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III. Background

Egypt has a long history of nongovernmental social activity, traditionally enabled by the Muslim charitable endowment system (waqf). In the aftermath of the 1952 revolution, the government sharply restricted rights relating to freedom of association, expression, and political participation. Anxious to eliminate any possible role for the Muslim Brotherhood, the government used a suffocating legal regime codified in Law 32 of 1964 to subordinate all nongovernmental organizations to government control.5

This legacy of state corporatism has profoundly affected the development of Egyptian civil society. Government-defined boundaries circumscribe civil society spheres of action and expression. To be successful, NGOs must maintain a good a relationship with the state bureaucracy ¾ and individual bureaucrats. One knowledgeable observer who wished to remain unnamed described the situation to Human Rights Watch as follows:

You have to understand: universities and research centers in other societies are independent. That is not the case here. Here they are the second face of the government. The only way we can talk about independent civil society organizations is NGOs and community service organizations...

[NGOs] are all divided. The government takes control by division and segregation and affiliates them to a different minister. Everyone in civil society has a godfather. Even if they’re useful, they’re corrupt. This is something from the first years of the revolution. Even the Boy Scout movement was completely destroyed.6

As in the rest of the world, civil society activities in Egypt expanded dramatically in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, particularly around the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in 1994. Intense local lobbying led the government in 1998 to announce its intention to reform Law 32/1964, the law of associations. After a consultation process with civil society that NGO activists characterized as “heavily controlled,”7 then-Social Affairs Minister Dr. Mervat Tellawi presented a draft law to the government that, if passed, would have marked a substantive break from past practice. Instead, the draft was substantially altered by the cabinet. This new associations law was enacted but promptly declared unconstitutional.8 The current law of associations (Law 84/2002) was passed hastily on June 3, 2002.9

Law 84/2002 was a missed opportunity. Although it eased some of the worst restrictions of the 1964 law, it also eliminated some of the improvements codified in the 1999 law. Overall, it created a legal regime that gives the state excessive latitude to dissolve, reject, or slowly choke any organization financially, should it wish to do so. Government corruption and inefficiency exacerbate the intrusive bureaucratic requirements. Worse still is the significant but unwritten role of the security services, which routinely reject applications to register new groups or candidates for board member elections, despite having no legal basis for doing so. Even groups that have successfully registered continue to endure close monitoring and sometimes harassment from security service agents.

Domestic Protections and Realities

A powerful network of legal and practical restrictions limits freedom of association in Egypt. Understanding this framework is vital to any assessment of civil society’s operational environment and the NGO law.

In principle, the Egyptian constitution protects the right to: freedom of speech (Article 47); freedom of the press (Article 48); literary and scientific research (Article 49); peaceable assembly (Article 54); to form association (Article 55); and to create unions and professional syndicates (Article 56). The Egyptian Constitutional Court has often upheld these constitutional rights, as has the State Council (majlis al-dawla, or administrative court).

In reality, however, the government has severely undermined these rights through its long-term use of restrictive legislation. Since the assassination of former President Anwar Sadat in 1981, President Husni Mubarak has ruled Egypt with emergency powers.10 These powers have created an environment where the authorities abuse fundamental human rights on a wide scale and with impunity, and where they adopt arbitrary measures to silence their critics in the name of safeguarding national security.11 The wide-ranging and extensive powers given to the security forces under the state of emergency enable them to arrest at will people suspected of being a threat to national security and public order absent any showing of probable cause. Such persons can be held in detention without charge for prolonged periods. Similarly, censorship of the press can be imposed and newspapers ordered to shut down if the authorities decide that such measures are required for reasons of national security or public safety. Under Article 80(d) of the penal code, individuals can be sentenced from six months to five years for disseminating damaging information abroad.12 Strikes, public meetings, and election rallies are prohibited: many have been dispersed violently.13

The state of emergency has also made it possible for the authorities to refer civilian defendants to military courts or to exceptional state security courts, in effect creating a parallel court system that lacks elemental due process protections. Political activists, including those who were not involved in any violent activity, have been tried before military courts that did not meet minimum fair trial standards, and charged with acts that amount to peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

For example, in April 2003 Ashraf Ibrahim Marzuq was arrested and held for three and half months before being charged before the Emergency Higher State Security Court with being on the steering committee of a “revolutionary socialist group,” “holding and possessing publications disseminating advocacy and propaganda for the group’s purposes,” and “sending false information to foreign bodies—foreign human rights organizations— which include, contrary to the truth, violations of human rights within the country, the content of which weakened the position of the state.”14 Ibrahim was eventually acquitted on March 11, 2004.

Since 1998 two prominent human rights activists have been arrested on the basis of Military Decree No. 4 of 1992, which lays down prison sentences for several offences that encompass the internationally protected exercise of freedom of association and expression. In 1998, Hafez Abu Saeda, secretary general of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, was accused of accepting funds from a foreign donor without prior authorization after publishing a report on torture and other abuses related to the government’s handing of a Muslim-Coptic disturbance in Upper Egypt. The case did not go to trial. Dr. Saadeddin Ibrahim, along with his co-workers at the Ibn Khaldun Center and the Hoda Association, an affiliated organization that promotes women’s voting rights, were arrested in June 2000 and later convicted on several charges, including accepting foreign funds without permission and disseminating false information about Egypt. After being sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment on July 31, 2002, the verdict against Ibrahim and his co-defendants was quashed on December 3, 2002.15

The government’s dominant role in public life is reinforced by other legislation as well. Heavy restrictions on trade unions and political parties date from the Nasserist era. The Trade Union Law establishes a central pyramidal trade union structure, under which all trade unions are compelled to affiliate with the only legally recognized labor federation, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation. Union elections and other matters are supervised solely by the Ministry of Manpower. All collective bargaining mechanisms are subject to trade union approval, and trade union membership is compulsory for all public sector employees.16 The Press Law (Law 96/1996) imposes custodial sentences for offences such as slander, insult, and libel. In its quest to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood and other critics, the government also intervened extensively in the elections and governance of professional associations in the mid to late 1990s, including at one point the sequestration of the Egyptian Bar Association.

Overview of Law 84/2002

Law 84/2002 establishes two main forms of non-profit organizations: associations (jam`iyyat) and civic foundations (mu’assassat ahliyya). All non-profit groups of ten members or more working in social development activities must register with the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA) or face criminal penalties, including up to one year’s imprisonment (article 76). A group of less than ten persons can neither apply for association status nor carry out volunteer activities. Non-profit groups working in other fields are answerable to other ministries: for example, the Ministry of Health regulates non-profit medical clinics.

In a welcome development, the new associations law has widened the scope of permissible NGO activities, including human rights activism.17 In theory, the law also allows NGOs to work in more than one field of activity, though in practice they must seek MISA permission before doing so.

Yet the scope of permissible NGO activities remains severely limited. Article 11 of Law 84/2002 forbids groups from pursuing the goals of “threatening national unity” or “violating public order or morals,” As this report will demonstrate, this language echoes that of international human rights law but the Egyptian government’s application of these concepts is broad and excessive in ways that are grossly inconsistent with international standards. Egyptian laws, for instance, effectively prohibit independent political or trade union activities.18 These prohibitions are defined further in the executive (implementing) regulations (articles 24-25). The regulations state that groups may not undertake or fund election-related activities, or represent employees in discussions with employers. In practice, Article 11 has given the security forces and government officials unacceptably wide powers to harass activists and dissolve civil society groups (see below.) The government may use Article 11 as a basis to block an NGO’s registration; to reject particular persons as founders or board candidates; or to dissolve a group and seize its assets.19

When a group applies for registration, it undergoes an official inspection and lodges the required forms at its local MISA office. According to NGO activists, applicants were typically asked to fill out the application in pencil and then go through it with a MISA official who instructs them what to change and what to keep. The ministry is required to respond by registered letter within sixty days. If a group’s objectives include any activities MISA considers banned by Article 11, the ministry may refuse the group permission to register, although it must give reasons for its decision in writing (Article 6). The ministry also has the powers to object to a group’s bylaws or founders (Article 8).

If more than sixty days have passed without an official MISA response, then a group can assume to be registered, although in practice it is impossible to function without an official registration number. Registered groups are entitled to significant tax privileges, as well as discounted telephone and utilities charges (Article 13). Because registration is compulsory, non-registered groups are forbidden from conducting any activity.

NGOs that have been refused permission to register may bring a complaint before the State Council (majlis al-dawla, or administrative court). Rejection of registration is the only circumstance in which the law allows an NGO to go straight to the administrative court. Registered NGOs that have disputes with the ministry may take complaints to a three-person dispute committee. If the committee has not decided the issue within sixty days, the NGO may take a case to the administrative court (Article 7). Complaints over dissolution, board membership and other issues must also be taken to the dispute resolution committee before resorting to the administrative court.20

Under Law 153 of 1999, later declared unconstitutional, the ministry had to go to court if it wished to reject the application of an association. Under Law 84, the NGO must initiate any court involvement. This puts the burden on the fledgling NGO and thus is a step backwards.

The new law limits the ministry’s previously absolute power to reject, amalgamate, and otherwise control organizations.21 However, it still provides ample means for governmental officials to intervene in internal governance – including the power to dissolve organizations by decree. Article 42 gives the minister unacceptably wide grounds on which to dissolve groups, including receiving foreign funds or affiliating with foreign organizations without permission, conduct of political or trade union activities, and violations of the law, public order or morals. Interestingly, the minister’s power to dissolve organizations had been eliminated from the 1999 law of associations, law 153/1999, which specified that organizations could be dissolved only as a result of a judicial order.22

Another fundamental problem is the ministry’s power to object to an association’s proposed board members (Article 34). If an NGO is electing new board members, it must notify MISA of the nominees at least sixty days before the elections. The ministry, and in fact any “interested party,” have the power to notify the NGO that certain candidates cannot be nominated, although the grounds for such action are not stated clearly.23 MISA does not have the same ability to object to the leadership of foundations, making the latter a more popular organizational structure.24

The new law no longer stipulates what color inks NGOs must use, but it does specify NGO governance and administrative procedures with a significant level of detail.25 MISA defines the number of board members and their terms of office, procedures for annual general meetings (AGMs) and quorum requirements, frequency of executive committee meetings and procedures, fundraising requirements, organizational record-keeping and so on (Executive Regulations Articles 81-90). In particular, organizations must provide MISA with advance notice as well as minutes of annual general meetings. MISA must approve invitations to conferences before the members of an association can participate. MISA can itself convene an NGO’s AGM if it considers it to be necessary. MISA also has the power to object to any organizational decision it considers illegal; the law does not indicate that it must explain the basis for its objection (Article 23). Groups may not work in more than one governorate, or beyond the limits of the governorate in which their main office is located, without seeking MISA permission.26

Crucially, the ministry also has the power to block an organization’s funding. The law’s ambiguous language on funding is clarified by the executive (implementing) regulations. If they notify MISA, organizations may receive funds from local sources, and from foreign organizations that operate in Egypt under agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But every grant from external sources must be reviewed and approved by the minister, who is officially required to respond within sixty days (Article 58). A group must hold any foreign funds it has received in escrow until it has received MISA approval. A group may become affiliated with non-Egyptian organizations if the minister is informed and does not object (Article 16).

The law establishes the right of any ten organizations working in the same field to join and form a union. In practice, however, those organizations that want to form a union must submit the names to MISA, which then groups organizations in unions corresponding to what the ministry understands to be their chief activity or activities. Such authority belongs with the organizations concerned, not with the state.

The law also establishes a General Union of Associations and Civic Foundations (Article 69). Headquartered in Cairo, the union is designed as a government-organized representative body for all NGOs. Although the union has the potential to play a positive role, it also constitutes an additional and unneeded layer of state-designed bureaucracy. One third of its board members are government-appointed. The law states that union representatives must be consulted on a variety of issues, including government orders for NGO dissolution. A member of the union also sits on the three-person dispute resolution committee established by Article 7.



[5] For example, under Law 32 of 1964, NGOs were allowed to work only in one of a group of twelve fields. Government officials could reject a group’s creation, its board candidates, and board decision-making for unspecified reasons. Officials could dissolve or amalgamate any groups at any time. A notorious example of politically motivated dissolution is the 1982 closure of the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association, led by prominent feminist Dr. Nawal al-Sa`dawi. See Human Rights Watch [Middle East Watch], “Egypt: Court Upholds Closure of Women’s Organization,” available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/egypt/.

[6] Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, Cairo, September 27, 2004.

[7] Dr. Seif al-Dawla is a founding member of several NGOs, including the Egyptian Association against Torture and the Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence.

[8] The Constitutional Court ruled law 153 of 1999 unconstitutional in May 2000 (case number 153 of Judicial Year 6, issued on June 3, 2000). The court found it had been issued without seeking the required approval of Egypt’s upper house of parliament, the Shura Council. The court also found that many of the law’s provisions violated the right to freedom of association established by article 55 of the Egyptian constitution.

[9] Law Number 84 of 2002, published in the Official Gazette – Number 22 – Supplement (A) June 5, 2002. For details of the preceding parliamentary debate, see Negad al-Bora’i, Al-maqsala wa al-tanur: Hurrayyat al-ta`bir fi Misr 2002-2003 al-mushkilat wa al-hulul, (Cairo: The United Group, 2004), pp. 495-502.

[10] Including the Emergency Law 162 of 1958, the Anti-Terror Law 97 of 1992, and related military decrees. The Egyptian parliament has successively approved each renewal of the state of emergency. The current state of emergency is due to expire in 2006.

[11] The authorities announced in 2003 that the Higher State Security Courts had been abolished, but the Higher Emergency State Security Court remained intact. For background see Human Rights Watch The State of Egypt vs. Free Expression, Vol. 14 No. 1(E), January 2002; Amnesty International Egypt: Muzzling Civil Society, September 2000 AI Index MDE 12/21/00.

[12] For a fuller discussion of the impact of Article 80(d), see The State of Egypt vs. Free Expression, p. 13.

[13] See Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Security Forces Abuse of Anti-War Demonstrators, Vol. 15 No. 10(E), November 2003.

[14] Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Security Forces Abuses of Anti-War Demonstrators, p. 11.

[15] Human Rights Watch, The State of Egypt vs. Free Expression.

[16]The ILO has informed the government of Egypt repeatedly that these infringe workers’ freedom of association. See CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, 1948 Egypt (ratification: 1957) Published: 2004. Available online http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newcountryframeE.htm, accessed December 4, 2004.

[17] Under Law 32 of 1964, NGOs were previously limited to working in only one of twelve fields; the twelfth field, human rights, was added by ministerial decree in 2000. The expanded field of permissible NGO activities is set out in Article 48 of the executive (implementing) regulations of Law 84/2002.

[18] The relevant language reads:

...it is also forbidden to include amongst an organization’s goals the performance of the following activities:

1. Forming military or paramilitary detachments or formations.

2. Threatening national unity, violating public order or morals, or calling for discrimination between citizens because of race, origin, color, language, religion, or creed.

3. The exercise of any political activity shall be restricted to political parties in accordance to the parties law, and exercising any unionist activity shall be restricted to unions in accordance to the trade unions law.

[19] Articles 8, 34 and 42.

[20] Throughout the process of registration and appeals, the founding members must pay rent for the premises of an as-yet unauthorized organization. Aida Seif al-Dawla, a founding member of the Egyptian Association against Torture, told Human Rights Watch that in the case of the Egyptian Association against Torture this has been going on for more than two years (e-mail communication from Aida Seif al-Dawla, May 4, 2005).

[21] See, for example, articles 29, 57, and 79 of Law 32/1964, justified on the grounds of coordination, prevention of overlap, and security: “it was imperative that the efforts which are exerted in the field of social service shall be subject to sound planning within the framework of a comprehensive general plan to be supervised by the State, which shall direct it and control its execution.” Explanatory Memorandum of the Law No. 32 for 1964, p. 35.

[22] Article 62, Law No. 153 of the Year 1999, The Non-Governmental Organizations Law/Qanun al jam`iyyat wa al mu’assassat al-ahliyya, published in the Official Gazette (al-jarida al-rasmiyya) – Issue 21 – Supplement (B) – May 27, 1999.

[23] Article 34 and Executive (Implementing) Regulations Article 81. According to Article 34, the administrative authority or any interest party can reject candidates for “non-fulfillment of the nomination criteria.” The only specific criteria are contained in Article 33, which states every nominee must be in possession of his or her civil rights—that is, over the age of 21.

[24] Instead of holding board elections, the founding members of a foundation instead appoint a board of trustees (article 60).

[25] The implementing regulations of law 32/1964 required that corrections to organization registers be made in red ink.

[26] Executive (Implementing) Regulations, Article 48. There are twenty-six governorates.


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