LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

On March 15, 1997, local government elections were contested by the five political parties, several months behind schedule, although still theoretically in time for the winners to take office within the time set out in the original transition timetable. In March 1996, local government council elections had been held on a "zero party" basis; the winners of these "zero party" elections were supposed to hold office for one year, after which they were to be succeeded by the winners of party-based local government elections due to be held in the final quarter of 1996.37

The 1997 local government council elections held on a party basis, which were intended to fill 774 council chairmanships and 8,184 ward council seats, were riddled with irregularities. The initial guidelines for these elections were embodied in guidelines promulgated by necon, which did not have the force of law. These guidelines were superseded by Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 7 of 1997, which, although dated March 3, 1997 and applied retroactively to January 2, 1997, was not published until early April 1997.38 The fact that Decree No. 7, which is much more detailed than the necon guidelines, was published, with retroactive effect, after local government elections had been completed, means that candidates can be disqualified for breach of rules of which they were not aware.

Registration of Voters

Massive chaos and corruption characterized the process of voter registration, which was scheduled to take place from February 10 to 19, 1997. In Modakeke town in Osun State, in the northern city of Kano, and in Akure, the capital of Ondo State, there were complaints about shortages of voter cards and insufficient numbers of voterregistration centers.39 In some rural southeastern areas and in Lagos, voter cards were reportedly on sale.40 In many registration centers in Somolu local government area in Lagos, there were no personnel to carry out the registration exercise.41 In some areas of Osun, Akwa Ibom and Delta States, riots led to the disruption of registration.42 In southwestern Oyo State, electoral authorities reportedly called in local party leaders after receiving reports that some of them had attempted to prevent supporters of rival parties from registering.43

In some cases, the recent establishment of new local government areas contributed to the problems surrounding the registration exercise. In Opobo/Nkoro local government area in Rivers State, Andoni youths obstructed the registration exercise by occupying a polling site and preventing registration officers from continuing their work. The protests are believed to have stemmed from a controversy surrounding the inclusion of Down-Below Community in the newly created Opobo/Nkoro local government area, which has been the subject of a High Court petition by the Andonis.44 Residents of Modakeke in Osun State and of Ilaje local government area in Ondo State boycotted registration exercises (and the ensuing elections) in protest over the government's rejection of their requests to create new local government areas.45

Confronted with the apathy of the population toward the upcoming elections, many government officials resorted to coercive measures in an effort to ensure that voters presented themselves for registration. In the northern state of Bauchi, for example, military administrator Colonel Theophilius Bamigboye is said to have warned civil servants that they would be required to produce a registration card in order to receive their salaries for the month of February. Ondo State military administrator Anthony Onyearugbulem warned that parents and guardians would be required to produce their registration cards in order for their children to be admitted to state schools. Similar restrictions were also in place in some areas of Lagos State and Delta State.46 Although necon claimed that more than fifty-five million voters were registered, the opposition claimed that this figure was vastly inflated.47 A final voters' register was not published prior to the elections.

Screening of Candidates

In the weeks preceding the elections, the five registered parties were enmeshed in internal leadership struggles that, in many cases, have persisted up to the present. Prospective candidates nominated by the parties were screened by necon, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, and the State Security Service, supposedly based on criteria specified in the necon guidelines. In practice, the screening appeared designed to exclude anyone showing any indication of support for pro-democracy or opposition groups. Because the guidelines did not have the force of law, disqualifications could not be challenged in court prior to the elections.48 Some candidates were disqualified as late as the night before the elections took place, in contravention of the necon guidelines in effect at that time which required necon to afford parties an opportunity to substitute rejected candidates with fresh candidates prior to the close of nominations.49 On the day of local elections, the Guardian, a local Nigerian newspaper, reported that over 171 chairmanship candidates had been disqualified in Osun, Cross Rivers, Adamawa, Lagos, Kaduna and Sokoto states alone.50

One aspiring candidate reported to Human Rights Watch that questions posed by security agents in the course of screening had focused on his views regarding the results of the annulled June 12, 1993 election. He responded that, as a former member of the Social Democratic Party, he had voted for Chief Abiola and that he believed that the country would have to "find a solution to the June 12 problem." On the day before the local government elections, the police arrested this candidate and forced him to sign an undertaking that there would be no breach of the peace on the day of the elections.51

Other candidates were disqualified for their pro-opposition sympathies. Kingsley Ezihuo, a Port Harcourt lawyer and the Rivers State Secretary of the gdm, expressed interest in contesting the chairmanship elections. However, after members of other parties convinced the government that he had links to nadeco, he was reportedly arrested by agents of the State Security Service and detained for two months at Bori Prison.52 Similarly, Dr. Clement Adolph Bassey was disqualified from contesting the chairmanship elections in Ikono, Akwa Ibom State based on a report from the State Security Service that he was a nadeco member.53 Some candidates were permitted to contestthe elections, but later forced to resign their positions due to alleged pro-opposition sympathies. These include Chijoka Amadi, who was elected chairman of Ikwerre local government area in Rivers State.54

Irregularities

In addition to the chaos that resulted from the lack of a final voters' register, election monitors reported pervasive bribery, with politicians seeking to compensate for their parties' lack of grassroots support by giving citizens money to vote for particular candidates-using "phantom" names in some cases.55 In most cases, the balloting process was open, meaning that voters cast their ballots in the presence of other voters, electoral officers, party agents or the police.56 Because the presence of security agents was minimal, politicians openly solicited votes at some polling sites.57 Moreover, political party agents were generally prevented from attending the final collation of votes at local government headquarters, creating the possibility for massive tampering.58

One election monitor told Human Rights Watch that voter turnout in Ikeja, Lagos had been minimal and that a considerable number of voters who presented themselves failed to find their names on the voters' register. Some of those voters' names later proved to be on registers in other polling stations. The election monitor also related that a number of the voters with whom he interacted had no idea of the candidates running for local government chairmanships, due presumably to the lack of any campaigning beforehand.59

Polling centers opened behind schedule in many areas of Lagos, including Surulere and Ikoyi, due to the late arrival of electoral officials and voting materials. In the Akowonjo-Egbeda area, for instance, local government elections did not start until mid-afternoon, when election materials arrived, instead of at 10:00 a.m. as originally planned. Many voters who came to polling sites in the morning grew tired of waiting and left. Political party representatives were reportedly seen handing out fifty naira notes to voters (approximately US 80¢).60

A dpn member reported that no elections took place in Okrika local government area in Rivers State. Although necon claimed to have been recruiting electoral officers in the weeks preceding the elections, a list of those selected was not posted until the morning of March 15. When all those listed proved to be known uncp supporters, representatives of the four other parties refused to participate in the elections unless the list was changed to ensureimpartiality. A number of non-uncp party officials waited at the polling site until 4:00 p.m., when they finally agreed among themselves that the elections should be rescheduled. No voting took place. A few days later, however, the uncp candidate was announced on the radio to have won the election.61 In Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni local government area in Rivers State, the dpn candidate was announced to have won the chairmanship election. Two days later, necon disqualified the dpn candidate "on security grounds" and directed the installation of the uncp candidate who had come in third.62 In many areas, party agents were not allowed to be present during the counting process at collation centers. In some cases, those responsible for counting the votes were known supporters of the uncp.63 In Akwa Ibom State, home area of former Minister for Petroleum Resources Don Etiebet, his party, the ncpn, was reported to have won in the great majority of the state's local government areas; results were later altered to favor the uncp and dpn.64

Violence reportedly disrupted the voting process in at least two instances. Students demanding the release of Chief M.K.O. Abiola stormed a polling station at Obafemi Awolowo University in Ile Ife, chasing away electoral officials and burning ballot boxes and other election materials. In Onitsha, Anambra State, police fired tear gas to disperse some two thousand protesters outside a necon office, including supporters of four out of the five registered parties, who were accusing electoral officials and leaders of the other political party of electoral fraud.65

Not surprisingly in these circumstances, the uncp and the dpn, the two parties that have been most outspoken in their support for Abacha, were most successful in the local government elections. Preliminary results, excluding constituencies where the elections were immediately challenged in tribunals, indicated that the uncp and dpn won 271 and 150 chairmanships in the local government elections. The remainder of the 531 chairmanships in which results were declared (out of a national total of 774) were split among the three other parties.66

Executive Interference in Decisions by necon

Under the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria Decree No. 3 of 1996, General Abacha is empowered to appoint the Chairman and the members of necon. He can also remove any member at any time "for inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misbehavior."67 In addition, necon must comply with any directives issued by the head of state or the ProvisionalRuling Council. The courts are specifically excluded from reviewing on constitutional or other grounds any decision reached by the head of state or the prc under this decree.68

The case of Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory, is instructive regarding the extent to which the executive can interfere with necon's decisions. Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 7 of 1997, which superseded the necon guidelines published before the local government elections, provides that bye-elections are to be held in cases where election results are inconclusive.69 In accordance with Decree No. 7, necon announced that bye-elections would be held in three area councils of Abuja, namely Abuja Municipal Area Council, Bwari Area Council, and Gwagwalada Area Council, on April 3, 1997. Defying necon's announcement, Minister of the Federal Capital Territory Jeremiah Useni declared that there would be no bye-elections in either Abuja Municipal Area Council or Bwari, where uncp candidates had won, and that the choice between the ncpn and dpn candidates in a contested ward in Gwagwalada would be made by the "tossing of coin," as provided in necon's rule book.70 Useni attempted to justify his position by explaining that, prior to announcing bye-elections, necon had proclaimed definitive winners in the three contested area councils and that an electoral tribunal would therefore be the appropriate forum in which to challenge the results. He swore in the three candidates, uncertified by necon, in late March.71 Meanwhile, necon issued a statement suspending the three contested bye-elections pending an investigation.72 This sequence of events sets a dangerous precedent for future interference by government officials with necon's activities.

necon's lack of independence is emphasized by a provision of Decree No. 7 that empowers the "Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces" to remove an elected local government chairman, vice-chairman or councilor "if he is satisfied that the affairs of a Local Government Council are not being managed in the best interest of the community or in any way to strengthen the unity of the people of Nigeria or for any good cause" or if any of these individuals "is found to be compromising his political standing, or [to] be using public funds or facilities to advance the cause of any political party." Alternatively, the head of state is empowered to dissolve the local government council and appoint an administrator to manage the affairs of the local government until newelections can be held.73 These nebulous standards give Abacha far-reaching authority to interfere arbitrarily with the decisions of the electorate.74

37 For a discussion of the irregularities surrounding the "zero party" elections, see Human Rights Watch/Africa, "`Permanent Transition,'" pp.12-13. 38 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Kaduna, September 2, 1997. 39 "Coaxed into Entering the Voters' List," InterPress Service, February 19, 1997. 40 Antony Goldman, "Nigeria poll registration doubts grow," The Financial Times (London), February 20, 1997. 41 Emmanuel Ugwu, "On the march again," Newswatch (Lagos), February 24, 1997. 42 Mikail Mumuni, "Register Now! Or Else!!" Tell (Lagos), February 24, 1997. 43 Antony Goldman, "Nigeria poll registration doubts grow," The Financial Times (London), February 20, 1997. 44 Friday Opusunju, "Opobo Community News: 1000 voters barred from registration exercise," Human Rights Update, February 11, 1997 (published in Port Harcourt by the Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law). 45 Remi Oyo, "Old Guard Out, Newcomers Celebrate Victory," InterPress Service, March 17, 1997; serious violence later erupted in Osun State over relocation of the local government headquarters. 46 Anthony Goldman, "Nigeria poll registration doubts grow," Financial Times (London), February 20, 1997; Emmanuel Ugwu, "On the march again," Newswatch (Lagos), February 24, 1997; Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Isoko North, Delta State, July 21, 1997. 47 Nigeria Today (an e-mail news service compiled in London from various sources), March 17, 1997. 48 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Kaduna, September 2, 1997. Most prospective candidates with connections to nadeco and other pro-democracy organizations were also reportedly screened out of the "zero party" elections in March 1996. Ima Niboro, "Another road to June 12 debacle," Tell (Lagos), April 1, 1996; Human Rights Watch/Africa, "`Permanent Transition,'" pp. 12-13. As in March 1997, the guidelines that governed the zero party elections did not have the force of law, and decisions based on them could therefore not be challenged in court. Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Kaduna, September 2, 1997. 49 "LG Polls: Abacha testing his programme," Constitutional Rights Journal, vol. 7, no. 22, January - March 1997 (published in Lagos by Constitutional Rights Project); necon Guidelines for Local Government Council Election on Political Party Basis, section 7(3). Decree No. 7 of 1997, which superseded the necon guidelines, similarly requires the Commission to afford political parties the opportunity to substitute new candidates for those rejected during the screening process, but renders this requirement "subject to the other provisions of the Decree." Given that Decree No. 7 gives the Commission up to twenty-one days after receiving lists from political parties to complete the screening exercise, a party that submits its list less than twenty-one days prior to an election would not appear to be entitled to an opportunity to substitute new candidates. In this and other respects which could cause confusion, Decree No. 7 differs from the necon guidelines. Decree No. 7 of 1997, schedule 4, paragraph 2. 50 Transition Review, no. 4, April 1997 (published in Lagos by Civil Liberties Organisation). 51 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview. For confidentiality reasons, the date and site of this interview are being withheld. 52 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Port Harcourt, July 17, 1997. 53 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Benin City, July 22, 1997. 54 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Port Harcourt, July 11, 1997. 55 The term "election monitor" refers here to any journalist, non-governmental organization staff member or other individual who observed local government elections for the purpose of reporting on their fairness. 56 "Slow start in municipal vote in Nigerian capital," afp, March 15, 1997; Transition Review, no. 4, April 1997 (published in Lagos by Civil Liberties Organisation). These procedures contravene a necon rule that voting should be done secretly, inside a screened compartment. necon Guidelines for Local Government Council Election on Political Party Basis, section 13(1)(g); Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 7 of 1997, section 61(2) and schedule 4, paragraphs 17(2)(c) and 23(g). General Comment No. 25 adopted by the Human Rights Committee, responsible for monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Nigeria is a party, similarly provides that "States should take measures to guarantee the requirement of secrecy of the vote." 57 On the day of an election, solicitation of votes is prohibited within two hundred meters of a polling station. Decree No. 7 of 1997, section 80(2). 58 Human Rights Watch/Africa interviews, Port Harcourt, July 10, 1997 and Abuja, September 4, 1997. 59 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Lagos, August 28, 1997. 60 "Slow start in municipal vote in Nigerian capital," afp, March 15, 1997; Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Lagos, August 30, 1997. 61 Human Rights Watch/Africa interview, Port Harcourt, July 10, 1997. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 "Etiebet's Metamorphosis: The Hidden Facts," The Post Express (Lagos), April 17, 1997. 65 Gilbert Da Costa, "Election profile," Associated Press, March 18, 1997; Remi Oyo, "Old Guard Out, Newcomers Celebrate Victory," InterPress Service, March 17, 1997; "LG Polls: Abacha Testing His Programme," Constitutional Rights Journal, vol. 7, no. 22, January - March 1997 (published in Lagos by Constitutional Rights Project). 66 Nigeria Today, March 20, 1997. 67 National Electoral Commission of Nigeria Decree No. 3 of 1996, sections 2 and 3(2). Decree No. 23 of 1987, which established the National Electoral Commission (nec) under the Babangida regime, similarly accorded substantial influence to the military government, which could "give the Commission such directives as appear to it to be just and proper for the effective discharge of the functions of the Commission." Odinkalu, "The Management of Transition to Civil Rule," citing Decree No. 23 of 1987, section 5(1). 68 Decree No. 3 of 1996, section 6. 69 Decree No. 7 of 1997, schedule 4, paragraph 11. Where there are more than two candidates, a winning candidate must receive a majority of votes cast and not less than one-quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of all wards in the local government area (or area council in the Federal Capital Territory). Ibid. 70 Mikail Mumuni, "Nzeribe's money, and Useni's muscle," Tell (Lagos), April 14, 1997; Wale Akin Aina, "A Crippling Blow," Newswatch (Lagos), April 14, 1997. Useni may have been referring to Decree No. 7 of 1997, schedule 4, paragraph 35, which provides: "When there is an equality of votes between candidates so that the addition of a vote would entitle any one of the candidates to be declared elected, the Returning Officer shall forthwith decide between those candidates by lot and proceed as if the candidate on whom the lot falls had received an additional vote, and shall declare that candidate to be elected." 71 Wale Akin Aina, "A Crippling Blow," Newswatch (Lagos), April 14, 1997. In early July 1997, the Federal Capital Territory election tribunal reportedly voided the election of Abuja Municipal Area Council chairman Vivian Ndigwe-Anazodo, whom Useni had sworn in. Victor Onyeka-Ben, "Many tribunals, little succour to the aggrieved," The Guardian (Lagos), September 1, 1997. 72 Wale Akin Aina, "A Crippling Blow," Newswatch (Lagos), April 14, 1997. 73 Decree No. 7 of 1997, section 106. 74 Similarly, the Local Government Elections (Basic Constitutional and Transitional) Provisions Decree No. 15 of 1989 empowered Babangida to remove an elected local government official or dissolve a local government council "if he [wa]s satisfied that the affairs of the Local Government [we]re not being managed in the best interest of the community or in a way to strengthen the unity of the people of Nigeria or for any other good cause." Odinkalu, "Management of Transition to Civil Rule."