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IV. MISTREATMENT BY MILITARY POLICE AND CIVILIAN GUARDS

Once children are transferred to detention centers, they must often endure violence at the hands of state military police, a pattern similar to the one we found when we investigated Brazil's adult prisons.54 Less commonly, civilian guards are also responsible for abuses against youths in detention, a possibility that most detention authorities dismissed out of hand. Officials in Manaus, capital of the state of Amazônas, were the only ones to raise the issue of abuses by guards and discuss it forthrightly with Human Rights Watch. "I can't hide this," said Paulo Sampeio, the director of the Amazônas Department of the Child and the Adolescent, "because if I do, I perpetuate it."55

The state military police-which, despite their name, are subject to civilian control-ensure the external security of detention centers, quell riots and other disturbances, respond to escape attempts, and routinely conduct cell searches. Children who complained of beatings often told us that military police hit them with cassetetes, rubber batons with a metal core.

We were particularly troubled by the actions taken by the military police in response to a disturbance on April 5 and 6, 2002, in the Espaço Recomeço detention center in Pará. One youth with burns, blisters, bruises, and cuts over his face, neck, abdomen, arms, and legs told us that military police aimed tear gas cannisters directly at him. We observed other youths with bandages over much of their bodies where they had been injured by rubber bullets. We also heard from youths who reported that police officers beat them with rubber batons and tree branches.

Whether at the hands of military police or civilian guards, such abuses persist in part because of the lack of effective complaint mechanisms and the corresponding lack of accountability for those who commit them. Most detention centers fail to investigate complaints of abuses; indeed, most centers had no meaningful complaint mechanism.

The Role of the State Military Police
In the five states we visited, civilian guards staff juvenile detention centers, and civil police officers (polícia civil) staff the police lockups. But youths are not entirely out of police hands once they are transferred to juvenile detention centers. State military police (polícia militar)-which, despite their name, are subject to civilian control-have a role in juvenile detention centers. The principal responsibility of the military police is to ensure external security, and at least one officer is stationed outside each detention center at all times. They are commonly called upon to quell riots, respond to escape attempts, and handle other disturbances, and they are responsible for conducting searches in many institutions.

Most youths in detention only have contact with military police during routine searches of living areas and seaches of their person when they enter and leave their detention facility. "There are simple searches every day at 7 or 8 a.m.," said Lincoln E., a detainee in the Aninga detention center in the state of Amapá. He told us that there are more complete searches two or three times a month. Speaking of the military police, he said, "They used to get mad at us, but now they don't. They talk with us."56

Some youths charged that military police would deliberately damage their personal property during these searches. "When we complained, they would say it was a lie. They left us a little fearful," Patrícia D. said of the military police. "I got mad about their searches. They threw things on the floor, broke things, poured out our shampoo."57

Others told us that some military police officers are physically abusive. "They use batons made of rubber," said Terence M., who spent ten months in the Aninga detention center. "When they came in for searches, they would hit us."58 "The police hit me once, just like this," said Patrícia D., indicating a strike with an open palm to the back of her neck. "That was the only time they hit me. I saw them hit a lot of other kids when they entered the cells. It was the police who hit us, not the guards."59 "Sometimes they commit abuses. It's not frequent," said Lucas G. "It's just a few. They hit us sometimes with their batons."60

The State Military Police's Response to the Espaço Recomeço Disturbance
On April 5 and 6, 2002, the weekend before representatives of Human Rights Watch and Cedeca-Emaús arrived at the Espaço Recomeço detention center in Pará, a small group of youths-official estimates ranged from four to nine-set fire to their mattresses and attempted to escape. The disturbance was contained to a wing that held nineteen youths.61

We visited the center twice during the week of April 8, 2002. During these visits, we were able to inspect the facility, to speak privately with youths who participated in or witnessed the disturbance, and to interview many of the staff.

"It was four boys at the beginning who began to break things and damage the property," explained the detention center psychologist. He told us that a guard had smuggled the boys a metal bar that they used to knock a hole in the wall.62 A youth we interviewed confirmed this account of how the disturbance began. "The rebellion happened on Friday [April 5] at about 6 p.m. Some of the boys set fire to their mattresses," said Hamilton A., a seventeen-year-old who was housed in Wing C, where the riot took place.63

Detention center officials initially downplayed the events and the official response. "We had a situation here," Raimundo Monteiro, the center's warden, told us at first. "It happened on Friday after we had left here. . . . The police arrived, and we had a conversation with the adolescents."64 When we asked him what role the military police had played, he told us, "We spent four or five hours negotiating, then we called in the shock troops."65 After we pressed him for more details, he referred us to other members of his staff, who told us that they attempted to negotiate with the youths involved in the rebellion before asking the military police to quell the disturbance. "A trained negotiator from the military police wasn't able to end the rebellion," the psychologist said. "They spent four or five hours in negotiation."66 The youths we spoke with confirmed that there was an extended period of negotiation before the shock troops entered the detention center. "They negotiated for eight hours," Hamilton A. told us. "Then the shock troops came in."67

"It's the military police who made the decision to go in," the psychologist told us. "We felt threatened, and we called the military police. . . . They had to reestablish control of the situation."68 The military police entered the detention center in the early morning of April 6. "The shock troops came in shooting," said André G., who was held in another wing of the detention center within sight of the disturbance.69 "They fired rubber bullets. A few boys got hit in the arm. They were all in C, where the rebellion was," said Lucas G., who was housed in Wing C.70 "The shock troops fired rubber bullets, and some guys were severely injured," Tobias V. told us.71

Asked to describe the military police's treatment during the riot, Júnior A., in the Espaço Recomeço detention center's annex, replied, "Cruel, cruel." He showed us scars on his back that he said were the result of beatings by the military police.72 Damião P. told us that military police shot at him after they entered the detention center. "I took off," he said. When we asked him why, he replied, "To not be shot." He told us that he went over the wall of the detention center, but he was caught the same day and placed in the annex. A military police officer beat him with a tree branch before taking him back to the detention center, he said, showing us long scars on his back. "They beat us. The police beat us," he said.73 "They used gas, and they shot me," said Hamilton A. He had burns, blisters, bruises, and cuts over his face, neck, abdomen, arms, and legs. "They have a type of bomb that explodes," he explained, pointing to his arm. "They got me here with something that hits and explodes." After he was incapacitated, military police beat him with rubber batons, he told us. He estimated that six or seven other youths were injured by police during and after the riot.74

After the rebellion ended, youths told us that military police had them undress and remain nude for the rest of the day. "I was naked the whole day of the rebellion. They didn't let us dress so we wouldn't be able to hide if we escaped," Lucas G. told us. "The next day, they allowed us to wash. My clothes were never found. I'm wearing borrowed clothes. No underwear. It's the only change of clothes I have."75 Tobias V. corroborated this account, saying, "Those who were in the rebellion had to take off their clothes."76

Detention officials appear to have made no efforts to contact the parents of injured youths. Hamilton's parents did not learn of his injuries until his father called the center after seeing a television news broadcast that mentioned the riot. "I called there," his father said, referring to the detention center. "I identified myself as the father. They told me that my son was injured. They said he wasn't involved in the rebellion. He hid in the bathroom; others burned mattresses. When I went there, it was horrible." When we asked him to describe Hamilton's condition, he repeated, "It was horrible. He was burned, limping, his knee was hurt, he was burned everywhere. . . . He'd had no food until Sunday. Friday night and all day Saturday, without eating, just liquids. It was horrible."77

When we asked whether those who were injured received medical treatment, every youth who reported serious injuries told us that he had received medical care, and those who were not involved in the disturbance reported that injured youths received medical attention within the hour after the disturbance ended. Tobias V. told us, "After the shooting, they [detention center officials] attended to the ones who were hurt. About forty or fifty minutes later, they went to the hospital."78

By the Monday morning of our visit, detention center personnel had already cleaned out much of the area. When we returned to the center at the end of the week, Raimundo Monteiro, the warden of the detention center, assured us that the military police had conducted their own investigation and had prepared a report. When we asked him for the military police's report, he claimed not to have a copy.79

"This is the second rebellion in fifty days," Hamilton's father told us.80 "I saw the last one," Henrique O. told us. "The police used tear gas. I saw one kid-they had to take him to the hospital."81 Flávio M., who was in the detention center during the earlier disturbance, told us, "The shock troop came in with shotguns, hitting the kids. They hit even those who weren't in the rebellion, just came in hitting."82

When we asked why the disturbances had occurred, many youths answered that the conditions of their confinement was a factor. In the Espaço Recomeço detention center, "there are many guards who go around beating the adolescents. That was one of the reasons for the rebellion," Hamilton A. said. He told us about one incident in which guards pulled a youth out of his cell and beat him because he was talking. "They can do anything. They can come in and pull us out of cells and beat us up."83 Tobias V. had similar complaints: "It was because of the treatment; the food, which isn't enough; the time for recreation. They changed it; before, we had a whole day of recreation. Now we only have half a day. It was because of things like that."84

Many of the precise circumstances of this disturbance will never be known. What we do know, however, raises troubling questions about the actions of detention center officials and military police in response to a disturbance that involved a small number of youths and was confined to one area of the facility. In particular, we are disturbed by the severity of the injuries caused by the military police.

Detention officials in most states told us that the military police did not enter their facilities unless detention authorities requested it. "They only enter when we ask," said José Asenção Fonseca, director of the Esperança Youth Center (Centro de Juventude Esperança) in São Luís. "They provide the external security." 85 Similarly, an agreement between Amapá's Foundation of the Child and Adolescent and the state's military police specifies, "The military police may only intervene in the internal area [of the detention center] when requested by the Unit Coordination Office, in the case of events that put the physical integrity of persons or the preservation of the property at risk."86

The state of Amapá provided a counterpoint to Pará. Detention officials and state military police working in the Aninga detention center in Amapá-which holds approximately the same number of youths as in Pará's Espaço Recomeço-have implemented security plans intended to identify security risks, provide for coordination between civilian guards and military police during disturbances, and ensure respect for the rights of youths in detention. As a result of these and other initiatives, they told us, they have not had a riot since 1995. Youths we interviewed in that state spoke to us at length about their complaints, but riots, rubber bullets, and tear gas were not among them.

Under international standards, police and detention center officials may resort to force restrictively in order to prevent a youth from inflicting self-injury, injuries to others, or serious destruction of property. The use of force should be limited to exceptional cases, where all other control methods have been exhausted and failed; it should never cause humiliation or degradation.87 Detention center officials should always inform family members of injuries that result from the use of force. In cases where the use of force results in serious injuries or death, a family member or guardian should be notified immediately.88
Treatment by Civilian Guards
Verbal abuse by guards appears to be common, based on the number of complaints we heard from youths. "They don't show respect," said Romão S., a detainee in Pará. 89 "Some guards verbally abuse us, " said Tobias V., in the Espaço Recomeço detention center in Pará.90 Asked if she would change anything, Iolanda D. replied, "The guards could use a little sensitizing. They can be arrogant. I would change that if I could."91 Loide Gomes da Silva Ferreira, a social worker with the Centro de Defesa in Maranhão, said of the frequent verbal abuse, "It's very prejudicial. They don't work within a pedagogical framework. They work within a framework of repression."92

We also heard reports of physical abuse by guards, although these were much less common. Romão S. returned to the topic of treatment by guards later in our interview, saying that when he was in the Espaço Recomeço detention center, "there was a lot of disrespect. . . . Some of the guards are good, but not all. There are some that think it's a prison [for adults]. They hit people. There was that."93

With the notable exception of authorities in the state of Amazônas, detention officials themselves tended to dismiss reports of physical violence by guards. "The problems are in the police stations or among the adolescents themselves," said Raimundo Monteiro, director of the Espaço Recomeço detention center. "We converse with the adolescents and try to resolve things."94

In Amazônas, Paulo Sampeio raised the issue in response to a question about violence by youths. "In the last four years, we haven't had a single rebellion," he said. "What we have is violence committed by guards. We've established an administrative procedure. . . . The response depends on the case. The guard can be dismissed, suspended, reprimanded. We investigate why the incident occurred."95 The state opened thirty-eight investigations of guards in 2001 and seven in the first four months of 2002.96

But we heard conflicting accounts of the progress of one such investigation involving a guard in the Raimundo Parente detention center. "Recently we had a confrontation between an adolescent and a guard," the center's director told us. "The minor escaped. When he returned, there was a discussion between them, and the guard hit the adolescent. He was suspended, and he doesn't work in this unit anymore. The boy is still here."97 Orlando S., the fifteen-year-old youth involved in the incident, told us, "It was a guard who was on duty when I ran away. When I returned, he abused me physically. It was about 9:00 at night, when we were in the bathroom for the last time that night. He hit me. I fell to the floor, and he hit me on the arm. First he hit me on the back of the neck and hit me legs. Then I fell, and he hit me on the arms and chest." He reported that he spoke with the director and attended a hearing three weeks later. "I went to the hearing. I spoke about what happened. There were other witnesses, two adolescents who were in the bathroom with me. The guard is still here. He's here today; it's his shift right now," he said. When we asked him whether this was the first time he had seen the guard at work since the date of the hearing, he replied, "I saw the guard four days ago. . . . He worked the whole day." Orlando had not heard whether his complaint against the guard had been resolved.98

In Amapá, Amazônas, and Maranhão, each of which has undertaken reforms in recent years, some youths suggested that guards hired before the reforms were most likely to engage in abusive behavior. For example, Patrícia D. described the majority of the guards at Aninga as "friends," saying that they treated her and the other girls well. "It was only the older educators that didn't. They didn't have the same contract with the government. They didn't have the same training or courses. . . . Some of those educators don't know how to work with adolescents."99 Similarly, speaking of a time when youths were held in police stations rather than in juvenile detention centers, Loide Ferreira commented, "Some are very aggressive, principally those from the era of the lockups. The orders back then were, `You can hit.'"100 Sampeio told us, "It doesn't happen with the newer guards; it's usually those who are remnants of the old system. We've had to keep them even though they haven't undergone the training we have for the new ones."101

Complaint Process
When we asked about procedures for making complaints against guards or military police, detention officials universally assured us that they were available to meet with youths who wished to raise concerns. The following account of the "complaint process" in the Esperança Youth Center (Centro de Juventude Esperança) in Maranhão was typical of those we heard: "We have systematic meetings every fifteen days," said José Asenção Fonseca, director of the center. "They [youths in detention] ask us when they want some individualized attention. They'll say, `I want to speak to the director.'"102

International standards call for the establishment of effective complaint mechanisms in each detention center. At a minimum, in addition to providing the opportunity to present complaints to the director and to his or her authorized representative, each detention center should guarantee the following basic aspects of an effective complaint process:

    · The right to make a request or complaint, without censorship as to substance, to the central administration, the judicial authority, or other proper authorities. 103
    · The right to be informed of the response to a request or complaint without delay.104
    · The right to regular assistance from family members, legal counselors, humanitarian groups, or others in order to make complaints. In particular, illiterate children should receive the assistance they need to make complaints.105

In addition, international standards recommend the establishment of an independent office, such as an ombudsman, to receive and investigate complaints made by children deprived of their liberty.106

54 See Human Rights Watch, Behind Bars in Brazil, pp. 85-111.

55 Human Rights Watch interview with Paulo Sampeio, April 22, 2002.

56 Human Rights Watch interview, Macapá, Amapá, April 16, 2002.

57 Human Rights Watch interview, Santana, Amapá, April 16, 2002.

58 Human Rights Watch interview, Macapá, Amapá, April 15, 2002.

59 Human Rights Watch interview, Santana, Amapá, April 16, 2002.

60 Human Rights Watch interview, Macapá, Amapá, April 16, 2002.

61 Human Rights Watch interviews with Raimundo Monteiro and Maria Luiza Jarolim, psychologist, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002; Raimundo Monteiro, April 12, 2002. See also "Adolescentes infratores do EREC se rebelem e fazen refens," O Liberal (Belém), April 6, 2002, p. 9; "Rebelião do EREC dura sete horas e termina com fuga de 4 adolescentes," O Liberal (Belém), April 7, 2002, p. 11.

62 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananindeua, Pará, April 12, 2002.

63 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Sócio-Educativo Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 12, 2002.

64 Human Rights Watch interview with Raimundo Monteiro, April 8, 2002.

65 Ibid.

66 Human Rights Watch interview, April 12, 2002.

67 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Sócio-Educativo Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 12, 2002.

68 Human Rights Watch interview, April 12, 2002.

69 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

70 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internaçao Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

71 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

72 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço annex, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

73 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço annex, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

74 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Sócio-Educativo Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 12, 2002

75 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

76 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

77 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Sócio-Educativo Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 12, 2002.

78 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

79 Human Rights Watch interview with Raimundo Monteiro, April 12, 2002.

80 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Sócio-Educativo Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 12, 2002.

81 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Sócio-Educativo Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 12, 2002.

82 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Juvenil Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 10, 2002.

83 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Sócio-Educativo Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 12, 2002.

84 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

85 Human Rights Watch interview with José Fonseca, April 19, 2002.

86 "Os policiais militares só podem intervir no ambiente interno, quando solicitados pela Coordenação da Unidade, no caso de ocorrências que coloquem em risco a integridade física das pessoas ou a preservação do patrimônio." Governo do Estado do Amapá, Fundação da Criança e do Adolescente, Projeto Aninga: sistema de contenção e segurança (Macapá, Amapá: Fundação da Criança e do Adolescente, 2002), p. 9.

87 See U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles, art. 64.

88 Rule 56 of the U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles provides, "The family or guardian of a juvenile or any other person designated by the juvenile has the right to be informed of the state of health of the juvenile on request and in the event of any important changes in the health of the juvenile. The director of the detention facility should notify immediately the family or guardian of the juvenile concerned, or other designated person, in case of death" or serious injury. Ibid., art. 56.

89 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Juvenil Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

90 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação Espaço Recomeço, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

91 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro de Internação de Adolescentes Femenino, Ananideua, Pará, April 11, 2002.

92 Human Rights Watch interview with Loide Gomes, April 18, 2002.

93 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Juvenil Masculino, Ananideua, Pará, April 8, 2002.

94 Human Rights Watch interview with Raimundo Monteiro, April 12, 2002.

95 Human Rights Watch interview with Paulo Sampeio, April 22, 2002.

96 Comissão de Sindicância, Secretaria de Estado do Trabalho e Assistência Social, Governo do Estado do Amazônas, "Relatórios de sindicância realizados no período de 2001 até abril de 2002," April 23, 2002 (on file with Human Rights Watch).

97 Human Rights Watch interview with Mário Nobel Rebelo, director, Centro Sócio-Educativo Senador Raimundo Parente, Manaus, Amazônas, April 23, 2002.

98 Human Rights Watch interview, Centro Sócio-Educativo Senador Raimundo Parente, Manaus, Amazônas, April 23, 2002.

99 Human Rights Watch interview, Santana, Amapá, April 16, 2002.

100 Human Rights Watch interview with Loide Gomes, April 18, 2002.

101 Human Rights Watch interview with Paulo Sampeio, April 22, 2002.

102 Human Rights Watch interview with José Asenção Fonseca, director, Centro de Juventude Esperança, April 19, 2002.

103 U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles, art. 76.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid., art. 78.

106 Ibid., art. 77.

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