Recommendations addressing human rights issues appear in nearly every chapter of the Patten Commission report. We will comment on those recommendations most closely associated with the issues we brought to the attention of the commission during the consultation process. This assessment thus responds to the commission's commentary and recommendations in chapters 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 19. The report's recommendations are referenced by a number in parentheses (for example, no. 34) and text from the report is indicated by chapter and paragraph in parenthesis (for example, chapter 7, paragraph 8).
The Patten Commission is to be commended for recommending that the new policing service in Northern Ireland be predicated on a "human rights-based approach" to policing and for placing human rights protection at "thecore" of the report (chapter 4, paragraph 6). Human Rights Watch welcomes the commission's statement that "there should be no conflict between human rights and policing . . . Policing means protecting human rights (chapter 4, paragraph 1)." We endorse the commission's recommendations for creating a new oath that includes upholding human rights and equal protection (no. 2); new codes of ethics and practice in conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights (no. 3); human rights training for all officers (no. 4); assessment of respect for human rights in the performance of duty in the appraisal process (no. 5); the appointment of a human rights lawyer to the staff of police legal services (no. 6); and the monitoring of police performance with respect to human rights by the new civilian Police Board (no. 7; see below for commentary on the Police Board).
The commission's emphasis on human rights is particularly important because in the past human rights have not been viewed by either the RUC or the government as vital components of policing in Northern Ireland. This failure to consider policing's human rights dimension has been addressed by Human Rights Watch numerous times and is reflected in the vast documentation of human rights violations committed by the RUC and in the procedures that allowed these violations often to go without remedy. The Patten Commission report notes that the RUC is in "a very early stage" of addressing human rights issues and that only two police training sessions out of 700 available currently are dedicated to human rights (chapter 4, paragraph 5). These facts point to persistent RUC resistance to the incorporation of human rights standards and awareness into its philosophy and training despite decades of criticism for abusive practices from United Nations and European monitoring officials, U.S. and European governments, the U.K.'s own government-appointed commissioners (for example, the independent commissioner for the holding centres and the members of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights), and international and domestic human rights organizations. The U.K. government and those monitoring implementation will need to be mindful of RUC resistance and obstruction to the incorporation of human rights into its mandate and practice in the past. As the organization with primary responsibility for the practical side of the report's implementation, the RUC's past and seemingly current negative institutional attitude toward the introduction of human rights criteria into policing may be the first and most serious roadblock to realizing the report's promise. The commission's recommendation for an oversight commissioner from outside the U.K./Ireland (no. 172) is particularly important in light of such past resistance to the incorporation of human rights protections into law enforcement in Northern Ireland (see below for additional commentary on this recommendation).
Absence of a Vetting Mechanism
Human Rights Watch welcomes the Patten Commission's observation that proper accountability for police misconduct has not been achieved in Northern Ireland (chapter 5, paragraph 5). We have argued this point repeatedly with RUC and government officials for the past eight years. The rote response from both law enforcement and government officials had been that there are numerous safeguards built into "the system" and that RUC officers are, in fact, the most scrutinized police force in Europe. The Patten report makes clear, however, in chapters five and six on accountability, that such alleged "safeguards" have failed and that a completely revamped system of interlocking mechanisms for police accountability are necessary.
We are deeply concerned, however, that despite the recognition that the RUC has not been held accountable for its abusive actions, the Patten Commission makes no recommendation for a vetting process to screen out and exclude from a peacetime police force those officers with a past history of abusive conduct (see appendix I: "Recommendations for Vetting the Northern Ireland Police Force," Human Rights Watch Submission to Patten Commission, January 16, 1999). In the absence of a commission of inquiry into the role of the security forces during the conflict or a truth commission modeled along the lines of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a vetting mechanism for accountability for past human rights violations by the police would at least have layed a firm foundation for the future policing arrangements that the commission has so carefully contemplated. It would have sent a strong message that human rights abuse will not be tolerated in the new policing service and would have provided a fair mechanism by which chronic and other violent abusers, including those whose actions have led to thestate's payment of civil damages and out-of-court settlements, would be made to answer as individuals for egregious violations committed with impunity.
The Patten Commission readily accepts the proposition-put forward by Human Rights Watch and many other human rights groups in the course of the consultation process-that abusive police conduct, tolerated by the RUC as an institution, has occurred in the past:
Although we were not a commission of inquiry, and had no powers to investigate specific allegations, we took seriously a number of allegations concerning past police performance, some of which are still under investigation (chapter 5, paragraph 18).
...we are in no doubt that the RUC has had several officers within its ranks over the years who have abused their position. Many supporters of the RUC and both serving and retired officers have spoken to us about "bad apples." It is not satisfactory to suggest, as some people have, that one should somehow accept that every organisation has such "bad apples." They should be dealt with ( chapter 5, paragraph 19).
It is not simply individual officers who have been at fault here. We are not persuaded that the RUC has in the past had adequate systems in place to monitor and, when necessary, act upon complaints against officers and civilian claims awards (chapter 5, paragraph 20).
Despite such strong language, the Patten Commission does fail to provide a mechanism by which such "bad apples" can be dealt with and the RUC can be held accountable for institutional tolerance, if not outright complicity, in the commission of past human rights violations. In the absence of a screening process to weed out and exclude those officers with past abusive human rights records, the "bad apples" and the RUC as an institution are effectively offered a "clean slate" by the Patten Commission.
A profoundly disturbing aspect of the commission's failure to provide an accountability mechanism for past abuses by the RUC lies in the naive assumption that Catholics and Irish nationalists will join the new policing service-and be encouraged by the RUC establishment-based solely on the promise of forward-looking arrangements. The commissioners urge the people of Northern Ireland to forget the past and embark on a "fresh start" with respect to policing (chapter 1, paragraph 7). Claiming that "Northern Ireland voted overwhelmingly in 1998 to turn its back on the politics of revenge and retaliation (chapter 1, paragraph 7)," the commission confuses retribution with justice and revenge with upholding the rule of law. The Patten report claims too much for the people of Northern Ireland when it equates approval of the Good Friday Agreement with a desire and willingness to forget past human rights violations. Indeed, during the consultation process commissioners were inundated by both written submissions and oral testimony offered at community meetings by people who have suffered violations at the hands of the RUC and are still seeking effective redress. If the people of Northern Ireland wanted to "forget the past" they would not have wasted valuable time and emotional energy informing the commission that it is justice for violations suffered that will lay a firm foundation for their acceptance of any new policing structures and arrangements. Thus, the commission has failed to lay the necessary groundwork for one of its most critical recommendations-that "all community leaders, including political party leaders and local councillors . . . should take steps to remove all discouragements to members of their communities applying to join the police, and make it a priority to encourage them to apply (no. 113)." Many people expect abusive officers to be held accountable for past violations, particularly among Catholic and nationalist communities wherein a disproportionate number of such abuses occurred. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a large segment of the population will have the confidence to join a new policing service that retains certain officers responsible for well-documented, egregious human rights violations (see page below for commentary on the holding centres and the status of Special Branch).
During a September 23, 1999, meeting with members of the Patten Commission in New York, Human Rights Watch representatives argued that the absence of an accountability mechanism for past police abuses could significantly hinder implementation of the report's recommendations. We detailed our experiences in other post-conflict zones where a screening mechanism was rejected or not adequately implemented (for example, South Africa and Bosnia) and how impunity for past violations has caused extreme tension within newly constituted police forces and lack of public confidence in these new forces. The commissioners pointed out that there are some new accountability mechanisms recommended in the report that "may" deal with abusive officers. They pointed to recommendations that include knowledge of human rights and conduct in conformity with human rights norms as criteria for performance appraisals and promotion. While we agree that each officer should be evaluated on human rights criteria for appraisal and evaluation, we do not agree that these mechanisms answer the call for transparency and accountability for past human rights violations.
Human Rights Watch urges the government of the United Kingdom to implement an official vetting mechanism to screen out those officers currently serving on the RUC who are responsible for past human rights violations. This should be without prejudice to the creation of commissions of inquiry, truth commissions, or other mechanisms by which individual criminal responsibility for abusive acts by RUC personnel could be established.
The Patten Commission makes a number of recommendations for future arrangements covering the current profound deficit in accountability. We note the new arrangements below and include questions where we seek clarification about composition and or function:
Establishment of Police Board
Human Rights Watch agrees with the commission's observation that the Police Authority for Northern Ireland (PANI) has not held the police adequately accountable and should be replaced. We welcome the recommendation to create a nineteen-member civilian Police Board with greater powers than PANI (no. 8). However, we are concerned that the board be representative of the community as whole. Ten of the nineteen members will be drawn from the political parties comprising the Northern Ireland Executive. The parties themselves should be encouraged to appoint members representative of the communities they serve, particularly in terms of gender composition and membership of ethnic minorities. The selection of the nine remaining members-to be appointed by the Secretary of State-should further ensure a representative presence of women and ethnic and sexual minorities on the board.
Powers of Secretary of State
The commission recommends that section 39 of The Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 giving the Secretary of State the power to guide the police as to the exercise of their functions should be repealed (no. 23). We agree that the Secretary of State enjoys too much involvement in directing the police under the current law and that this gives the impression that the police are subject to political influence.
Operational "Responsibility" of the Chief Constable
In our submission to the Patten Commission we urged that the concept of "operational autonomy" for the chief constable be clarified as it appeared in practice that the chief constable was not accountable to anyone regarding how the RUC conducted police operations. The commission prefers "operational responsibility," stating that the chief constable's right and duty to make operational decisions shall not be directed by any other body (no. 24) but may be reviewed after the fact by the Police Board (no. 25). Human Rights Watch believes that the chief constable should be required to consult with the Police Board in advance of possibly controversial police operations to benefit from the input of the civilian review board and to avoid putting the Police Board in the position merely of reacting to such operations.
Transparency
Human Rights Watch welcomes the commission's commitment to transparency, as evidenced by recommendations that the Police Board publicly meet once a month to receive a report from the chief constable (no. 35), and that the "presumption should be that everything should be available for public scrutiny unless it is in the public interest-not the police interest-to hold it back" (no. 37).
Police Ombudsman
The Patten Commission endorses the plan recommended by Maurice Hayes in his previous report, A Police Ombudsman For Northern Ireland? A Review of the Police Complaints System in Northern Ireland (January 1997), to establish an Office of the Police Ombudsman in response to persistent criticism of the current Independent Commission for Police Complaints (ICPC). The recommendation for a new complaints process overseen by an independent ombudsman's office with independent investigators pursuing complaints against the police is most welcome (no. 38). However, Human Rights Watch has a number of concerns regarding the Patten report recommendation, the current text of the statute enacting Dr. Hayes' report, and the selection of the first ombudsman for the office.
Dr. Hayes' report was published in January 1997. Subsequently, the proposal for a police ombudsman's office was included in the Police (Northern Ireland) Bill, which progressed through the House of Commons in 1997 and early 1998 and resulted in the passage of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act of 1998. Provision for the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland is in Schedule 3 of the Act. It is our understanding that a set of draft regulations will govern various aspects of the operation of the ombudsman's office.
The Patten Commission "aligns itself fully with Dr. Hayes' recommendations (chapter 6, paragraph 40)" and criticizes the 1998 act's rushed and inadequate response to the need for policing reform (chapter 5, paragraph 11). It is important to note that the Patten report is very specific in recommending that:
The Ombudsman should take initiatives, not merely react to specific complaints received. He/she should exercise the power to initiate inquiries or investigations even if no specific complaint has been received. The Ombudsman should be responsible for compiling data on trends and patterns in complaints against the police, or accumulations of complaints against individual officers...[He/she] should exercise the right to investigate and comment on police policies and practices, where these are perceived to give rise to difficulties, even if the conduct of individual officers may not itself be culpable, and should draw any such observations to the attention of the Chief Constable and the Policing Board. The Ombudsman should have access to all past reports on the RUC ( chapter 6, paragraph 41).
The Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 thus does not implement the Hayes report. It also remains unclear to what extent the draft regulations mentioned above address the disparities between what the Hayes report recommends, what the Act itself mandates, and what the Patten report recommends. Indeed, the Patten Commission itself registers its dissatisfaction with the legislation, recognizing that the legislation is "confusing," and "contains labyrinthine provisions as to objectives, performance targets, and policing plans (chapter 5, paragraph 11)." The commissioners further complain that "we are mystified as to why this legislation was put through parliament in the weeks following the establishment of this Commission, given that our terms of reference required us to take a new look at the subject (5.11)." With respect to the office of the ombudsman, Human Rights Watch believes that the relevant legislation and any relevant codes of practice or regulations related to the operation of the ombudsman's office must make provision for the critical issues listed below. Based on the Patten Commission's set of recommendations we are convinced that new policing legislation is required to give full effect to the commission's report. It is our hope, further, that thegovernment will take the opportunity with such new legislation to enhance the human rights provisions of the commission's report in areas where the Patten Commission failed to bring policing fully into conformity with international human rights standards.
Systematic Abuses
The Police (Northern Ireland) Act makes provision only for the ombudsman to deal with individual complaints against individual police officers. The Hayes report and the Patten report recommendation, however, clearly provide for the ombudsman to evaluate patterns of abuse or trends in abusive police practices. In this regard, it is important that the act and the codes of practice/regulations grant the ombudsman the power to investigate patterns and trends that indicate systematic abuses perpetrated by the police. It is critical that the ombudsman be vested with the authority and the responsibility not only for bringing such systematic abuses to the attention of the appropriate authorities and to the public but that she or he be directly involved in providing a solution to such abuses that will result in offending officers being held accountable for the abuse, requires the police force as an institution to eradicate the conditions within the force that have given rise to impunity in the past for such abuses, and gives the ombudsman a monitoring role in ensuring that the police force adequately addresses such systematic abuse. The ombudsman should have the discretion to decide what patterns of abuse he or she investigates and should be provided adequate resources to undertake investigations of this nature that may require more labor intensive methodologies, investigation, and analysis than the investigation of individual complaints. Human Rights Watch has suggested in numerous fora that possible abuses to be considered "candidates" for investigations of systematic abuse include such general practices as the use of plastic baton rounds and the policies regulating or encouraging the use of force during public order policing operations.
Standard of Proof in Police Disciplinary Hearings
The Patten Commission report states that Dr. Hayes' report calls for a change in the standard of proof for police disciplinary hearings (chapter 6, paragraph 40) from the current criminal justice standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to a sliding scale standard. However, it fails to note that the 1998 legislation, which was intended to give the Hayes report effect, does not do so, and specifically does not include the recommended change to a sliding scale of proof. Human Rights Watch urged the Patten Commission to include a specific recommendation on changing the current, inordinately high standard of proof to the civil standard of proof-"the preponderance of the evidence" or "the balance of probabilities"-bringing it in conformity with that in the vast majority of Western police forces. Indeed, in an interview in the ICPC Bulletin: Bulletin of the Independent Commission for Police Complaints, Issue 2 dated February 1998, Maurice Hayes himself "express[ed] regret that he had not simply recommended the straight forward civil standard of proof, i.e. the balance of probabilities." We urge the government to take the opportunity now to change the standard of proof in police disciplinary hearings to the "balance of probabilities" in order to avoid the paradoxical (and evidently unjust) outcome whereby a complainant could successfully seek redress in the civil courts, yet his or her complaint might still result in a disciplinary finding of "not guilty."
Assistance by Members of the Police Force
The Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 states in article 5 that the ombudsman "may enter into arrangements for members of the police force to be engaged for a period of temporary service with the Ombudsman." In an October 1999 BBC interview, Northern Ireland Security Minister Adam Ingram stated that serving or retired RUC officers could be involved in an investigative capacity in the ombudsman's office. The prospect of police officers continuing to investigate complaints against police officers is profoundly disturbing. The purpose of creating the ombudsman's office was to end this practice and to provide the citizens of Northern Ireland with a wholly independent mechanism to complain about possible police misconduct and abuse. It is thus inappropriate for the ombudsman to draft officers from the police force itself into his or her office to serve in any capacity whereby the police would actually be involved in investigating complaints (beyond the internal mechanisms already available to the police) or would be perceived to be involved in the ombudsman's work. There should be no "police policing the police" as this arrangement would undermine the very purpose of the ombudsman's office and severely damage the ombudsman'scredibility and thus effectivity. The ombudsman's office should be adequately resourced to engage fully independent investigators and others who are not current or formerly serving officers from the Northern Ireland force.
Ombudsman's Discretionary Powers
In the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, the ombudsman was granted discretionary power to determine which issues and complaints she or he would investigate and which complaints would be delegated to the police for investigation. For example, a reasonable interpretation of the legislation was that the ombudsman could choose only to investigate deaths in custody and leave all other investigations of complaints to the police themselves. While this article is not reflected in the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, it is important to reiterate that the police force should not be involved in any capacity in the ombudsman's work of evaluating, analyzing, or investigating complaints against its officers. The Hayes report, as well, recommends that as public confidence in the police develops and the complaints system gains credibility the ombudsman could remit the investigation of complaints to the police under supervision or subject to audit as appropriate. Human Rights Watch believes that the only way that public confidence in the ombudsman's office is to be generated and sustained is for the ombudsman's office to remain completely independent of the police. No complaints against the police should be investigated by the police on behalf of the ombudsman under any circumstances. Again, the ombudsman's office should be adequately resourced to provide it with a sufficient number of independent investigators and staff such that the contracting of services from officers in the Northern Ireland police service is not necessary.
Past Reports on the RUC
Human Rights Watch welcomes the Patten report recommendation that the ombudsman should have access to all past reports on the RUC. However, it remains unclear to us whether or not it is within the powers of the ombudsman to make all or portions of those reports public in the course of her or his investigations. Publication of past reports investigating RUC conduct would seem to square with the commission's repeatedly stated commitment to transparency, which thread runs throughout the entire report. Moreover, if the ombudsman is to investigate patterns of abuse and trends in certain types of complaints about police misconduct-as recommended by the Hayes and Patten reports-past reports on the RUC could provide valuable evidence and analysis of such patterns, their origins, possible official sanction for and/or tolerance of such abuses, and the measures, if any, taken by government and the RUC to eradicate such practices. Thus, it should be within the discretion of the ombudsman to make such reports public and to use them to hold accountable individual officers and RUC authorities for past human rights violations.
Appointment of the Current Ombudsman
In the Patten report, the commission states that the relationship between the Police Authority for Northern Ireland and the RUC is "in some respects that between executive collaborators rather than one between a service provider and a regulator (chapter 5, paragraph 13)." Thus, it was disappointing that the person named as the first ombudsman, Ms. Nuala O'Loan, was a member of the Police Authority at the time of her appointment to the office of the ombudsman. This appointment could be perceived as part of the continuum of past relations between "executive collaborators" that has resulted in the very lack of accountability for police abuse that the Patten Commission so adamantly decries in its report.
Covert Policing
The Patten Commission recommends that new legislation on covert policing-involving interception of communications, surveillance, informants, and undercover operations-should conform with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); that a commissioner for covert law enforcement be appointed; and that a special complaints tribunal comprised of senior members of the legal profession-with full powers to investigate cases referred to it (either directly or through the ombudsman)-be established (nos. 39-41). While the recommendation that covert policing be conducted in conformity with the ECHR is welcome, it is unclear how the covert policing complaints tribunal will interact with the ombudsman's office, and in particular whether this body could serve to exclude certain matters under its consideration from the purview of the ombudsman. Will the covertpolicing tribunal enjoy full judicial powers to subpoena documents and call witnesses in the course of its investigations? Who will appoint members and upon what criteria will they be selected? If the commissioner for covert policing determines that there is justification for a covert operation, will the complaints tribunal be foreclosed from investigating that particular operation? Will the complaints tribunal be vested with the ability to investigate controversial covert policing operations of the past? What are the precise roles of the various actors involved in monitoring covert policing under the commission's recommendations?
Emergency Legislation
Human Rights Watch is profoundly disappointed that the Patten Commission did not take a stronger position in support of the repeal of emergency legislation in Northern Ireland. The emergency laws have provided cover for abusive police practices and in November 1998, the U.N. Committee Against Torture recommended that emergency laws be ended. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has called for repeal more than once. It has been well documented by Human Rights Watch and numerous other human rights groups that, among other things, RUC officers have routinely abused the legislation's stop, arrest, and search provisions; that the high incidence of miscarriages of justice involving political suspects arrested and convicted under these laws required the establishment in 1997 of the Criminal Cases Review Commission; and that the European Court of Human Rights has found the delay in access to counsel provided for under the emergency legislation coupled with the abrogation of the right to silence in the U.K. violates the fair trial standards of the ECHR (Murray v. U.K., 1996).
Indeed, the Patten commission itself aptly describes how public confidence in policing can be severely undermined by the abuse of powers granted to the police under the law:
We cannot emphasize too strongly that human rights are not an impediment to effective policing but, on the contrary, vital to its achievement. Bad application or promiscuous use of powers to limit a person's human rights-by such means as arrest, stop and search, house searches-can lead to bad police relations with entire neighbourhoods, thereby rendering effective policing of those neighbourhoods impossible. In extreme cases, human rights abuses by police can lead to wrongful convictions, which do immense damage to the standing of the police and therefore also to their effectiveness (chapter 4, paragraph 3).
Human Rights Watch believes that the continuation of the emergency laws-which in and of themselves derogate from the highest standards of policing practice and have been used by the police in Northern Ireland as a shield against accountability for numerous abusive practices-threatens to undermine the many progressive changes recommended by the commission. It would not be too categorical to argue that as long as emergency laws remain in force, the commission's goal of entrenching a "human rights-based approach" to policing in Northern Ireland will not be achievable.
The Patten Commission report's recommendation that records be kept of stops, searches, and "other such actions taken under the emergency laws (no. 61)" falls far short of the action required to bring policing in Northern Ireland in conformity with international human rights standards. Recording emergency measures is not the equivalent of stopping abuses. Indeed, it can be assumed that the very officers exercising extraordinary powers under the emergency laws will be the police personnel documenting these actions. It is indeed another instance of the exclusive role of "police policing the police." Furthermore, given the RUC's past history of routine abuse of the emergency laws, it is unlikely that such a documentation project will be undertaken with vigor. Policing in Northern Ireland can best be brought into conformity with international human rights standards by repealing the emergency laws.
Holding Centres
Human Rights Watch welcomes the commission's recommendation to close all the special detention facilities(holding centres) for political suspects in Northern Ireland (no. 62). However, we have two specific concerns regarding this recommendation.
Accountability for Past Human Rights Abuses
While the commission recommends closing the holding centres, it fails to acknowledge that the reason pressure for closure has been sustained and gained momentum over the years is because conditions in the centres-supported in large part by provisions of the emergency legislation-amounted to environments conducive to the physical and psychological ill-treatment of detainees. The U.N. Committee Against Torture has repeatedly called for the closure of the holding centres for this very reason. Similarly, there is a small cadre of easily identifiable RUC detectives who have been responsible for conducting abusive interrogations in the centres, many of which have resulted in coerced confessions from detainees. These detectives should not be reassigned without review of their records to serve in regular police stations where political suspects will be held after the centres close. It is difficult to expect potential new recruits-which the Patten Commission hopes will come in large numbers from the ranks of the Catholic and nationalist communities-to serve side-by-side with officers easily identified as human rights violators from the holding centres.
Intimidation and Harassment of Defense Lawyers
Despite the voluminous evidence of police intimidation of defense lawyers in the holding centres, the Patten Commission fails to make any specific recommendation with respect either to lawyers being present for all interrogations of political suspects (as is the case in England) or to accountability for intimidation of lawyers which is a current and ongoing problem in Northern Ireland. The commission appears to predicate permission for lawyers to be present during interrogations on the absence of terrorism stating that "Provided the threat of terrorism in Northern Ireland diminishes to the point where no additional special powers are necessary to combat it, legislation against terrorism should be the same in Northern Ireland as in the rest of the United Kingdom (#60)." It is striking, given the past two reports of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers Param Cumaraswamy-detailing systematic current and past police abuse of defense lawyers-and a meeting between the special rapporteur and the Patten Commission in the course of the commission's consultation process, that the commission's final report does not make recommendations regarding defense lawyer intimidation. Given the recent fresh allegations of RUC collusion in the 1989 murder of defense lawyer Patrick Finucane (see attached Human Rights Watch letter to Tony Blair) and the March 1999 murder of defense lawyer Rosemary Nelson, the absence of any recommendation concerning lawyer intimidation is particularly glaring. Both lawyers credibly alleged that RUC detectives in the holding centres harassed and intimidated them by passing "warnings" and threats-including death threats-to them through their clients. We strongly recommend that the U.K. government review the recommendations in the U.N. special rapporteur's last two reports and include those recommendations in the final project of reform of the RUC in Northern Ireland. Once again, Human Rights Watch urges the U.K. government to establish a public, independent judicial inquiry into Patrick Finucane's murder and to ensure that the investigation into Rosemary Nelson's murder operates without RUC participation or influence.
Plastic Bullets
While Human Rights Watch welcomes the Patten Commission's sentiment that members would like to see the use of plastic bullets discontinued as soon as possible, we are profoundly disappointed that the commission did not recommend an outright ban on the weapons. Representatives of Human Rights Watch tasked with monitoring security force conduct during the "marching seasons" in 1997 and 1998 witnessed RUC officers shooting plastic bullets in violation of international standards and the RUC's own guidelines by aiming at close range (and hitting) the upper bodies of human targets, and indiscriminately shooting into large crowds of protesters. Seventeen people have been killed by rubber or plastic bullets in Northern Ireland, many of whom were subsequently found not to have been rioting or otherwise engaged in violent behavior directed at the police. Thousands of life-altering injuries have been sustained by persons wounded by plastic bullets and the RUC has paid out hundreds of thousands of pounds insettlement of compensation claims to such injured persons.
The Patten Commission ignores a range of international standards that govern the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials. These standards require that potentially lethal force be used only when absolutely necessary to protect life or guard against grievous injury, to prevent the perpetration of a crime involving a grave threat to life, to apprehend a person who presents a threat to life and to prevent such a person's escape, and only in the event that less extreme measures are insufficient to achieve any of these objectives (see U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials). The commission also ignores the U.N. Committee Against Torture's November 1998 finding that plastic bullets are not appropriate weapons for use in public order policing, thus further failing to conform with international thinking about effective, nonlethal weapons for crowd control.
The evidence that plastic bullets are unreliable and that the RUC has routinely abused the guidelines for their use-thus causing grievous bodily injury to many persons-is overwhelming. Evidence of this nature was presented to the Patten Commission by Human Rights Watch and by numerous human rights organizations, yet the commission failed to comment on this and to recommend a ban on these weapons. We urge the U.K. government to consider the Patten commission report deficient in this respect and to implement a ban on plastic bullet use throughout the U.K., including in Northern Ireland, as a matter of urgency.
Special Branch
The Patten Commission recommends that RUC Special Branch and the Crime Branch "be brought together under the command of a single Assistant Chief Constable" (no. 98). Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned that this recommendation leaves the status of Special Branch unclear. Credible allegations of Special Branch collusion with loyalist paramilitaries have plagued the RUC and, as noted above, recent revelations about possible Special Branch complicity in the murder of Belfast solicitor Patrick Finucane in 1989 have fueled urgent calls for the British government to establish an independent inquiry into the killing. Yet, there is no recommendation that Special Branch be evaluated to determine past abusive practices or for the unit itself to be replaced with a more accountable specialty unit. It appears from the recommendation that Special Branch will remain intact with absolutely no appraisal of its dodgy human rights record. This is unacceptable given the controversial nature of the policing undertaken by Special Branch in the past.
Human Rights Watch welcomes the Patten Commission's recommendations regarding recruitment goals and the provision for affirmative action, particularly for the recruitment of Catholics and nationalists. However, we note again the difficulty of recruiting from these communities given the failure of the commission to tackle the problem of retaining officers with abusive records. Thus, we urge the U.K. government to acknowledge the connection between successfully recruiting Catholics and nationalists and the need for a vetting process to weed out abusive officers responsible for decades of human rights violations against the Catholic and nationalist minorities.
The Patten Commission recommends "as a matter of priority" that "all members of the police service should be instructed in the implications for policing of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the wider context of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (no. 142)." While Human Rights Watch endorses such instruction, we are acutely aware that the lessons of the classroom rarely translate into immediate and effective protection of human rights at the ground level. In addition to educational modules that reflect simple instruction in human rights policing modalities, it is essential that officers be trained in how to put this training into practice and thus how to carry out human rights-based policing. Moreover, officers must be imbued with the sense that the failure to practice human rights-based policing will result in sanctions. Human Rights Watch believesthat the best and most effective way to send the message that human rights abuses will not be tolerated in peacetime Northern Ireland is to prohibit officers with past abusive records from serving in the new police force and to implement a set of accountability mechanisms that check abusive practices at their root and hold offending officers accountable with either rigorous disciplinary action or criminal prosecution. The fact that the Patten Commission report would permit abusive officers to remain on the force without any transparent process of review is the first failure to send that critical message. No amount of classroom instruction in human rights-based policing can erase the fact that the commission failed to take the opportunity to remove human rights abusers from the new policing service, thus undermining its own largely touted goal of accountability for abusive policing practices.
Human Rights Watch endorses the establishment of a neutral working environment for the new policing service (no. 156). We thus welcome the name change, new badge, and recommendations to employ the use of symbols that are free of any association with the British or Irish states.
The Patten report recommends that "an eminent person, from a country other than the United Kingdom or Ireland should be appointed . . .as an oversight commissioner with responsibility for supervising the implementation" of the commission's recommendations (no. 172). Human Rights Watch urges the U.K. government to appoint a person to this post who has extensive knowledge not only of police reform in post-conflict societies but of international human rights law and practice. If the commission's primary goal, as stated in its first recommendation, is to "focus policing in Northern Ireland on a human rights-based approach," it would appear that an essential criterion of appointment for an international oversight commissioner would be familiarity with such a policing philosophy and actual experience in mechanizing human rights-based policing practices.
