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III. Background

“Aceh is the most serious human rights crisis in Southeast Asia today.”
Matthew Daley, U.S. official⁸

In a series of reports, Human Rights Watch has documented widespread human rights violations in Aceh since the start of military operations in the province in May 2003.⁹  Based on testimony from Acehnese refugees in Malaysia, there is substantial evidence that Indonesian security forces have engaged in extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, beatings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and drastic limits on freedom of movement in Aceh.  There is also a clear pattern of singling out and persecuting young men who the military claims, often with little or no evidence, are members or supporters of GAM.  Indonesian security forces have often failed to distinguish between GAM combatants and civilians. 

The past fifteen months of fighting have also caused massive internal displacement.  Tens of thousands of civilians have fled their homes and been forcibly relocated by the military for operational reasons.  The cumulative strain of long-term conflict on the civilian population has been significant, with serious effects on the mental health of the population.¹⁰ 

In May 2004, Komnas HAM reported that in the first six months of martial law there had been an increase in the number of civilian victims of violence, including arbitrary arrests, torture, kidnapping, sexual abuse, and extrajudicial killings.  It reported that both Indonesian security forces and GAM were responsible for serious human rights abuses in the province.¹¹  

The fighting between GAM and the TNI is increasingly taking place outside of Aceh’s main towns, making it even more difficult to know what is happening or who is being killed, wounded, or detained.  Statistics on fatalities continue to be reported by wire services, quoting military statements from the province.  In almost all accounts fatalities are recorded as GAM or “rebel” deaths.  These accounts do not specify the circumstances of the deaths. Furthermore, the reported statistics on numbers killed in the province are inconsistent with each other, raising more concerns about the credibility of the information and the lack of comprehensive documentation of those killed in Aceh (see box below). 

On May 19, 2004, one year after martial law was imposed in Aceh, the military emergency was downgraded to a civil emergency.  Formally, this meant a handover to a civilian administrator for the province and the shifting of law enforcement responsibilities from the military to the police.  Major General Endang Surwarya, the martial law administrator, was now supposed to defer to the civilian rule of Aceh’s Governor, Abdullah Puteh. 

In practice, it appears that very little has changed.  Although Governor Puteh officially took charge on June 7, 2004, the military remains firmly in control in Aceh.  No significant decisions can be taken without military approval.  At the handover ceremony in June, Governor Puteh himself reiterated that despite the province's change of status to a civil emergency, a number of regulations from the martial law period, including the decrees restricting access for foreigners to the province, would still apply.  The Chief of Army Staff, Endriartono Sutarto, also made it clear that there was no plan for the withdrawal of the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), but law enforcement responsibilities would be gradually handed over to the police.¹²  Military involvement in the fight against GAM would continue. 

Given the limited nature of the handover to civilian authorities and the fact that military operations continue on a large scale, there is little reason to believe that human rights and humanitarian law violations previously documented will decrease or stop now that the province is officially under a civil, rather than a military, emergency.