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X. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND LOCAL RESPONSES
TO ABUSES AGAINST CIVILIANS

Côte d’Ivoire’s legal obligations

Initially described as a mutiny, then as a coup attempt, within a matter of days the conflict reached the threshold of an internal conflict.192 Despite the introduction of the Liberian fighters, the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire remained an internal conflict, albeit one with some international dimensions given the indirect involvement of neighboring Liberia and Burkina Faso.

All parties involved in the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire are obliged to respect fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. This body of law demands that all parties to the conflict distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants, and between civilian property and military objectives. Acts or threats of violence intended to spread terror among the civilian population, in particular murder, physical or mental torture, rape, mutilation, pillage, and collective punishment, are prohibited. The destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for food production, crops, drinking water installations and supplies, is also prohibited.193

Côte d’Ivoire has incorporated many of the key principles of international humanitarian law within its national legislation. The core provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the prohibition of genocide and crimes against the civilian population, have been incorporated into the Ivorian Penal Code.194 Article 138 of the Penal Code specifically prohibits reprisal killings, and both the government and rebel forces must be held accountable for the reprisal killings committed by each side. The government and rebel forces, including their respective Liberian mercenaries and civilian militia forces, must also be held accountable for the numerous counts of rape, murder, and pillaging of the civilian population described in the above chapters, all of which are prohibited under both national and international law.

Côte d’Ivoire has also signed and ratified key international human rights treaties. A number of fundamental provisions of these treaties, such as the right to life, the right to be free from torture and the right to be free from ethnic discrimination were violated by the government forces. Many of the fundamental rights embodied in these treaties are non-derogable, meaning that the government and its security forces are obliged to respect them regardless of the armed conflict.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Côte d’Ivoire is a party, states: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”195 The Human Rights Committee, the body that monitors compliance with the Covenant, has said that the deprivation of life by state authorities is a matter of the utmost gravity. A state must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which the authorities might deprive persons of their lives. The summary executions of dozens of civilians by the state security forces were clearly a gross violation of these legal obligations.

In addition, Côte d’Ivoire violated basic principles of international law when the government imposed an order stating that “any suspicious individuals would be shot without warning” during the curfew hours.196 The U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provides guidance on the use of force and firearms by those enforcing the law, including soldiers. In situations of law enforcement such as the control of civilian crowds or the enforcement of a curfew, where the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials must exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved; they must minimize injury, and respect and preserve human life. The Basic Principles further provide that the intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made “when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” Exceptional circumstances such as internal instability or other public emergency may not be invoked to justify a departure from these basic principles. A blanket order such as the one described above did not meet the required standards of proportionality.

The response of the government of Côte d’Ivoire197

Throughout much of the conflict in western Côte d’Ivoire, the government has acted in abnegation of its responsibility to protect civilians in territory under its control from violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Instead, government security forces have frequently and sometimes systematically conducted campaigns of violence against civilians, generally based on ethnic, religious, national and political affiliation. The government has consistently denied responsibility for attacks on civilians. Instead, they have attempted to divert responsibility for violations of humanitarian law that have been brought to public attention onto their opponents, onto the French forces, onto the media, in short, onto any possible alternatives.

In addition to denying responsibility, the government’s use of the media and political discourse, both before and since the events of September 19, 2002, has been inflammatory and has encouraged attacks by civilian militias against civilians. Calling on civilians to act as self-defense committees and man checkpoints encouraged vigilantism and was a virtual license to violence.

In October 2002, the government stated that it would investigate the events in Daloa, but there has been no official inquiry or report published on the findings to date. In May, the government announced anew that an inquiry would be undertaken into the events in the west. To date, Human Rights Watch is not aware of any individuals who have been arrested or convicted of any of the deaths of civilians since September 19, 2002.

The government has consistently denied using Liberian refugees and other fighters from the MODEL faction despite overwhelming evidence of their presence in the west and their link to the Ivorian state. Even when Liberian “LIMA” forces were detained by the French military, the Gbagbo government refused to acknowledge their deployment and responsibility for the Bangolo massacre. Instead, the “young patriots” mobilized a march to Daloa under the leadership of Charles Blé Goudé and decried the detention of the so-called young Guerés, resulting in the escape of a number of the detainees. In the weeks following the Bangolo events, popular concern over the “genocide” against the Wê was fueled and manipulated by government statements.

Even after a cease-fire in the west was signed by the government and rebel groups in early May and a meeting with Liberian President Taylor took place in which both heads of state committed to refrain from supporting insurgents, there were continuing suspicions about ongoing support to Liberian rebel factions. In mid-May, George Dweh, the vice-president of the LURD faction, told journalists that he was in Abidjan on the government’s invitation and was planning to meet President Gbagbo. A government communiqué denied the allegation.198 Worryingly, recruitment in Nicla camp continued to be reported as of late-May, weeks after government and rebel forces signed a cease-fire in the west, and days after the head of the U.N. refugee agency, Ruud Lubbers, visited the camp and raised concerns over recruitment with President Gbagbo.199

A welcome sign of the new direction taken by the recently implemented government of reconciliation was the declaration of prime minister Seydou Diarra at the end of May, who stated that Côte d’Ivoire would ratify the treaty for the International Criminal Court and launch an inquiry into abuses with support from the U.N. Security Council.200 The latter step would provide a welcome start to the lengthy process needed to account for and punish the abuses of the war.

The response of the rebel groups

The Ivorian rebel groups, in particular the MPIGO group, are responsible for serious abuses, including rape, murder, and other acts of violence against civilians and other non-combatants in violation of Common Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. Although many of the worst atrocities against civilians were committed by Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters working with the MPIGO group, all of the rebel forces have committed abuses and should be held accountable for these acts.

The MPCI clearly recognized the role played by the Liberian and Sierra Leonean contingents. In early April, Human Rights Watch was told by MPCI Secretary-General Guillaume Soro that the MPCI “was trying to get the Liberians out” and that they had told the prime minister Seydou Diarra that “if the French did not do anything in the west, then they would take matters in their own hands.”201

Details are unclear, but it is possible that around this time the MPCI may have decided to cooperate with the Special Court for Sierra Leone in order to turn over war criminal Sam “Mosquito” Bockarie, who was indicted by the Special Court in March 2002. It is unclear whether MPIGO leader Felix Doh was supportive or resistant to this idea. Doh was killed, allegedly by the Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters under Bockarie, at the end of April, but rumors also circulated that the MPCI might have been responsible for his death.202 Sam Bockarie himself was killed several days later, apparently by Liberian government troops who stopped him while he was trying to re-enter Liberia. It is believed that President Taylor was behind the deaths of Bockarie, members of his family, and other potential witnesses against his own record of responsibility for abuses in the Sierra Leonean war.203

While the MPCI rebels acknowledged the problem posed and abuses resulting from the introduction of Liberian fighters, they initially denied links with the western rebel groups and have not publicly acknowledged responsibility for introducing any Liberian contingents. Even after all three groups were formally incorporated into the “New Forces” (Forces Nouvelles), the precise chain of command between the MPIGO rebels and their Liberian recruits remained unclear, although a chain of command certainly existed, at least in the initial period. The rebels have also denied responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the killing of over fifty detained gendarmes and family members in Bouaké in October 2002. They have however acknowledged the increasing lack of discipline among the MPCI troops, citing tensions between the military and political wings in the long period between the signing and the implementation of the Marcoussis accords.204

Accountability for the Bouaké massacre and other reprisal killings will be a vital step towards establishing peace and reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, the continuing questions surrounding the links between the MPCI and the MPIGO, and the chain of command over the Liberian fighters require further investigation in order to establish the command responsibility for their abuses against civilians in the west.

The French response

France, the ex-colonial power, has had a long and complex relationship with Côte d’Ivoire. Over twenty thousand French nationals were present in the country up to September 2002, and the French retained a military presence in Abidjan, a reflection of the continuing French economic, political, cultural and social interests in the country. A treaty between France and Côte d’Ivoire provided that the French could protect Ivorian territory if it was threatened by an external power.205

Initially, the French forces of Operation Unicorn intervened only to the extent of evacuating Western nationals from areas engulfed by fighting. However, following the first cease-fire between the rebels and the government on October 17, 2002, the French agreed to monitor the cease-fire line. French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin also engaged in considerable diplomatic lobbying with President Gbagbo and the rebel forces, both around the first cease-fire and later. However, French relations with President Gbagbo’s regime deteriorated markedly, particularly after the signing of the Marcoussis accords. President Gbagbo appeared to be increasingly reluctant to implement the accords and did little to stem the demonstrations of the “young patriots.” The French soon found themselves attacked on both sides, by the government who claimed they favored the rebels by not denouncing the insurgency, and by the rebels who claimed that they obstructed the rebel advances on San Pedro and Abidjan.

Once French troops agreed to monitor the cease-fire line, they were witness to many attacks on civilians by both forces. Initially, they did attempt to publicize and verify the worst of these: the mass grave in Monoko-Zohi and the helicopter attacks on Menakro, for instance, were confirmed by French forces. They were later given a United Nations mandate to support the ECOWAS troops and protect civilians,206 but tended to interpret this fairly narrowly. For instance, they did distribute telephone numbers to civilians in Daloa, Duékoué and Guiglo, which they could use to call for help if needed, and Human Rights Watch was told of several cases where individuals were saved by French forces from acts of violence and even executions by government troops. However, in other instances, they did little to deter or prevent violence; placing troops around the Nicla refugee camp, for instance, might have had some effect in deterring the recruitment and militarization of that camp.

French pressure brought both sides to the peace table at Linas-Marcoussis in late-January, and forged the accords, which gave human rights issues a prominent place.In an annexe, the Linas-Marcoussis accords tasked the new government of reconciliation with legislative reform of the laws on nationality, electoral procedure, and land inheritance, the immediate creation of a national human rights commission, the establishment of an international inquiry into serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and demanded an end to the impunity of those responsible for summary executions, in particular the death squads. While all of these steps are worthwhile, few if any of them have been initiated, and all will be necessary in order to try to bridge the deep divisions in Ivorian society.

Until a May 1, 2003 cease-fire was signed in the west, French and ECOWAS troops were reluctant to enter the west, where fighting was on-going and abuses were taking place on a daily basis. However, by late-May, as Liberian fighters were reportedly clearing out of the area, French and ECOWAS troops were preparing to assume monitoring positions and secure areas of the west, and by early June, most of the major towns in the west were stabilizing.



192 Under international humanitarian law, an internal conflict is defined as a conflict that takes place between the national armed forces and “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” Article 1.1, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.

193 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva Conventions). Côte d’Ivoire has signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions; the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Additional Protocols of 1977 on September 20, 1989. The Protocols were published by Decree No. 88-1102 of November 25, 1988.

194Law No. 81-640. Article 138 of the Penal Code is based on the fundamental guarantees incorporated in the Geneva Conventions, and deals with crimes against the civilian population.

195 Article 6.1. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, accession by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) on December 16, 1966. Entered into force on March 23, l976 in accordance with article 49. Côte d'Ivoire ratified ICCPR on March 26, l992.

196 Statement of Jules Yao Yao, armed forces spokesperson, transcribed in le jour, December 7-8, 2002, p.2.

197 All references to the government are to the government of President Laurent Gbagbo, which was still in place as the main authority through April 2003, when members of the new government of reconciliation began taking their places.

198 “Dirigeant du LURD à Abidjan: le gouvernement dément toute rencontre officielle,” Agence France Presse, May 15, 2003.

199Silvia Aloisi, “Refugee camp nurtures recruits for Ivorian war,” Reuters, May 18, 2003, at www. Reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf./ByCountry/CôtedIvoire (accessed May 20, 2003).

200 Integrated Regional Information Network, “Côte d'Ivoire: Government to inquire into human rights abuses,” May 29, 2003, at www.reliefweb.int (accessed May 31, 2003).

201 Human Rights Watch interview, Bouaké, March 31, 2003.

202 “Ivorian leader ‘found dead’,” BBC News, April 28, 2003, at http/://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/2981383.stm (accessed April 28, 2003).

203 Integrated Regional Information Network, “Bockarie’s death boosts chances for peace,” May 9, 2003, at www.reliefweb.int (accessed May 30, 2003).

204 Human Rights Watch interview with Guillaume Soro, Secretary- General of the MPCI, Bouaké, March 31, 2003.

205 This was one reason why Houphouet-Boigny did not build up the Ivoiran military. Another reason was that he mistrusted the potential threat to stability—and his own power—posed by a strong military. Given the history of military coups in the region, he was not short-sighted in that regard.

206 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1464, February 4, 2003. S/RES/1464/2003.


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August 2003