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Current U.S. antipersonnel landmine policy is guided by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 64 issued on June 23, 1998. Although this document is classified, military and civilian officials have used details from it in many public forums and publications.5 The content is largely contained in a public letter from National Security Advisor Samuel Berger to Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat, Vermont) dated May 15, 1998. The letter states that "the United States will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if we succeed in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our anti-personnel landmines and mixed anti-tank systems by then." It also states that the U.S. will end the use of antipersonnel mines outside of Korea by 2003 (not including those in mixed systems), 6 and will "aggressively pursue the objective of having APL alternatives ready for Korea by 2006" (including those in mixed systems).7 This built on the previous U.S. policy announcement in September 1997 by (1) including antipersonnel mines in mixed systems as part of the alternatives program and (2) stating for the first time that the U.S. intended to sign the treaty, albeit only if the search for alternatives were successful.8
The Pentagon has made clear that it considers the 2003 date as a "deadline," while the 2006 date is considered an "objective dependent on the on-going search for alternatives."9 The end of reliance on antipersonnel mines in mixed systems is considered to be a "goal" and the search for alternatives for them has "no deadline."10 In other words, the Pentagon retains the right to use munitions that contain a mix of antitank mines and antipersonnel mines without geographic or time restriction, while an open-ended and uncertain search for alternatives proceeds.
Antipersonnel landmine policy in the U.S. is made through an interagency process wherein representatives of the National Security Council evaluate the concerns of departments and agencies in order to make recommendations to the president for a decision. The Department of State, Department of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff are the primary organs charged with implementing that decision.
There have been no changes in U.S. policy in the two years since PDD 64 was issued. Indeed there has been no further review of policy or consideration of changes, despite the rapidly spreading global embrace of a comprehensive ban. Today, the Mine Ban Treaty has been signed by 137 nations, more than two-thirds of the world, including all of NATO except the U.S. and Turkey, other major U.S. allies such as Japan, all of this hemisphere except Cuba, and all of the European Union except Finland. The treaty entered into force on March 1, 1999, faster than any major multilateral treaty ever, and continues to gain ratifications and accessions at a remarkable pace (ninety-six to date). The International Campaign to Ban Landmines' newly created global monitoring initiative (Landmine Monitor) reports that use of antipersonnel mines appears to have diminished significantly in recent years. Some twenty million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed from global stockpiles. Exports of antipersonnel mines worldwide have slowed to a trickle. The number of antipersonnel mine producing states has dropped from fifty-four to sixteen, though the U.S. is sadly still among the ranks of those refusing to ban production. The number of new mine victims is decreasing in heavily infested nations such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Mozambique.
Korea and Military Utility
The president cited the situation in Korea as the paramount reason for not signing the treaty in September 1997. Accepting the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president declared that antipersonnel mines were critical to the defense of South Korea.11 Several retired military leaders have questioned the utility of antipersonnel mines in Korea, citing the overwhelming technological superiority of U.S. weapons being able to compensate for having no antipersonnel mines. Lt. General James Hollingsworth, former commander of U.S. forces in Korea, has said, "There is indeed a military utility to APLs [antipersonnel landmines], but in the case of U.S. forces in Korea it is minimal, and in some ways even offset by the difficulty our own APLs pose to our brand of mobile warfare.... Not only civilians, but U.S. armed forces, will benefit from a ban on landmines. U.S. forces in Korea are no exception."12
The Pentagon reportedly validated its requirement for antipersonnel mines in Korea in a series of war games and computer simulations. The Pentagon has never made public the assumptions or techniques used in its models, citing the use of classified data. It is unknown if these models and their results were subjected to a peer review or competitive analysis. One report, citing Pentagon officials involved, has said that the computer war games were seriously flawed.13
President Clinton also cited the need for mixed mine systems as a key reason for not signing the treaty, noting that the antipersonnel mines are designed to protect the antitank mines from tampering or removal by enemy forces.14 One line of argument holds that antipersonnel mines delay an enemy force by twenty minutes from breaching a minefield containing both antipersonnel and antitank mines, thus allowing extra air strikes on the enemy.15 However, this applies only to a breach of a minefield by dismounted (on foot) forces. Antipersonnel mines have little to no utility against forces mounted in armored vehicles. Breaching a minefield by forces mounted in armored vehicles is the most common threat; the military's own doctrine acknowledges this by stating that "[b]ased on current technology, most breaching operations are accomplished by mechanical or explosive means."16
The president and others have often complained that during treaty negotiations in Oslo in September 1997 other states exempted their more dangerous antitank mines which were protected by antihandling devices (instead of antipersonnel mines) while purposefully excluding safer U.S. mixed mine systems. This is a fallacy. The treaty permits antitank mines with antihandling devices, but only if they explode from an intentional act (i.e., an enemy soldier's attempt to tamper or remove); if they explode from an unintentional act of a person, they are considered antipersonnel mines and therefore banned. However, states parties to the ban treaty have yet to clarify precisely what constitutes an intentional or unintentional act, or what antitank mines and/or antihandling devices are permissible.
Others have argued that landmines have little to no utility in the war fighting principles currently being developed and adopted by the U.S. military for the 21st century. One argument notes that mines violate the tenets of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and focused logistics that form the backbone of Joint Vision 2010, the foundation for the military's "revolution" in military affairs.17 Non-self-destructing mines would actually hinder implementation of Joint Vision 2010 because they are World War II technology and employed in ways not different than they were in that conflict and impose an inordinate burden on logistics assets. According to an assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency, modern U.S. self-destruct antitank mines-the ones in mixed systems-may be obsolete by the end of this decade because of the proliferation of countermine systems that will be able to neutralize these mines that rely on magnetic influence fuzes.18
Following is a summary of U.S. actions regarding landmine policy in 1999 and 2000 in a number of different fora.
Congress
No free-standing legislation on landmine policy has been introduced since 1997. In 1998, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY)19 1999 contained an amendment offered by Senator Leahy that provided funding for the alternatives program.20 It also called for two independent scientific studies on alternatives. The Act also contained a provision allowing the president to waive the one-year moratorium on antipersonnel mine use, beginning in February 1999, that was signed into law by President Clinton in 1996.21 This was part of an agreement reached between the administration and Senator Leahy in return for the qualified commitment to join the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006.
In 1999, the ban on U.S. antipersonnel mine exports, in place since October 1992, was extended until 2003. No new legislation regarding antipersonnel mines has been introduced in the current session of Congress.
Mine Ban Treaty
The U.S. sent Ambassador Donald Steinberg (the president's Special Representative for Humanitarian Demining) as an unofficial observer to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty held in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. President Clinton also sent a message to the meeting, which was read aloud during the opening plenary. U.S. representatives have also participated as unofficial observers in some of the intersessional standing committees of experts meetings on mine clearance, victim assistance, and general status of the treaty, held in December 1999, March 2000, and May 2000.
The United States abstained in the vote on December 1, 1999 for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B that called for the universalization and implementation of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The vote was 139 nations in favor, one against, and twenty abstentions. Joining the U.S. in abstaining in this vote were Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Lebanon voted against. The U.S. also abstained on pro-ban treaty U.N. resolutions in 1997 and 1998. No mention was made of antipersonnel mines in President Clinton's remarks to members of the fifty-fourth session of the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, 1999.
Although Human Rights Watch and other members of the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines have urged the U.S. to use its diplomatic clout to encourage others to join the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible, this does not appear to have occurred. There is also no recent evidence, however, that the United States has been actively trying to dissuade other governments from joining the ban treaty.
In January 2000, Democratic presidential candidate Senator Bill Bradley said the U.S. should accede to the ban treaty immediately. He said, "I have concluded that the time has come for the U.S. to join in strengthening the international ban on...antipersonnel landmines. At one time, the United States was a world leader in the effort to ban antipersonnel mines. Since then, however, we have abdicated our leadership position."22 He said, "As President I will sign the Ottawa Treaty and work for its ratification in the Senate."23 In response, candidate and Vice President Al Gore simply endorsed President Clinton's policy. Senator Bradley subsequently withdrew from the race.
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)
The United States ratified Amended Protocol II of the CCW on May 24, 1999, slightly more than three years after it was negotiated. For many in the U.S. government and U.S. military, the Protocol II approach to mines-not banning, but instead placing certain restrictions and technical requirements on certain uses of certain types of antipersonnel mines-remains the preferred approach. The U.S. participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II held in Geneva from December 15-17, 1999. In a report submitted at this conference, the U.S. declared that it has taken all steps required to be in compliance with the amended protocol. This included modifying 670,000 M14 antipersonnel mines by attaching metal washers to make them detectable.24 These mines are designated for use in Korea.
At that meeting, as well as a subsequent meeting of governmental experts for Protocol II on May 31, 2000 in Geneva, the U.S. introduced a series of proposals for strengthened restrictions on antipersonnel and antitank (antivehicle) landmines. For antipersonnel mines, the U.S proposed increasing the required reliability rate for self-destruction from 90 percent up to 95 percent and for self-deactivation from 99.9 percent up to 99.99 percent. The U.S. also proposed that all antivehicle mines be detectable, and that remotely-delivered antivehicle mines have self-destruct and self-deactivation features. The U.S. also proposed adding compliance procedures (possibly similar to those in the Mine Ban Treaty).25
In his statement to the conference, the head of the U.S. delegation Michael Matheson of the State Department said, "In the view of the United States, the Amended Protocol is an essential part of the strategy needed to deal with the threat of indiscriminate use of landmines. This Protocol is an instrument that can attract adherence of all states, including those which are not able to accept a total prohibition on anti-personnel mines at this time.... [I]t has been our strong hope and expectation that all states can be brought to support and adhere to this Protocol, whether they are party to the Ottawa Convention or not."26
Conference on Disarmament
Since 1997, U.S.-backed efforts at negotiating any type of international agreement on antipersonnel mines at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) have failed. Predictably, no progress occurred during the 1999 session. Several proposals for the appointment of a special coordinator for antipersonnel mines were made, but none were adopted by the conference. The agenda item under which antipersonnel mines are addressed has again been adopted for the 2000 session.27 U.S. Representative to the CD Ambassador Robert Grey affirmed that the U.S. still seeks a "role for the Conference in negotiating a comprehensive ban on the transfer of antipersonnel landmines."28 The impasse in the CD over issues relating to nuclear disarmament and other topics continue to stall any action on antipersonnel mines in 2000.
5 See for example, "Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives (APL-A)," a briefing delivered by Colonel Thomas Dresen, the Project Manager for Mines, Countermine, and Demolitions to the National Defense Industrial Association's Forty-third Annual Fuze Conference, April 7, 1999, Slide 7. Hereafter cited as "Dresen APL-A Briefing."
6 Current U.S. policy refers to the antipersonnel components of mixed systems as "submunitions" despite their being type classified as antipersonnel mines during acquisition and explicit references to them as antipersonnel mines in official military publications regarding doctrine, tactics, training, and procedures.
7 Letter from National Security Advisor Samuel Berger to Senator Patrick Leahy, May 15, 1998.
8 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: "U.S. Efforts to Address the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines," September 17, 1997.
9 Interview with Dr. James A. Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, May 10, 2000. Also in attendance were staff members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff. Hereafter cited as "DoD Interviews, May 10, 2000."
10 DoD Interviews, May 10, 2000.
11 The White House, Fact Sheet: "U.S. Requirements for Landmines in Korea," September 17, 1997.
12 See General Hollingsworth's Foreward to Demilitarization for Democracy, "Exploding the Landmine Myth in Korea," August 1997, p. ii. He also said, "To be blunt, if we are relying on these weapons to defend the Korean peninsula, we are in big trouble.... North Korea's mechanized assault can be destroyed well north of Seoul without the use of U.S. APLs. I never counted on our APLs to make much of a difference...", p. i.
13 Demilitarization for Democracy, "Exploding the Landmine Myth in Korea," August 1997, p. ii.
14 The White House, Fact Sheet: "Anti-Tank Munitions," September 17, 1997.
15 Cited in Lieutenant General [Ret.] Robert Gard Jr., "Alternatives to Antipersonnel Landmines," Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation's Monograph Series, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1999, p.15.
16 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, May 29, 1998, chapter 2.
17 Dr. Edwin Deagle, Jr., "U.S. Military Alternatives to Antipersonnel Landmines," a study prepared for the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and presented to the National Academy of Sciences' Committee to Examine Alternative Technologies to Replace Anti-Personnel Landmines, May 24, 2000, slide 11.
18 Deagle briefing, slides 18 and 19 citing a Joint Staff (J-8) briefing titled "Non-Material Landmine Alternatives," July 12-16, 1999.
19 Note to reader: U.S. Government fiscal years (FY) begin on the first day of October in the previous calendar year and end on the last day of September of the current calendar year.
20 Public Law 105-261, Section 248.
21 Public Law 104-107, page 110 STAT. 751
22 Arms Trade Insider no. 26, "Bradley Supports Ottawa Treaty Banning Landmines," January 19, 2000.
23 Quoted in the email newsletter of the US Campaign to Ban Landmines, January 24, 2000.
24 United States of America, "National Annual Report CCW/AP.II/CONF.1/NAR.13," November 5, 1999, p. 4. This report is required under article 13 of the amended protocol.
25 U.S. "non-paper" titled "Possible Improvements to the Convention on Conventional Weapons," obtained by Human Rights Watch October 27, 1999. See also, U.S. Information Service, "U.S. Wants to Strengthen Landmine Protocol to Make Mines More Detectable," June 1, 2000.
26 Statement of Michael J. Matheson to the First Annual Conference of Parties to the Amended Mines Protocol, December 15, 1999.
27 Agenda for the 2000 Session, CD/1603, January 18, 2000.
28 UNOG Press Release, February 17, 2000.