<<previous  | index  |  next>>

PART IV: FOREIGN CORPORATE COMPLICITY, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

TALISMAN AND CANADA, 1998-2000

Talisman’s Decision to Invest

Talisman began seriously to investigate the possibility of investing in Sudan in 1998. At that time, Arakis’ failure to obtain sufficient financing was evident to its partners CNPC, Petronas, and the Sudanese government. A pipeline was under construction and had to be completed in 1999.

A new Sudanese constitution was implemented on July 1, 1998, with an appearance of broader rights. The war begun in 1983 was still raging in the south, however, and had expanded to the Nuba Mountains and eastern Sudan; just a year before the adoption of the 1998 constitution, the SPLA had retaken many garrison towns from the government, all the way from the Uganda border up to and almost reaching Wau, the second largest town in southern Sudan. In addition, in 1998 there was a major famine in Bahr El Ghazal and relief agencies attracted prime time coverage with their warnings that Western Upper Nile/Unity State was on the edge of famine because of the fighting and government bans on access by humanitarian relief agencies. Human rights reports on Sudan proliferated, by the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights and by nongovernmental groups, denouncing the government as a gross abuser of human rights. The government had its Khartoum Peace Agreement, signed in April 1997 with several small and one respectably-sized southern factions. Riek Machar, head of the largest faction, was assistant to the president of Sudan and head of the SSCC and an army cobbled together of ex-rebel troops, the SSDF. His close political ally was governor of his home area, Western Upper Nile/Unity State, where GNPOC had its concession.

Two government-backed and armed Nuer groups, Riek Machar’s SSDF and the militia of Sudanese army Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep, were fighting each other in 1998 in Western Upper Nile/Unity State and several of the towns in that state had been burned and looted, with thousands of civilians displaced. This was a war that was not limited to fighting between the government and the rebels: even those ostensibly on the same side fought each other.

Then there was the Chevron experience: Chevron had abandoned its potentially lucrative southern project in 1984 because rebels had killed three of its employees in the very concession Talisman was about to buy. And rebels continued to threaten oil operatives in Sudan, in general. Arakis received threats from rebel groups¹¹⁵³ as early as 1995 but played them down.¹¹⁵⁴ If this project took off as projected, it would attract even more negative rebel attention. So far, it was the only major oil project in Sudan under active development.

There was also the domestic challenge to Talisman’s involvement in Sudan: the Canadian nongovernmental Inter-Church Coalition on Africa (ICCAF)¹¹⁵⁵ was actively opposing Canadian oil company investment in Sudan. Referring to Arakis, an ICCAF press release dated July 20, 1995 accused: “Canadian oil firm does business with one of the world’s worst human rights abusers.”¹¹⁵⁶ The industry press carried news of these human rights criticisms of Arakis, including the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly.¹¹⁵⁷ This criticism did not let up.

On August 17, 1998, Talisman announced that it would acquire Arakis and Arakis’ main asset, the Sudan project.¹¹⁵⁸ Before Talisman closed the Arakis deal, the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR, another Canadian nongovernmental group) protested by letter of August 28, 1998 Talisman’s announced intention to invest in Sudan, citing human rights abuses.¹¹⁵⁹

Talisman proceeded with the acquisition of all outstanding shares of Arakis, which was completed on October 8, 1998.¹¹⁶⁰ Talisman acquired a 25 percent interest in GNPOC’s Blocks 1, 2, and 4 and the incomplete pipeline and port, on which construction had started in May 1998.¹¹⁶¹

On November 18, 1998, Canadian NGOs that had been protesting Arakis’ presence in Sudan issued a press release denouncing Talisman’s participation in Sudanese oil development, with allegations about forced displacement from the Talisman concession:

According to these reports, Sudanese government forces and the militias armed and directed by the government have cleared the area of local people (whom the Sudanese government believes could be sources of support for the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army) in order to secure the safety of Canadian and other foreign oil workers and increased oil production.¹¹⁶²

Talisman Failure to Investigate Allegations

Although Talisman continued to insist that there were “no people” living in its operational areas, Talisman officials told Human Rights Watch in early 2000 that they had not consulted relief agency documents nor relief personnel operating in southern Sudan when they conducted their review of the Sudan project prior to acquiring Arakis, nor after they started doing business in Sudan.¹¹⁶³ The relief documents, most of which were readily available on the internet, would have been useful to corroborate displacement and military activity affecting the civilian population, although the agencies rarely name those forcing the displacement.¹¹⁶⁴

In addition, Talisman officials were made aware of serious concerns about the implications of their explorations on numerous occasions by various other sources, including representatives of Unity State (at that time from Riek Machar’s United Democratic Salvation Front/South Sudan Defence Forces (UDSF/SSDF)), statements by the Canadian government, and pressure from Canadian NGOs, among others.

What Riek Machar Said He Told Talisman, 1998-99

The first encounter between Talisman executives and Nuer leader and then-Assistant to the President of Sudan Riek Machar occurred prior to the date when Talisman bought into the project. According to Riek Machar, he told Talisman President and CEO Jim Buckee in Khartoum before August 1998 that oil operators must avoid displacing the civilian population and must take steps to maintain friendly relations with the local populace, by installing clinics and schools. He suggested that the oil companies should maintain close relations with his army, the SSDF, which he said was the only force that could guarantee the safety of Talisman’s operations.¹¹⁶⁵

But according to Talisman’s written response to Human Rights Watch, “At all such meetings prior to the start-up of oil production, neither Dr. [Riek] Machar nor [governor of Unity State] Taban Deng ever raised the issue of displacement of civilians from the GNPOC concession area.”¹¹⁶⁶ Talisman officials remembered that Riek Machar assured them the area was free from conflict.¹¹⁶⁷

Riek Machar told Human Rights Watch that his second meeting with Jim Buckee of Talisman took place in the presidential palace in Khartoum later in 1998; an elderly director of Talisman was also present. Riek Machar said that when he accused Talisman’s shareholders of a lack of concern about the suffering of the Nuer people, the director accompanying Buckee became angry and insisted that they did care. Riek Machar said that he informed the company officials that oil operations had displaced people, and that the officials neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.¹¹⁶⁸

According to Talisman, there were several meetings between Riek Machar and Talisman, attended by Jim Buckee, Vice President Jackie Sheppard, and others. In a written response to Human Rights Watch, Reg Manhas, Talisman’s senior advisor for corporate responsibility, said that during a meeting in October 1998, “there was no issue of civilian displacement raised by Dr. Riek Machar.”¹¹⁶⁹

Riek Machar told Human Rights Watch that at his third meeting with Talisman—in September 1999, after the first pipeline sabotage—he told Jim Buckee (accompanied by Jackie Sheppard) that the problem was Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep. Riek Machar assured the Talisman officials: “We do not want to drive you out. Use your influence on the government to stop Paulino Matiep.” He said that when SSDF Cmdr. Tito Biel, under Riek Machar, attacked Ryer/Thar Jath (in Block 5A, the Lundin consortium) in May 1999, it was not an attack against the oil companies. Cmdr. Tito Biel had escorted oil workers from Ryer/Thar Jath to Bentiu and did not destroy the oil facilities. The reason for the attack, according to Riek Machar, was that the government of Sudan was bringing its troops into the area. Riek Machar said that at this meeting Jim Buckee expressed concern for the security of Talisman’s operations, and said he wanted to know the truth of what was happening in the south.¹¹⁷⁰

Talisman officials said their last meeting with Riek Machar—at which UDSF governor of Unity State Taban Deng was present as well—took place just prior to Riek Machar’s resignation as special advisor to the president of Sudan and after oil production was underway; Riek Machar left Khartoum in mid-December 1999 and resigned from government positions on January 31, 2000. According to Talisman, at that November or December 1999 meeting Riek Machar “made a statement that 400,000 people had been displaced from the general oilfield area,” though “[a]t no time were any village names mentioned.”¹¹⁷¹ The company did not provide Human Rights Watch with any other information about this meeting.

Despite the discrepancies, both sides therefore acknowledge that Riek Machar did, at one point or another during the period he held an official government position, tell Talisman officials that large numbers of people were displaced from the oilfield area. Some of the conversations occurred after the massive May 1999 displacements from Ruweng County/Pariang.

After he resigned from the government in January 2000, Riek Machar disputed several statements on displacement made by Jim Buckee in a November 23, 1999, Talisman letter to shareholders.¹¹⁷² In a reply letter dated May 5, 2000, Riek Machar claimed that at a meeting in Khartoum with Jim Buckee:

I told you Heglig (Aling) was a Dinka village in 1983 and three kilometers south of Aling was a Nuer village called Yaak. From Aling to [Rubkona] there were many villages and the government sponsored Arab nomadic militia destroyed them all to make way for oil explorations and production. This barbaric act was the main reason that made the people of Liech [Western Upper Nile/Unity State] swell the ranks of the insurgency in 1983.

Riek Machar wrote that the Sudanese army in 1998 destroyed even the local Dinka village that had sprung up in Heglig as a result of the oil operations. Riek Machar continued: “Anybody who tells you the area is not habitable is only dragging you to the war, as your predecessor the Chevron was in 1985.” As to Talisman’s responsibility, he asserted: “There is no way you would deny your participation in the forced displacement of the people of Liech [Western Upper Nile/Unity State]. It is not forced relocation, as you referred the act to be, but it is forced displacement by the barrel of the gun.”¹¹⁷³

Talisman stated the first time it knew of this letter and its content was not in December 1999 but some time in May 2000 after the letter was posted on the website of the Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SPDF), the new military/political group formed by Riek Machar after defecting from the government.¹¹⁷⁴

What Gov. Taban Deng Said He Told Talisman, 1999

Talisman representatives met UDSF Gov. Taban Deng of Unity State in his official capacity three times, according to the governor, who was expelled from his office in May 1999 by the Sudanese army under Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep. Gov Taban Deng said:

I talked to Talisman in February 1999. They asked if there had been any people displaced by them. I told them about the market that existed before the locals were burned out. . . . I told Talisman about the displacement from Heglig and the discontent with the company’s operations in Heglig. People are mistreated, not employed, suspected of being a security risk. Our people are not safe there. Our orders are not respected.

I told them I would be happy for the companies to be there, but not this way. This is how Chevron was closed: they provided no local services. Everything was provided [by Chevron] to Muglad [in Kordofan]. Chevron even moved its headquarters to Rubkona [just north of Bentiu] early in the 1980s.¹¹⁷⁵

Taban Deng identified those who had cleared the area to provide a cordon sanitaire for the oil operations as security agents, noting that ““it was the behavior of the security clearing the area to provide security for the oil fields. Some [residents] were chased with guns. Some ran for their lives.”¹¹⁷⁶ Taban Deng gave this testimony to Human Rights Watch five months after the meetings with Talisman and more than a year before he defected from the government.

In July 1999, Human Rights Watch asked Ralph Capeling, a Talisman vice president and then the highest-ranking Talisman employee in Khartoum, also general manager for the GNPOC pipeline division, if he had heard reports of displacement from the GNPOC oil concession. He said he had but that he had not investigated them due to the frenetic pace of work that Talisman was maintaining in order to meet pipeline and production deadlines.¹¹⁷⁷ Hence, at several levels, Talisman heard accounts of displacement but looked into them only superficially, at best.

The Campaign Against Talisman

Canadian Government Promises Action on Talisman, March-April 1999

The Canadian government had been lobbied to bring pressure on Arakis, and the lobbying stepped up when Talisman took over Arakis in late 1998. The government began to express concern to Talisman about the link between the oil exploration, the war, and human rights abuses in Sudan.

Addressing a conference on religious persecution in March 1999, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy said that he had met with oil executives about the worsening situation in Sudan: “We’ve been engaged recently in what role we play in Sudan, partly because I think there is a responsibility of Canada because of the activities of some of our private-sector companies.” Minister Axworthy told the gathering that when Talisman officially said it did not feel it was its place to interfere with the actions of the Sudanese government, he had reminded the Talisman officers of voluntary codes of conduct, including one developed by the Canadian government, which set out standards for operating overseas. The Canadian government’s priority was a settlement to the war.¹¹⁷⁸

At that same March conference, Canadian Senator Lois Wilson, former president of the World Council of Churches, said that if no progress was made in Sudan peace negotiations by April 15, 1999, Canada should consider putting pressure on Talisman to refuse to turn on the flow of oil.¹¹⁷⁹

In April 1999, Minister Axworthy announced that he had discussed with Talisman the idea of Talisman participation in efforts to make peace in Sudan. He characterized the proposal as part of a larger peace initiative that Canada, Norway, and Kenya were undertaking on Sudan.¹¹⁸⁰

The government was also subject, however, to pressure from the growing Canadian petroleum industry, based in western Canada. One financial journalist noted that Canadian independent oil producers had “become players in big oil’s international big leagues.” Based on market capitalization, “seven out of the world’s 15 largest exploration and production companies, including Talisman, are now Canadian.” This was in contrast to ten years before, when U.S. multinationals had dominated Canada’s oil industry.¹¹⁸¹

Talisman Annual Meeting May 1999

In early 1999, eleven Canadian NGOs attempted to submit a proposal for a shareholder resolution at the Talisman annual meeting. The proposed resolution asked the board of directors to assure shareholders that the company’s operations in Sudan would not materially aid the capacity of the Sudanese government to engage in the civil war in that country, nor to violate internationally accepted standards of human rights. “As shareholders we believe that the company must assure us that the oil operations in which we have a financial interest are not in any way serving to fuel the war and thus to perpetuate the suffering of the Sudanese people,” one activist said. Talisman refused to include the proposal in its management proxy circular.¹¹⁸²

In a March 10, 1999 letter to Talisman shareholders, after refusing to include the shareholder proposal in the proxy circular, but recognizing that the Canadian NGOs and others had raised troubling questions about human rights abuses by the Sudanese government, CEO Buckee said,

Because Sudan presents significant challenges, we realized that this project would attract questions from varied sources. However, careful study last summer [1998] persuaded management that this is a sound business investment and our involvement could be carried out in a responsible, ethical manner. Experience to date confirms that judgment.

We recognize that Sudan's chronic troubles, including poverty and conflict running along political and tribal "fault lines", create special challenges. Like many other international companies who operate in similar environments, Talisman is taking the necessary steps to ensure the safety of our employees . . . . ¹¹⁸³

Apparently Talisman thought that its ethical obligations reached no further than ensuring the safety of its employees. Nothing was mentioned about the rights of those living in the area where the oil was found.

Buckee had previously stated that “The only way to break the logjam [in Sudan] is through development. . . Talisman’s presence there can only be for the good.”¹¹⁸⁴ But he offered no study or research of oil development in other third world countries establishing that oil investment had led to development and greater democracy.

Indeed, a World Bank study concludes that oil development conducted by unrepresentative or repressive governments does not lead to democracy, but actually hurts and impedes democratic development.¹¹⁸⁵ Oil development also has tended to retard peace, and in some cases is a casus belli for insurgents. That is certainly the case in Sudan. In two other countries in Africa that have large petroleum reserves, Nigeria and Angola, the oil wealth has neither been used to improve conditions for the poor, nor has it contributed to progress towards democratic government.¹¹⁸⁶

At almost the same time as the Talisman annual meeting in Calgary, Canada, the Sudanese government was conducting an all-out assault on the civilian population it wanted to clear off the Talisman (GNPOC) concession, according to later articles in the Canadian press, food and security monitors, and human rights investigators. Between May 9 and 23, 1999, the government army launched an offensive on Dinka villages from the garrison in Pariang, moving to Tagil and then Gumriak (Block 1). From there it went to Padit and Biem (northern Block 5A) and elsewhere in Ruweng County, apparently with the main intention of driving the villagers off their land, according to civilian survivors. The Sudanese government used Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships—which may have taken off from the GNPOC airstrip at Heglig—followed by soldiers in tanks and armored personnel carriers backed by militia from garrisons at Liri in the Nuba Mountains and Pariang.¹¹⁸⁷

All this displacement and destruction occurred in Block 1 of the GNPOC (Talisman) concession while Talisman was active in the concession, and while its CEO was brushing off reports of human rights abuse and reassuring shareholders that there was no fighting and that Talisman was continually monitoring the situation. After the shareholder meeting in early May 1999, CEO Buckee wrote another letter to shareholders on Sudan, dated May 27, 1999. Without mentioning the May 9-23, 1999 government assault/displacement, he stated that:

the oilfield development is at some distance from the areas of intermittent fighting, and . . . the government is deeply committed to completion of the project and uninterrupted operations of the fields. Nonetheless, we monitor the situation continually, take prudent security measures and have contingency plans in place to cope with emergencies. . . .

We also see headlines and reporting of ‘facts’ that can be misleading. Neither normal media activity nor comprehensive foreign government representation exists in the country.¹¹⁸⁸

The implication was that Talisman could ignore press investigations of human rights abuses in Sudan, because “normal media activity” did not exist in Sudan. But Canadian journalists among many others located and interviewed displaced persons within the GNPOC concession and those who fled the area.¹¹⁸⁹ Talisman was on notice, through the press, U.N., NGOs, and many other sources, of extensive human rights abuses and displacement in its concession and elsewhere. The burden was on Talisman, as a matter of corporate responsibility, to investigate these charges in a manner designed to establish, not dismiss or hide, the truth.

Talisman went forward with the Sudan project, announcing that the first flow of oil through the pipeline to Port Sudan took place on June 23, 1999.¹¹⁹⁰ Company officials projected that production was expected to start in late 1999 at a rate of 150,000 barrels a day (b/d).¹¹⁹¹

The first crude oil was exported from Sudan, amid government celebrations, on August 30, 1999. Two weeks later, in the north, the pipeline was sabotaged by northern-based rebels.

U.N. Expert Criticizes Oilfield Human Rights Abuses, October 1999

The report of U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan Dr. Leonardo Franco to the General Assembly on October 14, 1999, noted that the May 1999 government assault on Ruweng County had caused many persons to become internally displaced. He reported that the offensive lasted ten days.¹¹⁹² Jim Buckee, CEO of Talisman, denounced this report as “hearsay,” claiming that at least two of the facts were “wrong,” and promising an additional contribution to the rapporteur within two weeks.¹¹⁹³

Talisman never presented any evidence to counter Special Rapporteur Franco’s statements and in fact later endorsed the recommendations of an Amnesty International May 2000 report on oil and human rights in Sudan.¹¹⁹⁴ That report condemned forced displacement, mentioning the same raid detailed by Special Rapporteur Leonardo Franco.¹¹⁹⁵

Still, when asked, Talisman CEO Buckee continued to dispute the reports that government forces had attacked the area, attributing the bloodshed and displacement to local factional infighting from which the government had remained aloof. By his account, these were “two minor incidents,” that resulted from strife between factions protecting turf, while the Sudanese government kept its troops away.¹¹⁹⁶ But that was not what relief workers and journalists found, nor what victims of the offensive told visitors.

To complicate matters, the GNPOC concession was hit on October 15, 1999, by a coordinated rebel attack on Mobile Rig 15 by a disaffected Nuer commander, Peter Gatdet. He had been part of the government militia protecting the oil concessions from early 1999 until early September 1999, when he switched sides and took many men and weapons with him. Two Sudanese workers were killed and one injured in the night-time attack when rebels opened fire on the rig, which was, as were all oil implacements, guarded by Sudanese army troops. Army reinforcements ran over a land mine in the road, killing three more. Talisman made no announcement of this attack, although it acknowledged the attack to Human Rights Watch and others.¹¹⁹⁷

Canadian Government Issues Policy Statement on Sudan, October 1999; Talisman Signs Code of Conduct, December 1999

On October 26, 1999, the Canadian government set forth its Sudan policy in writing at a press conference held by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy and Minister for International Cooperation Maria Minna, hinting at the possibility of Canadian sanctions against Talisman. Minister Axworthy first said:

Canadians want assurances that the operations of Canadian enterprises are not worsening the conflict or the human rights situation for the Sudanese people. I intend to discuss with [Talisman Energy] ways in which it could support a peaceful resolution of the conflict.¹¹⁹⁸

At the same time, the government issued a background paper entitled “Canada’s Sudan Policy.” It noted that the ownership of the oil was in dispute in the war, and that oil exploitation therefore might contribute to the civil conflict. “The question of allocation and distribution of oil resources and their benefits must be resolved quickly as oil is now being exported and revenue generated,” the Canadian government paper stated. It presented its attitude toward Canadian companies operating in Sudan:

Canada is committed to ensuring that private sector involvement in Sudan does not prolong the conflict in Sudan or fuel related human rights abuses. The private sector has an ethical responsibility to ensure their operations do no harm, but rather contribute to fostering a climate conducive to building a durable and just peace. Canada is therefore seeking assurances from both the Government of Sudan and Canadian oil sector interests (including Talisman Energy) that both international humanitarian and human rights laws are being upheld, and that oil extraction and export is not exacerbating the conflict in Sudan.¹¹⁹⁹

The foreign minister announced the appointment of two persons to monitor the situation in Sudan for the Canadian government. Senator Lois Wilson was to be Canada’s special envoy to the Sudan peace process and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). John Harker, a Canadian specialist in African issues and advisor to the government of Canada, was to lead a fact-finding mission to Sudan to examine human rights allegations.

Minister Axworthy also introduced other initiatives regarding Sudan: an invitation to the leaders of Sudan’s warring factions for talks in Canada to help end the conflict (which was declined and never took place); an offer of Canadian $ 300,000 to shore up the bureaucracy of the IGAD peace forum; and a meeting with Talisman within the week to discuss the firm’s responsibilities with regard to promoting peace, human rights, relief and development in Sudan.¹²⁰⁰ As items for discussion, the government of Canada set forth five demands to the company:

i) effectively implement the “International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business;”¹²⁰¹

ii) publicly encourage Sudan to invite independent experts to investigate the human rights situation in the oil areas in Sudan, focusing on forced displacement allegations;

iii) initiate discussion with the government of Sudan and independent experts on verifiable ways in which oil export earnings can be reserved for humanitarian and development purposes and shared equitably by all regions of Sudan;

iv) publicly urge Sudan to recommit itself to the IGAD Declaration of Principles (DOP)¹²⁰²; and

v) invite independent expert observers to participate in Talisman discussions with the Sudan government on the peace process and human rights.¹²⁰³

“If it becomes evident that oil extraction is exacerbating the conflict in Sudan, or resulting in violations of human rights or humanitarian law,” Minister Axworthy warned, the government of Canada “may consider, if required, economic and trade restrictions” such as were authorized by the Export and Import Controls Act (EICA), the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), or other instruments.¹²⁰⁴ The Canadian government had already enacted arms sanctions on Sudan in 1992.

Talisman’s shares lost 11 percent on the Toronto stock exchange in the two days after Minister Axworthy mentioned the possibility of sanctions, to Canadian $ 38.60.¹²⁰⁵ The company’s share price continued to drop.¹²⁰⁶

Analysts said that Talisman shares lost more than 20 percent of their value after the rebel attack on the pipeline in mid-September 1999, although not all of the slump could be attributed to concern over Sudan, or the “Sudan overhang,” as the stock analysts termed it. Some emphasized that the Sudanese operations comprised only about 10 percent of Talisman’s asset base, by production and investment.¹²⁰⁷ One financial commentator observed:

Whatever the ethics of the situation, Talisman has clearly misjudged the potential impact of activist power and the perception of political risks. These have knocked perhaps as much as a billion dollars off Talisman’s market capitalization, possibly far more than the Sudanese investment is worth.¹²⁰⁸

Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy met with CEO Buckee on November 3, 1999, regarding Sudan. He again asked Talisman to sign the International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business. After months of urging by the Canadian government, Talisman finally signed the Code in December 1999, after the government human rights investigatory team led by John Harker had arrived in Sudan. The Code committed the company to the “value” of “human rights and social justice” and to “support and respect the protection of international human rights within our sphere of influence” and to “not be complicit in human rights abuses.”¹²⁰⁹

Southern Politicians in Khartoum Denounce Oil Companies, November 1999

Southern opposition politicians based in Khartoum were following international developments and issued a statement in response to the announcement that a Canadian fact-finding team would investigate human rights abuses in Sudan. On November 3, 1999, the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), a registered party, denounced the role of oil companies in the south and called on the Sudanese government to suspend immediately all oil operations there and to concentrate on the resolution of the causes of the conflict and the realization of a just and lasting peace in Sudan.¹²¹⁰ The statement’s significance was in part due to the fact that it came from a political party representing southerners living in the north, operating within the system.¹²¹¹

USAP did not denounce the government, but focused all blame on the oil companies, mentioning Talisman by name for hiring agents in Europe, North America, and elsewhere to launch “foolish propaganda that claims that [the] people of Southern Sudan are incapable of appreciating the economic advantages which petroleum exploitation in Southern Sudan will offer to them.” It accused Talisman of knowing “very well” that what the Dinka and Nuer are currently experiencing in their “invaded land” is:

brutal death, wanton destruction of their homes and huge unprecedented displacement of whole families and clans. Their ancestral land has instead become a theatre of war, fueled with inputs from oil interests in Canada, China, Malaysia and some European countries.¹²¹²

The statement charged, “Nothing in the Unity State, not even life of a citizen, is too precious to spare, if the oil companies believe it constitutes an obstacle or threat to their interest.”¹²¹³

Talisman Takes Oil Analysts on Company Tour of Sudan, November 1999

Talisman swung into a public relations campaign. It responded to the Canadian foreign minister’s announcement that the government was sending a fact-finding delegation to Sudan by quickly organizing a public relations tour of its project for Canadian and U.S. oil industry analysts, who were less human rights-oriented, more likely to be sympathetic to the industry perspective, and perhaps less likely to know anything about Sudan or Africa.

The analysts and journalists apparently were presented with a misleading version of life at Talisman’s operations center at Heglig. The military Antonovs and helicopters—that the Sudanese army had been using for bombing runs in the south—were moved away from the Heglig corporate airstrip prior to the trip and relocated to another base not on the foreigners’ itinerary, according to the report later written by the Canadian government human rights delegation.¹²¹⁴

Flying over the Heglig oil facilities, CEO Buckee pointed out to the financial analysts and press what he said was “proof” of the absence of forced eviction: the tracks of seismic tests made some twenty-five years ago by Chevron.¹²¹⁵ He asserted that if villages had been forcibly evacuated to make room for oil development, there would be signs similar to these tracks.¹²¹⁶

Burned-out villages would be visible from the plane, however, only if the plane were flying near them. Heglig is in Block 2, in the northern part of the oil area. The more recent evictions and village destructions took place further to the south; the burned out villages in the Gumriak area are perhaps seventy-five miles from Heglig base camp.

As one journalist wrote:

During the four-day visit, the analysts saw no evidence of conflict. . . . [A]t Heglig, the site of one of Talisman’s major oilfields and processing facilities, there is no evidence of population displacement. Military presence is low key. Children are playing and going to school near the oil wells.¹²¹⁷

Journalists were shown a new school and a small hospital. According to schoolteacher Mahmoud Hassan, “The nomads can use the schools, markets and the hospital.”¹²¹⁸ But the previous residents were Nuer and Dinka, not the Baggara who are referred to as “nomads.”¹²¹⁹

When CEO Buckee wrote his November 23, 1999, letter to Talisman shareholders shortly after taking journalists on this visit to Sudan, he referred to and elaborated on their reports as corroboration of his statement that there was no forced displacement in the oilfields:

We recently visited the area with a large contingent of Canadian and US analysts, representing large reputable banks and brokerage houses, as well as several journalists. They also note the lack of any permanent habitation of the vast, empty plains. Seismic lines cut by Chevron over 20 years ago are still clearly visible, as the “footprint” of villages would be, had there been any. . . .¹²²⁰

The plight of the displaced was in vivid contrast to the conditions the oil workers in Western Upper Nile/Unity State enjoyed. As one Nairobi-based journalist traveling with the financial press group observed:

All are vulnerable to hunger, but unlike the oil companies—which operate daily charter flights to transport staff and supplies—WFP has been unable to reach the needy due to a government ban on aid flights to most of Unity State.¹²²¹

Buckee wrote another letter to shareholders on November 27, 1999, after his return from escorting the financial press through the Talisman project in Sudan. The letter specifically referred to the allegations of forced displacement:

I would like to make it clear that Talisman is vehemently opposed to forced relocation for oil development and I personally believe such practices are abhorrent. In five years of operation, staff in the field have not seen any evidence of forced displacement or relocation in our area of operations, which is located on a flood plain with minimal permanent settlements, as it is largely underwater for several months each year. We have diligently investigated these allegations and have found them to have no basis in fact.¹²²²

What was the “diligent investigation” that Talisman conducted before writing this November 1999 letter? Legal Counsel and Vice President Jackie Sheppard told Human Rights Watch in February 2000 that she visited Pariang, a government garrison town near Gumriak in Block 1, and asked a head chief if there was any displacement in the area. The chief said there was not. Ms. Sheppard did note that there were various government security officials present at the interview.¹²²³

The Harker team was also curious about the investigation Talisman claimed to have carried out. While in Sudan, they discussed the investigation with the person assigned to carry it out, and reported:

It is our information that no formal report of the investigation exists, and from the investigator himself we now know that he has never been to Pariang, the center of the May 1999 actions and subsequent allegations, nor even to Bentiu, currently the center for the [Maj. Gen. Paulino] Matiep forces engaged in a struggle, certainly linked to oil, with the “SSDF” forces formerly linked to Riek Machar.¹²²⁴

Talisman met with Human Rights Watch representatives on February 3, 2000, in Calgary. The meeting lasted several hours. Forced displacement was discussed, as was U.N. Special Rapporteur Franco’s report (the Harker report had not yet been released). CEO Buckee presented several photographs of empty plains to “show” that when they arrived in the area, no people were living there. They were logically inadequate to establish the proposition that no one lived in the large concession or near any of the many GNPOC facilities in 1998. If anything, they might demonstrate that the government’s forced removal program was successful.

Human Rights Watch pointed out to Talisman on maps the locations and progress of the fighting that produced tens of thousands of internally displaced persons noted by the U.N. for the years 1999 and previously. Human Rights Watch pointed out the areas from which people had been displaced and to which they fled. The Talisman officials claimed again to have no knowledge of the displacement.

The Harker Report

The Canadian government human rights delegation led by John Harker¹²²⁵ visited the north and the south of Sudan in December 1999 and received many testimonies. The human rights team found that oil development was exacerbating the conflict and that Talisman’s presence was making things worse.

Upon the return of the Harker Canadian human rights team to Canada, and before the report came out, John Harker in January 2000 informed Foreign Minister Axworthy that the Sudanese military was using the GNPOC airstrip to wage war against rebel forces, apparently in violation of Sudan’s pledge to refrain from using oil development as cover for military operations.

Talisman admitted the use and said it had protested strongly to the Khartoum government.¹²²⁶ The foreign minister of Canada sent a letter of protest in January 2000 to President Bashir, condemning this military use of oil facilities.¹²²⁷ The Sudanese government denied the team’s finding, contradicting Talisman’s own admissions.¹²²⁸

The Harker report was released in February 2000. In a harsh and straightforward manner, it condemned Talisman and the government of Sudan:

We can only conclude that Sudan is a place of extraordinary suffering and continuing human rights violations, even though some forward progress can be recorded, and the oil operations in which a Canadian company is involved add more suffering.¹²²⁹

The Harker report made several recommendations, including that:

· Canada and Talisman should put their influence behind efforts to have flight bans on relief operations removed;

· They should support and negotiate a ceasefire, monitored by the international community;

· Talisman should be very firm in advocating a ceasefire, and ready to pay a price for it, perhaps in the form of foregone revenues;

· Talisman should establish a trust fund acceptable to the southern parties for its revenues, with Canada assisting in forensic accounting and auditing for this trust;

· Canada should place Sudan on the Area Control List for selective trade restrictions in support of specific objectives, which would provide Canada with leverage over Talisman;

· Canada should seek detailed scheduled reports relating to Talisman’s compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law, and what it knows of the Sudanese government’s compliance;

· Talisman should seek independent help to develop and implement practical means of monitoring and reporting forced removals; and

· Talisman should continue discussions with Canadian NGOs regarding setting up a human rights monitoring mechanism.

The report cited two ways of neutralizing the negative impact of oil: either a halt in oil production until peace—which it considered unfeasible—or a set aside for government oil revenues for use when a peace is in place.¹²³⁰ “It is difficult to imagine a ceasefire while oil extraction continues, and almost impossible to do so if revenues keep flowing to the GNPOC partners and the government as currently arranged,” the report stated.¹²³¹

The report urged Talisman to acknowledge the destructive impact of oil extraction, and work toward creating a trust fund. The trust fund idea faded as Sudanese churches in the north and south, which had first endorsed a trust fund, rejected the idea because they concluded that continued oil production would lead to continued abuses. Two months later, the Sudanese churches instead called on the oil companies to withdraw from Sudan.¹²³²

The Canadian government deserves credit for designating a human rights team and commissioning a special report on human rights abuses connected with oil development and Canadian companies. It failed, however, to follow up on the damning findings of its own human rights report.

Canadian Government Announces Toothless Sudan Program, February 2000

Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy on February 14, 2000 announced that Canada would not impose sanctions on Talisman—at that time.¹²³³ Talisman’s stock briefly rose.¹²³⁴

Axworthy listed new measures that Canada would undertake, along with others already underway. But the Canadian government overlooked almost all the Harker report recommendations and was ready to take only conventional small steps:

· Financial support for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights special rapporteur on human rights in Sudan;

· Financial assistance to the Sudanese government’s Committee on the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC);

· Financial support for the IGAD process and its Declaration of Principles as the only viable means of achieving a just peace;¹²³⁵

· Exertion of Canadian diplomacy for the Security Council to support IGAD;

· Strong encouragement for Talisman to continue its efforts to develop, with NGOs, an effective mechanism for monitoring its operations in Sudan, to ensure that they did not lead to an increase in tensions, or otherwise contribute to the ongoing conflict;¹²³⁶

· Support for Canadian NGO monitoring of human rights in Sudan; and

· Opening of a Canadian consular office (but not an embassy) in Khartoum for three purposes: to make a more effective contribution to the peace process, to promote respect for human rights, and to offer consular services to Canadians.¹²³⁷

This list of Canadian initiatives overlooked several Harker report recommendations:

· It did not mention any effort to have government bans on relief flights removed, although most of Blocks 1, 2, and 4 were and are subjected to flight bans by Khartoum.

· It did not address the ceasefire option, except indirectly by reference to the peace talks through IGAD.

· It did not attempt a step-by-step approach—whereby the foreign minister could publicly express grave concern about Sudan and receive the mounting evidence that Canadian oil extraction activity was exacerbating the crisis, to be followed by stiffer measures.

· There would be no scrutiny of exports to Sudan, nor would Sudan be placed on the Area Control List, an item that was considered only a token gesture in any event because the supplies needed could be obtained elsewhere.

As soon as the Canadian government announced it was not imposing sanctions, Talisman negotiations with Canadian NGOs ended. These were negotiations to develop monitoring mechanisms to assure Talisman operations did not lead to an increase in abuses, or otherwise contribute to the ongoing conflict. Talisman insisted that the NGOs had proposed unworkable mechanisms, such as having an NGO representative attend Talisman human rights discussions with the government. It said the NGOs were to blame for ending the negotiations. The NGOs said the negotiations ended because Talisman was not serious and “had refused to recognize evidence that Talisman’s operations in Sudan were linked to human rights abuses.”¹²³⁸

U.S. Criticizes Canada

In February 2000, almost immediately after Canada’s no-sanctions announcement, the U.S. Treasury announced that it was imposing sanctions on GNPOC and Sudapet, adding them to the list of entities owned or controlled by the government of Sudan with which U.S. persons were forbidden to do business.¹²³⁹

The U.S. State Department said, “We certainly have concerns about the way in which this Canadian and other companies have essentially provided a new source of hard currency to a regime that has been responsible for massive human rights abuses in Sudan.”¹²⁴⁰ It had earlier criticized the Canadian government for not imposing sanctions on Talisman. The Canadian government responded that it made its own policy “in Canada based on Canadian values and Canadian judgment as to the most effective way to support the peace process in Sudan.”¹²⁴¹ Foreign Minister Axworthy alluded to Canadian opposition, in principle, to unilateral sanctions such as the U.S. imposed on Cuba, which affected Canadian businesses.¹²⁴²

Canadian Initiative at U.N. Security Council Blocked, April 2000

The Canadian government, as president of the U.N. Security Council for the month of April 2000, sought to put the Sudanese war on the Security Council agenda, and garner the “highest level multilateral support for the ongoing efforts” of IGAD, as Axworthy had announced in February 2000. Canada sought an informal consultation of the Security Council on the Sudan peace process, followed by a press statement expressing the Council’s backing for regional mediation efforts.¹²⁴³ Canada dropped its plans, however, after closed-door consultations with the Arab League and the Organization for African Unity (OAU), which in the language of diplomacy suggested that Security Council engagement on this issue “at this time” would not be “productive.”¹²⁴⁴

China’s ability, as a permanent Security Council member, to shame the U.S. into blocking any Security Council consideration of Sudan posed one of the real impediments to action. The Chinese did this by threatening to put the issue of the August 1998 U.S. bombing of the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum on the agenda whenever Sudan came up. The U.S. government, intent on avoiding this potentially embarrassing sideshow, had little stomach for a Security Council investigation of that missile strike, and urged its ally, Canada, to refrain from putting Sudan on the Security Council agenda.¹²⁴⁵