MILITARY DYNAMICS

General Abacha's efforts to silence perceived opponents have also extended to the ranks of the military. Following the example set by General Babangida, but on a much greater scale, Abacha has repeatedly resorted to detention, dismissals and transfers on questionable grounds; or to forced retirements and filing trumped up charges against those members of the armed forces whom he perceives as a threat. The series of bomb blasts at military sites, which allegedly prompted the filing of treason charges against sixteen pro-democracy activists in March 1997, may also be driving Abacha's fears of dissension among the armed forces.

Some 200 senior officers were reportedly sacked for various reasons between 1995 and 1996. Abacha sacked Maj. Gen. Chris Ali, the chief of army staff, and Rear Admiral Alison Madueke, the chief of naval staff, in early 1995, after they urged him to release political prisoners from detention.119 As discussed above, several retired and serving armed forces officers were convicted in 1995 of involvement in an alleged coup plot that was generally viewed as an excuse to solidify the Abacha regime's hold on power. In mid-1996, 120 officers were summarily retired from the Nigerian army. In an apparent attempt to explain this development, Maj. Gen. Abdul-Salaam Abubakar proffered that the army "is not a place for permanent employment."120 In August 1996, the military administrators in all thirty-six states were redeployed or summarily retired.

This pattern of dismissals has continued through the present. In mid-August 1997, sixty-four air force officers were sacked. Forty-seven of them were involuntarily discharged, twelve were voluntarily discharged, and five were dismissed for alleged offenses. There is speculation that both the navy and the army are currently in the process of preparing lists of officers to be sacked.121

Human Rights Watch received credible reports that senior military police officers regularly delegate investigations of alleged offenses to low-ranking, non-commissioned officers, with minimal or no oversight. Reports of these investigations, which tend to be carelessly conducted, often become the basis for court-martial proceedings. Despite inconclusive evidence, the officers presiding over court-martial proceedings feel pressured to convict and sentence accused officers as a matter of course, for fear of receiving a "letter of displeasure" which could prompt their own retirement or dismissal.122

The arbitrariness of convictions in court-martial proceedings is exemplified by a classified report issued in March 1997 by Maj. Gen. A.S. Mukhtar, the Provost Marshall (in charge of discipline), from Nigerian army headquarters in Kaduna.123 In three of the eleven cases considered, Major-General Mukhtar did not confirm the findings and sentences imposed by courts martial. In the case of Major U.G.K. Duwo, sentenced to two years'imprisonment for stealing service property and for conduct prejudicial to service discipline, the report states that "the case was not thoroughly investigated while the prosecution failed to call material witnesses." In the case of Maj. Jo Iyela, sentenced to two years' imprisonment for illegal possession of ammunition, the finding and sentence were not confirmed "on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to sit and hear the sum up by the Judge Advocate, having been reduced below the legal minimum." In the case of Yakubu Gwagwada, sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment for improper carriage of persons and goods, the finding and sentence were "quashed for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt."124

In some cases, soldiers and officers are detained without trial under oppressive conditions despite investigation reports confirming their innocence. Lt. Corporal Afolayan Michael, for example, was dismissed from the Nigerian army on October 9, 1995 for alleged concealment of information regarding the theft of rifles, an offense punishable under the Robbery and Firearms Decree. This charge appeared to have stemmed from Lieutenant Corporal Michael's knowledge of a plan to illegally purchase a weapon from a military store, which he had reported to the detachment sergeant major. The detachment sergeant major took no action and, until he was arrested, denied that Lieutenant Corporal Michael had ever brought the information to his attention. Once he confessed, the superior officer was released and never charged.

On July 3, 1995, Lieutenant Corporal Michael was summoned before a Board of Inquiry, which exonerated him; he resumed duty the following day. On October 9, 1995, however, he was again charged with the same offence before Lieutenant Colonel Olorugun, commanding officer, Military Recruitment Centre Nigerian Army Depot Zaria, who dismissed him without conducting a hearing. The case was then turned over to the police, who issued a report in February 1996 declaring Lieutenant Corporal Michael blameless and recommending his reinstatement. Prior to issuing their report, the Police sought the advice of the Kaduna Ministry of Justice, which had similarly found that the allegations lacked foundation. Rather than reinstating Lieutenant Corporal Michael, the commanding officer called for a new investigation by the Kaduna Special Investigations and Intelligence Bureau. This investigation resulted in a third report finding the accused not guilty. Upon receipt of the third report, the Commanding Officer ordered that Lieutenant Corporal Michael be reinstated. To date, however, this order has not been implemented.125

Compounding the armed forces' general sense of insecurity, General Abacha has only infrequently convened the Provisional Ruling Council, the country's top ruling body comprised of military service chiefs and division commanders.126 Given that some members of this body are reportedly opposed to the prospect of Abacha succeeding himself, this may be an attempt at self-preservation.127

119 "Understanding three years of Abacha's Nigeria," Nigeria Now, vol. 5, no. 8, (London: New Nigeria Forum, November/December 1996). 120 Kayode Fayemi, "Nigeria's Military Politricks: Maniacal tyrant repositions himself," Nigeria Now, vol. 6, nos. 3 & 4, (London: New Nigeria Forum, April/May 1996). 121 John Okafor, "Panic grips the military," Tell (Lagos), September 8, 1997. 122 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview. For confidentiality reasons, the date and site of this interview are being withheld. 123 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Nigeria is a party, sets out standards for the conduct of trials and court proceedings. Geneeral Comment 13(21) of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the iccpr, states that "the provisions of article 14 apply to all courts and tribunals within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialized" and goes on to provide guidelines for military tribunals. 124 "Confirmation of general court martial findings and sentences: Maj. U.G.K. Duwo (N/6962) and ten others," 1DIV/LS/635/A, March 27, 1997. 125 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview. For confidentiality reasons, the date and site of this interview are being withheld. 126 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Lagos, August 26, 1997. 127 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Lagos, August 28, 1997. Human Rights Watch received unofficial reports that General Diya, Abacha's Chief of General Staff, will request early retirement if Abacha opts for self-succession. Ibid.