December 1997               Vol. 9, No. 4 (B)

PERU
TORTURE AND POLITICAL PERSECUTION IN PERU



 
 
 
 
 

I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS


In the past few years, the human rights panorama in Peru has brightened considerably because of the decline in the massive "disappearances" and extrajudicial executions that has accompanied reduced political violence. Despite this positive trend, however, serious human rights violations continue, chief among them the use of torture. With the success of the Alberto Fujimori administration in substantially crippling the armed opposition groups' military capacity, counterinsurgency efforts are now conducted principally through a system of special anti-terrorism courts and military tribunals, backed by a ubiquitous intelligence apparatus. Institutionalized torture plays a key role in this system. Torture is also routine in the interrogation of suspects in cases of common crime. The army has even used torture against its own members who came under suspicion of endangering national security.

Although President Fujimori says that he does not condone torture, his administration has made no effort to curtail it. To the contrary, it has facilitated torture by weakening constitutional guarantees in wide areas of the country and by undermining the autonomy and effectiveness of government bodies established to protect constitutional rights. It has also failed to enact legislation that would designate torture as a distinct offense within the penal code carrying a commensurate level of punishment. It has attacked and intimidated the press for carrying stories critical of its human rights record.

The security forces continue to confront two armed opposition groups, the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL), known as the Shining Path, and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, MRTA), both of which consistently breach basic principles of international humanitarian law. The Shining Path commits selective assassinations of its civilian opponents and carries out indiscriminate attacks, killing and maiming civilians. The MRTA, on a lesser scale, has also resorted to executions and indiscriminate attacks, and has kidnaped civilians and taken them hostage for lucrative ransoms or to force the government into releasing imprisoned cadres. Both organizations have resorted to torture, usually as a prelude to execution.

The legal regime imposed to combat political violence facilitates torture. Detainees suspected of what Peruvian law defines as terrorist offenses may be held for up to fifteen days by the police before they are charged or released. Such detainees are usually handled by Peru's anti-terrorist police, the National Directorate Against Terrorism (Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo, DINCOTE). DINCOTE may hold suspects incommunicado for up to ten days without a court order. Torture typically occurs on police premises while suspects are being held incommunicado and interrogated. It is used to extract signed declarations incriminating the victim and to obtain information. Reforms introduced in 1996 to safeguard detainees' rights while under interrogation, such as allowing them access to defense lawyers and requiring the presence of a public prosecutor when statements are taken, have not eliminated torture. Many detainees are tortured by military personnel before being handed over to the police. Public prosecutors also fail to supervise or monitor detention to protect the physical security of detainees. These abuses take place most frequently in "emergency zones," areas in which the police and army enjoy special powers under the emergency regulations to combat Shining Path or the MRTA. For instance, they can detain suspects and conduct searches without a warrant.
 

According to a study of cases by the Institute for Legal Defense (Instituto de Defensa Legal, IDL), one of the most important Peruvian non-governmental human rights groups, more than three out of four people accused of "terrorism" reported that they were tortured after arrest. When instances of torture come to light periodically, the government calls them isolated cases and assures the public that they will be investigated and punished. The record shows, however, that such pronouncements are usually hollow: torture cases are rarely punished. Although the compilation of comprehensive statistics is difficult, Peruvian human rights groups estimate that at least 95 percent of the torture cases they document go unpunished. Those responsible are only held accountable in special circumstances, such as when a case causes a public outcry, receives close press attention, or comes under the spotlight of international publicity.
 

The role of torture in the government's counterinsurgency strategies was demonstrated during the occupation of the residence of the Japanese ambassador by the MRTA, which began on December 17, 1996. In March 1997, before army commandos broke into the building and released seventy-one hostages held by the guerrillas, the Peruvian army detained more than forty coffee growers in Alto Yurinaki, where they believed the MRTA guerrilla column responsible for the attack had originated. Over the next few days, the army reportedly tortured almost all of the detainees in an attempt to force them to incriminate themselves and their neighbors as members of the MRTA. The army variously beat them, submerged them in tanks of water, made them stand without food in the sun for hours, and shocked them with electricity. DINCOTE later ordered the release of all but one of the detainees for lack of evidence. Human Rights Watch/Americas, together with representatives of Peruvian human rights organizations, conducted investigations in the area of the arrests, interviewing released detainees or members of their families. The testimonies of former detainees, their relatives, village leaders, and provincial government authorities confirmed the systematic use of torture during this operation, and the failure of the legal regime in force to protect the physical integrity of the victims or to punish those responsible.
 

In early April the country was stunned by reports based on a television investigation that army intelligence officials had brutally tortured one of their own agents in the basement of army headquarters in Lima. Film shot secretly in the military hospital showed the fingers and ankles of the agent, Leonor La Rosa, inflamed and scarred from burns reportedly inflicted with a blowtorch. La Rosa had been under investigation after secret intelligence plans to intimidate journalists and members of the opposition were leaked to the press. The body of another agent, a colleague of La Rosa's, was discovered on a roadside north of Lima with its head and hands missing, after they had been severed apparently to avoid her identification.
 

If Peru is to bring its counterinsurgency policy and crime fighting tactics into line with international human rights standards, it must introduce effective measures to combat torture and impunity. Although Peru is a signatory to international treaties against torture, neither its laws nor its practice meet the standards required by international law. For example, torture is still not classified as a specific crime in Peru. Cases of torture must currently be prosecuted as "battery," and the low penalties provided upon conviction are inappropriate given the gravity of the crime. More importantly, the government fails to ensure that complaints of torture are investigated adequately and those guilty held accountable.
 

The persistence of torture in Peru is attributable, in part, to the weakness and lack of independence of entities responsible for ensuring respect for the law and human rights. Despite repeated promises, President Fujimori has failed to restore fully the independence of the judiciary, shattered following the coup d'etat in 1992. Civilian judges still occupy provisional posts in many parts of the country, subject to removal by a committee dominated by a government appointee. Fearful for their jobs, many judges are unwilling to challenge police misconduct and accept as evidence confessions extracted under torture, a practice that is explicitly banned under international law. Such confessions are also readily accepted by the special "faceless" courts and military tribunals that try persons accused of subversion and treason: the laws that govern these courts impose additional obstacles to judicial detection of torture by preventing members of the police who conducted interrogations from appearing for cross-examination.
 

Torture is committed with impunity. Few members of the military or police are prosecuted for abusing detainees unless the victim dies from the torture. Moreover, they are rarely prosecuted by impartial and autonomous courts. Instead, military courts assert jurisdiction in torture cases in which the accused are members of the armed forces. Convictions in military courts are rare, and when agents are convicted they are given sentences disproportionately light given the seriousness of the crime. Military courts also obstruct and refuse to cooperate with investigations and prosecutions of torture cases by civilian authorities.
 

Grave shortcomings in the effectiveness and independence of official monitoring bodies limit their ability to combat torture. In recent months, the ruling party, Change 90-New Majority (Cambio 90- Nueva Mayoría, C90-NM), which has a substantial majority in congress, has striven to maintain control over institutions like the Public Ministry, which works within the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation to prosecute crimes, and the Constitutional Court, which monitors observance of the constitution. The office of the Attorney General, which is responsible for overseeing the independence of the courts and ensuring the correct administration of justice, has had key powers removed and transferred to a single official, a government appointee, who is known to be a close ally of the president. In April 1997, the attorney general came under personal attack by the armed forces for seeking to enforce habeas corpus rulings affecting military justice officials. In June 1997, three judges of the seven-member Constitutional Court were dismissed after an impeachment spearheaded by C90-NM, which assailed the judges for ruling that Fujimori's planned run for a second re-election was unconstitutional. The court was left barely functioning, and could not continue to act effectively as a forum for the protection of constitutional rights.
 

The news media, which in early 1997 played a vital role in spotlighting human rights abuses, including torture, suffered a welter of government reprisals in the months that followed. Journalists who had covered torture cases were victims of physical threats and intimidation and selective prosecution for alleged tax debts. Channel 2 television, known as Frecuencia Latina, which broadcast the sensational report on the torture of La Rosa, came under persistent attack for its critical reporting. The government attempted to intimidate the channel by subjecting it to an investigation for alleged evasion of tax or customs duty, a tactic also used against a radio station, a private clinic which had agreed to admit La Rosa, and one of the impeached Constitutional Court judges. Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, Frecuencia Latina's majority shareholder, a naturalized Israeli, was publicly denounced by the armed forces and later deprived of his Peruvian nationality on specious legal grounds in a crude attempt to silence the station. Finally, a court ordered that Ivcher relinquish control of Frecuencia Latina to its minority owners, provoking a walk-out by respected journalists.
 

President Fujimori used his inaugural address at the annual General Assembly of the Organization of American States to launch barbed criticism of the press and attacked a daily opposition newspaper in television spots paid for by the Ministry of the Interior. These actions by government officials helped to create at atmosphere in which physical attacks against journalists appeared justified.
 

The Defender of the People (Defensor del Pueblo), an ombudsman appointed by congress to protect and promote human rights, has managed to preserve his independence and has acted energetically in individual cases involving torture. Jorge Santistevan de Noriega, who heads the office of the Defender of the People, told Human Rights Watch/Americas of the commitment of his office to work toward major reforms that will benefit the treatment of detainees. Human Rights Watch/Americas welcomes this commitment and hopes that it will be backed by the full cooperation of the Peruvian government.
 

So far, while declaring its opposition to torture, the government has failed to take measures to stop it, although the extent of the practice has been amply documented by the international bodies that monitor compliance with the human rights treaties that Peru has signed. The Alto Yurinaki cases, documented in this report's fifth chapter and widely covered in the press, led to an assurance by Fujimori that allegations of torture would be investigated. Despite their gravity and credibility, no investigation was carried out. Although four officers allegedly responsible for the torture of Leonor La Rosa were tried and convicted by a military court, the victim was held incommunicado, harassed, and threatened. Politically motivated assaults on the independence and effectiveness of institutions such as the civilian judiciary and the attorney general's office have weakened their ability to serve as a bulwark against abuses by the police and the armed forces. In short, the government has treated human rights as an inconvenient encumbrance in the way of government policy; instead it must treat them as a central political objective.
 

Recommendations to the Peruvian Government: