V. IMPUNITY AND THE ROLE OF POLICE

Impunity is a recurring theme in the cases of political violence outlined in this report, and indeed in many other criminal acts in Nigeria. The overwhelming majority of politically motivated crimes have not resulted in prosecutions. In some instances this is the result of corruption or undue influence of politicians over the police. A news reporter in the northern state of Kano recounted to Human Rights Watch a conversation he had had with a friend in the police: the police officer said that on several occasions his men had intervened in violent political clashes at the local government level, and sometimes before they had even been able to bring the suspects back to the police station, he had received instructions to let them go. The officer understood that the instructions originated from local politicians. As a result, he said that now when he received a report of fighting he would normally wait a couple of hours before sending his men, as there was no sense in risking their lives to make arrests when no punishment would follow.¹⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch received numerous reports that suspects in different states were released by the police after influential persons had intervened. In the aftermath of the Ogbolomabiri conflict described above, the political sponsor of the Isenasawo group claimed to have successfully "insisted" that police in Abuja arrest of a man accused of storing weapons in his home in Ogbolomabiri. He claimed the man was detained for three days until Governor Alamieyeseigha himself came to Abuja and obtained his release.¹⁷⁸

In other cases, impunity may result partly from the police force's inability to carry out effective investigations because of inadequate (or wasted) resources allocated to the police force and lack of appropriate training. Simple lack of will among police officers overwhelmed by fighting too many violent criminals for too little financial compensation also contributes to the problem.¹⁷⁹ According to Nigeria's Justice Minister, the Nigerian Police Force was operating with 10 percent of the personnel it should have.¹⁸⁰ But while the police doubtless could do with more resources, an expert on police affairs noted that additional funding would not necessarily be properly used until police were able to account for the money they already receive, which until now they have not.¹⁸¹

Impunity is one grave consequence of ineffective law enforcement; arbitrary arrests are another. When police did come under pressure for results in a particular investigation, their response was often to carry out arbitrary arrests to appease the demand for action. Once the dust settled, the "suspects" were released either because there was insufficient evidence or because of the interference described above. For example, in PDP local primaries in Ogbolomabiri, Bayelsa State, and in Jos, Plateau State, there was evidence that numerous people had been rounded up in the aftermath of violence without clear evidence that they had participated.¹⁸² In Kano, Human Rights Watch also found evidence of arbitrary arrests after protests during a visit by President Obasanjo in late July 2002 provoked a violent response by police.¹⁸³

There is also a danger that even when police genuinely believe a person has participated in some form of political violence, they may resort to extrajudicial executions or other excessive use of force instead of effectively disarming and arresting the suspect. Extrajudicial executions are a long-standing human rights problem in Nigeria and have often occurred in the context of security force interventions to contain inter-communal conflict, police efforts to curb armed robbery, and in the course of illegal police activity such as traffic checkpoints set up to extort money from motorists.¹⁸⁴ Police initiatives introduced in 2002 authorized police officers to open fire in "very difficult" circumstances without the approval of their superiors, including whenever a police station is "under attack" by rioters. Dubbed "Operation Fire for Fire," these initiatives highlight the culture of conflict that exists between police and the population they are meant to protect. As elections approach, police must avoid taking sides in any fighting or resorting to excessive use of force or extrajudicial executions in attempts to contain this violence.

Police have an important role to play in preventing violence during elections. Impartial deployment in adequate numbers in the vicinity of election booths could help deter some violence. But the danger also exists that a heavy police presence could frighten away voters who anticipate police partisanship and intimidation. Local efforts to reassure voters of non-partisanship could help reduce some of these anxieties in voters and create a better relationship between the population and police. In order to protect politicians on election days, police reported a plan to patrol the areas around the homes of politicians at least three times a day; earlier plans to have one police officer for each politician were apparently scrapped because of a lack of manpower.¹⁸⁵

The Police Service Commission (PSC), a constitutional body created to provide independent oversight of the police, including personnel decisions with respect to police force officials, has drafted "Guidelines for the Conduct of Police Officers on Electoral Duty in Nigeria." The PSC plans to distribute the guidelines to police officers with electoral duties.¹⁸⁶ Police were also working on a model program of training for election security, with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Acknowledging that police have been accused of complicity in electoral violence and vote rigging in the past, the PSC guidelines explain the role of police in helping to ensure "the success and credibility of elected government in Nigeria." ¹⁸⁷ The document explains the role of police, electoral officers and the PSC; outlines the guidelines for police behavior, including maintenance of impartiality, proportionality in the use of force, and knowledge of the electoral law; and lists electoral offenses police are obliged to prevent If implemented in a professional manner by police, with an effective system of oversight and accountability, these guidelines could go a long way toward reducing political violence during the elections.

The PSC also has a statutory mandate to exercise disciplinary control over police officials. While the PSC was planning a deployment to monitor police conduct during elections, a representative of the PSC told Human Rights Watch that they had been unable to establish a department for general investigations due to insufficient funding. When they received complaints about officers, they had to refer them to the police force for investigation. In addition, the PSC relied on the police to actually implement their disciplinary decisions.¹⁸⁸ The PSC has the potential to be an agent of positive change in the Nigerian Police Force; eliminating the obstacles to its full independence could enhance its effectiveness and in turn the effectiveness of the police.

In a seeming effort to justify past abuses by the police, Justice Minister Kanu Agabi told Human Rights Watch that "police can commit excesses; it does happen. They become brutalized by the difficulties of their job. From time to time they break loose, but when they do we should sympathize with them. That's why police have to resort to desperate measures. That's why it's Operation Fire-for-Fire; it should be `fire-for-law.'"¹⁸⁹

¹⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Kano, February 2003.

¹⁷⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with Chief Barigha-Amange, Port Harcourt, February 16, 2003.

¹⁷⁹ Dayo Johnson, "AIG [Assistant Inspector General of Police] Laments Under-policing of Population," News, January 21, 2003; Henry Omunu, "Polls: No Allocation for Police in 2003 Budget," News, January 21, 2003.

¹⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with Kanu Agabi, Justice Minister and Attorney-General, Abuja, February 18, 2003.

¹⁸¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Lagos, January 30, 2003.

¹⁸² See discussion of Ogbolomabiri in section II and Jos in section III.

¹⁸³ Human Rights Watch interviews, Kano, February 1-2, 2002.

¹⁸⁴ See Amnesty International, Security forces in Nigeria: Serving to protect and respect human rights?, December 2002.

¹⁸⁵ Yemi Akinsuji, "April Poll: Police Patrol Team Now to Protect Civilians," This Day, March 26, 2003; "Nigeria Before National Elections," Roundtable discussion at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., March 27, 2003.

¹⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Innocent Chukwuma, Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN), Lagos, January 30, 2003. The PSC was planning to distribute 20,000 copies in handbook form for superior officers, and 120,000 laminated cards summarizing the guidelines for the rank-and-file officers.

¹⁸⁷ Police Service Commission, Guidelines for the Conduct of Police Officers on Electoral Duty in Nigeria (draft version), 2003.

¹⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with Emmanuel Ibe, Special Assistant to the Chairman, Police Service Commission, Abuja, February 17, 2003.

¹⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with Justice Minister Kanu Agabi, Abuja, February 18, 2003.