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The Responsibility to Protect Returnees

My son lost half his leg in September.  The problem is that people are hungry and they go for mangoes.  Usually it is the children who go after the mangoes, but my son is twenty.  The area was marked as mined but he was recently arrived and so hungry that he ignored the sign.
– Feliza, Luau, November 23, 2004.

Even before the war ended, the government of Angola officially recognized its responsibility to protect the rights of IDPs and returning refugees by adopting a domestic law, the Norms for the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Populations (the Norms) in January 2001, and the implementing regulation (the Regulamento) in 2002.1  In doing so, Angola became the first country in the world to incorporate the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into domestic law,2 and extended the application of those principles to the treatment of returning refugees.  In addition to this legislation, under Article 18 of the Angolan Constitution, “All citizens shall be equal under the law and shall enjoy the same rights and be subject to the same duties, without distinction as to color, race, ethnic group, sex, place of birth, religion, ideology, level of education or economic or social status.”   Yet despite these domestic laws and Angola’s obligations under international law, a culture of impunity at the local level and lingering political tensions and suspicions have made returnees vulnerable to abuse by the authorities and some local communities.

The Voluntary Repatriation Program

The Tripartite Agreements negotiated between the government of Angola, UNHCR and the main countries hosting Angolan refugees (including DRC, Zambia and Namibia) require Angola to provide the minimum conditions necessary for voluntary refugee repatriation, particularly regarding mine clearance and access to land.3  The 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (“African Refugee Convention”), which was ratified by the Government of Angola in 1982, recognizes the voluntary character or repatriation and provides, in particular, that “the country of origin, on receiving back refugees, shall facilitate their resettlement and grant them the full rights and privileges of nationals of the country, and subject them to the same obligations.”4  In terms of institutional responsibilities, facilitating and promoting voluntary repatriation is a core and statutory function of UNHCR.5  By virtue of Article 35 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and Article VII of the African Refugee Convention, State parties are required to cooperate with UNHCR in this and other areas.  The General Assembly has repeatedly re-affirmed and broadened UNHCR’s functions with regard to voluntary repatriation, and has increasingly foreseen an active role for UNHCR in the country of origin.6  UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom)7 Conclusions also reaffirm the international principles and contain standards governing the voluntary repatriation process.8

The initial Tripartite Agreements reached with the governments of Zambia and DRC recognized that voluntary repatriation constitutes the best durable solution for refugees, as long as refugees are repatriated in conditions of “safety and dignity.”9  The first question to address in assessing the repatriation process is whether it is voluntary.10  According to the UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, refugees must have accurate information about conditions in their home country to make an informed decision, and must not be subject to “push factors” such as physical, psychological, or material pressure, to leave the country of asylum.11 

Using these guidelines, the repatriation of Angolan refugees from DRC and Zambia—the two cases investigated by Human Rights Watch—appears to be voluntary.  The large number of spontaneous returns before and during the UNHCR program demonstrates Angolans’ strong desire to return home.   Long waiting lists for voluntary repatriation still exist in camps in DRC and Zambia.12  Human Rights Watch interviewed several returnees in the Luau and Cazombo reception centers in Moxico province who revealed they had been eager to return since the war ended in 2002, despite the difficulties they expected to face.13  As Joao N., a father of six returning from DRC, told Human Rights Watch:

UNHCR explained that there would be no food, houses or schools, and they also told us there would be a lot of mines.  But even if we don’t have houses, we don’t have food, we don’t have schools, we wanted to return to our country because it’s our country.14 

After refugees indicate their intention to participate in the voluntary repatriation program, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) organizes air and land transport for them to reception centers in Angola.  The NGOs acting as implementing partners of UNHCR assist both the organized returnees and spontaneous returnees who arrive at the reception centers on their own.15  Medical NGOs screen returnees, transport those who are seriously ill to local health facilities, and provide HIV/AIDS education.  International de-mining organizations provide mine risk education to returnees.  Returnees are also meant to receive construction kits for building new homes and agricultural kits with seeds and tools, but the kits are not always complete due to logistical and funding constraints.  In Cazombo, for example, UNHCR was unable to distribute seeds with the agricultural kits in September-October 2004.16  Other returnees complained of receiving incomplete construction kits.

As highlighted above, repatriation must not only be voluntary, but take place in conditions of “safety and dignity,” which UNHCR explains as legal safety (such as amnesties or public assurances of personal safety, non-discrimination and freedom from fear of persecution or punishment upon return), physical security (including protection from armed attacks and mines), and material security (access to land or means of livelihood).17

Denial of the Right to Citizenship

The right to citizenship is the cornerstone of the legal protection of returning refugees.  The Regulamento requires the provincial delegation of the Ministry of Justice to conduct birth registration and ensure that national identity cards are issued.18  This requirement corresponds to Principle 20 of the UN Guiding Principles, which requires authorities to issue new documents or replace those lost in the course of displacement and not impose “unreasonable conditions” to obtain these documents.  This principle protects the right to a nationality under customary international law, crystallized in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the right to recognition as a person before the law, codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).19  The Convention on the Rights of the Child also mandates birth registration for children to protect their right to a nationality.20  ExCom Conclusion 101(LV) of 2004 also “notes the importance of ensuring nationality and the provision under national law of the recognition of the civil status first stage of returning refugees and changes thereto…”21

Many of the returnees interviewed by Human Rights Watch did not have the identity documents necessary to establish their citizenship, ensure access to such government services as public education, and allow them to work and vote.  Under the Norms and Regulamento, the Ministry of Justice must conduct birth registration and issue cedulas (proof of birth registration) and bilhetes de identidade (identity cards issued to adults) to returnees.22

The war destroyed the birth registration system and archives in most of the country, so the Ministry of Justice, with assistance from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and NGOs, instituted a free birth registration campaign in 1998.23  The second campaign, which began in 2001 and was repeatedly extended until the end of 2004, included children in the UNITA family reception areas in the demobilization process.  The campaign targeted children under eighteen in their areas of return by registering them in refugee reception centers and sending mobile registration teams to their final destinations.

Free birth registration for children is vital to securing their right to citizenship and identity.  In a recent survey by UNICEF and the Angolan National Statistical Institute, most people cited excessive cost as the biggest impediment to registering their children, followed by distance to the civil registry.24  UNICEF is urging the government to make free birth registration permanent, but at the time of this writing, UNICEF plans to limit its support to the registration campaign to children less than five years of age in 2005.25  In addition to funding constraints, the birth registration campaign is also in danger of being strangled by red tape.  In Luau, for example, the local Ministry of Justice office ran out of registration books in October 2004; the provincial and national governments have ignored their requests for additional books, meaning that no children who passed through the Luau reception center in October and November 2004 were registered.26 

One international official told Human Rights Watch that the national Ministry of Justice is sympathetic to the need for free birth registration, but suspected some local officials might be eager to end the campaign so they can resume charging fees, which could open the door to opportunities for bribery.27 UNITA supporters have raised the possibility of an even more sinister motive for denying free identity cards to adults – a plan to prevent UNITA supporters and former soldiers from voting.  According to a UNITA Member of Parliament, “Nothing prevented the government from going into the countryside to mount a very successful polio vaccination campaign.  But when there’s a political reason not to visit UNITA areas [as part of a mobile registration campaign], there is not the same enthusiasm.”28  Although Human Rights Watch found no evidence to substantiate this claim, the government’s excuse that it lacks adequate resources cannot be used to deny the basic human right of citizenship.   

Human Rights Watch interviewed a number of adults in Moxico and Huambo who could not afford cedulas and bilhetes de identidade for themselves, leaving them open to abuse by local authorities. One recently returned refugee from DRC told Human Rights Watch that police had approached him in Luau in 2003 and demanded to see his identity documents, which he had not yet obtained.  The police jailed him overnight and released him only after a relative arrived and paid a bribe of 500 kwanzas.29  A representative of the International Organization for Migration in Luau said that he and his staff have witnessed the police—who are able to recognize recent returnees from DRC by the way they dress and speak French—harassing people without identity documents.30  The police generally demand a gasosa (the term for a soft drink, which has come to mean a bribe).  As one police officer told Human Rights Watch casually, “The police are supposed to stop people to check their documents because they need money.”31

Human Rights Watch has received disturbing reports from NGOs and UN agencies that in some cases, the abuse of returnees has escalated to severe beatings and rape.  In the town of Maquela do Zombo in Uíge province, near the border between DRC and Angola, the military has been cracking down on illegal diamond smuggling in what is known as OperaçÃo Brilhante, a government campaign that brutally expelled approximately 12,000 illegal migrant workers in 2004.  Border officials accuse Angolan returnees of being “Congolese.”  One NGO in Maquela do Zombo has worked with women who were detained at the border, imprisoned, beaten and raped.  According to this NGO, in one case a pregnant woman suffered a miscarriage after she was picked up at the border and beaten in a truck on the way to jail in Maquela do Zombo.32

Similar problems have been reported in Malanje province, which also borders DRC and has been part of the OperaçÃo Brilhante sweep.33  The abuse of women, however, is not limited to areas targeted in OperacÃo Brilhante.  One UN official told us that in Lumbala N’Guimbo, the location of a reception center and military base in Moxico, members of the military sexually exploit returnee women,34 although it remains unclear whether the relations constitute prostitution or rape.35  UNHCR has been funding women’s associations in Lumbala N’Guimbo since women in the community took it upon themselves to help returnee women find livelihoods outside prostitution, demonstrating the agency’s vital role in protecting returnees.

In response to these incidents, UNHCR and some NGOs also have organized human rights training workshops for local government officials, police and soldiers.  In a hopeful sign, one NGO admitted to having trouble fulfilling all the training requests coming from the military at the national and provincial level.36  Additionally, government officials have assured UNHCR that they will accept alternative forms of identification, such as the Voluntary Repatriation Form issued by UNHCR and/or WFP rations cards, from returnees who lack the cedula or bilhete de identidade.37  Yet these assurances and requests for training, though welcome, are not adequate.  Military and police commanders must investigate reports of abuse and discipline perpetrators accordingly. 

Returnees also complained that the government interferes with their right to work by refusing to recognize educational and professional credentials obtained in countries of asylum.  In Moxico, Human Rights Watch interviewed medical professionals trained in DRC who are currently working with international NGOs, but fear the government will not allow them to continue working when the NGOs turn over clinic operations to the Ministry of Health:

I came with my diplomas from DRC but they have no value here.  The government never definitively rejects my application for equivalency—they just keep dragging out the process.  For the past two years, the Ministry of Justice keeps sending back my application for a bilhete for so-called errors, like poor quality of photos and the wrong type of paper.  I even paid the application fee twice.  I don’t understand—the level of education in this country is so low—couldn’t we mobilize other people with our experience to help our country?38

International refugee law requires Angola to provide returnees with non-discriminatory access to processes, where they exist, to recognize the equivalence of primary and secondary education received abroad, as well as the equivalence of academic, professional and vocational diplomas, certificates and degrees achieved abroad.39

Political Tensions and Violence

Overall, there appears to be little tension between former UNITA soldiers, UNITA supporters, and MPLA supporters and soldiers.  People are exhausted from thirty years of fighting, and few care about politics enough to risk renewed conflict.  Because both sides forcibly conscripted many combatants during the war, they harbor little if any lingering ideological or partisan loyalties and are simply relieved the war is over.  Returnees remember how UNITA’s defeat in the 1992 elections led to the resumption of war and voiced the understandable concern that the upcoming elections will generate new conflict and violence.  They are likewise wary of political activity by UNITA.

Although these fears of a return to the violent past have left the population largely subdued and tranquil, some communities have demonstrated their suspicions by reacting violently against UNITA party officials attempting to open offices in areas that were devastated during the war.  The most notorious incident occurred in Cazombo in July 2004, when a former UNITA general, Moises Cayumbu Jolombo, and his delegation of UNITA officials tried to open a new party office.  The townspeople viewed General Jolombo as the officer responsible for destroying the bridge over the Zambeze River during the war, which left Cazombo isolated from the rest of Angola.  The UNITA delegation requested a building for a new office from the local administrator, who told them there were no buildings available.  The delegation then identified a local UNITA supporter and used her home to show videos of Jonas Savimbi to the public.  Early one morning after a video showing, a large group of people gathered in the Chipoya neighborhood, where the new UNITA “office” was located, and the “confusÃo” (troubles) began:

It was July 17, at around 6:00 a.m.  I was inside with my wife and three children when the crowd reached my house.  We ran away.  The crowd burned my house down—they destroyed everything inside.  They were shouting that I was UNITA and that UNITA should not live in Chipoya.40

In all, fifty-one houses were destroyed in less than two days.  Another victim, a former UNITA combatant, related how one of the sobas (traditional leader or village chief) got caught up in the atmosphere of rage:

My house was destroyed.  All that remained of it were the walls.  The group who burned my house down was getting ready to burn some others when another group stopped them.  Some people ran for help to the house of our neighbor Dominga.  Four days later, Soba White Kaumba went to Dominga’s house and demanded to know how she could give refuge to UNITA people.  Her children ran out to get her when they saw the soba.  The soba yelled at her, then he ignited a stick with grass and set her house on fire. The police arrested the soba and he went to prison in Luena for three months.  He just returned a few days ago.  He is still the soba of Chipoya, but he is not able to give people land any more—the Paramount Soba of Moxico took that authority away from him.  We don’t trust this soba anymore.   A leader wouldn’t do such a thing.  The people might do such things but the soba should not.41

According to the victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch, the police interviewed some of the victims but did not arrest anyone other than Soba White Kaumba.  The provincial authorities promised compensation to the victims but failed to deliver on their promise.42  Nonetheless, the victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch felt safe enough to rebuild their homes on nearly the same spots where they were burnt down.  Even General Jolombo remained in his home.  “We have confidence in the police because they never did anything wrong to us.  The authorities protected me,” one victim said.43 

The UN investigated the incident and concluded that it was an isolated case of vigilantism directed against the return of General Jolombo.44  This explanation may be true in Cazombo, which has remained peaceful since the incident, but does not explain similar cases of violence and vandalism occurring elsewhere in the country, particularly in Huambo and other areas where a large number of former UNITA combatants have returned.  The provincial secretary for UNITA in Huambo described what happened to her when she, two UNITA members of parliament and a few other party officials tried to open an office in the village of Galanga (in the commune of Londuimbali) on June 9, 2004:

I met with the administrator of Londuimbali and with MPLA leaders there before we traveled to Galanga to tell them that we planned to visit the villages of Londuimbali.  We did not plan to raise the UNITA flag in Galanga because we knew the people would not welcome it—we just wanted to have a conversation with the people.  When we arrived in Galanga, a big crowd of maybe one hundred or 150 people arrived and threatened to kill us.  We ducked inside the building where we planned to open our office and met with the local soba, administrator and clergy from the local church.  We all agreed that Angola should have peace—the MPLA chopped up my father with a machete, but if we hold onto these bad memories, we won’t make any progress.  But when our delegation was left alone in the office, the crowd started throwing rocks and broke some windows.  The administrator of Galanga and some police arrived to escort us out.  When I left the building, I got hit by a rock on the head and one of the parliamentarians was injured on the jaw and shoulder.45

An Angolan NGO that has been working on conflict resolution in Galanga since this incident told Human Rights Watch that the MPLA secretary there urged former UNITA combatants to join the MPLA to avoid further conflict.46

Similar events occurred in two villages in the municipality of Bailundo, Savimbi’s refuge in the 1990s, when UNITA attempted to open party offices in July and September 2004.47  The incidents follow a similar pattern: a mob of people who are never identified vandalize the UNITA office and sometimes burn down houses.  The police interview victims but no one is arrested.  UNITA party officials and several former combatants also told Human Rights Watch that some government officials pressure UNITA supporters and former soldiers to join the MPLA to avoid conflict and, if employed by the government, to advance in their careers.48 

Human Rights Watch found no evidence of government complicity in these violent episodes.  But these incidents demonstrate that obstacles to reconciliation and reintegration remain, despite the provisions of the Luena MOU that gave amnesty to actors on both sides for all acts committed during the war.49  In Huambo, the MPLA and UNITA have formed a joint commission to investigate these incidents.  The local police and government at the provincial and national level should give this commission its full support to stem these incidents now, before the advent of elections in 2006 polarizes society even further.

The government of Angola recently appointed former Justice Minister Paolo Tjipilica as the new Justice Ombudsman, and has been consulting with the UN Human Rights Office on the creation of a national human rights commission.  These could be promising developments for the national protection of the human rights.  Unfortunately, the government failed to ensure the participation of members of Angolan civil society in the selection process for the Justice Ombudsman.50  Any future human rights commission needs the support of civil society, a strong mandate and adequate resources to have the credibility and capacity necessary to be effective.

Landmine Danger

One would be hard-pressed to overstate the lethal threat posed by landmines and unexploded ordinance (UXO) in Angola today.  At the end of the war, the international de-mining agency HALO Trust estimated that there were at least one million landmines in Angola, of some seventy-six different types manufactured in twenty-two countries.51 The government estimates there are 80,000 survivors of landmine accidents in Angola.52 

Landmines isolate communities from humanitarian assistance because aid organizations are unable to travel on many of the country’s roads due to the mine danger, which worsens during the rainy season as the rains expose mines and cause them to shift.  People are also unable to farm their land safely.  Human Rights Watch researchers personally observed the landmine threat in Luau, where people are literally living in minefields.  Children play within meters of areas marked as mined with red flags.  One returnee explained a recent mine accident in her family:

My son lost half his leg in September.  The problem is that people are hungry and they go for mangoes.  Usually it is the children who go after the mangoes, but my son is twenty.  The area was marked as mined but he was recently arrived and so hungry that he ignored the sign.53 

The international organization Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is the lead de-mining agency in Moxico.  UNHCR asked MAG to assess the mine situation in the proposed location for the Luau refugee reception center, but MAG was unable to evaluate the refugees’ final destinations before the organized repatriation program began.  Consequently, the extent of the mine contamination in Luau only became apparent as people moved to their final destinations in and around Luau and encountered mines.  “We suspected there would be problems, but not to the extent that there are in Luau,” the MAG program officer told Human Rights Watch.  In addition to manual mine clearance, MAG also conducts about thirty “spot tasks” a month to destroy UXO uncovered in Luau.54

As pressure on available land in Luau increases with the return of more refugees, returnees are forced to choose between living on mined land near the Luau town center or moving farther from Luau and losing access to services (including health care and schools) and markets.55  Some refugees decide to take the risk of living on or near mined land.  At the national level, UN agencies recognized the dilemma facing returnees but expressed dismay that they would knowingly choose to settle in known mined areas.56 A UNHCR official explained the conundrum facing the agency, which must respect returnees’ right to choose their final destination yet prevent them from settling in unsafe areas: “We can’t stop them—all we can do is provide them with the information.  It’s a very intentional choice.”57  But the decision to live amongst mines is not so hard to comprehend when the alternative is almost complete isolation.  Landmines appear to pose somewhat less of a problem to returnees in the rural areas of Huambo province (possibly because national authorities have prioritized the densely populated central highlands for de-mining activities58), although Human Rights Watch researchers observed extensive mined areas running alongside some of the major roads in Huambo.

Under the Norms, the government is responsible for ensuring that “all resettlement and return sites must be verified as free of mines,” and the government must provide mine awareness training and conduct de-mining activities, working with partners and NGOs if necessary.59

The government’s de-mining efforts to date have been confined to military de-mining operations designed to clear strategic transport arteries, not prepare residential areas for resettlement.  For now, the government’s role is primarily coordination.  The National Inter-Sectoral Commission on De-mining and Humanitarian Assistance (ComissÃo Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária às vítimas de minas, CNIDAH), which reports directly to the Council of Ministers, works to improve collaboration between the international community, the National Institute for De-mining (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD) and other relevant government institutions and ministries.  INAD hopes to establish offices in ten of the most mine-affected provinces in the country and assist the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA) in adopting humanitarian mine clearance standards, which are quite different from military standards.60  CNIDAH has devised a national mine action plan to prioritize intervention based on the density of the population, number of minefields, number of mine victims, recorded incidents in 2003, and number of vulnerable people, especially those in transit, IDPs or returning refugees.61  Despite these planning and coordination efforts, however, the government’s operational capacity in de-mining remains minimal, and ordinary Angolans continue to rely upon international de-mining agencies when they encounter mines.

According to its Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, UNHCR has the responsibility “from the very outset of repatriation planning, to obtain reliable information on areas seriously affected by the presence of land mines.”62  The Global Consultations paper on Voluntary Repatriation recognizes that landmines are one of the most prevalent threats to physical safety in repatriation operations and that “de-mining and mine-awareness training programs are therefore essential.”63  Given the enormity of Angola’s landmine problem, UNHCR cannot be expected to foresee every potentially mined area, but Human Rights Watch is concerned that UNHCR’s limited monitoring capability may prevent the agency from getting sufficient information on mined areas as they are identified and sharing that information with returnees before they decide on their final destinations.  Human Rights Watch is also concerned that UNHCR does not regularly include de-mining agencies in its coordination meetings with implementing partners, which means the agencies are not fully integrated into the repatriation planning process.  At the same time, UNHCR has done very well in ensuring that refugees receive mine risk education.  All of the refugees interviewed at UNHCR reception centers told Human Rights Watch that they received mine risk education before leaving their country of asylum and also upon arriving at the reception center.  De-mining agencies also travel to communities of return to give further mine risk education.

Need for International Protection Monitoring

The dangers posed by mines and incidents of violence against returnees and UNITA supporters illustrate the continued need for international monitoring of the reintegration process in Angola.  Historically, OCHA has been active in monitoring protection issues in Angola, but OCHA is currently phasing out its activities and has drastically reduced its monitoring capacity.64  OCHA continues to coordinate information sharing for protection purposes at the national level, and is building the capacity of the government’s Technical Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (Unidade Técnica de CoordenaçÃo da Ajuda Humanitária, UTCAH) to take over this coordination role.65

Despite OCHA’s involvement in monitoring and protection activities, UNHCR is the only international organization with the legal mandate to monitor the return and reintegration of refugees.66  The Executive Committee of UNHCR elaborated on the organization’s mandate to supervise the conditions for voluntary repatriation in the refugees’ country of origin:

The High Commissioner should be recognized as having a legitimate concern for the consequences of return… The High Commissioner must be regarded as entitled to insist on his legitimate concern over the outcome of any return that he has assisted.  Within the framework of close consultations with the State concerned, he should be given direct and unhindered access to returnees so that he is in a position to monitor fulfillment of the amnesties, guarantees or assurances on the basis of which the refugees have returned. This should be considered as inherent in his mandate.67  (Emphasis added)

Cazombo is a good example of the impact UNHCR can have with an active monitoring and protection policy.  In Struggling Through Peace, Human Rights Watch reported that border officials were harassing, abusing and extorting spontaneous returnees when they crossed the border from Zambia into Angola.  Since the time the report was written, UNHCR in Cazombo has been building a close working relationship with the local FAA commander, holding frequent coordination meetings and providing human rights training for soldiers, including border guards.  UNHCR also intervenes on the spot when it receives reports of abuses.  UNHCR now reports that when border officials encounter spontaneous returnees crossing into Angola from Zambia, they contact UNHCR and arrange to have the returnees picked up and transported to the Cazombo reception center.68

Unfortunately, funding constraints have forced UNHCR to cut its protection staffing.  As a UNHCR protection officer in Luanda told Human Rights Watch:

I am very concerned about our ability to monitor returns as we wind down the organized return phase and move into reintegration.  If we don’t have the money and we’ve brought back all these people, how are we expected to help them stay?69

There is now a single protection officer monitoring returns in all of Moxico and Kuando Kubango—two vast and often inaccessible provinces.  The UNHCR field officer in Cazombo lamented the loss of a protection officer who was able to interview returnees and monitor their progress closely.70  The UNHCR field officer in Luau echoed his colleague’s regret over losing a dedicated protection officer: “Protection is our main thing.  You can’t be UNHCR without having a protection officer.”71

In some cases, UNHCR has turned to their implementing partners (NGOs funded directly by UNHCR) for assistance in conducting protection activities.  In Uíge and Moxico, for example, the Center for Common Ground (CCG) facilitates conflict management and human rights workshops for security forces and leadership workshops for women.  CCG also trains local people, called Social Promoters, in conflict resolution techniques and encourages them to monitor returns and share information on protection problems as they arise.72

Human Rights Watch welcomes these efforts to train Angolans to resolve their own conflicts and open dialogue with government officials, because ultimately, a durable solution rests on citizens having the tools to protect themselves.  At the same time, the efforts of NGOs and local citizens are no substitute for active monitoring and intervention by UNHCR in cases of abuse during this delicate transition phase. 

UNHCR is also responsible for monitoring the conditions to which refugees are returning.  According to UNHCR’s Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities, the agency should ensure that basic needs are met during an initial period of reintegration and beyond, including an assessment of access to health care, education and other public services.73  In Angola, however, UNHCR’s resources appear to be focused almost exclusively on organizing and implementing the voluntary repatriation process, with very few resources left over for protection and human rights monitoring, let alone monitoring the material conditions of return.



[1] Council of Ministers Decree No. 1/01, adopted January 5, 2001, and Council of Ministers Decree No. 79/02 (Regulation for the Application of the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations, or Regulamento), adopted December 6, 2002.

[2] The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were adopted in September 1998 by the UN General Assembly.  See UN Doc. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998).  Although not legally binding, they provide an authoritative normative framework for the protection of IDPs. The Guiding Principles are a firm reinstatement of existing international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law relating to the internally displaced.  They draw heavily on existing standards and provide additional guidance and explanation when there are gaps. They are intended to provide practical guidance to governments, other competent authorities, the UN and other governmental agencies and NGOs in their work with IDPs.  The Guiding Principles are available at http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html.

[3] See, e.g., Agreement on the Establishment of a Tripartite Commission for the Voluntary Repatriation of Angolan Refugees between the Government of the Republic of Angola, the Government of the Republic of Zambia and UNHCR, March 15, 2003.  Article 13 (Mine Awareness) of the Tripartite Agreement requires the government of Angola to prioritize routes and areas of destination for returnees in its demining activities, and Article 14 (Access to Land and Recovery of Property) mandates that the government of Angola “use its best endeavors” to ensure that returnees have access to land in accordance with Angolan law, including the Norms.

[4] Article V, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (African Refugee Convention), 1001 UNTS 45, entered into force June 20, 1974.

[5] Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950. See also “Voluntary Repatriation,” Global Consultations on International Protection, EC/GC/02/5, April 25, 2002.

[6] See in particular General Assembly Resolutions 1672 (XVI) of December 18, 1961; 40/118 of December 13, 1985; and 44/137 of December 15, 1989.

[7] The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Program (“ExCom)” is UNHCR’s governing body. Since 1975, ExCom has passed a series of Conclusions at its annual meetings. The Conclusions are intended to guide states in their treatment of refugees and asylum seekers and in their interpretation of existing international refugee law. While the Conclusions are not legally binding, they do constitute a body of soft international law and ExCom member states are obliged to abide by them. They are adopted by consensus by the ExCom member states, broadly represent the views of the international community, and carry persuasive authority.

[8] The most relevant ExCom Conclusions are Conclusion 18 (XXXII) of 1980, Conclusion 40 (XXXVI) of 1985 and Conclusion 101(LV) of 2004. Conclusions 74 (XLV) of 1994 and 85(XLXIX) of 1998 are also relevant.

[9] Agreement on the Establishment of a Tripartite Commission for the Voluntary Repatriation of Angolan Refugees between the Government of the Republic of Angola, the Government of the Republic of Zambia and UNHCR, November 28, 2003.  See also Agreement on the Establishment of a Tripartite Commission for the Voluntary Repatriation of Angolan Refugees between the Government of the Republic of Angola, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and UNHCR, December 11, 2002.

[10] The voluntary character of repatriation is affirmed in ExCom Conclusion Conclusion 18 (XXXII) of 1980, Conclusion 40 (XXXVI ) of 1985 and Conclusion 101(LV) of 2004. The latter Conclusion “reaffirms the voluntary character of refugee repatriation, which involves the individual making a free and informed choice through, inter alia, the availability of complete, accurate and objective information in the country of origin.”

[11] Section 2.3 (Voluntariness), UNHCR Handbook, Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection (Geneva: March 1996).  Although the handbook is not binding international law, it provides a set of guidelines for the activities of UNHCR and governments during repatriation process based on international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law. 

[12] Human Rights Watch interview with Paulo Moises, UNHCR field officer, Cazombo, November 24, 2004.

[13] Human Rights Watch interviews with Joao N., Bernard C., Maria I., Manuel C. and Jose L., recently returned refugees from DRC in Luau reception center, November 22, 2004, and Human Rights Watch interviews with Julio V., Evelina N., Adelino U. and Ihemba K., recently returned refugees from Zambia in Cazombo reception center, November 24, 2004.

[14] Human Rights Watch interview with Joao N., Luau reception center, November 22, 2004.  A UNHCR field officer in Luau told Human Rights Watch that the government of DRC has allowed some camps with very few remaining refugees to remain open until the 2005 repatriation season begins (in spring 2005, after the end of the rainy season), an indication that DRC is not pressuring Angolan refugees to return home.  Human Rights Watch interview with Acacio Juliao, UNHCR Field Officer, Luau, November 22, 2004.

[15] The reception centers remain open all year to accommodate spontaneous returnees, but at reduced capacity during the rainy season when the assisted repatriation process is suspended.  Human Rights Watch interview with NGO representative working in Moxico, Luanda, November 18, 2004.

[16] Human Rights Watch interview with Paulo Moises, UNHCR Field Officer, Cazombo reception center, November 24, 2004.

[17] For a detailed discussion on these concepts, see UNHCR’s Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, section 2.4 and “Voluntary Repatriation,” Global Consultations on International Protection, EC/GC/02/5 25 April 2002, section IV.

[18] Article 12 (Identification of Populations), Council of Ministers Decree No. 79/02, December 6, 2002.

[19] Article 16, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December 16, 1966, entered into force March 23, 1976.

[20] See Article 7, Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature November 20, 1989, entered into force September 20, 1990: “(1) The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. (2) States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.”

[21] ExCom Conclusion 101(LV) of 2004, paragraphs k and l.

[22] Article 12 (Identification of Populations), Council of Ministers Decree No. 79/02, December 6, 2002.

[23] As of 2004, the government estimated that 4.5 million children were unregistered, and the functioning few registration offices experienced low morale due to meager salaries and poor working conditions.  See Section IV(A) (Civil Rights and Freedoms: Name and Nationality), Committee on the Rights of the Child, Angola Initial Report (submitted under article 44 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child), August 10, 2004.

[24] Section IV(A) (Civil Rights and Freedoms: Name and Nationality), Committee on the Rights of the Child, Angola Initial Report (submitted under article 44 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child), August 10, 2004.

[25] Human Rights Watch interview with UNICEF official, Luanda, November 10, 2004.

[26] Human Rights Watch interview with Manuel Kaiombo, Ministry of Justice Registration Official, Luau, November 24, 2004.

[27] Human Rights Watch interview with international official, Luanda, November 2004.  In Moxico, UNHCR overcame local reluctance to continuing the free birth registration campaign by presenting local authorities in Luau with a petition to continue the campaign signed by members of the local Protection Working Group; the local authorities then successfully lobbied the provincial government explaining the need to continue the campaign through the end of 2004.  This incident illustrates the vital role of UNHCR in protection activities.  Human Rights Watch interview with Acacio JuliÃo, UNHCR Field Officer, Luau, November 24, 2004. 

[28] Human Rights Watch interview with Jaka Jamba, UNITA Member of Parliament, Luanda, December 2, 2004.

[29] Human Rights Watch interview with Ismail M., Luau, November 22, 2004.  The soba of the Capamba area of Luau said that the police had harassed and/or detained many men in his community for not having identity documents.  Human Rights Watch interview with Soba Raul Isak, Luau, November 23, 2004.

[30] Human Rights Watch interview with Ponteiro Tunguna, IOM Officer in Charge, Luau, November 22, 2004.

[31] Informal conversation with police officer, Luau, November 24, 2004.

[32] Due to the advent of the rainy season, Human Rights Watch was unable to travel to Maquela do Zombo to verify this incident.  The NGO cited verified this incident by interviewing the victim when she was released and admitted to the hospital, as well as interviewing the medical staff treating her and the local police commander.  Human Rights Watch interview with NGO representative, Luanda, November 16, 2004.

[33] Human Rights Watch interview with Heather Kulp, Country Director, Center for Common Ground, Luanda, November 16, 2004, and Prasant Nalk, Program Operations Manager, Oxfam, Luanda, November 15, 2004.

[34] Human Rights Watch interview with Thomas Vargas, UNHCR Protection Officer, Luanda, November 12, 2004.

[35] Human Rights Watch interview with Thomas Vargas, UNHCR Protection Office, Luau, November 18, 2004.

[36] Human Rights Watch interview with Heather Kulp, Country Director, Center for Common Ground, Luanda, November 16, 2004.

[37] Human Rights Watch interview with Thomas Vargas, UNHCR Protection Officer, Luanda, November 12, 2004.

[38] Human Rights Watch interview with C.K., Luau, November 24, 2004.  Another medical technician trained in DRC suspects the local administration is preventing him and his colleagues from getting jobs because they fear competition from better-educated returnees:  “We are citizens—we have the right to work.  I fled the war because I did not want to have anything to do with politics and now that I want to help rebuild the country, I can’t. … The administration will not accept giving jobs to DRC returnees.”  Human Rights Watch interview with J.K., Luau, November 24, 2004.

[39] ExCom Conclusion 101 (LV) of 2004, para. (o).

[40] Human Rights Watch interview with Pedro Z., Cazombo (Chipoya), November 2, 2004.

[41] Human Rights Watch interview with Augusto K., Cazombo (Chipoya), November 2, 2004. Nhakatolo Chilombo, the Paramount Soba of Moxico province, said that Soba White was drunk and confirmed that she stripped him of his authority to allocate land.  Human Rights Watch interview, Cazombo, November 25, 2004.

[42] Human Rights Watch interview with international official, Cazombo, November 24, 2004.

[43] Human Rights Watch interview with Augusto K., Cazombo (Chipoya), November 2, 2004.

[44] Human Rights Watch interview with Philippe Lazzarini, Representative, OCHA/TCU, Luanda, November 10, 2004.

[45] Human Rights Watch interview with Alda Juliana Paulo Sachiambo, UNITA Provincial Secretary, Huambo city, November 29, 2004. 

[46] Human Rights Watch interview with Martinho Tchissingui, Director of LONGA, Huambo city, November 29, 2004.

[47] In September 2004, an angry crowd destroyed six houses in Luvemba. Human Rights Watch interviews with Alda Juliana Paulo Sachiambo, UNITA Provincial Secretary, Huambo city, November 29, 2004, and Manuela Gonzalez, OCHA Field Representative, Huambo city, November 26, 2004.  A similar event occurred in Hengue in July 2004. Human Rights Watch interviews with Martinho Tchissingui, Director of LONGA, Huambo city, November 29, 2004, and Manuela Gonzalez, OCHA Field Representative, Huambo city, November 26, 2004.

[48] Human Rights Watch interviews with Alda Juliana Paulo Sachiambo, UNITA Provincial Secretary, Huambo city, November 29, 2004.  Two former UNITA combatants employed at the Ministry of Health in Chicala Cholohanga told Human Rights Watch that their supervisors promised them promotions if they signed an MPLA membership card.  Interviews with Joaquim M. and Isac N., Chicala Cholohanga, November 30, 2004.

[49] In the spring of 2004, UNITA party Leader Isaias Samakuva met with Prime Minister Fernando Da Piedade Dias dos Santos after UNITA lodged official complaints of discrimination against former UNITA soldiers and acts of violence and intimidation against UNITA party activists. During their meeting, the Prime Minister reassured the UNITA leader that such incidents were spontaneous, localized and not part of any countrywide MPLA agenda.  OCHA, Humanitarian Situation in Angola, Quarterly Analysis (April-June 2004).

[50] IRIN News, “Angola: Appointment of New Justice Ombudsman Sparks Concern,” January 26, 2005, available at

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45244&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA.

[51] “HALO Trust in Angola,” Journal of Landmine Action, issue no. 6.2 (August 2002).

[52] Presentation by Angola, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, February 10, 2004.

[53] Human Rights Watch interview with Feliza, Luau (Retornado), November 23, 2004.

[54] Human Rights Watch interview with Greg Crowther, MAG Program Officer, Luanda, November 17, 2004.

[55] Human Rights Watch interviews with returnees in Luau, November 22-24; Acacio JuliÃo, UNHCR Field Officer, Luau, November 22, 2004; and Greg Crowther, MAG Program Officer, Luanda, November 17, 2004.  A similar phenomenon has occurred in Lumbala N’Guimbo, the site of another reception center in Moxico that is even more isolated than Luau.

[56] Human Rights Watch interview with Philippe Lazzarini, OCHA/TCU Representative, Luanda, November 10, 2004. 

[57] Human Rights Watch interview with Thomas Vargas, UNHCR Protection Officer, Luanda, November 12, 2004

[58] Human Rights Watch interview with Thomas Vargas, UNHCR Protection Officer, Luanda, November 12, 2004.

[59] Article 4 (Security of Site), Council of Ministers Decree No. 1/01, January 5, 2001.

[60] International Committee to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Toward a Mine-Free World (November 18, 2004), available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/, and Human Rights Watch interview with Greg Crowther, MAG Program Officer, Luanda, November 17, 2004.

[61] Based on these criteria, CNIDAH has prioritized the provinces according to five levels of urgency, with “1” being the most urgent: Bié (Level 1); Cuando Cubango, Benguela and Malanje (Level 2); Kwanza Sul, Huambo, Moxico and Huila (Level 3); Bengo, Kwanza Norte, Uige, Zaire, Lunda Norte, Cunene and Lunda Sul (Level 4); and Cabinda, Namibe and Luanda (Level 5).  See International Committee to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Toward a Mine-Free World (November 18, 2004), available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/.

[62] Section 6.5 (Landmines), UNHCR Handbook, “Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection” (Geneva: March 1996).

[63] Global Consultations on International Protection, EC/GC/02/5, April 25, 2002

[64] Until recently, OCHA had a field presence in almost every province in the country.  Currently, OCHA has three field representatives, each responsible for monitoring a vast section of the country. Manuela Gonzalez, the OCHA field representative for Huambo, Bie, Benguela and Kwaza Sul, told Human Rights Watch, “It’s impossible to have an idea of protection issues in four provinces.”  Human Rights Watch interview, Huambo, November 26, 2004.

[65] The UN agencies and NGOs share information in human rights and protection working groups at the Luanda level.  They also have working groups at the local and provincial level in many of the provinces, including Huambo and Moxico.  The UN Human Rights Office in Angola is involved in government capacity building at the national level only, and has no monitoring or protection capacity.  Human Rights Watch interviews with Vegard Bye, Chief of Office, UN Human Rights Office in Angola, Luanda, November 12, 2004, and Philippe Lazzarini, Representative, OCHA/TCU, Luanda, November 10, 2004.

[66] See section on the Voluntary Repatriation Program for a description of UNHCR’s mandate.

[67] UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 40 (Voluntary Repatriation), October 18, 1985, available at http://www.unhcr.ch. This is reiterated in paragraph q of Executive Committee Conclusion 101 (LV) of 2004.

[68] Human Rights Watch interview with Francis Olabode Olayiwola, UNHCR Field Officer, Cazombo, November 24, 2004.

[69] Human Rights Watch interview with Thomas Vargas, UNHCR Protection Officer, Luanda, November 12, 2004.

[70] Human Rights Watch interview with Francis Olabode Olayiwola, UNHCR Field Officer, Cazombo, November 24, 2004.

[71] Human Rights Watch interview with Acacio JuliÃo, UNHCR Field Officer, Luau, November 22, 2004.

[72] Center for Common Ground in Angola, Proposal to UNHCR: Returnee Protection to Advance National Recovery and Reconstruction in Angola, October 2004. 

[73] UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities (Geneva: May 2004), available at http://www.unhcr.ch.


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