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DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF CROATIAN SERBS

The government has made little progress since the 1997 presidential elections in tackling the large scale disenfranchisement of Croatian Serb citizens, despite repeated recommendations from the Council of Europe, ODIHR, the European Union, and the OSCE Mission to Croatia. Problems with the citizenship law, slow consular procedures, and inadequate out-of-country voting arrangements will make it difficult for many refugee Serbs to exercise their political rights as citizens of Croatia in the 1999 parliamentary elections. Some of the blame, however, must be laid at the feet of the European Union, the United States government, and the OSCE who have focused on limiting polling places for Bosnian Croat voters (because of concerns over fraud, and in some cases, a wish to limit their participation in elections in Croatia) instead of assisting Croatian Serb refugees in Bosnia and Hercegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to vote. Political leaders in the Croatian Serb refugee communities in Bosnia and FRY must also bear some responsibility for insisting on unrealistic conditions for return and failing to encourage refugees to exercise their right to Croatian citizenship and to vote.

Estimates vary widely, but it is safe to assume that approximately half of Croatia's Serb population in 1991 are now living outside the country as refugees.22 Although around 35,000 Serbs have returned to Croatia since 1996, an equal number have departed, most notably from Eastern Slavonia. Although the Croatian government's 1998 Program for Return has had some success in facilitating organized return to Croatia, most Serbs continue to return at their own initiative, through so-called "spontaneous" means. Lack of documentation proving citizenship continues to impede the return of Serbs.23 Although almost all are eligible for citizenship either by birth or naturalization, many refugee Serbs failed to obtain Croatian citizenship documents following Croatia's independence in 1991. Frequently lacking documents, Serb refugees often find it difficult to prove that they are eligible for citizenship, especially if they obtained citizenship by naturalization. Croatia's citizenship law, which follows a jus sanguinis model where citizenship is determined by descent rather than residence, makes it more difficult for long-term Serb residents to obtain citizenship by naturalization than it does for ethnic Croats with no history of residence in Croatia.

Serb refugees must travel to Croatia in person to apply for a citizenship certificate or passport. In order to facilitate the process of obtaining citizenship documentation, Croatia adopted procedures for individual return in 1998 that permit persons to apply at Croatian embassies and consulates abroad for a putni list (travel letter), which enables them to travel to Croatia to obtain a certificate of citizenship and passport. In addition to the consular departments at the Croatian embassies in Belgrade and Sarajevo, part-time consulates were opened during 1998 in Banja Lukain Bosnia and Kotor and Subotica in FRY, areas with substantial Croatian Serb refugee populations. Interruptions to the operation of these consulates and complaints in some cases about slow processing of applications, however, mean that only a fraction of those eligible for citizenship have been able to apply for the necessary travel letter. Consequently, many Croatian Serb refugees remain without citizenship documentation despite the new procedures.

The Croatian government has rejected a recommendation by the European Union that Croatian Serbs who can demonstrate residence prior to 1991 be allowed to vote even if they do not have Croatian documents verifying citizenship, arguing that under the constitution only citizens may vote and such persons are not citizens. As a result, any Croatian Serb who has a legitimate claim of citizenship but does not possess documents proving Croatian citizenship will remain disenfranchised until such time as he or she is able to obtain such documentation.

Many Croatian Serb refugees with citizenship documentation will also find it difficult to exercise their right to vote. The new election law makes no reference to voting arrangements for refugee Croatians who are Serbs. Articles in the law referring to "persons who do not have a permanent residence in the republic of Croatia" concern only the ethnic Croat diaspora (predominantly Bosnian Croats) who have their own special district. All other voters are expected to have permanent residence in Croatia, if they are outside the country at the time of the vote. According to article seven of the law:

Voters who have residences in the Republic of Croatia and are on the day of the elections outside the Republic of Croatia vote in the diplomatic-consular representative offices of the Republic of Croatia for representatives of a constituency as determined by their residence on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.24

The law thereby requires that any citizen outside Croatia (other than members of the diaspora) who wishes to vote must be registered in a constituency in Croatia. Provided that a person is registered in a constituency in Croatia, he or she may vote abroad in the election.

Voter registration is governed by a 1992 law that is widely regarded as problematic, primarily because of concerns over fraud related to the difficulty of removing persons from the register of voters. The war in Croatia meant that in some areas voter lists were incomplete or destroyed, so a new register of voters was carried out in those areas in 1995. The matter is made more complex by the fact that no central register of voters exists, with lists instead being compiled and maintained at the constituency level. Persons who did not vote in 1995 (including the many Croatian Serbs who fled the country) were not covered by the re-registration exercise. Although it is theoretically possible for Croatian Serbs with citizenship documents to be added to the register, it would require them to contact the local authorities in the municipality in which they were formerly resident to check if they are listed on the register. If they were able to obtain documentary proof of residence in that constituency, they could take that proof together with their citizenship documents to a Croatian embassy or consulate two weeks prior to the elections in order to be added to the register. Of course, in order to benefit from this procedure, one would have to be aware of it. However, there has been no serious effort to inform refugees of this option.

Even if a Croatian Serb refugee is listed on the register of voters and has the documentary proof that he or she is a citizen, it may still be difficult or impossible to vote. As article seven of the election law states, voting outside Croatia will take place in "diplomatic-consular representative offices." The lack of a public information campaign to encourage refugee Serbs in Bosnia and FRY to vote contrasts with daily public service announcements in Croatia advising Bosnian Croat refugees about forthcoming municipal elections in Bosnia. The lack of arrangements for public transportation for voters is also problematic. In Yugoslavia, where the bulk of Croatian Serb refugees currentlyreside, access to the Belgrade embassy or consulates in Subotica and Kotor may be difficult, particularly for elderly refugees, although the decision under article 80 of the election law to allow two days for out-of-country voting will ease the situation somewhat.

Serb leaders in Croatia are understandably disappointed by the failure of the Croatian government to take any measures to facilitate voting by Croatian-Serb refugees. According to the president of the Serb Democratic Forum, Vjelko Dzakula, "one year ago, we raised this problem with Ljerka Mintas-Hodak [the deputy prime minister of Croatia] and all the parliamentary parties. We have had an insufficient response from Mintas-Hodak and no response at all from the parliamentary parties."25 The international community also bears some responsibility for failing to make the disenfranchisement a priority in its dealings with Croatia. With the exception of the recent E.U. suggestion, little effort appears to have been made to develop ways to tackle the disenfranchisement of Croatian Serb refugees.

Although the issue of the disenfranchisement of many Croatian Serbs was raised in the OSCE Mission to Croatia's May and September 1999 reports to the OSCE Permanent Council, as well as in the August 1998 joint OSCE, E.U., and Council of Europe "non-paper," some senior officials in the OSCE Mission to Croatia have suggested to Human Rights Watch that the mission lacked the mandate to practically address the issue of disenfranchisement with the Croatian government.26 Several senior Western diplomats indicated to Human Rights Watch that they were more concerned with trying to limit voting by Bosnian Croat voters than with facilitating voting by Croatian Serbs, both because of concerns over fraud and a desire to limit the influence of Bosnian Croats in Croatian politics. They also acknowledged that this focus had weakened or eclipsed their ability to argue for assistance to Croatian Serb refugees wishing to vote.27 Although the wish to reduce electoral fraud is a valid goal for international policy toward the elections, activities to limit the participation of Bosnia Croat voters in the elections per se appear to support a strictly political, rather than a rights-based agenda, while also having the effect of reinforcing the disenfranchisement of Serb citizens of Croatia who happen to be refugees. The sole voice of principle was the international community's high representative in Bosnia, Wolfgang Petritsch, who made public statements on the need for all Croatian voters living in Bosnia, Serb and Croats, to be able to exercise their rights as citizens to vote.28

The ambivalent role of some leaders among the Croatian Serb refugee communities in Bosnia and Yugoslavia toward the participation of the Croatian Serbs in the Croatian elections must also be acknowledged. On the positive side, the Belgrade-based Association of Serb Refugees from Croatia made a public statement on September 18 urging Croatian Serbs to vote in the parliamentary elections irrespective of where they were currently residing. The statement followed an August letter from the Association to the U.S. ambassador in Croatia, William Montgomery, asking him to use his influence to facilitate the right of refugees to vote.

22 According to the 1999 census, the Serb population in Croatia was 581, 663 or approximately 12 percent of the total population of 4,784,265. Low estimates from late 1998 suggest that the Croatian Serb refugee populations in FRY and Bosnia are 280,000 and 40,000 respectively.

23 For more information on issues related to the return of refugees and citizenship, see Human Rights Watch, "Second Class Citizens: The Serbs of Croatia."

24 Law on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian State Parliament, adopted October 29, 1999. (Unofficial translation.)

25 Human Rights Watch interview, Veljko Dzakula, president, Ankica Gorkic, legal adviser, Serb Democratic Forum, Zagreb, October 21, 1999.

26 Human Rights Watch interview with OSCE officials, Zagreb, October 22, 1999.

27 Human Rights Watch interviews with western diplomats, October 22 and 28, 1999.

28 Western Envoy Urges Fair Access to Croatia Poll, Reuters, November 3, 1999.

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