According to the final census of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, completed in 1991, the Serb population of Croatia numbered 581, 663 persons, or approximately 12 percent of the total population of 4,784,265.194 No commensurate figures exist for the population today, and given the political implications of population levels, it is impossible to determine accurately the current Serb population inside Croatia. UNHCR estimates from July 1998 indicate that there are 40-50,000 Croatian Serb refugees in Republika Srpska.195 Estimates of the Croatian Serb refugee population in FRY vary between 280,500196 and 330,000.197 Assuming a median figure of 300,000 refugees in FRY,198 and 40,000 in Bosnia, the current Serb population in Croatia can be estimated at around 240,000.199 Even by conservative estimates, half of all Croatian Serbs are refugees.

Until 1998, return to Croatia was difficult or impossible for many Serb refugees. In addition to inadequate security and material conditions for return, and fear among returnees, no mechanism existed to facilitate the return of Croatian Serb refugees. Most international attention was focussed on the situation in the UNTAES region andpressure on the Croatian authorities was limited to efforts to secure rights for displaced and resident Serbs in Eastern Slavonia. The Joint Working Group Agreement covered only two-way return of displaced persons inside Croatia, and efforts related to documentation and restoration of housing rights were limited to those inside the region. Some Croatian Serb refugees in FRY and Bosnia were able to benefit from the expedited issue of Croatian documents in Eastern Slavonia during the UNTAES period by traveling to the region in person or through use of a temporary address inside Croatia. Nevertheless, many refugees lacked Croatian documents (see section on citizenship above), and refugees without documents in Bosnia were unable to enter Croatia at all while new Bosnian citizenship rules rendered them ineligible for Bosnian citizenship and documents. Those able to cross borders feared arrest on unwarranted war crimes charges, attacks, or harassment from police or other residents, as well as the occupation of their property and housing by others, and a range of administrative obstacles related to documents, welfare, and pensions.

There have been some encouraging developments during 1998. A mechanism for refugee return now exists, in the form of the “Procedure for Individual Return” (with “Mandatory Instructions”) and a framework for return, in the form of the “Program for Return” which establishes a means for repossession of private property.200 An additional mechanism for organized return from FRY also exists in the form of the bilateral “Protocol on Procedures of Organized Return” between FRY and Croatia.201 There has also been some progress in actual returns. In addition to the 17,000 to 21,000 displaced Serbs who have returned to their former areas of residence from Eastern Slavonia, more than 6,000 refugees have returned to Croatia from FRY and Bosnia.202 There is also measured optimism among Serb leaders. Speaking about former Sector South, Milorad Pupovac noted “we can see people coming back and we can see life returning to villages.”

Notwithstanding the progress toward the return of Serb refugees, a number of outstanding issues remain. As much of the preceding analysis has attempted to illustrate, commitments by the Croatian government are not always matched by action. The slow- or non-functioning of the mechanisms designed to facilitate return are more than a bureaucratic inconvenience. By limiting the rate of return, a government can ultimately reduce the total population that will attempt return. As noted in the section on housing commissions above, over time refugees assimilate and establish ties to the host community, making return more of a risk, and hence less likely. Speaking soon after the program for return was adopted, a leading Serb politician explained his concerns: “The problem is time. If the program had been accepted last year things would be different. But soon it will be fall, then winter [when return is unlikely].”203

The narrow focus of efforts toward return is also a cause of concern. The international community’s focus on the mechanics of return, which is reflected in the actions of the Croatian government, was undoubtedly prompted by the understanding that without documents and housing there would be no return. Such a focus is unlikely to be successful unless there is a concomitant focus on other factors which drive or inhibit return, such as fear of prosecution on political grounds, access to government reconstruction programs and social security, recognition of legal documents, adequate security, and equal treatment under the law. Being able to cross a border alone does not mean the conditions necessary to return successfully have been met. Facilitating return also means a focus on the treatment of Serbs inside Croatia, both of returnees and those who remained. The ongoing departure of displaced anddomiciled Serbs from Eastern Slavonia should therefore be a cause of particular concern. As the January 1999 progress report from OSCE Mission notes: “The number of Serbs who have left Croatia over the three years since [the] Dayton and Erdut [agreements], is almost as large as the number who have returned.”204

Mechanisms for Return

Leaving aside the question of registration, transportation, and assistance, any refugee who wishes to cross the Croatian border must have Croatian documentation. If a person has a Croatian passport, there are no obstacles to entering Croatia. Such return would be classified as “spontaneous” where the person does not inform ODPR or UNHCR prior to their repatriation. Until the creation of the new mechanisms for return in 1998, if the person did not have a Croatian passport but did possess other documents proving citizenship which can be used to apply for a passport, such as a Croatian identification card or domovnica, they could apply for a passport at a Croatian Embassy or Consulate (provided he or she had access to such a facility) and return once the application was accepted (generally within three months).

Until 1998, however, a person lacking such documents had no possibility of entering Croatia through formal channels unless he or she was the holder of a passport from another country. The development of a new mechanisms for refugee return in the “Procedure for Individual Return” has created the possibility for Croatian Serb refugees to enter Croatia without passports or documents proving citizenship, provided that they can establish that they are eligible for citizenship. The breakthrough of the Procedure for Individual Return (with the Mandatory Instructions) is that, in the words of ODPR chief Lovre Pejkovic: “Each and every person can come to an embassy and apply for documents.”205 The procedure for individual return allows for refugees from Croatia who meet eligibility requirements to be issued with a putni list (travel letter) in lieu of a passport. The putni list is valid for thirty days and permits the bearer to enter Croatia (at which time they can apply and obtain a passport or other Croatian documents). Where a person has one of the documents that prove citizenship (passport, I.D. card, domovnica, or listing in the register of Croatian citizens), he or she can apply at an embassy or consulate and be issued a putni list immediately. Where persons do not have documents proving citizenship, they must submit other documents to support a claim for citizenship (such as an expired identity card, expired passport, military I.D. booklet of the former SFRJ, or certificate of birth).206 The submission of one of these documents forms the basis of an application for return through an embassy or consulate, which is then sent to the Ministry of Interior for verification within “two months, as a rule, but not later than three months.”207 If approved, the person will then be issued with a putni list. The instructions also state that persons charged with “gravest violations of humanitarian law” will “be denied the acquisition of Croatian citizenship [by naturalization].”

Refugees in FRY can also apply for return without documents through the procedure developed by the bilateral protocol between FRY and Croatia and administered by ODPR.208 Under that procedure, Croatian Serb refugees can submit repatriation applications for clearance by ODPR through local offices of the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees. The applications are forwarded to the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees in Belgrade, which passes them to UNHCR in Belgrade for processing. After processing, UNHCR Belgrade returns the completed application forms to the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees for submission to ODPR through diplomatic channels. Actual clearance entails verification of citizenship eligibility and criminal status by the Croatian Ministry of Interior in Zagreb, as well as checks into whether the applicant’s property is vacant, damaged, or occupied. Under the protocol, ODPR has to inform the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees in ninety days as to the outcome of an application. Once anapplication has been cleared, the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees alerts UNHCR which notifies applicants and arranges for transportation. Although the procedure spares refugees the expense and difficulty of arranging multiple trips to the Croatian consulate in Belgrade or the weekly “consular day” in Subotica (when staff from the Croatian Embassy in Belgrade visit the town), the clearance procedure is more rigorous and complicated than simple verification of citizenship under the procedure for individual return.209 As a result returns according to this procedure have been mostly limited only to so-called “easy cases” of family reunification or return to vacant property. UNHCR statistics from late November 1998 indicate that of the 15,721 applications submitted to ODPR for clearance, 4,037 persons had returned with clearance, with another 2,648 were cleared for return, while 3,734 cases had been deferred, 5,225 were pending and seven applications were closed.210

For refugees seeking Croatian documents or a putni list, at least one visit to a Croatian Embassy or consulate is a prerequisite. While diplomatic missions do not issue passports, they are the only offices outside Croatia that can process applications for Croatian documentation. Many refugees process applications through the Croatian Embassy in Belgrade, the new consular day in Subotica, and the Banja Luka consular days of the Croatian Embassy to Bosnia and Hercegovina. The speed at which these offices process applications determines the rate at which return can take place (outside the ODPR clearance procedure for refugees in FRY described above). The arithmetic is simple: if the offices issue one hundred travel letters per month, one hundred persons can return, and if they issue 1,000, a corresponding number can do so. Unfortunately, none of the consulates seems able to cope with demand, and multiple visits by refugee applicants are frequently required.

The Croatian Embassy to Bosnia’s consular days in Banja Luka began in July 1998. The consular days, which were welcomed by refugees and international agencies alike, take place on Tuesday and Thursdays for four hours. They provide many Croatian Serbs in Republika Srpska with the first opportunity since their departure to apply for Croatian documents. Human Rights Watch visited the office on July 14, 1998, its first day of operation and spoke to an official from the Croatian Embassy to Bosnia. When asked why the embassy had such limited hours, the official explained that the embassy “would like to open a full consulate but can’t get the office space.”211 The official added that they “would have liked to open the consulate before today but office space is a problem.” The limited hours of operation restrict the numbers of appointments that the consulate can manage: a Croatian Serb refugee who tried to get an appointment on the opening day was told by Croatian Embassy officials that the consulate could only accept twenty appointments per day.212 Since an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Croatian Serbs reside in Republika Srpska, such a small number of appointments will sharply limit the potential rate of return of refugees from Bosnia. As of November 29, only eight-two persons had returned to Croatia from Republika Srpska.213

The consulate at the Croatian Embassy in Belgrade is better established. It is larger, better staffed, and open five days a week, along with a weekly consular day in Subotica. Nevertheless, demand by Croatian Serb refugees appears to exceed the consulate’s current capacity, creating a bottleneck in the return process. A visit by UNHCR during the summer revealed a number of the consular section’s limitations. There are significant delays in the issuance of a putni list to persons with citizenship documents. According to UNHCR, the “applicant must wait a few months before traveling, despite having necessary papers.”214 In order to obtain a putni list, a person must go to the consulate with an original citizenship certificate (domovnica) or a photocopy verified in Croatia, and a refugee I.D. card, and duplicate copies of the documents. They are then issued an application form and an appointment date. Only tenappointments are scheduled per day. The putni list is issued the following day after the receipt of the application form. It must be collected in person, necessitating three trips.

For those without a domovnica or other documents establishing citizenship, the process is also cumbersome.215 They must fill out three forms — a return request plus two questionnaires concerning citizenship and other documents required — and provide supporting Croatian documents (such as a military I.D., birth certificate, or expired I.D. card), plus their refugee I.D. card. Those without documents must bring two witnesses who hold new Croatian documents to vouch for them. At the time that the forms are issued to them, a date is scheduled for submitting the forms. After submitting the forms, applicants are told that they will be informed by cable within two to three months, once the Ministry of Interior has determined their eligibility and then have to return to the embassy. The consulate also continues with regular consular business, issuing visas to persons wishing to visit Croatia and assisting Croatian citizens working or traveling in FRY. The embassy’s limitations translate into limited returns: as of late November 1998, only 6,207 Croatian Serbs had returned to Croatia from FRY, including 2,252 persons who returned with a putni list (each of whom therefore already possessed Croatian citizenship documents).216

Croatian government officials offer various explanations for the backlog of cases involving Croatian Serb refugees at consulates in neighboring countries. The delays in starting consular days in Banja Luka are attributed by Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Josip Paro (who is responsible for consular matters) to a lack of cooperation from local authorities: “It is obvious that twice a week is not enough to meet the potential number of applicants but we [were] hardly [able to obtain] permission for two days.”217 The head of ODPR Lovre Pejkovic told Human Rights Watch that efforts to open a permanent consulate in Republika Srpska have been complicated because the consulate’s “area of responsibility can’t be [limited] to Republika Srpska, since it’s not a state.”218 Both officials pointed to limited resources in consulates. Mr. Pejkovic noted that “our consular offices do not have the capacity to accept large numbers of people,” while Minister Paro admitted that in the case of the embassy in Belgrade “some of the problems are related to the number of applicants and the number of officials.”219 “I don’t think equipment is a problem,” he added.

To some extent, resource limitations are understandable. Few countries have consulates equipped to process thousands of applications simultaneously. Croatian government efforts to open additional consulates in Subotica and Kotor have been complicated by the dispute between FRY and Croatia over the Prevlaka peninsula, although the Croatian Embassy in FRY began a weekly consular day in Subotica at the start of 1999. The limited capacity of consulates raises questions about the wisdom of insisting that returnee applicants visit consulates in person. Nor can all problems be attributed to administrative shortcomings. The procedures at the embassy in Belgrade seem needlessly complex. Minister Paro argues that “it’s not less complicated for Croats wanting to check citizenship,” adding that “if a Croat applies in Bonn, [the applicant] cannot expect documents in less than two months.”

The problem with the logic of patience has already been alluded to: return is a time sensitive process. If people do not return within a certain time frame, they are unlikely to return at all. A joint U.N.-OSCE non-paper on the return program from October 1998 was unequivocal: “...serious problems remain with the implementation of the Procedures of Return, as well as the issuance of Croatian travel documents...”220 According to ODPR Secretary-General Sonja Lovrecic, “We are not blocking return. We only want to be organized and for conditions to exist.”221 Unfortunately, return that does not happen today is not equally likely to happen tomorrow. Unless further efforts are made to streamline the process of return for those without documents (and the issuance of a putni list for those who do), the effect of the document application process will be to block return, even if that was not the intention.

Ongoing Obstacles to Return

Lack of documentation is not the only obstacle to the process of return. Even those with a passport or domovnica need encouragement, assistance with transportation for “go and see visits,” assurances regarding returnee status, and information about housing prior to return. Serbs who decide to return to Croatia from FRY and Bosnia lose their refugee status in the host country (assuming that they enjoyed it), and as a representative from the refugee association in Banja Luka noted “you don’t know what you are returning to.”222 While security is no longer a primary impediment to return (save in the “Arc of Terror” around Gospic described in the security section above), the occupation of Serb housing remains a major obstacle, with mechanisms developed under the program for return yet to have a significant impact on repossession, as does lack of access to reconstruction assistance. As noted above, refugees also have legitimate fears related to the application of the Amnesty Law and domestic war crimes prosecutions (which are unfortunately exploited by some members of refugee communities who wish to prevent return for their own political ends). Adequate mechanisms to help Bosnian Croats freely decide if they wish to return to Bosnia, and to facilitate the return of those who do, are also required.223

Croatian officials argue that the main impediment to the return of refugees is the state of the economy in target areas of return. According to Lovre Pejkovic, the “biggest obstacle is finding social and economic security for the people.” Minister Paro considers “the biggest problem [to be] that of unemployment, which affects Croat and Serb returnees.” There is no doubt that the economic situation in the former U.N. sectors is dire. The combination of war, the collapse of Yugoslavia as an internal market for goods, the flight of elites to other countries (the so-called “brain drain”) and the transition to a market economy have reduced industrial production to a trickle. The Borovo shoe factory in Borovo, Eastern Slavonia, which provided employment for an estimated 18,000 workers in the town before the war, now has only a few hundred employees.224 The Tvik screw factory in Knin, which employed 6,000 persons prior to the war, is now home to the UNHCR office in the region, and the factory itself retains only 200 staff.225 The low rate of return by Croats to Eastern Slavonia and the demographics of return by Serbs (most of whom are elderly and therefore have some access to pensions) can also be attributed in part to economic conditions.

Economic factors should not be overstated, however. Most Croatian Serb refugees live in Republika Srpska or FRY, both of which are in economic circumstances comparable to those in war-affected areas of Croatia, and whose economies are in far worse shape than the Croatian economy as a whole. Further, much of the pre-war economy in the former U.N. sectors was based on agricultural production, which can be restarted in a modest way without major investment — provided that the land is not mined. Finally, Human Rights Watch interviews with life-long Serb residents in Eastern Slavonia planning to leave for FRY (detailed below) suggest that even if economic circumstances were better, return is unlikely in the present environment.

Human Rights Watch interviewed a number of Croatian Serb refugees and a representative from the Croatian Serb refugee association in Banja Luka in order to better understand their perceptions of obstacles to return.226 Some are still traumatized by the circumstances of their departure and fearful of returning. Human Rights Watch spoke in Banja Luka with Mirjana B., a young journalist originally from Zagreb, about her experiences. As they fled Croatia on August 6, 1995, Mirjana and her family were caught in fighting around the Croatian town of Dvor, close to the Bosnian border. After describing the battle she had witnessed, Mirjana explained what she had subsequently experienced:

When we crossed the bridge [into Bosnia] I didn’t have the feeling I would ever be free from the darkness [that I witnessed]. When we came I couldn’t talk to anyone about it - it took me six months to come back....I still can’t believe that things like this happen....After all that I don’t feel safe to go back. Although I have friends here - Croats and Muslims - I don’t know. When other refugees go to visit, many come back with negative stories....My parents are thinking about it, but I told them I don’t want to return. If others went back and it was ok I would consider it.227

When asked what would have to change for her to consider return, Mirjana replied “In my opinion, I will have to change — it will take time for me to forgive things.” She added that “old people want to go back because they want to die and be buried where they lived. Young people think in a different way. I meet lots of people through my work. Most are from Croatia — you can see only bitterness and empty looks.”228

Some refugees in Banja Luka clearly do not wish to go back, in part because so much has changed. Human Rights Watch spoke to a woman of mixed family originally from Rijeka. A psychologist by training, the woman had a strong attachment to Croatia, noting that until 1991 “Serbs from Croatia felt like Croatia was our country....[but then] Serbs became a minority in the constitution.”229 She and her husband and children moved first to Hrvatska Kostajnica and then to Bosanska Kostajnica, until Serbs occupied Hrvatska Kostajnica in September 1991, at which point they returned to Hrvatska Kostajnica until Operation Storm in August 1995 when she and her family fled to Banja Luka. She told Human Rights Watch “it took me three years to forget Rijeka.” Since moving to Banja Luka she has been able to find work as an instructor. She concluded by saying: “I don’t want to go back. Here I have a good job.”230

Mr. S.P. and Mrs. M.P. from Kostajnica want to leave the region altogether. Mrs. M.P. left Hrvatska Kostajnica for Dobrinja on June 26, 1991, and her husband joined her seven days later. Both returned to Hrvatska Kostajnica when it was occupied by Serb forces in September 1991, and remained there until Operation Storm in August 1995. They fled initially to Serbia, before learning of an empty house in Banja Luka, which they occupied later that year. They continue to occupy the same property. S.P. told Human Rights Watch that “the owner of this house died. We still have threats. A small shed in the yard was burned....We don’t want to go in someone else’s property but we don’t have any other way.”231 The couple, who have neither Croatian nor Bosnian citizenship documents, showed Human Rights Watch applications for Canadian citizenship, which they cannot complete without passport numbers. They“want to emigrate to Canada but can’t get passports.”232 S.P. explained why: “My parent’s house is all gone. There is no chance for me to get employment. My school friend from Croatia has no contact with me because it would cause problems for him with other Croats.”233

Some refugees have tried to return without success. Human Rights Watch met an elderly woman in Banja Luka whose efforts to return to her home have been frustrated by its current occupants. Originally from Blinjski Kut (near Sisak), the woman explained that “my grandparents were born in Croatia - it’s my country.”234 She was able to get a passport from Vukovar during the UNTAES period by paying someone to allow her to be listed as resident of their property (and hence of the region). She told Human Rights Watch “we are forced to return because here we are so poor” and explained her efforts to go home:

I have tried to return to my former home. [I have] tried to go twice. [First visit March 9, 1998; second visit May 18, 1998.] I have a very old mother-in-law. She returned to [our] house but they [the current occupants] pushed her out. When I came to do something about my mother-in-law, I heard only threats. I have tried for more than one year to get the house back. Bosnian Croats are living in the house. The Bosnian Croat family doesn’t need to occupy the house because they have a house in Zagreb. They threatened to kill me with a scythe. I didn’t report it to the police — they can’t do anything — but I have made a petition to the court. I have documents for the house [proving ownership] but the lady living in the house is a cousin of the police chief....[My] mother-in-law went to court to ask about the case...[and was told] the problem can’t be solved unless alternative housing can be found.235

In her case, there is some possibility that an effective housing commission could resolve the situation, but early experiences with new commissions are discouraging. There was little optimism from a representative of the Croatian Serb refugee association in Banja Luka. She explained that refugees from Croatia “are in very difficult economic circumstances, but also have other needs. [They] don’t have voting rights either in Republika Srpska or Croatia; don’t have Croatian documents or I.D.s...[and] can’t realize other rights related to property and pensions.”236 She also noted the amnesty and convalidation laws were “not being applied,” as well as “problems getting citizenship.” Fear and uncertainty among refugees may be harder to address than lack of documents or repossession of property, but they are perpetuated by the negative experiences of Croatian Serb returnees and the departure of Serbs from Eastern Slavonia.

Refugee Return in Former Sector South

To date, most of those Serbs who have returned to their former areas of residence have been internally displaced, not refugees. While 17,000 to 21,000 displaced Serbs have returned to their former areas of residence, UNHCR estimates from late November 1998 are that only 6,289 Serb refugees have returned. The range of difficulties enumerated above, including security, housing, reconstruction, citizenship, documentation, and pension issues, affect both refugee and displaced returnees alike. However, given the additional logistical difficulties for refugees and the time spent outside Croatia, it is perhaps not surprising that most refugees willing to return so far are so-called “easy cases” — people with Croatian documents and a residence of some kind to move into.

Human Rights Watch spoke to a number of refugee families in the category of “easy cases” who had returned to their home villages in former Sector South.237 All regarded return as preferable to remaining displaced, although several were not yet living in their own homes. A returnee interviewed in the village of Raškovici, just outside Knin, fell into this category. The former construction company director lives with his wife in a house belonging to his mother-in-law. The couple returned spontaneously from Serbia to the Knin area in November 1996 on the “first bus from Belgrade to Zagreb,” having left in August 1995. He explained that when he first returned “I was afraid, I thought that I would not have the freedom here, but I thought I would have more work. My experiences after twenty months are something else. I understand that there are no jobs for Croats...[but] the fact is that there is no Serb who works — not even a simple job — whose wife or mother is not Croat.”238 Since his house is occupied, the man naturally identified occupation of housing as a problem, along with pension problems and tensions with Bosnian Croats living in the village (whereas he suggested that among “people who are born here.... there are no incidents”). When asked if they regretted returning, the man replied “I don’t have a choice — I worked for twenty-five years [and] this is my homeland.”239

The Raškovic family, a working-age married couple with four children who live in the same village, are also unable to return to their home. The family returned spontaneously from Subotica, Serbia, in September 1997. According to the father, Ilija, “we knew more or less how the situation was — but I thought it was a little bit better [than it in fact is]....I wanted to go home mostly.”240 The family, who live in an old house without plumbing that also belongs to their family, receive welfare benefits of between 250 and 300 kuna per person per month (approximately U.S. $37-45). They cannot access their agricultural land, because it is being used by a refugee whom they are afraid of , and are concerned about employment prospects: “If only one of us was working,” lamented Vesna, the mother.241 She added that without electricity, running water, and a telephone it was as if “we went back fifty years in time.” Their house, which is occupied by a Croat refugee from Vojvodina, is 200 meters away. Ilija noted that there have been problems between neighbors in the village but added, “I personally didn’t have any incidents because I [have] tried to keep to myself.” He concluded that “it’s hard, but again we are happy we came back.”

Others have returned to their own homes, but found the furniture gone.242 In the village of Golubic (near Knin), Human Rights Watch met an elderly married couple who returned spontaneously from Serbia in April 1997 and waited an additional seven months before being able to move into their property, which was occupied by a refugee from Bosnia. The husband, who was director of a agricultural company, explained that when they finally entered the house “there was nothing inside” except “stuff belonging to my neighbors.”243 He claims that during the seven months they were waiting to return to their house, the temporary occupant “was selling stuff from my house,” and that he paid the then-occupant “800 Deutsche marks” (approximately U.S. $445) for the remaining furniture. Human Rights Watch spoke with an elderly woman in the village of Raducic (near Knin). The village has only Serb residents, most of whom are retired. The woman, who lives with her adult son, “came back on her own” in May 1996 from Serbia.244She was able to return to her own home, but found it empty. “They took everything,” she remarked. Despite her empty house, and the fact that her son’s house in Knin town is occupied, she told Human Rights Watch that she and her son “haven’t had any problems since we came back. Nobody bothers us.” She lives on her pension of 420 kuna per month (approximately U.S. $63).

Domiciled Serbs Leaving Eastern Slavonia

The final transfer of authority from the United Nations to the government of Croatia in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium took place on January 15, 1998 .245 The departure of Croatian Serbs from the region nevertheless continues. The two-year United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAES) had been tasked with the peaceful reintegration of the region, including the return of displaced Croats to Eastern Slavonia and displaced Serbs to other parts of Croatia. At the start of the UNTAES mandate, the region was home to some 127,000 Serbs,246 including around 55,000 displaced.247 Estimates from mid-1998 indicated that around 61,000 Serbs248 remain in the region, of whom around 6,000 were displaced from other parts of Croatia.249 Although 17,000 to 21,000 displaced Serbs have now returned to their former areas of residence from the region since 1996 (see housing section, above), at least 29,000 left for Serbia or Bosnia as refugees. The pattern among the domiciled Serb population in the region is less extreme but perhaps even more troubling. Compared to a pre-UNTAES population of 72,000, it is estimated that around 55,000 domiciled Serbs remain in Eastern Slavonia.250 Those who leave depart almost exclusively for Serbia or third countries. Long-term residents cross the border on a daily basis, as the president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly discovered on a January 1999 visit to the region.251 The silent exodus of the region’s Serbs calls into question the success of the UNTAES mission beyond peaceful reintegration of the territory. More importantly, it is a microcosm of the situation of Serbs in Croatia. Confidence among refugees to return is undermined by new departures, especially of long-term residents.

In order to understand the motivations for these departures, Human Rights Watch spoke to long-term Serb residents in the village of Tenja who were planning to leave Croatia permanently. Tenja was given temporary municipal status for a one-year period during the UNTAES period in order to ensure political representation for its Serb inhabitants.252 This status was revoked by Croatian authorities (allegedly for budgetary reasons) and the village was subsumed into Osijek municipality on July 24, 1998, the day before Human Rights Watch visited. The five Serb residents interviewed all intended to leave as soon as their houses were sold. None were willing to give their names. A middle-aged woman, who had lived in Tenja for more than thirty years said that she “had no problems with neighbors or police” but explained that she “decided to leave four months ago” citing “financial reasons.”253 Her neighbor, a man with two grown-up sons was more concerned about security: “We don’t feel so safe. That’s the reason we want to leave.” Both planned to go to Serbia, but are under no illusions. “We know that it’s hard inSerbia,” the man explained “you’re here without a job or there without a job but you feel safer there.”254 Human Rights Watch asked another resident of Tenja for more than thirty years why he was leaving. “The reason is that they don’t need us here, the Serbs...I’d like to stay here [but] now I don’t have hope...,” the former railway worker replied, adding that his “family had been threatened by neighbors.”255 Although residents cite economic concerns as a factor driving departure from the village, those interviewed stated that they would not remain even if they were able to find employment.

There is another factor driving departures and inhibiting returns that is difficult to pin down. In his penultimate report to the Security Council on the work of the UNPSG, the secretary-general noted that the “wide gap between the actual security provided by the police and the perception of security held by many Serb residents has been an important factor leading to the continuing departure of Serbs from the region.”0 The gap results from a lack of confidence that “the law will be the same for everybody no matter the nationality,” as a member of the Serb displaced persons association in Eastern Slavonia expressed it.1 Aside from prosecutions and serious security issues, which are rare, most of the everyday difficulties — related to housing, documents, citizenship, and pensions — faced by Serbs are relatively minor when considered individually. Taken together, they cause people to give up hope for the future in Croatia. This underscores the need for an effective program of trust and reconciliation, as well as equal treatment for all Croatian citizens.

205 Human Rights Watch interview with Lovre Pejkovic, head of ODPR, Zagreb, August 7, 1998.

206 “Mandatory Instructions for Acquiring Documents Required by the Individual Return Procedure for Persons Who Left the Republic of Croatia” (May 14, 1998).

207 Mandatory Instructions.

208 “Protocol on Procedure of Organized Return” (April 1998).

209 The Croatian Embassy to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began a weekly consular day in Subotica in early 1999.

210 UNHCR Croatia, Statistical Summary, Zagreb (November 29, 1998). The statistics include 552 applications for clearance from refugees in Bosnia and Hercegovina, of whom eighty-two had returned by November 29.

211 Human Rights Watch interview with Croatian Embassy official, Banja Luka, July 14, 1998.

212 Human Rights Watch interview with Croatian Serb refugee, Banja Luka, July 14, 1998.

213 UNHCR Croatia, Statistical Summary, Zagreb (November 29, 1998).

214 Note for the File “Visit to the Consular Department of the Embassy of Croatia,” UNHCR Belgrade, July 3, 1998.

215 Information drawn from: Note for the File “Visit to the Consular Department of the Embassy of Croatia,” UNHCR Belgrade, July 3, 1998.

216 UNHCR Croatia, Statistical Summary, Zagreb (November 29, 1998).

217 Human Rights Watch with Josip Paro, assistant minister of foreign affairs, Zagreb, August 6, 1998.

218 Human Rights Watch interview with Lovre Pejkovic, head of ODPR, Zagreb, August 7, 1998.

219 Human Rights Watch with Josip Paro, assistant minister of foreign affairs, Zagreb, August 6, 1998.

220 Joint OSCE, U.N. Non-Paper - Preliminary Review in Preparation for an Assessment of the Return Process (October 7, 1998).

221 Human Rights Watch interview with Sonja Lovrecic, secretary-general, ODPR, Zagreb, August 7, 1998.

222 Human Rights Watch interview with representative from the Association of Expelled Serbs from Croatia and Krajina, Banja Luka, July 13, 1998.

223 The linkage is recognized by Lovre Pejkovic, who told Human Rights Watch, “We are going to show that Croatian Serbs are not an obstacle to return to Republika Srpska.” Human Rights Watch interview with Lovre Pejkovic, Head of ODPR, Zagreb, August 7, 1998.

224 Estimate from Human Rights Watch interview with Fedor Klimtchouk, UNPSG, Vukovar, July 20, 1998.

225 Estimates from UNHCR Knin.

226 UNHCR estimates that 28,000 Croatian Serb refugees in Republika Srpska “have already shown interest in return to Croatia. ” “A Regional Strategy for Sustainable Return of Those Displaced by Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,” UNHCR, June 17, 1998.

227 Human Rights Watch interview with Mirjana B., Banja Luka, July 13, 1998.

228 Human Rights Watch interview with Mirjana B., Banja Luka, July 13, 1998.

229 Human Rights Watch interview with refugee from Rijeka, Banja Luka, July 14, 1998. The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous.

230 Human Rights Watch interview with refugee from Rijeka, Banja Luka, July 14, 1998. The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous.

231 Human Rights Watch interview with S.P. and M.P., Banja Luka, July 13, 1998.

232 Ibid.

233 Ibid.

234 Human Rights Watch interview, Banja Luka, July 14, 1998. The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous.

235 Human Rights Watch interview, Banja Luka, July 14, 1998. The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous.

236 Human Rights Watch interview with representative of the Association of Expelled Serbs from Croatia and Krajina, Banja Luka, July 13, 1998.

237 Urban return has been limited: Most town residents had tenancy rights rather than private property, and towns were favored for resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.

238 Human Rights Watch interview with married couple, Raškovici, August 1, 1998. The interviewees wish to remain anonymous.

239 Ibid.

240 Human Rights Watch interview with Ilija and Vesna Raškovic, Raškovici, August 1, 1998.

241 Ibid.

242 As noted above, temporary decisions under the LTTO also covered the use of movable property, but inventories were rarely kept as required by the law, making it virtually impossible for returnee owners to reclaim furniture from departing temporary occupants. Movables in Serb-owned property were also looted during the wave of arsons and explosions that followed Operation Storm (see housing section, above). There was also looting of Croat movables in Eastern Slavonia by Serbs who left Croatia for FRY, especially prior to the termination of the UNTAES mandate.

243 Human Rights Watch interview, Golubic, August 1, 1998. The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous.

244 Human Rights Watch interview, Raducic, August 1, 1998. The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous.

245 For more information on the UNTAES period, see Human Rights Watch “Croatia: Human Rights in Eastern Slavonia During and After the Transition of Authority,” April 1997.

246 Human Rights Watch interview with monitor from European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM) Coordination Center Vukovar, Vukovar, July 21, 1998.

247 Human Rights Watch interview with Fedor Klimtchouk, U.N. Police Support Group (UNPSG), Vukovar, July 20, 1998.

248 Human Rights Watch interview with Fedor Klimtchouk, UNPSG, Vukovar, July 20, 1998.

249 Estimate by Croatian Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR), quoted in “Report of OSCE Mission to the Republic of Croatia on Croatia’s Progress in Meeting International Commitments,” September 8, 1998. More recent estimates from ODPR cited by the Council of Europe indicate that fewer than 4,000 displaced Serbs remain.

250 Human Rights Watch interview with Fedor Klimtchouk, UNPSG, Vukovar, July 20, 1998.

251 “Diplomat Questions Reconciliation in Croatia,” Reuters, January 13, 1999. The January 1999 progress report from the OSCE Mission to Croatia quotes Croatian Border Police statistics that “over 600 families departed with their household effects between July and October 1998.”

252 Tenja was sometimes referred to as a “Klein municipality,” after Gen. Jacques Klein, the head of UNTAES.

253 Human Rights Watch interview with two neighbors, Tenja, July 25, 1998.

254 Ibid.

255 Human Rights Watch interview, Tenja, July 25, 1998.

0 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Police Support Group,” (S/1998/887), September 23, 1998.

1 Human Rights Watch interview with representative of the Association of Displaced and Refugee Serbs, Vukovar, July 21, 1998.