The Commission on Human Rights, the Fight Against Poverty and Social Inclusion's most notable feature is the stress that its mandate places on economic and social rights. Economic and social rights issues are, for the most part, not accorded sufficient attention by national human rights commissions, nor African and international human rights NGOs, although the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has made it a stated priority. National human rights commissions rarely address poverty alleviation and social inequities from a human rights perspective, and the Mauritanian commission is breaking new ground in formally expanding the traditional activities taken up by state human rights commissions.

Although the commission's single year of existence does not allow for an exhaustive evaluation, there are already a number of worrying aspects of the commission's mandate, structure, and articulated vision that are significant obstacles to its functioning as an autonomous human rights body. The first of these obstacles is the commission's lack of independence from the executive branch. The prime minister holds total power over the commission and appoints the commissioner and adjunct commissioner. The prime minister has a representative on the supervisory council charged with approving the actions of the commission, and vets the decisions of the supervisory council. When asked about the enormous control exercised by the executive branch over the commission, Koita Bamariem, the director of human rights promotion in the commission, seeming surprised by the question, replied that the supervisory powers exercised over the commission are "a normal aspect of our constitutional system."165

The commission's mandate is a second source of difficulty. Although the attention to poverty alleviation and human rights education is important, nonetheless, in order for the interdependence of economic development and respect for human rights to be more than a slogan, it is critical that the commission give as much attention to civil and political rights. Attention to economic and social rights should not be a screen behind which the commission hides in order to avoid dealing with more politically sensitive civil and political rights abuses by the government. Additionally, much of the mandate of the commission is framed in terms of "planning" and "research," terms which allow them to avoid broaching problems and seeking redress. There are serious human rights concerns to which the commission has not directed any attention to including the problems suffered in the aftermath of violations that occurred between 1986 to 1991; racial discrimination and the systematic social exclusion of the black community; and the harassment of human rights activists.

This risk is also felt by the Mauritanian NGOs. The Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l'Homme (AMDH) warned at the twenty-fourth session of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights in October 1998 that "the creation of a human rights commission [in Mauritania] will not be a magic wand that will result in the disappearance of human rights violations."166
Finally, one of the most troubling flaws in the structure of the commission is the almost complete absence of collaboration and support for the human rights NGOs which are often attacked by the government. President Cheikh Saad Bouh Kamara, president of the AMDH, noted:

All the independent human rights NGOs are being discriminated against [by the government]. At the beginning we had a lot of hope, but we saw, every quickly, that the Commissariat is more a kind of mirror for donors and an "alibi" because, in fact, the government does not want to share rights with civil society . . . . Why don't they recognize the thirteen independent Mauritanian NGOs? . . . . In fact, it is easier to found a political party in Mauritania than to create a human rights NGO. In conclusion, the Commissariat does not cooperate with independent human rights NGOs.167

A more formal overture ought to be made to the human rights NGOs so that they might bring to the commission their experience in human rights protection and promotion work and gain some measure of support for their work. More specifically, the July 1998 decree should be amended to guarantee greater independence, particularly with respect to the prime minister and the supervisory council.