far from being a separate paramilitary group, was an integral part of the army intelligence structure, and that its members, all with military rank, were assigned, transferred, tasked, and disciplined on the orders of top military intelligence officials.16
Indeed, most of the people charged as members of the Colina Group were in fact military officers who were part of the Army Intelligence Service, under the command of Army Intelligence Director Juan Rivero Lazo, who is currently under prosecution for the crimes attributed to Colina. At the same time, Montesinos has been charged for having coordinated, from within the SIN, the activities of the Colina Group with Rivero Lazo.17 Former members of the Colina Group have testified that for several months in 1991, the group actually operated from SIN offices and met with Montesinos there.18 Army Technician Marco Flores Alván, who has been charged with being a member of the Colina Group, has also stated that sometime in 1991 there was an official inauguration of the Colina Group at the SIN, at which Rivero Lazo and the head of the SIN, General Julio Salazar Monroe, were present, along with Martin Rivas and others.19
Shortly after the Barrios Altos killings occurred on November 3, 1991, there were media reports that the killers were linked to the government.20 The reports cited evidence that intelligence operatives had been conducting surveillance of the house where the killings happened.21 Colina Group members have also stated that immediately after the killings, Rodriguez Sabalbeascoa, along with Martin Rivas and another Colina Group leader, Carlos Pichilingue, met with Presidential advisor Montesinos at the SIN.22
In November 1991, Fujimori signed Legislative Decree No. 746, which greatly broadened the functions of the SIN and provided that the SIN would report directly to the President (previously, it had also been required to report to the Prime Minister).23
After Fujimoris April 1992 self-coup, he exerted complete control over the government for several months, until January of 1993, when a constituent assembly took office to draft a new Constitution and act as a temporary legislative power. Nonetheless, the Colina Group apparently remained intact and operational.
During the period immediately after the coup, the Colina Group allegedly caused the disappearances of several peasants in May 1992, and of journalist Pedro Yauri in June 1992.24 On July 18, 1992, the Colina Group is believed to have committed the infamous Cantuta massacre, entering the student dormitories of the University of La Cantuta in the middle of the night, abducting nine students and a professor, and executing all of them. Martin Rivas has stated that the massacre was the governments response to the Shining Paths bombing, only a few days before the massacre, of Tarata Street, in a residential district of Lima.25
In the aftermath of the Cantuta killings, there were increasing reports of the existence of a military death squad that was responsible for the killings in La Cantuta and Barrios Altos.26 Within a few months, the students remains were found, and criminal investigations were started.
The Fujimori government came under significant international pressure in 1993 to fully investigate the Cantuta killings.27 In early 1994, Major Martin Rivas and several other Colina Group members were convicted by a military tribunal for the Cantuta killings.28 However, they were released on July 15, 1995, as a result of an amnesty law signed by Fujimori.29 Journalist Gilberto Hume later said that Martin Rivas told Hume that he agreed to go before the military tribunals at Fujimoris request because Fujimori offered to give him an amnesty later.30
It is extremely doubtful that the existence of this group would have been unknown to Fujimori, who even before the Cantuta massacre, had conducted a successful coup with the support of the armed forces, was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and to whom the SIN answered directly. Indeed, Major Martin Rivas has stated that Fujimori knew and authorized what the group was doing.31 And two years before Martin Rivass statements were made public, another Colina Group member, Army Technician Julio Chuqui Aguirre, had testified that, immediately before the Barrios Altos and Cantuta killings, Martin Rivas had told him and all the Colina Group members that they had a free pass to carry out the actions in La Cantuta and Barrios Altos because Fujimori had knowledge and had authorized them.32 Similar statements have been made by other army intelligence officers.33
Early on in Fujimoris first term, the government started tapping the phones of a large number of Peruvian citizens, including journalists, members of civil society, and politicians. Sophisticated phone tapping equipment was set up in various buildings rented throughout the city of Lima, and specialized personnel were assigned to start intercepting and transcribing calls. Such large-scale interception of private calls not only subverted the rule of law, but facilitated the Fujimori governments concentration of power and erosion of democratic institutions.
Fujimori has been charged before Peruvian courts with planning and implementing, in conjunction with Montesinos and others, the illegal phone tapping scheme. He has also been charged with using state resources for the purchase of the phone tapping equipment and to pay the personnel who conducted the tapping.
There is strong evidence pointing to Fujimoris direct involvement in the scheme. Montesinos, for example, has testified as to his participation in the scheme, stating that it was all ordered by Fujimori.34 He has also stated that the equipment was purchased and the personnel were paid with funds from each of the armed forces, as well as the SIN, with Fujimoris authorization.35 These statements have been corroborated by Matilde Pinchi Pinchi, Montesinoss former assistant and accountant, who has testified that on numerous occasions she saw Fujimori order Montesinos to intercept specific phones of congressmen, journalists, and others. She has also testified that Montesinos kept Fujimori informed about the transcripts of the intercepted calls.36
Other witnesses have testified that one phone tapping center was even set up in the Palace of Government, following Fujimoris direct orders.37 Army Brigade General Gerardo Luis Pérez del Águila, who served as the head of the Military House outside of the Palace of Government, has testified that when he discovered the equipments presence in the Palace, he ordered that it be disconnected, but then received specific orders from Fujimori to reinstall the equipment.38
Numerous technicians who conducted the tapping have testified as to their activities, giving specific names of politicians and journalists whose calls they intercepted.39 Equipment used to conduct the tapping has also been recovered and identified.40
Fujimori has been charged with diverting, throughout much of his presidency, millions of dollars in public funds for his own and his relatives benefit. The bulk of the funds were diverted through a complex scheme by which funds were secretly transferred from various government entities to secret accounts of the SIN, which in accordance with Fujimoris instructions, were managed by his close advisor Montesinos. In this manner, Fujimori allegedly was able to obtain large sums of money, which he used to increase his monthly personal income and to fund the bribery, extortion, and concentration of power that so damaged Perus democratic institutions during his government.
There is substantial evidence that from 1992 to 2000, Fujimori colluded with Montesinos, as well as with various ministers of economy, defense, and interior, to divert public funds to the SIN.41 To this end, the Ministry of Economy regularly assigned extra-budgetary funds to the Ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.42 In turn, allegedly following Fujimoris orders, the ministers of defense and interior would order that some of these funds be delivered in cash or check every month to Montesinos at the SIN. 43
The funds were then allocated to two SIN budgets for reserved actions which were supposed to be used for intelligence operations in emergency zones.44 According to testimony by the SINs official leadership, Fujimori ordered them to give Montesinos complete control of the funds in two SIN budgets for reserved actions.45
Case files include documents showing the movements of the funds. And there is substantial evidence of Fujimoris direct involvement in the transfers. For example, a former minister of interior, Army General César Saucedo Sánchez, has testified that Fujimori specifically told him to request that extrabudgetary funds be assigned to the ministry, and that Fujimori ordered him to deliver those funds to the SIN.46 Montesinos, too, has testified in detail about the funds transfers, and has stated that Fujimori was not only aware of the transfers, but approved of them.47
There is no record whatsoever of the funds diverted to the SIN being used for official purposes. And contrary to standard practice, the SIN kept no records concerning the use to which the funds were put.48 Fujimori apparently approved the spending of the funds through monthly Supreme Resolutions, which were classified as secret and did not specify how the funds were spent.49
According to Montesinos testimony, the SIN funds were used, with Fujimoris knowledge, for a variety of purposes, including making payments to congressmen for their loyalty.50
In addition, Montesinos has testified that every month Fujimori asked him to deliver a sum of money, drawn from SIN accounts, to Fujimori himself or his family.51 Montesinos testimony has been corroborated by that of his former secretary Maria Angelica Arce Guerrero, and by that of Matilde Pinchi. Both have testified that they handled money that was set aside for regular deliveries to Fujimori.52 Also, Army Colonel Luis Rodriguez Silva, who was one of Fujimoris escorts for four years and later became sub-director of the SIN, has testified that he personally delivered envelopes of money from the SIN to Fujimori at the Palace of Government.53 In some cases, Arce and Pinchi have testified, money was also transferred to Fujimoris relatives, such as his sister Rosa Fujimori and his brother-in-law, former Peruvian Ambassador to Japan Victor Aritomi, who allegedly picked up substantial sums of money during their visits to Peru from Japan.54
Based on the testimony of Montesinos and Pinchi, the Office of the Comptroller General of Peru has estimated that Fujimori received between U.S.$43.2 million and U.S.$59.4 million in transfers from the SIN between 1992 and 2000.55
In light of these transactions, it is not surprising that financial analyses show a substantial imbalance between Fujimoris assets and official income as president and university professor, and his expenses (including payment for his four childrens college educations and expenses in the United States).56
Other charges against Fujimori are based on his management of millions of dollars in donations that Japanese persons and entities made to Peru through various organizations and accounts set up by Fujimori and his family. There is documentary evidence, for example, that enormous donations were made to Peru via the organization Apenkai, which was established and managed by the Fujimori family from within the Palace of Government.57 However, Apenkais financial records contain serious inconsistencies and do not explain the use to which the funds were put.58 Recent reports indicate U.S.$4.5 million from Japanese donations were diverted to personal accounts of Fujimoris sister Rosa, his brother-in-law Victor Aritomi, and his mother Mutsue Inamoto.59 And there is evidence that Rosa gave Fujimori three checks of approximately $175,000 each, drawn from these accounts, between 1996 and 1997.60
Fujimoris party, Peru 2000, did not obtain a parliamentary majority in the 2000 elections. Fujimori has been charged with planning and putting into effect, in conjunction with Montesinos, a scheme to pay bribes to congressional representatives from opposition parties so that they would switch and join Peru 2000. In this manner, Fujimori could ensure that he would have full congressional support during his third term. The plan completely undermined the principle of separation of powers.
As a result of the bribes, Fujimoris party went from controlling only 42.6 percent of the seats in Congress, to controlling 58 percent of the seats, thus gaining a parliamentary majority.61 According to Montesinos and Matilde Pinchi, the payments were made with funds from the SINs reserved actions budget, and with funds that had been diverted from the budgets of the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the Armed Forces.62
Montesinos has confirmed that he and Fujimori planned the strategy together, and he has given detailed testimony about the various payments. In at least one instance, a former congressman who switched parties testified that after an initial meeting with Montesinos at which Montesinos proposed that he change his party affiliation, he had a second meeting with Fujimori, in which Fujimori asked him about the matter, and in which the congressman agreed to the switch.63
The scheme involved the purchase of the loyalty of a group of representatives. In exchange for various payments, usually of thousands of dollars that Montesinos paid to them in cash in the offices of the SIN, these congressional representatives agreed to change their party affiliations. As part of the agreement, the representatives signed three documents: first, a letter of resignation from their party of origin; second, a letter of affiliation to the party of the government or a commitment to support the regime of Fujimori Fujimori; and third, a receipt for money delivered (copies of these papers have been incorporated into criminal records). Many of the transactions were actually recorded on videotape by Montesinos, and several of these recordings were subsequently recovered by authorities.64
5. Transfer of U.S.$15 Million in Public Funds to Montesinos and Cover-up
On September 14, 2000, a videotape in which Montesinos appeared to be bribing a Peruvian Congressman was leaked to the media and made public. The tape sparked an enormous scandal that eventually resulted in the collapse of the Fujimori government.
In the weeks after the tapes release, Fujimori publicly denounced Montesinos, and announced an investigation and nationwide manhunt for him. Yet at the same time, Fujimori was apparently frantically trying to cover up the criminal and corrupt activities through which his government had concentrated power and avoided real democratic oversight. Fujimori has subsequently been charged with assisting Montesinoss escape, and conducting illegal searches of Montesinos home. Indeed, Montesinos fled the country and, as evidence mounted against Fujimori, Fujimori himself flew to Japan, from where he resigned the presidency by fax.
Perhaps the most serious criminal charge against Fujimori arising from his activities during this period is that, shortly after the tapes release, Fujimori arranged to have U.S.$15 million in state funds delivered to Montesinos. According to Montesinoss testimony, as a result of the videotapes release, Fujimori held a meeting with him, in which Fujimori decided to give him U.S.$15 million.65 The payment was supposed to be Montesinoss compensation for services rendered.66
The transfer took place through an elaborate scheme. On September 19, shortly after the videotapes release, Fujimori and three of his ministers signed Emergency Decree 081-2000. The decree increased a portion of the Defense Sector budget by 69,597,810 new soles (approximately U.S.$19 million). Formally, the decree was issued in response to an August 25 request by the Army for a budgetary increase to implement the Sovereignty Plan (Plan Soberanía) to protect the Peruvian border from intrusions by Colombian guerrillas. However, there is strong evidence that such a plan never existed.67 And there is no record of the decree being discussed by the full Council of Ministers as would ordinarily be required under Peruvian law.68
Carlos Boloña, the former minister of the economy who signed the Emergency Decree, confessed during his criminal prosecution that he knew the money that was being transferred to the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the Decree was going to be used to solve the problem of governance that was created with the release of the sadly famous Kouri-Montesinos videotape, as President Fujimori told me so when he asked me to urgently handle the Defense Sectors request.69
On the basis of the Emergency Decree, Defense Minister Carlos Bergamino filed a formal request for 52,500,000 new soles to be placed in the bank account of the Ministry of Defenses General Administration Office. The request was immediately approved by the Ministry of Economy. Bergamino then sent a formal request to the bank, asking that the full amount be converted to U.S. dollars and turned over to Brigade General Luis Muente, the head of the Ministry of Defenses General Administration Office.
On September 22, Muente picked up the money, which in dollars added up to U.S.$15 million. He has testified that, following Bergaminos orders, he drove the $15 million to the SIN on September 22, and personally met with Montesinos to deliver the money. He has also testified that throughout that day, Montesinos called him repeatedly to ask about the money. In those calls, Muente says that Montesinos explained his insistence by stating that he was acting on a direct order from Fujimori.70
Montesinos has testified that he had a meeting that same night with James Stone Cohen and Swi Sudit Wasserman, who frequently handled foreign deposits and transactions for Montesinos, at the SIN.71 Montesinos claims that he gave the money to Stone and Sudit for them to deposit it in a Swiss bank account, but that they kept the money instead.72 Three days later, Montesinos fled Peru. Both Stone and Sudit are currently under prosecution for their participation in this scheme.
On November 2, Fujimori allegedly tried to cover up the illegal withdrawal by depositing another $15 million back in government accounts. According to Bergaminos testimony, Fujimori called a meeting at which Fujimori gave him four suitcases containing $15 million. Following Fujimoris instructions, Bergamino gave the money to the Treasury and drafted a memo stating that the Sovereignty Plan had been postponed until the following year. 73 The next day, the sum was deposited in the bank.
However, there is very strong evidence that the money that was withdrawn on September 22 was not the same money that was returned to the Treasury on November 3. In particular, currency conversion receipts for the money that was withdrawn and the money that was returned show that the bills withdrawn were different from the ones returned.74 Also, Henry David Tunanñaña, an army economist who says he accompanied Muente during the withdrawal of the $15 million, has testified that the money they withdrew included $50 and $20 bills. He also participated in the November 3 replacement of the $15 million, and testifies that the money that was returned consisted exclusively of $100 bills and thus could not be the same money that had been withdrawn.75 The origin of the $15 million that was deposited in the account on November 3 remains unknown. Both Boloña and Bergamino have been convicted for their participation in this scheme; their convictions are currently on appeal.
 See Primera Fiscalía Superior Penal Especializada, Acusación, Expediente No. 28-01, May 11, 2005.
 Interview by Umberto Jara with Santiago Martin Rivas, excerpted in In the Mouth of the Wolf, Program by Cesar Hildebrandt, September 24 and 25, 2003, and incorporated into the case file against Fujimori. See also Umberto Jara, Ojo por Ojo: La verdadera historia del Grupo Colina (Lima: Norma, 2003), pp. 118-25.
 Memorandum from Alberto Fujimori, President of the Republic of Peru to the Minister of Defense, June 25, 1991; Memorandum from Alberto Fujimori, President of the Republic of Peru to the Minister of Defense, July 30, 1991.
 These records were recovered on April 1 and 12, 2002, when Judge Luz Victoria Sánchez of the fifth special anti-corruption criminal court and provincial prosecutor Richard Saavedra conducted a search of army intelligence records on the assignments of the Colina group in 1990-1992. See Diligencia de Exhibición de Documentos Realizada en las Instalaciones del Cuartel General del Ejército, April 1, 2002, Fs. 14057 a 14070, Expediente Barrios Altos.
 The documents found by Judge Sánchez in army records included a transcription of personal congratulations from President Fujimori in August 1991 to members of the Colina group for providing efficient services on national security and defense of the highest values of democracy. Other records showed that members of the group had been decorated in July 1994 for services to national pacification. Ibid.
 See Primera Fiscalía Superior Penal Especializada, Acusación, Exp. No. 28-01, May 11, 2005.
 See Testimony of Army Technician Marco Flores Alvan, summarized in Primera Fiscalía Superior Penal Especializada, Acusación, Exp. No. 28-01, May 11, 2005; Testimony of Army Technician Julio Chuqui Aguirre, summarized in Primera Fiscalía Superior Penal Especializada, Acusación, Exp. No. 28-01, May 11, 2005.
Testimony of Marco Flores Alván, May 21, 2001, described in Acusación Constitucional Contra el Ex Presidente de la Republica, Ingeniero Alberto Fujimori Fujimori por la presunta comisión de los delitos de homicidio calificado, desaparición forzada y Lesiones Graves, por los casos denominados La Cantuta y Barrios Altos, August 27, 2001, p. 96.
 See, for example, Horror y Misterio, Revista Si, November 11, 1991; Alker: El Militar Asesino de Barrios Altos, Revista Si, November 18, 1991.
 See Ricardo Uceda, Tres Misterios por Resolver en el Juicio a los Jefes del Grupo Colina, El Comercio, September 18, 2005.
 Legislative Decree No. 746 of November 10, 1991, Arts. 7 and 10. Compare with Legislative Decree No. 271 of February 10, 1984.
 See Primera Fiscalía Superior Penal Especializada, Acusación, Expediente No. 28-01, May 11, 2005.
Interview by Umberto Jara with Santiago Martin Rivas, excerpted in In the Mouth of the Wolf, Program by Cesar Hildebrandt (September 24 and 25, 2003), and incorporated into the case file against Fujimori. See also Umberto Jara, Ojo por Ojo: La verdadera historia del Grupo Colina (Lima: Norma, 2003), pp. 176-81.
See, for example, Sociedad para el Crimen, Revista Si, December 7, 1992; Leon Dormido, Caretas, April 7, 1993.
 See Nathaniel C. Nash, Grisly Find in Peru Puts Army in Deep Shadow, The New York Times, August 13, 1993; James Brooke, Lima Journal: Dictator? President? Or General Manager of Peru?, The New York Times, November 25, 1993; Human Rights Watch, Anatomy of a Cover-Up: The Disappearances at La Cantuta, A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 5, No. 9, September 1993.
 Criminal investigations were started within the civilian and military justice systems almost simultaneously. After the Supreme Court was unable to reach a quorum to decide the jurisdictional conflict, Fujimori signed, on February 9, 1994, Law No. 26291. That law allowed only three, instead of four, members of the Supreme Court to decide jurisdictional conflicts between the military and civilian tribunals (previously, the Court would have had to bring in an additional judge to reach a quorum). The Supreme Court then ruled in favor of the military justice system. See Acusación Constitucional Contra el Ex Presidente de la Republica, Ingeniero Alberto Fujimori Fujimori por la presunta comisión de los delitos de homicidio calificado, desaparición forzada y Lesiones Graves, por los casos denominados La Cantuta y Barrios Altos, August 27, 2001.
 Law No. 26479 of June 15, 1995.
See Participacion en Crimenes Admite Mayor (R) Martin Rivas, El Comercio, May 22, 2001. See also Testimony of Gilberto Hume (September 20, 2001).
 Interview by Umberto Jara with Santiago Martin Rivas, excerpted in In the Mouth of the Wolf, Program by Cesar Hildebrandt (September 24 and 25, 2003), and incorporated into the Fujimori case file. See also Umberto Jara, Ojo por Ojo: La verdadera historia del Grupo Colina (Lima: Norma, 2003).
 See Testimony of Julio Chuqui Aguirre before Supreme Court Justice Jose Luis Lecaros, December 21, 2001.
 Chuquis testimony is consistent with the statements of Witness 1, a former Army intelligence officer who claimed, in testimony to the Congress, that friends of his who were members of the Colina group had said that Martin Rivas would tell them that their orders came from Fujimori. See Comisión Investigadora sobre la Actuación, el Origen, Movimiento y Destino de los Recursos Financieros de Vladimiro Montesinos Torres y su Evidente Relación con el ex Presidente Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Sesión on Monday February 11, 2002. Leonor La Rosa, an Army intelligence operative, has testified that she personally saw Fujimori in meetings with members of the Colina Group and Montesinos. See Testimony of Leonor La Rosa, August 1, 2002, Expediente 19-2001 A.V.
 See Fujimori ordenó pagar US$2 millones para encubrir espionaje telefónico, La Republica, October 15, 2001.
Ibid. See also Fujimori ordenó pagar US$2 millones para encubrir espionaje telefónico, La Republica, October 15, 2001.
 See Testimony of Army Brigade General Gerardo Luis Pérez del Águila, cited in Fiscalía Suprema en Segunda Instancia de la Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema, Dictamen de Acusacion, Expediente No. 14-2003 (date not available).
Fiscalía Suprema en Segunda Instancia de la Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema, Dictamen de Acusación, Expediente No. 14-2003 (date not available).
 See Ministerio Público del Perú, Denuncia Penal contra Alberto Fujimori y otros, March 20, 2003.
 In the case of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces, these funds were consistently assigned to a budget line for Emergency Zones, which would ordinarily have been used for social assistance. Ibid.
 See Fujimori ordenó dar el dinero a Montesinos, La Republica, March 7, 2003.
 See Testimony of Army General Cesar Saucedo Sánchez, described in Ministerio Publico del Perú, Denuncia Penal contra Alberto Fujimori y otros, March 20, 2003.
 See Confesiones de la Red de Corrupción II, Peru 21, March 7, 2003.
 Contraloría General de la República, Informe Pericial de la Instrucción Seguida contra el Ex Presidente Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Exp. 09-2003, pp. 82-106.
 See Confesiones de la Red de Corrupción II, Peru 21, March 7, 2003.
 See Concluyen que Fujimori Manejo Fondos a Su Antojo, El Comercio, April 24, 2002; Confesiones de la Red de Corrupción II, Peru 21, March 7, 2003.
 See Ministerio Publico del Perú, Denuncia Penal contra Alberto Fujimori y otros, March 20, 2003; Contraloría General de la República, Informe Pericial de la Instrucción Seguida contra el Ex Presidente Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Exp. 09-2003, p. 6.
 See Ministerio Publico del Perú, Denuncia Penal contra Alberto Fujimori y otros, March 20, 2003; Contraloría General de la República, Informe Pericial de la Instrucción Seguida contra el Ex Presidente Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Exp. 09-2003, pp. 7-8.
 Contraloría General de la República, Informe Pericial de la Instrucción Seguida contra el Ex Presidente Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Exp. 09-2003, p. 5
 Ibid., pp. 3-5, 20-26; see also Ministerio Público del Perú, Denuncia Penal contra Alberto Fujimori y otros, March 20, 2003. Montesinos has testified that the childrens college educations and expenses were paid for with money from the SIN, which he had sent to Fujimori, or directly to Fujimoris daughter Keiko. See Contraloría General de la República, Informe Pericial de la Instrucción Seguida contra el Ex Presidente Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Exp. 09-2003, p. 22.
 Ibid. See also Contraloría General de la Republica, Informe Pericial de la Instrucción Seguida contra el Ex Presidente Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, Exp. 09-2003, pp. 32-82.
 Fujimoris mother, despite being very elderly, is registered as having withdrawn $1 million in cash from these accounts in Peru. See Ángel Paez, Mamá de Fujimori retiró $1 millón, La Republica, December 1, 2005.
 See Ángel Páez, A Japón no le queda otra que abrir cuentas de los Fujimori, La Republica, December 2, 2005.
 See Segunda Fiscalía Suprema en lo Penal, Acusación, Expediente No. 05-2002, July 4, 2005.
 See Testimony of Gregorio Ticona Gómez, described in Segunda Fiscalía Suprema en lo Penal, Acusación, Expediente No. 05-2002, July 4, 2005.
 Transcripts of some of the Vladivideos are available on the website of Perus Congress, at http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/SICR/diariodebates/audiovideos.NSF/indice?OpenView&Start=1 (retrieved December 8, 2005).
 See Testimony of Vladimiro Montesinos, described in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.
 See Milagros Trujillo, El Cuento de las CTS, Caretas, August 14, 2003.
 Montesinos has testified that the request was in fact drafted after September 14, when the first videotape of Montesinos making payments to a Congressman was made public. Ibid. The Ministry of Defense has certified that the Sovereignty Plan does not appear in any of its files. See Oficio No. 4369-SGMD-C/4, August 19, 2002, referenced in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.
 According to testimony by the General Secretary of the Presidency at the time, Fujimori delivered the decree directly to him so that it would be taken to the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to be sealed and numbered, and then immediately returned to Fujimori. He also testified that because the decree was labeled secret, Congress was not informed of it. See Testimony of Jose Kamiya Teruya, described in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.
 Aclaración de términos de la defensa material presentada en el juicio oral, court filing by Carlos Alberto Boloña Behr, Causa No. 23-2001, January 25, 2005 (emphasis added).
 Testimony of Luis Anibal Muente Schwarz, described in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.
 Swi Sudit Wasserman has also testified that he met with Montesinos and that they discussed the money, but he claims that he did not receive the money. See Testimony of Swi Sudit Wasserman, described in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente Nro,: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.
 See Testimony of Vladimiro Montesinos, described in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003. Army Captain Mario Rafael Ruiz Aguero, who worked at the SIN, has stated that on the night of September 22 Montesinos instructed him to put four or five bags into the trunk of Stones car. See Testimony of Mario Rafael Ruiz Aguero, described in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.
 See Testimony of Carlos Bergamino Cruz, described in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.
 See Fiscalía Suprema en Segunda Instancia, Sala Penal de la Corte Suprema, Acusacion, Expediente No.: 23-2001, November 11, 2003.
See Testimony of Henry David Tunanñaña, described in Vocalía Suprema de Instrucción, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica, Informe Final, Expediente No: 23-2001 A.V., March 24, 2003.