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“Even before the war began, there were ‘dialogues of war’ among Ivorians. There was no war on the ground, but there was war in the mouth.” Ivorian refugee, Nonah refugee camp, Guinea
Throughout over ten weeks of interviews with victims and witnesses to the violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Human Rights Watch was consistently told—by Ivorians, Burkinabé, long-time observers, victims—that the Ivorian media and the political discourse of key politicians played a crucial role in inflaming tensions, inciting fear and hatred, and galvanizing conflict, not only since September 19, 2002, but long before.
Côte d’Ivoire is home to a plethora of media: at least a dozen daily newspapers have wide circulation in the capital and major towns around the country. Local and international radio programs have a wide audience, and both Ivorian and international television programs are available in Abidjan and in many large and small towns. Yet the variety of media available to Ivorians, probably unmatched in any other country in the region, has not guaranteed access to objective news coverage for two main reasons.
First is the politicization of the Ivorian media, particularly the print media, which almost entirely lacks independence, given its links to the main political parties. Each major political party has a newspaper that acts as its mouthpiece, voicing its policy and propaganda. Since most of these newspapers lack objectivity, their audience receives at best partial, and at worst, false and inflammatory impressions of events. Second, while the Ivorian literacy rate is above average for the region, it remains below 50 percent,29 particularly in the rural areas, where radio remains the principal source of information.
When the “mutiny” began, the government moved quickly to ensure that Ivorians could no longer access independent media. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio France Internationale (RFI) programming on FM frequencies were cut within a week of September 19, 2002, thereby eliminating access for the vast majority of rural villagers to independent radio coverage of the conflict. Television soon followed—by October 7, 2002, the French channel TV5 was taken off the air. The combined blocks on both radio and television cut access to independent media programming for the majority of the Ivorian population.
The government simultaneously began a campaign to vilify the international press and their coverage of Côte d’Ivoire, not only by cutting audience access, but in some cases through intimidation of individual journalists. Local opposition media also suffered badly, with repeated attacks on the offices and persons of particular opposition papers.
The lack of objective coverage by local media worsened with the onset of the conflict in September 2002 and the increase in “patriotic” fervor.
The Ivorian media and the political discourse of high-level politicians inflamed popular feeling, especially among the groups of rural and urban youth, both before and after the conflict began. A witness to the rural inter-communal violence over land in 2002 told Human Rights Watch, “[e]veryday, the radio incited people to disputes.”30
After September 19, the situation worsened. Ivorian “patriots” were exhorted to mobilize. In late-October, civilians were encouraged by government statements to obstruct the access routes to Abidjan and form “vigilance committees” to “neutralize any assailant who attempted activities in Abidjan.”31 Television broadcasts and newspaper photographs of captured “assailants,” bound, with weapons at their sides, were frequently shown. Displaying the captives, who were mainly northerners and immigrants, heightened popular feelings against these groups. Sometimes the images of immigrants were shown in conjunction with thinly veiled or outright accusations of foreign support to the rebels (generally assumed to be Burkina Faso). These statements appear to have contributed to heightened hostility and attacks on the immigrant community. A witness to the violence against the Burkinabé in villages around Duékoué said: “Television—when it says the Burkinabé are ‘assailants’—that inflames the youths.”32
Government statements were sometimes ambivalent, sometimes ominously clear. As the rebels’ success grew and the weakness of the defending government forces became more apparent, the government’s position hardened. As its forces lost Bouaké, Vavoua and then Daloa, public statements issued on the national television program and in the print media by members of the government sent alarming signals. Telephone hotline numbers were set up for the public to phone in their denunciations of suspected rebels and the official spokesperson for the Ivorian armed forces at that time, Lieutenant-Colonel Jules Yao Yao, stated on October 11 that “all those who assist the assailants or act alongside are considered as accomplices and will be treated pure and simply as military objectives.”33 Yao Yao continued, “It is the same for all the patriots who might be tempted by reprisals. They fall beneath the force of the law.” Despite this latter qualification, Human Rights Watch’s research indicates that many abuses were committed by civilian “patriots” or members of self-defense committees, sometimes in collaboration with the state security forces, and these cases were neither investigated nor prosecuted (see below, chapter IX).
29 Human Development Report 2002, United Nations Development Program website at http://hdr.undp/org/reports/global/2002/en/indicator/indicator.cfm?file=cty_f_CIV.html (accessed June 25, 2003).
30 Human Rights Watch interview, Bobo-Dioulasso, February 16, 2003.
31 Armed forces spokesperson Jules Yao Yao, statement transcribed from Radio Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI), “Appel à plus de vigilance dans la région d’Abidjan,” Notre Voie, October 18, 2002.
32 Human Rights Watch interview, Duékoué, April 2, 2003.
33 “Tous ceux qui assistent et agissent aux côtés des assaillants seront des objectifs militaires,” Notre Voie, October 11, 2003, p.2.
