TRANSITION FRAMEWORK

The current Nigerian transition program, announced by Gen. Sani Abacha in a nationwide address on October 1, 1995 and governed by the Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Decree No. 1 of 1996, is the fourth such effort by a military government in Nigeria.1 The structure of General Abacha's proposed plan, which is supposed to culminate in the handover of power to an elected civilian government on October 1, 1998, recalls that of previous transition programs. As before, the process includes the drafting of a new constitution, the lifting of a pre-existing ban on political activities, the establishment of transitional institutions, the election of local government officials on a non-party basis, the redrawing of state and local government area boundaries, the formation of political parties and, finally, the holding of elections on a party basis.2

The most striking parallels are with the transition program supervised by General Ibrahim Babangida, who annulled the results of Nigeria's last presidential election on June 12, 1993. For example, Decree No. 1 of 1996 renders subject to five years' imprisonment any person who "organizes, plans, encourages, aids, co-operates or conspires with any other person to undermine, prevent or in any way do anything to forestall or prejudice the realization of the political programme" or who "does or attempts to do any act to counsel, persuade, encourage, organize, mobilize, pressurize or threaten another person to join with him or with any other person or persons to misrepresent, accuse or distort the details, implications or purports of any item of the political programme."3 Offenses under Decree No. 1 are triable only by a special tribunal and appealable to a Special Appeal Tribunal, with any sentences imposed subject to confirmation by the Provisional Ruling Council.4 The decree specifically ousts the jurisdiction of regular courts.5 Decree No. 19 of 1987, which governed the Babangida transition program, set forth a virtually identical arrangement for the trial of persons whose acts or omissions undermined the program.6

To an even greater extent than General Babangida, under whom he served as chief of army staff, General Abacha has manipulated every aspect of the current transition process to his own advantage, suggesting that his ultimate aim may be self-succession.

Nigeria's Obligations Under International Law

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), to which Nigeria is a party, provides in Article 25 that:

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 [forbidding discrimination] and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

The U.N. Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the iccpr has elaborated on states' obligations in a general comment on Article 25.7 States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right. Among other measures, this implies that any abusive interference with registration or voting, as well as intimidation or coercion of voters, should be prohibited and the law strictly enforced. Voter education and registration campaigns are also necessary. The Committee specifies that freedom of expression, assembly and association are essential conditions for the effective exercise of the right to vote. Also, persons entitled to vote must have a free choice of candidates and restrictions on the right to stand for election must be based on objective and reasonable criteria. Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind. Most importantly, perhaps (in the Nigerian context) , the results of genuine elections should be respected and implemented.

The Human Rights Committee also specifies that an independent electoral authority should be established, to supervise the electoral process and ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant. The secrecy of the vote should be guaranteed, the security of ballot boxes must be guaranteed, and votes should be counted in the presence of the candidates or their agents. There should be independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process and access to judicial review or other equivalent process to ensure that electors have confidence in the security of the ballot.

Finally, the Committee elaborates on the need for free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives. There must be a free press and other media able to comment without censorship or restraint. There must be freedom to engage in political activity individually or through political parties and other organizations, freedom to debate public affairs, to hold peaceful demonstrations and meetings, to criticize and oppose, to publish political material, to campaign for election, and to advertise political ideas.

The Harare Commonwealth Declaration, adopted by Commonwealth Heads of Government in 1991, echo the obligations of states parties to the iccpr. Commonwealth states are committed, among other things, to respect "the individual's inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in forming the society in which he or she lives."

The following sections of this report indicate to what extent Nigeria is falling short of these obligations.

Timetable

The current transition timetable has been subject to repeated postponements, reminiscent of the recurrent delays that plagued the Babangida transition.8 According to the timetable, a new constitution was to have been approved by the Provisional Ruling Council (prc), the military cabinet (which is paired by a civilian Federal Executive Council, fec), by the fourth quarter (October - December) 1995. Although the government convened a National Constitutional Conference, which presented a draft constitution to General Abacha in June 1995, the constitution has yet to be promulgated, so that voters do not understand the foundation of the system for which they are voting.9 Local government elections on a party basis, which were originally scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1996, did not take place until March 15, 1997. Government and electoral officials cited a variety of reasons for this delay, including the threat of bomb blasts at polling centers and the administrative burden of delineating new constituencies and updating the voters' register following the creation of new states and local government areas in October 1996.10

Further revisions to the original schedule were imposed through the Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) (Amendment) Decree No. 9 of 1997, which, while maintaining "the inviolability" of October 1, 1998 as the terminal date of the transition program, empowers the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria to alter the previous timetable "to meet the exigencies of the due and faithful implementation of the programmes specified therein."11 Under Decree No. 9, local government bye-elections, which were to be completed by the fourth quarter of 1996, were shifted to July 1997; state assembly elections, which were supposed to take place between July and September 1997, have been rescheduled for December 6, 1997. In addition, elections of state governors, which were scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1997, will now coincide with the presidential elections, slated for the third quarter of 1998.12 To date, no rules for gubernatorial, state assembly, or presidential elections have been published.

Whether the political parties requested these postponements of their own accord or were instead asked by the government to "rubber stamp" its pronouncements is a subject of controversy. Politicians who supported the postponements have cited the importance of preventing state governors from acquiring too much control over the operations of the political parties or the nomination of National Assembly candidates (scheduled for early 1998). They have also expressed the view that necon needs additional time to overcome the problems that arose during the local government elections. More skeptical sources have pointed out that civilian governors would be more likely than military governors to resist any attempt by Abacha to succeed himself.13

Transitional Institutions

A number of government institutions have been established with responsibilities in respect of the transition, in accordance with the Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Decree No. 1 of 1996. These institutions include the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (necon), the Transitional Implementation Committee (tic), the Federal Character Commission (fcc), the National Reconciliation Committee (narecom), and the Panel for the Creation of State and Local Government Boundary Adjustment. In addition, a Power Devolution Committee, mentioned by General Abacha in his October 1, 1995 independence day address, but not provided for in the decree, has been established.

The principal body entrusted with overseeing the transition process is necon, headed by Chief Sumner Dagogo-Jack, which was created under the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria Decree No. 3 of 1996. necon has broad range of functions, including registering political parties, monitoring the organization and conduct of political parties, screening candidates, registering voters, preparing and maintaining a voters' register, as well as organizing, conducting and supervising all elections. In some cases, necon has overstepped the bounds of its authority in an apparent effort to micromanage the day-to-day operations of the political parties. Shortly before the March 1997 local government elections, for example, Chief Dagogo-Jack nullified the positions of National Leader in the National Centre Party of Nigeria (ncpn) and National Coordinator in the Democratic Party of Nigeria (dpn), which he considered to be in violation of the parties' constitutions.14

Apart from necon, the transitional institutions appear to be ineffectual at best. Most are chaired by individuals whose interests are closely aligned with the current regime. Distinctions between the mandates of the Transitional Implementation Committee, which is supposed to supervise the transition program, and necon are unclear, making the tic seem redundant. The tic is chaired by retired Justice Mamman Nasir, a core member of the northern political establishment, from which General Abacha derives his strongest backing, and former vice-chairman of the National Constitutional Conference which drafted the yet-to-be-promulgated 1995 constitution. Not surprisingly, Justice Nasir has announced that General Abacha is legally eligible to run for president.15

The other bodies are concerned with the resolution of problems related to Nigeria's diverse ethnic and religious makeup. narecom has been preoccupied with collecting information about intercommunal disputes among minority groups, with little success.16 The chairman of narecom is Alex Akinyele, minister of information underGeneral Ibrahim Babangida. With respect to the Federal Character Commission, which is supposed to work out an equitable formula for individuals from different regions of the country to share posts in the federal and state civil services, government-owned corporations and parastatals, and the Power Devolution Committee, which is charged with the task of redistributing power from the federal government to state and local council authorities, any recommendations that may have been made by these institutions do not appear to have been implemented as yet.17 The fcc is chaired by Alhaji Gidado Idris, secretary to the government of the federation, while the Power Devolution Committee is chaired by Alhaji Abdulrahman Okene, the chairman of the Northern Elders Forum, a pro-government body. As for the Panel on State and Local Government Creation and Boundary Adjustment, the government announced the establishment of six new states-three in the north and three in the south-and 183 additional local government areas on October 1, 1996. The chairman of this Panel is Chief Arthur Mbanefo, who has not previously featured prominently in Nigerian politics. A separate panel was then convened to formulate recommendations regarding the adjustment of local government boundaries, which were announced in December 1996.18 Given that the recommendations of the Committee were never made public, it is not clear whether the government took them into account.

Political Party Registration

In late September 1996, necon announced the registration of five political parties (out of eighteen that applied): the United Nigeria Congress Party (uncp), the Committee for National Consensus (cnc), the National Centre Party of Nigeria (ncpn), the Democratic Party of Nigeria (dpn) and the Grassroots Democratic Movement (gdm). All political associations that failed to qualify for registration were pronounced to have been dissolved and were thereby barred from participating in the planned elections. Parties which included many known opponents of the Abacha regime, such as the People's Progressive Party (ppp), made up largely of members of the National Democratic Coalition (nadeco) formed from the remnants of Chief Moshood Abiola's dissolved Social Democratic Party, which contested the 1993 election, were not registered.19

necon claimed that registration decisions were based on objective criteria set forth in its guidelines announced in June 1996.20 However, it is doubtful that any of the parties was able to comply fully with such onerous registration requirements. The necon guidelines required parties seeking registration to have at least 40,000 members in each of the thirty states of the federation and 15,000 in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, with each member to receive a photo-membership identification card. Parties had to submit a comprehensive list of their members with names, ages and residential addresses; set up offices throughout the country, and demonstrate that theywere organized in at least two thirds of the local governments in every state, including Abuja. In addition, each party was obligated to pay a nonrefundable deposit of x500,000 (US $6,025) to necon and to submit a "short profile" of the party and ten copies of its constitution and manifesto.21 In tacit acknowledgment of the difficulty of fulfilling all the requirements, necon extended the original deadline of June 26, 1996 to provide the opportunity for associations to merge into more "politically viable" groups.22

Human Rights Watch interviewed a number of politicians who had been affiliated with parties that were disqualified. Most expressed frustration with the short time period allotted for submitting registration applications and the exorbitant costs they had incurred in the process. One politician noted that each of the five registered parties could not possibly have enlisted 15,000 members in Abuja because the total population is well under 75,000.23 Even a member of the uncp, which is reportedly dominated by the Kanuri political elite (from Abacha's home region) and is viewed to be Abacha's party of preference, conceded to Human Rights Watch that his party had been unable to comply with the requirement to issue photo-membership identification cards.24

A more probable explanation of the rationale behind registration decisions is the government's desire to ensure a compliant set of parties unwilling to challenge the military. Minister for Special Duties Laz Unaogu stated publicly that, in order to avert political instability, neither "progressive" nor "conservative" parties would be registered.25 That the registered parties have commonly been described as "five fingers of a leprous hand" attests to the fact that the government achieved its goal. Even a uncp member interviewed by Human Rights Watch was frank about the fact that the ideologies of the five registered parties were "centrist" and essentially interchangeable.26 Based on the inability of four out of the five parties to provide any printed materials to Human Rights Watch, the scope of public knowledge of their respective ideologies-if they have ideologies-is questionable.27 Only the uncpwas able to produce its manifesto and constitution, at the cost of x100 (US $1.20) each. Given the desperate state of the Nigerian economy, it is doubtful that an average citizen could afford such an expenditure.

To date, none of the five registered political parties has officially specified a presidential candidate. There is much speculation that General Abacha will ultimately decide to run for president on one or more of the parties' platforms. Many senior members of the registered parties have said publicly that they would be willing to promote Abacha's candidacy, and the uncp and the dpn have reportedly even offered to adopt him as their exclusive consensus candidate.28 A number of government ministers are reportedly involved in running and financing the political parties. Notably, Minister for Special Duties Wada Nas supposedly has close links with the dpn, while Minister of State for Petroleum Resources Dr. Kabiru Chafe, and Ministers for Special Duties Laz Unaogu and Wole Oyelese are said to have ties with the gdm.29

Since March 1997, when Abacha's chief press secretary David Attah told Radio Nigeria that Nigerians should pressure General Abacha to run for president, the activities of pro-Abacha groups have become increasingly visible.30 Although there have been official statements that these groups are not backed by the government, they are led by individuals close to Abacha. The groups include the Movement for Abacha for President (launched by uncp member Chief Orji Uzor Kalu), the National Mobilisation and Persuasion Campaign (nmpc) (headed by gdm member Dr. Godwin Daboh Adzuanah) and Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha (yeaa).31 At the time of Human Rights Watch's mission, a painted placard saying "yeaa: We want him back in `98" stood outside the entrance to Abuja, the Nigerian capital, and many civil servants in the Federal Secretariat wore small badges with photographs of General Abacha or his wife. In a January 1997 interview with the Washington Times, General Abacha denied that he had given serious thought to running for president, but left the option open by claiming that his decision would depend on his "constituency." He pointed out that such a move "is not new in Africa, neither is it new in the subregion, where military people have stepped into politics."32

Government officials have gone to great lengths to eliminate technical obstacles that might otherwise have prevented Abacha from running for president. As early as October 1996, Sam Ikoku, then deputy chairman of the Transitional Implementation Committee (now deceased), conceded that prevailing party rules would render Abacha ineligible to contest the election, but pointed out that party constitutions could be amended.33 On February 20, 1997, Secretary to the Federal Government Alhaji Gidado Idris announced that the 1988 Civil Service Reform Rules hadbeen amended to prevent civil servants from having to retire after thirty-five years. General Abacha would otherwise have been forced to step down this year.34

One of the few individuals to have expressed presidential aspirations is former Minister of Petroleum Resources Don Etiebet, who was a principal funder and the chairman of the ncpn. On the afternoon of March 16, 1997, Etiebet was arrested by State Security Services (sss) agents in Akwa Ibom State and taken to the headquarters of the sss in Uyo. There, Etiebet was reportedly shown a letter from ncpn national chairman Mogaji Abdullahi, who accused Etiebet of "tilting the party to an opposition and sectional divide" and using it "as an instrument of confrontation, blackmail and intimidation." Etiebet is also said to have been accused of seeking to generate foreign support for Abacha's ouster. Following his release a few days later, Etiebet traveled to Abuja to meet with high-ranking government officials. On April 4, he addressed a press conference where he announced that he was leaving the ncpn to join the uncp and renounced any presidential ambitions.35 General Abacha is believed to have threatened to expose Etiebet's participation in corrupt activities during his tenure as minister of petroleum resources if the latter refused to abandon his quest for the presidency.36

In February 1997, lawyer Tunji Abayomi, on behalf of twelve nongovernmental organizations, filed a petition in Lagos Federal High Court seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that "the 1995 constitution" is invalid and court orders mandating redrafting of the constitution by an assembly of popularly elected representatives in consultation with the public. He subsequently filed a motion for an injunction restraining the Abacha regime from using, issuing, publishing or enacting the 1995 constitution pending the determination of the above-mentioned petition. A hearing on the government's preliminary objections to the petition was scheduled for October 8, 1997.