|
<<previous | index | next>> BATTLE FOR CONTROL OVER BLOCK 5A,April-June 1999OverviewAs the nascent Sudanese oil industry prepared to bear its first real fruits for the government, oil exploration in the south took on a new momentum. The projected completion of the GNPOC pipeline from Blocks 1 and 2 to the Red Sea in June 1999, with exports projected for a few months later, brought pressure on the developers of other blocks. Block 5A, adjacent to Block 1, immediately began to look not only commercially viable, since a hookup to the Block 1 pipeline only seventy-five to one hundred kilometers away was available, but also very attractive as Talisman continued to prospect for and find new wells in its concession. The goverment of Sudan made clear its intention to move its troops, escorted by Paulino Matiep’s Nuer militia, into Block 5A to protect the only Lundin exploratory drilling location in that block, at Ryer/Thar Jath. At the same time, the SSDF forces of Riek Machar reacted by attacking the Lundin exploratory site, permitting the one hundred person crew to evacuate but summarily executing three Sudanese government employees. The SSDF inflicted little infrastructure damage. Then it withdrew from the location to fight off the joint Paulino Matiep/government advance, which it failed to block for lack of ammunition. The government/Paulino Matiep advance reached Ryer/Thar Jath, Duar, Koch, Ler, and the river at Mayandit, driving frightened civilians and SSDF forces before it, in a matter of days. Leaving the Paulino Matiep forces to guard Ler and Ryer/Thar Jath, the government forces withdrew north to Bentiu, having abducted women and boys to porter their loot, burned homes, raped women, and sowed fear. The SSDF fled with the Dok, Jikany, and Jagei Nuer civilians in several directions—one large group fled into Dinka/SPLA territory to the west (an unheard of refuge prior to the Wunlit peace agreement a few months earlier). There, the SSDF entered into negotiations with the SPLA which gave the beleaguered commanders ammunition to fight the Sudanese government. The SSDF launched a surprise attack on the Paulino Matiep forces present in Ler on July 3, chasing them to the northern part of Block 5A before the government intervened with helicopters and Antonovs to stop the advance at the garrison town of Wangkei. The SSDF again ran out of ammunition again and retreated south to Nyal, a Nyuong Nuer site considered well protected by the sudd in Block 5B, south of Block 5A. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep reportedly retaliated in anger against this SSDF surprise attack on Ler. His men detained many and killed some SSDF/UDSF civilians, among them state ministers, in Bentiu on July 11-12, 1999. This provoked a civilian exodus from Bentiu. The government announced a flight ban on most of Western Upper Nile/Unity State in the middle of July 1999. The civilians, who had fled the main towns and villages for safety ahead of Paulino Matiep’s advance, were cut off without food or emergency supplies. But the freshly-defected SSDF/Riek Machar rebels had succeeded in their goal: they had shut down the Lundin operation. Battle for Control of Block 5A: First Rebel Attack on Oil Operations Since 1984; Lundin Evacuates, May 1999The events of April-May 1999 marked the beginning of the real battle between the government and former rebels over control of Block 5A oilfields in Western Upper Nile/Unity State.489 Once again, the fighting was about which armed group would control the Nuer area and “protect” and benefit from the oil operations: the government army and its loyal Nuer allies, or the Nuer ex-rebel SSDF under Riek Machar, who aspired to participation in the oilfields in Nuer territory as a result of the Khartoum Peace Agreement. On April 8, 1999, Lundin announced its first exploratory well in Block 5A, at Thar Jath (the locals called the location Ryer). In short time, Lundin discovered a “substantial” oil deposit there, containing as much as 300 million barrels.490 (In 2002, a reserve study showed that the Thar Jath Field in Block 5A had proven and probable recoverable reserves of 149.1 million barrels of oil.491) The central government already had a few agents assigned to Lundin’s security team at Ryer/Thar Jath, as did the SSDF. But the “substantial” find there added a sense of urgency to the government’s desire for military control; it wanted to post its own troops to guard the oilfield. Lundin’s security representative was said to be negotiating with both Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s militia and Cmdr. Tito Biel of the SSDF about the company’s future operations.492 The oil company reportedly had evacuation plans in place for Ryer/Thar Jath, just in case.493 Following the withdrawal of most of Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces from Ler and other areas in October 1998, residents had returned from the toic and started rebuilding. In February and March 1999, the government warned the people of Ler not to build too near its army barracks at Pajak. When the chiefs tried to discuss this, the government rebuffed them: “Forget about it. No further talks.”494 By late March 1999, some 30,000 people received food relief in Ler, most of them displaced from other parts of Western Upper Nile.495 According to participants, representatives of the Khartoum government and UDSF/SSDF held a meeting in Bentiu, state government capital, on or about April 24, 1999. The government had already started negotiating with Gov. Taban Deng, Riek Machar, and local field commanders to expand Khartoum’s presence in Ler and put regular Sudanese army troops at Duar. At the Bentiu meeting, ministry of defense representatives told Riek Machar and his colleagues that the government army would protect all the oil areas in Western Upper Nile/Unity State. There was no agreement on this, however. Cmdr. Tito Biel, whose SSDF forces controlled the area south of Bentiu, insisted that he would retain responsibility for “protecting” these oilfields.496 Another SSDF commander described the discussion:
After these UDSF/SSDF officials again refused the government request to position government troops south of Bentiu, Gov.Taban Deng was removed by Paulino Matiep. On April 29, Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep wrote a letter to Taban Deng, expressing government lack of trust in the UDSF/SSDF and accusing it of posing obstacles to oil development: “Your meeting with Garang’s movement in the area of Wunlit [the NSCC People-to-People conference] was meant to delay the process of petroleum refining, and to disrupt peace in the area,”498 he charged. The government apparently feared that the grassroots reconciliation effort would jeopardize its war plans to divide and displace, and capture the prize: oil. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep then gave Governor Deng and other UDSF supporters three hours to leave the state, under threat of arrest.499 Taban Deng left on April 30, having negotiated a slight extension of his three-hour deadline. According to the governor, the Bentiu security committee initially sympathised with him:
According to Taban Deng, the security officers returned and informed him that Paulino Matiep had the backing of the government in Khartoum, so he (Taban Deng) should leave Bentiu. The deposed governor then went to Khartoum and met with First Vice President Ali Osman Taha and President Omar El Bashir, who claimed they could not control Paulino Matiep, and would look into the situation; but nothing happened. Taban Deng marks the beginning of the 1999 fighting from the time of his expulsion: “When I left, everything was all right, tranquil. After that, Tito Biel and Paulino started fighting. Many were displaced.”500 The governor was not the only person to be expelled from Bentiu town. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep also required SSDF soldiers to leave, replacing them with his own militia, while reportedly detaining other pro-Riek Machar officials:
According to Makuac Youk, UDSF spokesperson in Khartoum, Paulino Matiep removed the seventy-five captives to his military base at Mankien, and the UDSF feared for their lives.502 By early May 1999, the power-sharing provisions of the Khartoum Peace Agreement had been abandoned in all but name. President Bashir issued a decree on May 8 canceling recent decisions issued by the UDSF governor of Unity State, Taban Deng, all relating to office holders.503 Fighting Begins As Army Troops Attempt to Occupy Oil RigFollowing the expulsion of Taban Deng, the government ordered Paulino Matiep to go from Rubkona to Bentiu with his troops and from there to serve as an escort for the army overland to the Lundin oil exploratory rig at Ryer/Thar Jath, and on to the Ler (Payak) garrison.504 The government meant business. A convoy of fifteen trucks with almost 400 troops and heavy weapons moved south from Bentiu into the area in late April, flanked by an escort of more than 1,000 of Paulino Matiep’s militiamen and others.505 After being warned by five SSDF soldiers stationed in Guk of the troop movement, an SSDF contingent from Koch moved up and ambushed the government troop convoy at a place two hours south of Bentiu and one and a half hours from Guk. Supported by government artillery, Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces broke through the ambush.506 Before government forces could reach the location, however, Cmdr. Tito Biel’s SSDF forces hit the camp where the oil workers slept at Ryer/Thar Jath at about 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., most likely on May 2. A small SSDF contingent sought out and summarily executed two northern Sudanese government employees found there, and fatally injured a third.507 The three northerners worked for the government oil production monitoring agency, the Organization of Exploration and Production Authority (OEPA).508 The rebels sought out these three men for what several UDSF/SSDF officials later alleged was retaliation for torture of local Nuer civilians.509 Regardless of whether the three government agents had tortured anyone or not, the summary executions of the three men constituted a violation of international humanitarian law by the SSDF. Cmdr. Tito Biel, when asked about the three by Human Rights Watch, said they had not been killed but were prisoners of war.510 In addition, the SSDF claimed it captured twenty-three Chinese nationals in Guk and released them in Bentiu. Francis Gatlouk, deputy operations commander for Paulino Matiep, said that the SSDF rebels had captured and released oil workers, four of them Chinese, in Koch.511 Lundin evacuated all its employees (estimated at more than one hundred, many of them Chinese employees of Chinese subcontractors to Lundin): several rotations of planes flew them to Bentiu, twenty minutes away.512 The SSDF rebels withdrew. Before leaving the site, they shot up the oil camp at Ryer/Thar Jath (the employees had already gone) and the exploratory rig. The rig, not far from the workers’ accommodation, was not badly damaged but reportedly was later dismantled and moved from the area by Lundin.513 Shortly after its press release announcing a major find in Block 5A, Lundin issued another press release, stating that its operations were being “suspended” because of the “rainy season.”514 A second SSDF attack was launched on the same day, May 2, 1999, on the Ler army garrison at Payak. This Sudanese army position at Ler had been a thorn in the side of the SSDF since the army entered Ler in April 1998 and refused to leave. Its presence pertained to the same underlying issue: who controlled Block 5A.515 The government had been resupplying and reinforcing its garrison at the Payak airstrip by helicopter from Bentiu. Clashes between the SSDF and government forces occurred at the Payak airstrip on May 2, 1999, as a helicopter arrived, apparently with reinforcements. 516 The government troops withdrew into their garrison,517 taking no further part in the fighting in this round. When Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces entered Ler, the government garrison accepted their wounded but did not let the noninjured into their garrison.518 Government Army Occupies Lundin Drilling Site; Militia Forces Chase Civilians and SSDF Rebels to a Distant Corner of Block 5AMeanwhile, Paulino Matiep’s pro-government militia forces and a large government army and muhajedeen contingent were moving south from Bentiu to Ryer/Thar Jath and Ler. After pushing aside the SSDF ambush north of Guk, Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s militia clashed with SSDF forces until the SSDF pulled back. A force of more than 500 regular government army troops joined by some 1,000 mujahedeen occupied Guk, which was then garrisoned with mujahedeen. After the mujahedeen occupied Guk, the rest of the government and militia troops proceeded east to Ryer/Thar Jath the same day,519 occupying the slightly damaged drilling location unopposed. It has not been recaptured by any rebels to the date of this writing. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces proceeded southwest to Koch,520 with Riek Machar’s SSDF not putting up much resistance. Running out of ammunition, the SSDF fighters withdrew,521 or “retreated defending,” warning the civilians that they were out of ammunition and the government forces were close behind. Many civilians fled on the tail of the SSDF, before they could be captured or killed by government forces.522 The SSDF withdrew to the Ler area but did not stay there long. When Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep arrived in Ler, he occupied it without a fight as government soldiers had been reinforced by air and SSDF forces retreated southwest to Mayandit. The main SSDF forces—with thousands of civilians behind them—ran further south to Nyal and Ganyliel in Nyuong Nuer territory (Block 5B), protected by the sudd and seasonal flooding of the Nile. At Mayandit, some SSDF forces, led by Cmdr. Peter Paar Jiek, retreated west to the Dinka area of Tonj County in Bahr El Ghazal (the far western corner of Block 5A), with the civilians not far behind. Mujahedeen militia arrived in Ler to join Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep, and a regular army battalion reinforced the army troops already there.523 According to the SSDF chief of staff Elijah Hon Top who was in Khartoum at the time, Nuer pro-government militias were sent in from elsewhere in Upper Nile to support government forces.524 The army said that it destroyed the air strip in Nhialdiu (Block 5A) and thus denied the SPLA air supplies “from foreign organizations.”525 On June 12, Sudanese government bombing reportedly killed twenty-four civilians and soldiers as they crossed a river in that area, according to the SPLM/A.526 Each Side Accuses the Other of Instigating Fighting in Block 5A, May 1999The UDSF spokesperson in Khartoum blamed government troops for provoking the fighting on May 2 “by replenishing their armed forces at Ler.”527 SSDF Cmdr. Tito Biel similarly claimed that government troops, escorted by Paulino Matiep forces, were the ones to initiate the hostilities when they moved south from Bentiu into his zone of operations without SSDF consent.528 According to the government army, however, its forces were attacked when engaging in a normal deployment to a part of the south where they had the right to be, protecting the oil which was a national asset. The army had prepared for a large deployment south of Bentiu in Block 5A to safeguard oil installations Lundin planned to build.529 First Vice President Ali Osman Taha stressed that protection of the oil production was a national duty. Although production facilities were not seriously damaged, the government claimed it was the intention of the rebels to destroy the government’s gains.530 The armed forces spokesman Gen. Mohamed Osman Yassin claimed that his soldiers had repulsed SPLA rebels (not the SSDF), who attempted on May 2 to attack government troops guarding “petroleum sites” at Ler.531 Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s militia spokesman accused the SSDF forces of attacking Paulino Matiep’s forces in a coordinated attempt to seize the oilfields with SPLA help, attributing this to plans formed “during Wunlit.”532 Cmdr. Tito Biel, he alleged, “has been working with the SPLA since the Wunlit conference of February and March this year [1999] and one of the secret documents of the conference was the seizure of the oilfields.”533 Tot Galwak, a southern member of Khartoum’s parliament, also claimed that Cmdr. Tito Biel’s alleged realignment with the SPLM/A was in implementation of “a secret part” of the Wunlit agreement.534 It does not appear that the SPLA was acting jointly with the Nuer SSDF anti-government forces at this time. That came later, briefly. The SPLM/A had no presence in Nuer areas of Western Upper Nile/Unity State at this time, nor anywhere near the oil concessions or fighting, except in the Dinka enclave in Ruweng County in Block 1.535 It responded to the fighting in Block 5A by expressing its view that “the exploitation of oil resources at present will not be of any economic benefit to the Sudanese people but will rather lead to the escalation of the civil war.”536 The SPLM/A issued congratulations to Cmdr. Tito Biel for his “patriotic action” in fighting the government in the oilfields.537 As for the civilians living in Block 5A, one Dok Nuer chief, when asked who began the hostilities in 1999, responded rhetorically, “Who started the fighting? The one who defends his own land? Or the one who tells the people to move away from their own land?” The same displaced chief lamented, “The Arabs give money to Paulino [Matiep] to fight, and arms. . . . The jallaba [northerners] have captured our area.”538 In mid-May, the Sudanese government announced that the fighting had been contained and that the parties involved were working on a solution.539 The UDSF, the political wing of the SSDF, met but decided not to cancel the Khartoum Peace Agreement despite what it regarded as a government breach of the agreement.540 A committee was formed of seven UDSF members and seven government members; the government characterized their negotiations as “intensive.” The UDSF spokesman said that the Peace Agreement was “in a coma in an intensive care unit and it is up to the government to revive it,”541 then announced that on May 20, a six-hour heated discussion had reached “a deadlock.”542 On May 25, 1999, Riek Machar sent another letter to President El Bashir outlining the ways he said the government had violated the peace agreement.543 Yet, despite more challenges, 544 Riek Machar still held on to his position as head of the Southern States Coordinating Council as Western Upper Nile/Unity State went up in flames. Civilians Displaced from Block 5A, May-August 1999Nuer Civilians Flee to Mayandit, then to DinkalandFighting between the government troops and militias, and the rebel forces over control of the oilfields caused great hardship to the civilian population of those areas. The intent of Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s militia (under Zonal Cmdr. Peter Gatdet) to drive away civilians was evident from the looting and destruction of the civilian economy—not only the usual cattle looting, but also destruction of grain, granaries, animals that could not be carried off by the militia, and homes. Civilians who lagged behind were captured or killed; some were forced to act as porters, many women were raped, and underage boys were forcibly conscripted. Not all civilians fled immediately after the attacks on Ler. Some hid outside the town as they had done in 1998, although it was the wet season. Many stayed in the toic for long periods, waiting to see what would happen, and suffered rashes on their bodies and swollen legs because of the water, as well as malaria, from which several of those in hiding died.545 One woman who escaped to the toic from Ler returned to her tukl at night to check on her four children who remained at home, because “the soldiers do not move at night.” She did not take her children to the toic because there were too many mosquitoes there. In her absence the four, unaccompanied by other family members, had to flee from soldiers and she became separated from them, like countless other displaced families.546 Another woman returned to Ler secretly to look for her daughter, who had just given birth, but could not find her; it was reported that her daughter had fled toward then-government-occupied Koch.547 When the SSDF withdrew from Ler in early May, many civilians fled with them. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep took one day to organize his forces and chase them on foot, following on the heels of the civilian stragglers. Civilians recalled the flight as very difficult: “People were killed around me; the Paulino [Matiep] forces were close behind as we fled to Mayandit. The Paulino soldiers chased us five hours to Mayandit from Ler.”548 This witness remembered seeing the body of one victim, Peter Yu Yut, a Presbyterian church elder, shot by Paulino Matiep’s forces, and sixty head of cattle stolen from him. A woman, Ayong Tap of the Sudan Women’s Association, was killed. A sixty-year-old man, Bulthiep, was tied to a tree and beaten to death, also by Paulino Matiep militia.549 When those displaced who could move faster reached Mayandit, they collapsed into sleep. While they were asleep, Paulino Matiep’s forces attacked Mayandit. Out of ammunition, the SSDF commanders and troops crossed the River Neang on the other (west) side of Mayandit. A female resident of Mayandit observed: “There was never such destruction in Mayandit as this year [1999]; there is no Arab garrison in Mayandit,”550 meaning that without a government garrison neaby, the people had been left in peace. She continued, “I saw the Paulino soldiers and the bad things they did. Those who did not run for their life were shot on the spot.” She saw bodies with gunshot wounds. She saw people running away who were shot outside their houses: “All were running, shooting was all around them. They were caught in the early morning. This was when they [Paulino Matiep’s forces] had already defeated [Cmdr.] Peter [Paar]’s forces, killing the civilians who were left behind. They were using mortars for some of this killing.”551 Buar Kueth and his brother Kui Kueth, both young unmarried civilian men, were killed running away in Mayandit, according to witnesses.552 Many others were separated from their families in the confusion. 553 This was not combat but a mad dash by Nuer combatants and civilians alike across the river. Those civilians who could not find dugout canoes swam, as did the cattle.554 But “so many drowned, and cattle drowned too.”555 Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces did not cross the river. After a few days of looting in Mayandit, his troops returned to Ler.
The people crossing the river thought their best bet was to keep running from Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep and the army. The SSDF and Nuer civilians in the thousands, once across the river, kept walking through the swamp and rain for days until they reached safety in Dinkaland to the west, or in Nuer towns of Nyal and Ganyliel, to the south. Some of those who fled described the terror and hardship of their experience:
Some walked seven days to reach safety in the Dinka area of Makuac in Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal: “There was so much water on the way, and we were walking with children, that it took a week.”558 Different groups formed and continued walking together; usually the men could walk to Makuac in three or four days, without women and children, but this trip took longer. Once it was clear they would be safe in Makuac, they sent word back so that other displaced Nuer could join them. The displaced Nuer brought few possessions because they were carrying their children.559
There was hunger and sickness, such as relapsing fever,561 malaria, and skin diseases. “The main thing was the mosquitoes eating us alive, leaving rashes, scabies. We drank the water from the road and toic. There were rivers with water lilies and fish; we ate both.”562 According to another, “Hunger was the main problem.”563 Twenty-three people from one group died of hunger and disease on the way.564 The cattle that were too exhausted to keep up and straggled behind were attacked by lions, which the displaced saw behind them as they traveled by day and night. One man survived a snakebite on his heel.565 There was rain, sometimes erratically, starting on one day and continuing to the next. But they were grateful. “The rain saved our lives. It stopped them from chasing us, and we kept walking through the rain. Small children died of cold on the way, and had to be left on the road.”566
Dinka Warmly Welcome Displaced Nuer, Slow International ReliefIn keeping with the covenant at Wunlit in March 1999, the Dinka from Makuac had returned to resettle the border communities deserted because of the Nuer-Dinka war. Building in this floodplain was seasonal, starting in October, with thatching grass for roofs not available until after the rainy season ended and vegetation dried out, starting in December. So the Dinka planted sorghum and other crops in Makuac and stayed in Paliang, Bahr El Ghazal, five hours away by foot.568 They had not even settled in when the Nuer arrived seeking refuge, starting in May 1999. The Nuer stayed around Makuac despite the lack of shelter, because it was near the toic and fishing camps, sources of food. They had almost nothing. A Nuer chief from Mayandit said, “We are lacking so many things because our houses [in Western Upper Nile] were looted and burned. We have no mosquito nets, nothing for cooking, no blankets, and the cows were looted. We are being helped by this Dinka population.”569 According to Dinka chief Lino Madut of the Luak-jang Dinka, who was present at Wunlit: “We the Dinka slaughtered eighty-three bulls for the Nuer because they had no rations.”570 The Nuer confirmed that the Dinka also shared their WFP relief food with them. In Makuac, the Nuer were not associated with or related to forces that belonged to the SPLM/A but they were nevertheless welcomed by Dinka chiefs and other traditional leaders because of the Wunlit agreement. The friendship that grew up between Dinka chief Lino Madut and Nuer chief Isaac Majok at Wunlit made the decision to flee to Dinkaland easier. Chief Isaac Majok said: “We are here because peace was signed in Wunlit. Also because that peace led to an escalation of fighting by the jallaba [northerners], stirring up fighting between us Nuer.”571 The Nuer flight to Makuac, and the Dinka welcome of them there, thus marked another important step in the demilitarization of Dinka-Nuer relations on the West Bank of the Nile. The Dinka welcome of the Nuer was all the more generous because these Dinka had been displaced themselves—by the Nuer now seeking their help. Chief Lino Madut, one of the Dinka who fled Nuer raiders, said Makuac was evacuated by its Dinka residents “during the war with the Nuer, which lasted from 1993 to 1999.” He continued, “I’m glad I was in Wunlit. . . . They [the Nuer] devastated Makuac and today we are brothers. We had a quarrel with our brother but the dispute is over. Today we and they are one.” 572 As to why the Nuer chose to flee to a Dinka area, the Nuer chief said:
The WFP conducted an assessment of the area in early August 1999, several months after the first Nuer displaced arrived. By that time, in mid-rainy season, the mud was deep and passage for vehicles was impossible. The Makuac airstrip had been waterlogged for weeks. The WFP team had to slog on foot several kilometers to Makuac. About a dozen trucks carrying relief food from WFP warehouses in Uganda had been stuck for weeks in Paliang, not able to get any closer to Makuac. By mid-August, the agencies decided to ask the displaced Nuer in Makuac to walk the five hours from their makeshift shelters to the bogged down trucks in Paliang for the first relief food distribution. The displaced gladly complied, and the Nuer women carried fifty-kilo bags of maize and sorghum back on their heads, along slippery muddy paths. Nuer Chief Isaac Magok commented to a Human Rights Watch researcher:
Other Displaced Nuer Embark on Hazardous Journey to Nyal and GanylielSome Nuer who fled Block 5A due to fighting and forced displacement were closer to the Nile and turned south along this waterway, which flows north. They escaped using primitive river transport into the territory of the Nyuong Nuer in Western Upper Nile, to their main towns of Nyal (on the sudd) and Ganyliel (formerly a port on the Nile). The OLS (Southern Sector) assessment team visited Nyal and Ganyliel in late May 1999.575 These displaced, who carried little but their children with them, optimistically planned “to cultivate in Nyal and Ganyliel and return to their original homes when the fighting stops.”576 They may have brought tuberculosis and kala azar with them, however, which were newly reported in both towns.577 One Ler man left his wife, one child, and an infant born on May 30 hidden in the toic southeast of Ler. He went to look for transport. As he went north down the Nile, he could hear firing on the fishing camps and villages near the river, and artillery shelling on an island. He, his younger brother, and a guide spent almost two weeks looking for a canoe; at this time of year the rivers were too deep to swim. They located his family (which had fled the government troops) and then in a canoe made of a hollowed-out palm tree, they paddled south upriver with his wife, child, and newborn baby for three days, through mosquitoes and rain, arriving in Nyal on June 16.578 Others to the north, the Bul Nuer, fled to Bulyom, a Dinka area in Bahr El Ghazal, where they stayed in an area for internally displaced people and received emergency relief as part of the Maper distribution. In June 1999 there were 3,426 new Nuer arrivals in Maper.579 Other Human Rights Abuses Linked to Displacement, 1999The forcible displacement of the population from strategic areas of Western Upper Nile/Unity State involved wholesale theft of cattle, rape, underage recruitment, use of landmines, and summary executions. During the 1999 fighting, as usual, civilians were preoccupied with protecting their main asset, their cattle. As one Ler chief described:
During 1999, until he defected to the SPLA in September, Cmdr. Peter Gatdet was zonal commander of Paulino Matiep’s Western Upper Nile/Unity State forces; in 1998 he was assigned elsewhere. This period of heightened abuses by the Paulino Matiep forces coincides with Cmdr. Peter Gatdet’s command, although the abuses did not diminish after his defection. In 2000, increased abuses by SPLA forces operating in Western Upper Nile/Unity State—under then SPLA Zonal Cmdr. Peter Gatdet—were reported, including summary execution of prisoners. Rape and Other Abuses Against WomenIn 1999, civilians in Western Upper Nile/Unity State were especially horrified because the enemy soldiers murdered women, something these civilians were not used to:
The witness said Paulino Matiep’s soldiers knew the names of their victims because the soldiers “were born in Mankien, and were living in Ler from 1991 to 1996 when Paulino [Matiep] was governor.”582 One underage soldier forcibly recruited by Paulino Matiep’s militia observed that the militia, together with government soldiers, beat and abused civilians, including women. “They would remove a lady’s skirt and petticoat. When she cried, they beat her more,” he said, and “If they captured you and then took your sister as a wife, if you were angry, they would beat you. . . . They are serious about raping.[583] The Arabs are serious, they bring girls from far off to the garrison.”584 Shortly after the boy soldier was sent to Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s base at Ler, he said the “Arabs,” northerners, asked Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces to accompany them to remote places: “The Arabs feared going there alone. When they go, they abduct young ladies. They sleep with them today and tomorrow send for a plane to take them away.”585 He was sent in a mixed Nuer and “Arab” government platoon to the village of Ger:
This patrol did not attack any military objectives, according to the boy participant. Its purpose was to look for—kidnap—young women and loot cattle. The soldiers, both Nuer and northerners, raped all the captured women before taking them back to the garrison. None of the soldiers objected to this mistreatment of women. The boy soldier said he “did not do anything” to the women. He was forced to beat one woman who resisted rape, under threat that if he did not beat her, it would mean that he did not belong to “our side,” and would be killed. He therefore “beat her with a stick.” The boy recruit knew four Nuer women among those captured and held at this base, locked inside a house. The soldiers and officers were prevented from going inside. “The women who were beautiful to the commanders were kept for them. The others were shared among some soldiers, both Nuer and jallaba.” He did not know how many women were locked up there. As far as he could tell, there were no children with the women. The captive women were taken outside the house, six at a time, to urinate while three soldiers held them at gunpoint. On one such occasion, the boy saw his cousin in the group. She was unmarried, a few years older than he. There was no way to talk to her. She saw him and immediately started crying. She was wearing a sheet; in the village she had worn a T-shirt and a skirt. The young unmarried girls wore sheets and the older married women wore skirts. 586 A young woman who had never been captured described her fear. “They are abducting girls and making them their ‘ladies’,” said Nyanchar, to explain why she had been in hiding before leaving her village of Ger. She knew some of the young women and girls who were abducted in 1999, including Chuoy Wat Keah who was about her age—eighteen. Chuoy Wat was taken with three girls from a village one hour from Ger. “Their mother came to our house and told us of the abduction by the renegades [Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces]. No one knows what happened to them. Their mother tried to follow but she could not find them. They were taken away this month [August 1999],” she reported. 587 Nyanchar had been hiding in the forest and going home at night to sleep. After hearing of the abductions, she fled to Nyal.588 Nyacuot, age twenty-five, had seven children and was born near Mayandit. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces stole her property and her family’s cattle, and abducted her in May 1999. They held her for four months at their camp in Boaw, more than fifty roadless kilometers north of Mayandit, before she managed to escape through a friend who had married into the clan at Boaw. Most of the time in captivity she did not do any cooking, cleaning, or carrying water. When she refused orders, however, the soldiers beat her. She said she was not a “wife” to them. Some of the men tried to take her as a wife (rape her). “Did you marry me before?” she told them. “I’m not your wife.” She told them they had not paid any cattle to her father (as bridewealth) so she could not be their wife. For this, too, she was beaten. Nyacuot saw no other captive women in the Paulino Matiep camp at Boaw, but she did see captive boys and girls. She talked with one girl and two boys, all about five or six years old, who said they were from the Bul and Dok sections of the Nuer. They talked only once before they were interrupted by the guards.589 Two Nuer women who fled from Ler to Nyal, Elizabeth N. and Martha N. (no relation), described the changing nature of the conflict in Western Upper Nile/Unity State and in particular the generalization of attacks against whole communities. Elizabeth N. echoed a familiar lament among those displaced:
Martha N. added:
Government Use of Antipersonnel LandminesThe Sudanese government began to use landmines in this area when its army advanced into Block 5A in 1999 and sought to protect outposts from rebel assault. 592 When the SSDF retook locations in Western Upper Nile/Unity State from the government in July 1999, it encountered landmines that the government had just laid in Ler (outside the Payak garrison), Adok, and Piling. One SSDF soldier participating in an attack on the government army garrison in Ler on July 3, 1999 saw three SSDF soldiers near him die when one of them stepped on an antipersonnel landmine outside the garrison. The mine was connected to a large antitank mine and caused it to detonate, killing the three immediately.593 Another source noted that this deadly government practice of connecting antitank mines to antipersonnel mines had occurred in this area on other occasions.594 In July 1999, a landmine killed Kuis Boh, a civilian, and his fourteen-year-old son, John Kuis, on a road that passed by the Piling garrison. The chief reporting these deaths said government troops would go to Piling from Ler for ten days or a month, and while there would surround the Piling garrison with mines: “They put up no warning signs, because they are our enemies.”595 A Presbyterian pastor by the name of Day Yout, age thirty-two, was also allegedly killed by a landmine near Ler that July. As he was taking his cattle to graze, he reportedly stepped on a mine on the road that passed by the government garrison at Payak and led to the grazing area.596 In Adok, a landmine killed three women and five cows on the road to the government garrison on or about July 20, 1999, when the women were going to look for food.597 The deaths of six women in one group around the garrison in Ler—following landmine explosions—were reported in August 1999. None of the six women died immediately, but there was no treatment for them in Ler, and they could not be medically evacuated by ICRC plane to the ICRC hospital across the Kenyan border because the Sudanese government had imposed a flight ban, which made the Western Upper Nile/Unity State area inaccessible to all agencies.598 Rebel Treatment of PrisonersThe SSDF and SPLA treatment of “Arab” prisoners, the “main enemy,” as they put it, was sometimes in violation of the captives’ human rights. As one SSDF soldier said: “if we capture, we kill them because they are taking our petrol.”599 The execution of three government employees who were seized at Ryer/Thar Jath in May 1999 is an example of summary execution based on political affilitation and ethnicity. There were other cases in 2000, but summary execution, even of northern or “Arab” prisoners, did not appear to be the rule, despite the quote above. The Nuer rivals in the fighting in Western Upper Nile/Unity State reportedly tended to treat fellow Nuer prisoners with respect. None of the SSDF, SPLA, or Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep forces killed captured Nuer combatants at this time, according to the SSDF, preferring to release them or use them as their own soldiers. One high-ranking SSDF officer stated:
Many times, however, SSDF officers and soldiers told Human Rights Watch that if they captured a Nuer combatant, he would be required to fight with them, i.e., switch sides. The fate of those who refused is not known. Requiring a captured combatant to change sides is a violation of international humanitarian law because of the inherent coercion involved.602 Unfortunately, as the Nuer-Nuer fighting heated up in 2000 and after, the Nuer could no longer claim that they did not kill their “own people” whom they captured. (See below) Rebel and Government Militia Recruitment of Child SoldiersThe escalation in fighting in Western Upper Nile in 1999 resulted in increased recruitment of child soldiers by all sides. By the Paulino Matiep MilitiaThe displaced Nuer complained in 1999 that—unlike 1998—Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s militia forces were recruiting boys603 as soldiers by force on the spot, without going through the chiefs, the usual practice. “They did not take boys or young men in 1998. The jallaba [northerner] does this. It arms the Bul Nuer [Maj. Gen. Matiep’s forces] to come and cause destruction.”604 In 1999, witnesses observed that there seemed to be an explicit policy among Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces of abducting and recruiting boys by force. One young boy who had been abducted into Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces returned home to Ler and told local authorities and families that there were many other young Dok Nuer men who had been forcibly recruited by Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep.605 Once a group of recruits had reached platoon size (thirty-six) or company size (two hundred), all including the underaged boys would be sent for training.606 During 1999, Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep trained them in Boaw, unless there was insecurity there. During this time, the training lasted about fourteen days, and the youngsters and young men were taught how to shoot, load, and clean guns. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep organized them into fighting units by section or ethnic subgroup. Each unit was headed by a section leader who would be responsible for all members. The boys were generally used for guard duty and to occupy captured locations.607 By the SSDFThe recruitment practice in Nuer and Dinka areas, when carried out by the armed rebels of the same ethnic origin as the recruitment pool—that is, Dok Nuer commanders in the Dok area of Western Upper Nile/Unity State—was based on appeals to the chiefs to cooperate with the rebel movement. The chiefs would in effect serve as conscription officers, designating boys from the village to serve with the rebels. These conscripts often complained they had no choice. One Bul Nuer man said that when he was sixteen, in about 1998, a local commander went to the chief of his village, who selected for soldiers the first born and the youngest brother of the families. This young man thus was forced to go against his will.608 This “chiefs’ system” of recruitment applied to all recruits, not just the underage ones. In about 1996, a Jagei Nuer man with two wives and several children was ordered by his chief to join the Riek Machar forces. Cmdr. Gatluak Damai, a Jagei Nuer commander then with Riek Machar, threatened that if this married recruit tried to escape, the commander would seize his cattle609—an extremely effective way to force compliance. Many visitors noted the presence of underage soldiers (under eighteen years of age) among SSDF troops. SSDF leaders denied they recruited children and said they released young Nuer combatants they captured to their parents. This proved to be untrue. Fighting Disrupts Demobilization of SSDF Child Soldiers in Ler, May 1999The SSDF under Riek Machar admitted that it had some child soldiers in its ranks, and in 1998 agreed to participate in a UNICEF/Rädda Barnen program to demobilize its child soldiers. Rädda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children) collaborated with the Relief Association of South Sudan (RASS), the relief wing of Riek Machar’s forces, in running a transit camp in Thonyor near Ler for demobilized child soldiers originally from the Ler area.610 Most child soldiers had been “given” to Riek Machar’s local commanders by the chiefs, so the commanders knew where the boys came from. The Thonyor camp held some 280 boy soldiers, all of whom were interviewed and registered by social workers. Just before the fighting started in Ler in May 1999, staff working with these children were evacuated because of insecurity; all 280 boys in the transit camp scattered. Of this 280, an estimated one hundred to two hundred were redrafted by Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep and Riek Machar in mid-1999, defeating the purpose of the demobilization. By August 2000, about 200 of the original group of 280, plus eighty-eight new child soldiers, had been reunified around Nyal and were under the supervision of Rädda Barnan and RASS.611 Cmdrs. Peter Gatdet and Riek Machar said they would demobilize the boy soldiers but they did not know what to do with them. Cmdr. Peter Gatdet, by then with the SPLM/A in the Bul Nuer corner of Western Upper Nile, demobilized the boy soldiers under his command in exchange for the promise of UNICEF school materials.612 489 Although there had been fighting in the Block 5A areas in 1998, the government troops and mujahedeen had not overtly taken part but were content to have the fighting perceived as “Nuer on Nuer.” 490 AJackpot for Lundin Oil in Sudan,@ Finanstidningen, May 21, 1999; ALundin, OMV Claim Substantial Find in Sudan,@ Platt=s Oilgram News (New York,), May 21, 1999. 491 The study was done by Resource Investment Strategy Consultants of Perth, Australia, for Lundin. Lundin Petroleum, Report for the period ended December 31, 2001, http://www.Lundin-petroleum.com/Documents/qr_4_2001_e.pdf (accessed May 28, 2002). 492 Taban Deng, interview, July 26, 1999; employee of security consultant to oil company, Human Rights Watch telephone interview, September 8, 1999 (anonymity requested). 493 Ibid. 494 Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999. 495 U.N. OLS (Southern Sector), “Weekly Report: March 15-21, 1999,” Nairobi, March 21, 1999. 496 Tito Biel, interview, August 19, 1999. 497 Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999. 498 Letter, Paulino Matiep to Taban Deng Gai, Bentiu, Unity State, April 29, 1999. Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep cited several military actions directed by Gov. Taban Deng indicating to him that the UDSF supported the SPLM/A. 499 Ibid. 500 Taban Deng, interview, July 26, 1999. 501 Ibid. Those arrested during this April 1999 wave of arrests allegedly included Bol Riel Gatluak, an ex-Minister of Parliament from Unity State and commissioner for Payinjar (Nyal and Ganyliel), who was feared dead in custody; Chol Met, also an ex-minister of parliament from Unity State; and former Deputy Cmdr. Riek Lor Jiok, an executive officer of the state. Others included ex-Alt. Cmdr. Dok Wangang, an executive officer (believed to have been lashed to death); ex-Alt. Cmdr. Jol Banak; and James Pui Yeek, a former adjutant to Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep who reportedly had worked with the ICRC in Lokichokkio, Kenya. SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999. Those who were still held in Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s base at Mankien when Cmdr. Peter Gatdet captured it in September 1999 were freed. 502 Makuac Youk also accused major Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep of removing furniture from government offices in Bentiu and taking it to Mankien in a government helicopter. Alfred Taban, “Rival Militias Feud in Sudan’s Unity Oil State,” Reuters, Khartoum, May 31, 1999. 503 “President of the Republic Cancels Decisions Issued by Wohda [Unity] State’s Wali [Governor],” SUNA, Khartoum, May 8, 1999. 504 Cmdr. Peter Gatdet, then serving under Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep, was given this assignment. John Noble, WFP security official, Human Rights Watch interview, Lokichokkio, Kenya, July 31, 2000 . The government wanted to send forces to two adjoining Lundin sites in Block 5A, Guk and Ryer/Thar Jath, with an escort of Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s militia. According to additional sources, Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep wanted to prevent the resumption of fighting between his troops and the SSDF. Paulino Matiep reportedly convinced the Sudanese government that it should send in the forces by helicopter, without his escort, instead of overland. He then appealed to rival and SSDF Cmdr. Tito Biel, through intermediaries, telling him of the government’s plans and asking him not to attack the government troops. He warned that if Cmdr. Tito Biel did resist, then the government would insist that Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces escort the army, and this would ignite further Nuer-Nuer fighting. Cmdr. Tito Biel was said to have replied that he would oppose any government attempt to increase its military presence in his territory (south of Bentiu) by air or any other way. Indeed, his understanding from meetings with Riek Machar was that he must not allow the government to build up its forces in Block 5A south of Bentiu. Anonymous relief worker, Human Rights Watch interview, August 22, 1999; Anonymous relief worker, February 2000. In any event, Paulino Matiep’s forces ultimately accompanied the Bentiu army convoy. 505 The SSDF believed that the government had artillery and fifteen trucks that carried three companies at some 126 soldiers per company, or an estimated 378 army soldiers. Paulino Matiep’s forces on foot made up three “task forces” of some 400 each. Thomas Duoth, interview, July 22, 1999. 506 SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999. 507 The third died of his injuries while being evacuated to Bentiu by plane that same day. Employee of security consultant to oil company, interview, September 8, 1999. 508 Ibid., and others. 509 Thomas Duoth, interview, July 22, 1999. He claimed that there were two “Arab” plainclothes security men who were captured by Nuer chiefs and cattle guards from Duar. The chiefs and guards allegedly executed the captives in retaliation for their alleged killing of two civilians. He said that Cmdr. Tito Biel was advised of the capture but washed his hands of it. Many UDSF and SSDF officials denied the killings or claimed no knowledge of them. Based on the testimony of the oil company securityconsultant, the Harker Report, below, and others, it appears that the SSDF was responsible for the summary execution, not Nuer civilians. 510 Tito Biel, interview, August 19, 1999. Neither Lundin nor the government made any mention of the triple murder at the time, but a Sudanese army spokesman later said that Cmdr. Tito Biel’s forces killed three oil guards and carried out other “hostile acts” at petroleum sites in Unity State beginning on April 29, 1999. The Canadian human rights team concluded that three government soldiers guarding this Lundin rig had been abducted from the camp near the rig and killed. Talisman also said it was aware of three killed in a May 1999 attack on Lundin’s operations. “Sudanese army confirms defection of ally, says he hijacked boat,” AFP, Khartoum, May 28, 1999; Harker report, p. 50; Human Rights Watch interview, Talisman officials, February 3, 2000 (two northern guards shot dead by warlords). 511 Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s spokesman said that Cmdr. Tito Biel’s forces seized four Chinese and several Sudanese workers in Koch at the start of the fighting on May 2 and took ten oil company vehicles. The vehicles, used to transport rebels to the front lines, were returned a day later to the oil companies and the abductees were released the day after their capture, he admitted. Alfred Taban, “Calm reported restored in oil-rich Sudan state,” Reuters, Khartoum, May 9, 1999. 512 Employee of security consultant to oil company, interview, September 8, 1999. 513 Ibid. 514 After estimating that the oil find might be up to 300 million barrels, Lundin stated, “The rain period is just starting so Lundin Oil cannot investigate the current finding in detail until the autumn of 1999.” “Jackpot for Lundin Oil in Sudan,” Finanstidningen, May 21, 1999, abstracted from Finanstidningen in Swedish, World Reporter. 515 There were two airstrips serving Ler, one to the west near the government garrison (Payak or Gil) and one airstrip near the Ler hospital, called Pomzor. Isaak Magok, interview, August 14, 1999; Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999. 516 Eyewitnesses told the Canadian human rights delegation in December 1999 that SSDF soldiers outside the army garrison had noticed, on May 2, 1999, a white helicopter arriving in Ler full of troops but leaving half empty. The SSDF shot at that helicopter. Harker Report, p. 56. The Harker Commission further noted that on the same day, relief and other officials, before their evacuation from Ler, had also seen a white helicopter bring troops to Ler—and added that it was flown by “Caucasians.” The origin or ownership of this helicopter has not been established. Ibid. These events occurred when the governmennt had a working military helicopter fleet of six, before the purchases of sixteen more such helicopters in 2001-2002. 517 SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999. 518 Thomas Duoth, interview, July 22, 1999. 519 SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999. 520 Tito Biel, interview, August 19, 1999. 521 SSDF officer, interview, August 3, 1999. 522 Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999. 523 Most of the mujahedeen, after the capture of Ler, returned to Bentiu. 524 The pro-government militias of Nuer commanders Gabriel Tanginya, Gordon Kong Chuol, and Simon Mabor Gatwich Dual reportedly helped push SSDF forces out of Ler before returning to their home positions in other parts of Upper Nile. Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999. 525 “Sudan army says destroys . . . camps,”May 23, 1999. 526 SPLM/A press release, Nairobi, June 16, 1999. 527 Alfred Taban, “Pro-government militias clash over oil with Sudan army,” Reuters, Khartoum, May 6, 1999. 528 Tito Biel, interview, August 19, 1999. 529 “First Vice-President Affirms Government Keenness for National Dialogue,” SUNA, Khartoum, May 12, 1999. 530 “Sudan: Government forces dispatched to defend oilfields,” Sudan TV, Omdurman, in Arabic, May 5, 1999, as translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 531 “Armed Forces Spokesman Issues Statement,” SUNA, Khartoum, May 5, 1999; “Rebels reportedly targeting oil facilities in the south and east,” IRIN, Nairobi, May 6, 1999; “Sudan army says rebels attack oil installations,” Reuters, Khartoum, May 5, 1999. 532 Alfred Taban, “Calm reported restored in oil-rich Sudan state,” Reuters, Khartoum, May 9, 1999. 533 Ibid. 534 “Pro-government Sudanese militia commander defects to SPLA,” AFP, Khartoum, May 17, 1999. Alfred Taban, “Sudan group reports more clashes in oil-rich state,” Reuters, Khartoum, May 11, 1999; Alfred Taban, “Pro-government militias clash over oil with Sudan army,” Reuters, Khartoum, May 6, 1999. 535 Part of Ruweng County in Block 5A, north of the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam) River, apparently was not of commercial interest to Lundin, which later permitted it to be released back to the government pursuant to the contract. That northern tip of Block 5A was closer to the GNPOC oilfields in Block 1 than to the areas of Lundin’s interest south of the river in Block 5A. This report covers the northern tip of Block 5A in the context of the adjacent GNPOC concession. 536 Dr. Samson L. Kwaje, SPLM/A Secretary for Information and Official Spokesman, SPLM/A press release, Nairobi, May 4, 1999. 537 SPLA News Agency (SPLANA), “Message to the Sudanese People on the Occasion of the SPLM/SPLA 16th Anniversary,” by Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Nairobi, May 18, 1999 (text of radio message). 538 Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999. 539 “Khartoum plays down alleged strain on peace pact,” IRIN (Nairobi), Khartoum, May 12, 1999. 540 Mohamed Ali Saeed, “Sudanese faction demands revision of peace pact with regime,” AFP, Khartoum, May 10, 1999. 541 “First Vice-President Affirms Government Keenness,”May 12, 1999; Alfred Taban, “Khartoum seeks to heal rift with rebel allies,” Reuters, Khartoum, May 20, 1999. 542 “Khartoum accused of violating peace accord,” AFP, Khartoum, May 21, 1999. 543 His list of grievances included: assimilating five SSDF officers into the government army without consultating with him; trying to create southern militias affiliated with the government to divide the SSDF; dismissing the governor of Unity State (Taban Deng Gai); sending armed forces into Ler without prior agreement; and “deploying armed forces aggressively on May 2, 1999, without being justified on grounds of security, an action that threatened oil exploration south of Bentiu, Unity State, and led to confrontation and fighting against the SSDF.” Letter, Dr. Riek Machar, Assistant Vice President and Chairman of the Coordinating Council, to President Omar El Bashir, Khartoum, May 25, 1999. 544 “Split in ranks behind Khartoum’s chief for south Sudan, Machar,” AFP, Khartoum, June 2, 1999; Alfred Taban, “Southern Sudan leader faces ouster attempt,” Reuters, Khartoum, June 4, 1999. On June 3, Weles Wal Bang, a Nuer convert to Islam, and others broke from the UDSF and set up the UDSF Collective Leadership, calling for Riek Machar’s dismissal from the UDSF and the SSDF. 545 Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999. 546 Elizabeth N, interview, August 18-20, 1999. 547 Elizabeth N.and Martha N. interviews, August 18-20, 1999. 548 Isaac Majok, interview, August 14, 1999. 549 Ibid. 550 Nyakier, displaced woman from Mayandit, Human Rights Watch interview, Paliang, Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal, August 15, 1999. 551 Ibid. 552 Ibid. 553 Elizabeth N. and Martha N.., interviews, August 18-20, 1999. 554 Adok chief, interview, August 20, 1999. 555 Elizabeth N. and Martha N., interviews, August 18-20, 1999. 556 Nyakier, interview, August 15, 1999. 557 Ibid. 558 Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999. 558 Ibid. 559 Ibid. 560 Ibid. 561 “Relapsing fever is an acute febrile illness caused by spirochetes of the genus Borrelia. The high fevers of presenting patients spontaneously abate and then recur.” This pattern of recurrence gives the disease its name. There is a 30-70 percent morbidity rate in untreated patients. It is transmitted by ticks and human body lice. Jonathan A Edlow, MD, “Tick-Borne Diseases, Relapsing Fever,” eMedicine Journal, January 26, 2001, Volume 2, Number 1, http://www.emedicine.com/emerg/topic590.htm (accessed June 27, 2001). 562 Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999. 563 Woman displaced from Mayandit, Human Rights Watch interview, Paliang, Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal, August 15, 1999. 564 Chief Chany Both Nyang of Mayandit, Human Rights Watch interview, Paliang, Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal, August 15, 1999. 565 Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999. 566 Ibid. 567 Ibid. 568 Victor Bol Duop, assistant commissioner of Makuac, Human Rights Watch interview, Paliang, Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal, August 14, 1999. 569 Chany Both Nyang, interview, August 15, 1999. 570 Lino Madut, paramount Luak-jang Dinka chief of Makuac, Human Rights Watch interview, Paliang, Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal, August 14, 1999. 571 Isaac Majok, interview, August 14, 1999. 572 Lino Madut, interview, August 14, 1999. 573 Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999. 574 Ibid. 575 U.N. OLS (Southern Sector), Weekly Report: May 31–June 6, 1999. 576 Ibid. 577 Ibid. 578 Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999. 579 WFP, “Sudan Bulletin No. 92: 20 – 26 Jun, 1999,” June 26, 1999; Christopher M. Kiilu, WFP, “Nuer Displaced in Twic County” (handwritten report), Maper, Bahr El Ghazal, June 30, 1999. 580 Isaac Magok, interview, August 14, 1999. 581 Elizabeth N. and Martha N., interview, August 18-20, 1999. 582 Ibid. 583 There is no exact word in Nuer for rape. Most Nuer talk about rape as “taking her as a wife.” 584 Boy soldier, Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile, August 19,1999. 585 Ibid. 586 Ibid. 587 Nyanchar R, displaced from Ler province, Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile, August 19, 1999. 588 Ibid. 589 Nyacuot D., interview, August 15, 1999. 590 The disastrous state of maternal health in the vast unserved areas of rural southern Sudan cannot be overemphasized. On a single afternoon, a relief vehicle passed two different groups of people (along a thirty-kilometer muddy road) attempting to evacuate women who were in desperate need of medical care. One woman was in a coma from post-partum anemia and one was in labor for days before a local practitioner cut the dead fetus out of her womb. Human Rights Watch observation, Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal, August 16, 1999. See Dr. Michaleen Richer, “Overview of the Health Situation in Southern Sudan 2002,” UNICEF-OLS, Nairobi, September 2003. 591 Elizabeth N.and Martha N., interview, August 18-20, 1999. 592 In 1998, the Sudanese government signed the Convention to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines. It has not yet ratified the convention, but under international law it is bound by the intention indicated by its signature to abide by the spirit of the treaty. 593 Former Nuer combatant from Ler, Human Rights Watch interview, Kenya, August 21, 1999. 594 Anonymous medical relief worker, Human Rights Watch interview, Kenya, August 1999. 595 Chief of Adok area, Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile, August 20, 1999. 596 Ibid. 597 SSDF soldier, Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile, August 19, 1999. 598 Senior SSDF officer, Human Rights Watch interview, Nyal, Western Upper Nile, August 19, 1999; Christian Aid, The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan, London, March 2001, pp.13-14. 599 Former aide to Cmdr. Tito Biel, Human Rights Watch interview, Kenya, August 21, 1999 (stating policy; this man denied seeing any such executions). 600 Former aide to Cmdr. Tito Biel, interview, August 21, 1999. 601 Elijah Hon Top, interview, July 26, 1999. 602 Geneva Convention III of 1949, art. 444. 603 Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999. It was not the custom to recruit or conscript girls because traditionally young women enriched their families at marriage, when bridewealth was paid in cattle to be distributed mostly among the bride’s male family members over time. This also cemented the relations between the two families. If a girl were to be killed or maimed in battle, it would be a considerable economic loss to her family. Therefore neither families nor chiefs would usually consent to female conscription. 604 Adok chief, interview, August 20, 1999. 605 Simon, age seventeen, from Mayandit, Western Upper Nile, Human Rights Watch interview, Paliang, Tonj County, Bahr El Ghazal, August 15, 1999. 606 Michael Wal, interview, August 18, 1999 (based on his debriefing of a displaced boy in 607 Ibid.; boy soldier, interview, August 19, 1999. 608 Leek Nuer former combatant, Human Rights Watch interview, Lokichokkio, Kenya, August 4, 2000. 609 Jagei Nuer former combatant, Human Rights Watch interview, Lokichokkio, Kenya, July 29, 2000. 610 Social worker, Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, August 23, 1999. Interviews, assessment, and registration of the first group of child soldiers for the Thonyor camp began in October 1998. In April 1999, a team conducted psychological social work with the boys identified, all between ages ten and eighteen. Simon Kun, interview, July 23, 1999. 611 Ibid.; social worker, interview, August 23, 2000. RASS negotiated with the SSDF to secure the re-release of the boys. No humanitarian agencies had access to Maj. Gen. Paulino Matiep’s forces at the time. When his second in command, Cmdr. Peter Gatdet, defected at Mankien in September 1999, most of his forces went with Cmdr. Peter Gatdet, including the formerly demobilized child soldiers. Child welfare worker, Human Rights Watch interview, August 10, 2000, Nairobi. 612 By August 2000, however, he complained to U.N. officials that no supplies had arrived. John Noble, briefing, August 5, 2000.
|