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Government Undermining of the UNDP Program⁷²

“The despair of the displaced and refugee populations is an abuse to human dignity and reasoning.”

—President Daniel arap Moi, Jamhuri Day speech, December 1996⁷³

The optimistic assessment of the reintegration process contained in the second Rogge report, was not without cause.  Some reintegration did occur in 1994, particularly in Nyanza and Western Provinces, and there was a gradual return to normalcy.  Violence had reduced greatly over what existed a year earlier and many people were in varying stages of return.  In relation to the preceding two years, these were significant improvements relative to the highly-charged and volatile situation that had existed.  While there was good reason to be heartened by these improvements, however, serious obstacles to full reintegration remained. 

The 1994 Rogge report’s oblique references to individuals in government who were continuing to incite violence and undermine reintegration understated the extent to which the government remained an unwilling partner.  At no time was the Moi government ever a genuine partner in the UNDP endeavor.  Through a dual process of active obstruction on some fronts and complete inaction on others, the government managed to undermine the UNDP program throughout.  Alongside the reintegration which was occurring in some areas, there was a pattern of intimidation and a callous disregard for the displaced among government officials both at the local and national level.

The decline of the large-scale attacks, the return of the displaced in some areas, and the personal initiative of a small number of local administration officials to cooperate with the UNDP program appear to have been interpreted by UNDP as signaling an end to the government’s policies of ethnic persecution and a commitment to the UNDP program.  UNDP states:

the fact that violence surged in a few areas because of a small group of powerful, manipulative politicians cannot be put at the doorstep of UNDP or the U.N. system.  It is ingenuous [for Human Rights Watch/Africa] to suggest that the U.N. programme’s optimistic attitude in early 1994 was inappropriate because the government reverted to its former policy which contributed to an escalation of violence in late 1995 [sic][UNDP must mean late 1994.  By late 1995 the program had ended].⁷⁴ 

Human Rights Watch/Africa recognizes that ultimate responsibility lies with the Kenyan government, and that UNDP does not bear responsibility for the actions of the government.  However, UNDP bears responsibility for not being a vigorous advocate on behalf of the rights of the displaced where government actions undermined the objectives of its reintegration program.  Human Rights Watch/Africa does not find UNDP’s response inappropriate because later events proved otherwise.  Rather, the sections of this report that follow indicate that during 1994 itself, reintegration, while underway, was being limited and undermined on a regular basis by government actions. 

UNDP’s public characterization of local officials as being largely “committed to the program,” and its diminutive portrayal of government abuse as being the setbacks of a “few key figures,” was not wholly accurate and left the distinct impression that the government was by and large cooperating.  The 1994 Rogge report mitigated both government and UNDP responsibility to act, while undermining the efforts of other agencies and NGOs to bring international pressure on the government to reverse and remedy its abusive policies.  While UNDP had reason to be pleased with the gradual progress being made, the climate of mistrust and perceived insecurity which persisted in many parts of the Rift Valley should have been cause to place this progress within the context of the significant difficulties which remained and to recommend steps that could have been taken by UNDP at that time.  Ultimately, the government was able to systematically undermine the UNDP program through inadequate security; uneven and discriminatory application of the legal system; harassment of the displaced, relief workers and journalists; illegal land transfers; and forced dispersals.

While it is true that the government abandoned its high-visibility tactics of terror and violence which had attracted national and international protest, it only did so after it had succeeded in displacing a significant number of people of certain ethnic groups from select areas.  After achieving this end, all it had to do was to drag its feet to prevent a complete and permanent reintegration.  Certainly, with the level of international and national scrutiny surrounding the displaced, the government had to give the appearance of supporting reintegration efforts, and even allow some to return to their land.  Among the first to return to their land, once material assistance was provided, were many of the Kalenjin farmers who had been displaced in retaliatory attacks.  However, in fundamental ways, the Kenyan government never committed itself to the reintegration of the displaced, not during the UNDP program and not now.

Inadequate Security or Protection

The lack of adequate security and protection was a consistent theme both during the violence and the reintegration process with regard to physical security of person and property, security for the returning displaced to live on their land and harvest crops without fear, and security of land title or lease.  On all counts, the government has failed to provide these guarantees comprehensively.

During the height of the violence, eyewitnesses consistently alleged that members of the security forces had failed to take any action against the attackers.  In some cases, police who were present at the scene of an attack had refused to respond to appeals for help, simply standing by and watching people being driven out of their houses.  In others, police based at nearby posts would only arrive to assist clash victims well after attackers had left, despite earlier calls for action.  This prior history with the security forces left the displaced with a well-founded and deep-rooted distrust of the government.  Throughout the reintegration process, continuing incidents, threats and fears of renewed violence prevented many of the displaced from returning to their land.  Little was done by the government to conduct confidence-building measures that would have sent a clear message to the nation that the government was not prepared to countenance the ongoing security threats to reintegration.

In September 1993, after two years of inaction in providing additional security, and soon after the highly publicized visits of representatives of two foreign human rights organizations to the clash areas, the government declared three “security operation zones” giving the police emergency-type powers, excluding “outsiders,” preventing the publication of any information concerning the area when deemed necessary, and banning the carrying of weapons in the worst-affected areas of the Rift Valley Province.⁷⁵  For most of the duration of the UNDP program, the restrictions were in force.  They were lifted in March 1995.  However, even when they were in place, the extra security precautions in these zones did not prevent a large outbreak of “ethnic” violence in the Burnt Forest area in March 1994, which left at least eighteen dead and perhaps 25,000 displaced.

Burnt Forest was an area that was particularly hard hit and, for some, this was the second or even third time they had been displaced.  Communities in Burnt Forest were first attacked in December 1992 and then in January, February, April and August 1993 and January 1994.  The attacks in Burnt Forest in March 1994, which continued for a week, left the disturbing impression that the government was unable or unwilling to take effective measures to stop the clashes.  In the meantime, the government was using the security legislation to restrict access to the area to journalists, NGOs and, on occasion, even to UNDP staff.  In comparison to past incidents, the outbreak of violence in a security operation zone resulted in a prompter response from the local administration and security forces, although some residents accused the government of having had a hand in instigating the violence.  The government also provided a small amount of food aid which was received by the displaced, whereas in the past, food relief pledged by the government was often never actually received by the displaced.⁷⁶  But as a journalist who writes on ethnic conflict in Africa noted, no one ever questioned how armed attacks on such a large scale could have broken out in an area under emergency regulations, particularly since sporadic incidents since January should have indicated that it was imminent:

The Kenyan journalists were really exasperated at UNDP’s willingness to be an apologist for the Kenyan government.  Here you had a situation where there were emergency security powers in place and David Whaley [former UNDP Resident Representative to Kenya] was holding a press conference to say how amazing it was that the government had managed to get the violence under control so quickly.  The surprise was that the violence had even happened in a security zone.⁷⁷ 

In a March 1994 pastoral letter, the nation’s Catholic bishops criticized the government’s inaction on preventing the ethnic violence in the security operation zones:

The government has not spared any efforts to persuade public opinion that the clashes are caused by the opposition leaders, but Kenyans now have the conviction that these clashes could not have taken place nor continued for such a long time without the passive and sometimes active collaboration of the authorities.  Should Kenyans believe that our numerous, well trained and well equipped army and police can be defeated by a small group of village warriors armed with pangas and rungus?  Should we believe that the police and the army did their best but unfortunately always arrived late?⁷⁸   

At a press conference held in Nairobi on March 28, 13 displaced Kikuyu residents of Burnt Forest issued a statement complaining that the local authorities had not taken any action even against known perpetrators of the violence.  The displaced stated:

We want to tell the world that these clashes are occurring in the so-called security zones which the government brought into force last year.  We want to remind the world that the government blamed earlier clashes on outsiders.  Hence the idea of security zones to keep outsiders out...The current wave of arson, murder and destruction of property is aimed largely at the Kikuyu in the area...[but] all administrative positions in the area are held by Kalenjins to whom we cannot report when we are killed or our property is stolen or destroyed.  We have been attacked a thousand times in the presence of the D.C. [District Commissioner], D.O. [District Officer], chiefs and assistance chiefs and their policemen and yet nothing is done.  The policemen merely fire in the area.  Warriors walk openly with arrows and bows and are never arrested...our children are sick with sleeping in the cold.  Our families are hungry.  We want the world to intervene on our behalf.  The aim of these crimes is to drive Kikuyus out of Burnt Forest.⁷⁹

Other attacks on a smaller scale occurred sporadically elsewhere in the country throughout the duration of the UNDP program.  For example, in January 1994, approximately 4,000 Kikuyus fled from their homes at Mwoyoi Scheme and Nyandonche, Ibere, Nyaiguta, Masimba, and Tilango farms in Trans-Mara sub-district of Narok province, after their farms had been attacked by Maasais.  The Kikuyu owners alleged that a meeting had been held at Lolgorien division headquarters of the local administration, which non-Maasais had been barred from attending, where a resolution had been passed to evict them.  On February 21, there was a raid by approximately fifty Kalenjins on Kianjogu village at Laikipia district.  The attack resulted in several injuries and the death of one Kikuyu, Kuria Njoroge, as well as the burning of houses.  The victims of the attack reported that their attackers identified themselves as “tribal executioners who will return soon to finish all of you.”⁸⁰  On May 1, 1994, eight were killed and twenty-six seriously injured when over one hundred attackers chanting majimbo slogans attacked Mtondia village, approximately ten kilometers from Kilifi town in Coast province, hundreds of miles from the Rift Valley, where the clashes had previously centered.  The houses and property of predominantly Luo residents were destroyed and looted.  Approximately 2,000 people fled the area following the attack.  The attack had been preceded by the circulation of anonymous leaflets stating “if you are a Luo, the road to Kisumu is wide open, we have no mercy, we shall fight you.”  Journalists who attempted to visit the area after the attack were prevented by police who had sealed off the area.⁸¹

The sporadic incidents of violence and the occasional large outbreaks did nothing to engender confidence among the displaced.  The then UNDP resident representative to Kenya, David Whaley, had stated that a necessary precondition for the success of the reintegration program was that the government creates “an enabling environment.”⁸²  It is fair to say that the government never created an enabling environment on a national scale.  There was no effort by the government to mobilize its security forces effectively to prevent violence, to take preventive measures to avert threats of violence or to put forward government representatives from all the affected ethnic groups to promote solutions to the ethnic violence in cooperation with UNDP.  Among the local government authorities, the ethnic mix is in no way proportionally representative of the populations in the area.  Local government positions at the Provincial Commissioner (P.C.), District Commissioner (D.C.), District Officer (D.O.), chief and sub-chief levels are heavily dominated by Kalenjin appointees.  The government has also relied on other ethnic minority groups with no ties to the displaced, such as Somali-Kenyans, in the clash areas to promote their policies.  Throughout the UNDP program, the Kenyan government assigned only trusted Kalenjins from the Office of the President as national program coordinators to oversee the UNDP initiative.  When the government perceived that the first national program coordinator, Zakayo Cheruiyot, was becoming too cooperative with UNDP, he was replaced by the even more loyal Paul Langat, who had been notorious for his lack of concern toward the displaced when he served as D.C. for Uasin Gishu district.⁸³

In most cases where Kalenjins were driven off their land in retaliatory attacks, they were generally able to return to their land once they were provided with material assistance to rebuild their destroyed homes.  However, in many of the hardest hit areas, particularly around Eldoret and Nakuru in the Rift Valley Province and on the slopes of Mt. Elgon in Western Province, where these factors are absent, the government’s inaction is evidenced by the thousands of predominantly Kikuyu, Luhya, and Luo displaced who remain off their land to date.  In interviews with Human Rights Watch/Africa in August 1996, the most frequently cited reason for not returning to their land was the fear of renewed violence and a lack of confidence that government authorities would provide any protection to the displaced if it did break out.  A displaced Kikuyu man from Olenguruone in the Rift Valley Province told Human Rights Watch/Africa that they would willingly return to their land if they could, but the security risk was too high:

Life has been hard since the clashes.  How does one feed the family with no land?  For one year we were on food from the Catholic church after our farms at Korofa were attacked by a group of people with spears, pangas and arrows in April 1992.  Since 1993, I have been working as a casual laborer.  When people around this area try to return to their land, some are killed.  In 1992, someone was killed when they went back.  I cannot risk going back until I am certain there is enough security.⁸⁴ 

A 35-year-old Luhya women from Western Province, who was widowed as a result of the violence, said:

I was chased off my land in Kimama in 1992 with my five children when the attackers came.  My husband was killed.  I have tried to go back to my farm.  The first time I went back in September 1994, I rebuilt the roof and doors, which had been stolen from the house, and began to plant maize.  But I was chased off my land again by a group of Kalenjins who came with clubs to threaten me.  One of them even had a gun.  They fired in the air, and I ran away.  I have been living in Namwele since then because I fear to return.  I rent a place here, and I go back to farm my land in the day time.  But I do not dare return.  The roof and door that I had replaced were taken down.  Sometimes I find some of my maize and beans uprooted and left there.  These are signs to me not to return.  If something happens, there is no one that I can get help from.  My husband is dead, and the police will not help me.⁸⁵ 

A much smaller number cited the lack of building materials for rebuilding their destroyed homes as the reason for their continued displacement, particularly in Western Province.  Some have decided that they do not dare to chance returning to their land until after the next national election to be held by March 1998, because of the possibility of renewed violence and a complete lack of confidence in the government.

Uneven and Discriminatory Application of the Law

An important impediment to full reintegration, which was completely ignored by UNDP, has been the impunity enjoyed by the organizers of the violence and the attackers.  The lack of accountability directly undermines reconciliation and long-term reintegration efforts in several ways.  First, a critical factor in reconciliation and peace work is the importance of ensuring that justice is done.  The ability of communities to put behind them the injustices they have suffered at the hands of another community is furthered if there is a sense that justice was done in acknowledging the wrongs committed against them.  Second, holding those responsible for their actions—particularly in ethnic conflict—recognizes that certain individuals within a group were responsible for such acts, mitigating the blanket condemnation against the whole ethnic group, which otherwise inevitably arises and creates a lingering suspicion and hatred against the group generally.  Third, because many of those accused of masterminding the clashes were high-ranking government officials, investigation and condemnation of their role in furthering the violence would have sent a strong message that the government would no longer tolerate the blatant misuse of power by its officials.

Yet, there has been a general failure by the government, during the UNDP program and since, to investigate reports of the involvement or collusion of government officials in the attacks, at all levels of responsibility.  President Moi has consistently denied even the possibility that members of his government might be involved in instigating the clashes, alleging instead that members of the opposition, journalists, church leaders and “certain foreign embassies” were stirring up tribal hatreds.  Claiming from the outset that the clashes were the consequence of ethnic rivalries stirred up by multipartyism, he has repeated these claims to date despite all evidence to the contrary.

The findings of the government’s own parliamentary select committee’s report which concluded that the violence had been orchestrated by Kalenjin and Maasai “individuals” close to the president have never been further investigated.  The parliamentary report provides evidence that high-ranking politicians, including Vice-President George Saitoti and Members of Parliament Ezekiel Barngetuny, Nicholas Biwott, Rueben Chesire and Wilson Leitich, funded and aided the “warriors,” that government vehicles and helicopters had transported the “warriors,” and that the local administration and security forces did not react to the situation with the required urgency.  The report’s recommendation that “appropriate action be taken against those administration officials who directly or indirectly participated [in] or encouraged the clashes” has never been acted upon.⁸⁶

High-ranking Kalenjins and Maasai within the government have freely called for the expulsion of non-pastoralist groups who settled in the Rift Valley Province after independence.⁸⁷  The presence of the UNDP program neither deterred messages of ethnic hatred from being sent to communities by certain government officials nor prompted the government to punish such speech in cases where it constituted an incitement to violence.⁸⁸  In November 1993, Kalenjin Member of Parliament Nicholas Biwott called for majimboism at a rally in Kericho district, warning other ethnic groups that they would only be welcome in the Rift Valley if they respected the rights of the original inhabitants (Kalenjins, Maasais, Samburu and Turkana).⁸⁹  Kipkalia Kones in the Office of the President attended majimbo rallies at which he declared that the Rift Valley Province would only have Kalenjin Members of Parliament and made statements to the effect that anyone who supported the opposition would “live to regret it.”⁹⁰  In April 1994, KANU Assistant Minister Shariff Nassir told Kenyans that until Kenya reverted to a one-party state, the ethnic violence would continue.  Home Affairs Minister Francis Lotodo gave a speech on November 28, 1993, telling Kikuyus that they had forty-eight hours to leave West Pokot district.  He also warned that the Kalenjin community would take the law into its own hands if they did not comply with this order.  Following his threat, local administration officials reiterated the message.⁹¹

In other cases, where these pronouncements directly resulted in attacks against certain ethnic groups, they constituted an incitement to violence which warrants government investigation and sanction.  In November 1993, for example, the minister of local government and member of parliament for Narok, William ole Ntimama, stated that he had “no regrets about the events in Enosupukia [where a group of Maasai had attacked and driven away thousands of Kikuyus living in a predominantly Maasai area] because the Maasai are fighting for their rights.”⁹²  Ntimama was reported to have organized the Maasai attack on his own account: no measures have ever been taken against him to investigate these charges.  In 1994, Mr. Kones threatened to lynch and forcibly expel Luo people from Bomet and Kericho districts if they supported the opposition party, FORD-Kenya.⁹³  In March 1995, Minister Lotodo, while addressing a crowd at Kenyatta stadium in Kitale town, said that all land in Trans Nzoia district belonged to the Kalenjin (Pokot) community and that if other communities living there did not toe the line, they would be flushed out.  Shortly after, seven people were killed and several houses burnt in Kwanza division.⁹⁴  The outbreak of “ethnic” violence shortly after statements such as these was not uncommon.

Although attackers of all ethnic groups were arrested, various charges were disproportionately brought against members of the Kikuyu and other groups who in general had borne the brunt of the attacks.  Often, Kalenjin and Maasai individuals accused of serious offenses, including murder, were released on bail despite continuing disturbances.  Since the site of the clash areas was outside the capital, Nairobi, charges and trials were often brought to the local courts in those areas.  Away from the international and national scrutiny that pertains to the Nairobi courts, the government was more easily able to criminalize and further disempower some of those it had displaced. 

For example, a number of Kikuyus were prosecuted for the crime of “oathing” or weapons possession around the Nakuru area, while similar reports from the Kalenjin community were never investigated.  Oathing is an integral part of the history of resistance in Kenya.  In the Kenyan context, oathing represents a powerful and significant means for organizing violence.⁹⁵  Following the clashes, there were reports of oathing being performed by both Kikuyus and Kalenjins.  Many of the Kalenjin warriors who did the attacking reportedly had taken oaths to drive away the non-Kalenjins from the Rift Valley.  Oaths among the Kikuyu community were to defend themselves against the Kalenjin attackers and to ensure that the Kikuyu were not driven from the Rift Valley Province.  It was also rumored that the oath allows its adherents to retaliate against fellow Kikuyu who leave or sell their land in the Rift Valley Province.  In October 1995, fifty-seven of sixty-three Kikuyus who had been arrested in December 1994 and charged with membership in an illegal organization, oathing, and plotting to kill members of the Kalenjin community were convicted.  Since 1994, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission has been providing legal counsel to some forty people, predominantly Kikuyu, who were arrested and charged with allegedly organizing or participating in unlawful meetings.   All those charged were either displaced or people who had been working with them.  Cases of weapons possession also continue to be pursued against Kikuyus in the Nakuru area.⁹⁶  However, the same charges have not been brought against those members of the Kalenjin community responsible for oathing or possessing weapons.

The government has also brought politically-motivated charges against members of the Luhya community.  In Western Province, some of the displaced from the Luhya community in Bungoma who had been instrumental in organizing the displaced to form self-help committees to obtain services and facilitate a return to their land were reportedly arrested by the government during a 1995 crackdown against an allegedly clandestine guerrilla movement.  In early 1995, the government announced that two guerrilla groups were plotting from Uganda to overthrow the government by force: the February the Eighteenth Resistance Army (FERA) and the Kenya Patriotic Front.  Some forty FERA suspects, who were tortured, only appeared in court after habeas corpus petitions were filed on their behalf in March 1995.  The blatant irregularities in the FERA trials and the use of torture to obtain guilty pleas reinforced the widespread perception that the government was using this claim to further its political ends. 

Some of the FERA suspects had been arrested in 1994 and held for a year incommunicado.  Most of those arrested came from the areas hard hit by the clashes in Mt. Elgon.  The displaced in the Bungoma area told Human Rights Watch/Africa that the crackdown against the alleged FERA members provided the government with an opportunity to go after the leaders of the displaced communities in the area.  One displaced Luhya man said:

after we were displaced, we began to organize ourselves.  We had self-help groups to distribute food, to negotiate with the Sabaot (Kalenjin) community.  Then the government came and picked our leaders and arrested them.    It was meant to disorganize us further.  As you can see, we are still displaced after all this time.  UNDP did nothing for us all that time.⁹⁷   

Among those arrested for being FERA members were some thirty Luhyas who had been displaced by the clashes: ten were arrested from Chebusienya, five from Kimaswa, more than five from Lwakhakha and more than ten from Lwandanyi center.⁹⁸  Many of the other displaced camp or center representatives were forced to go underground fearing arrest.  Currently, some 300 to 400 families displaced from the clashes still live across the border in Uganda afraid to return.  The Special Branch security officers in the area have reportedly told them that they cannot return without their permission.

None of these issues were ever addressed by UNDP in the course of its reintegration program.  Instead, UNDP dismissed the incitements to ethnic violence by high-ranking government officials as the acts of individuals separate from government policy.  However, justice for those wronged should have been one of UNDP goals because these unresolved issues remain a stumbling block to reconciliation.  There were a number of local human rights and legal assistance organizations in Kenya, and UNDP could have approached them to create programs to assist with the legal claims by the internally displaced.  UNDP should also have put pressure on the Kenyan government to end its uneven and discriminatory application of the law, and to investigate the findings of the government’s own 1992 parliamentary report. 

Harassment of the Displaced, Relief Workers and Journalists

During the UNDP program, leaders of displaced communities, local and international NGO representatives, and church officials, were continually obstructed in their activities by local government officials.  Displaced persons who attempted to form self-help groups to organize schools or assist their communities were singled out and politically-motivated charges, such as participating in illegal meetings, were brought against them.  Access to areas, even those not in security operation zones, was periodically denied at the whim of local government officials to those attempting to assist the displaced or to journalists who tried to report on the situation.

One of the government’s tactics was to restrict the flow of information.  Reporting on events pertaining to the conflict was made particularly difficult for journalists.  There were numerous charges of government harassment of the press for reporting on the clashes including arrests without charge, the bringing of patently political charges such as subversion, police interrogation, and the illegal impounding of issues of publications and newspapers that carried articles on the clashes.  During the year and a half in which the Security Operation regulations were in effect, the media were denied access to three of the worst-hit areas.  According to the former Rift Valley P.C., Ishmael Chelanga, the primary reason for the creation of the security zone was to keep away “those who did not wish us well and those who were spreading rumors, lies, and propaganda.”⁹⁹  By contrast, there has been a general failure to investigate reports of involvement or collusion of government officials, at all levels of responsibility.  At no time has President Moi taken steps to censure or discipline those officials who were responsible for this harassment.  Among the incidents reported include:¹⁰⁰

In January 1994, the government declared Maela camp a restricted area and banned all NGOs, churches and UNDP officials from visiting the camp.  On January 5, a contingent of administration and regular police, on orders of the Naivasha D.O., closed down a medical clinic and a makeshift school and destroyed the shelters of the displaced, ordering them to leave.  Local government authorities also pressured church officials to stop a church feeding program for the camp residents.  Only after intense international and media pressure did local government authorities abandon their actions against the internally displaced at Maela camp.

On January 7, 1994, two reporters, Moses Wanyama Masinde and Jeff Mbure and their driver Joshua Mutunga, from the NCCK magazine Target, were arrested and held for three days without charge after they visited and interviewed the displaced at Maela camp.  While in custody, Mr. Masinde was beaten by the district Criminal Investigation Division (CID) officer Godana Golicha.  Their notebooks, cameras, employee identity and press cards were confiscated by the police, and they were accused of inciting the victims in the camp.  They were released on bond pending police investigation. 

On January 8, 1994, reporters from the Daily Nation were prevented from interviewing Maela camp residents by the local D.O.  Two weeks later, representatives from the U.S. Embassy were barred from entering the camp.  An Irish priest, Tom O’Neil, who had spoken out against the forced eviction was threatened by the Nakuru D.C. and served with a deportation order. 

On March 16, 1994, Ngumo Kuria, Standard newspaper’s Nakuru bureau chief and Peter Rianga Makori, a provincial correspondent, were arrested and charged with subversion under section 77 of the Kenya Penal Code for “an act prejudicial to the security of the state” by writing a report “intended or calculated to promote feelings of hatred or enmity between different races or communities in Kenya.”  They were charged after the publication of an article alleging that nine people had been killed and hundreds of others displaced by renewed “ethnic” fighting in Molo, one of the areas in the Rift Valley worst affected by violence in the previous two years.  The published story quoted an eyewitness source who claimed to have seen the violence.  Government statements that the incident had not occurred were later confirmed to Human Rights Watch/Africa by clergy assisting the displaced in the area.  A week later, the managing editor of the Standard, Kamau Kanyanga, and the deputy sub-chief, John Nyaosi, were also charged with subversion for editing an article.  All four were granted bail on March 31, 1994.

In April 1994, two priests, Fr. Stephen Mbugua and Fr. Ndenyere, were arrested after visiting Olenguruone, an area that had been badly affected by the clashes. 

On April 10, 1994, FORD-Kenya Member of Parliament Mukhisa Kituyi was prevented by police from entering a camp for displaced people at Thessalia mission in Kericho district to donate fifteen bags of maize to the 630 residents.  The police told him that they had been given instructions by the D.C. not to permit access to the displaced.  According to the NCCK, children in the mission had begun to suffer from malnutrition.

On April 11, 1994, Mutegi Njau, news editor of the Daily Nation, and Evans Kanini, Eldoret correspondent, were arrested in Nakuru.  They had been summoned to the office of the Rift Valley provincial criminal investigations officer to answer questions relating to an article entitled “Clashes: Bishops Condemn the Govt,” published in the April 4 edition of the paper.  The article had quoted a displaced clash victim from Burnt Forest claiming that he had seen a government helicopter transporting Kalenjin attackers land on the farm of an unnamed “prominent Rift Valley politician” shortly before residents of nearby Rurigi farm were attacked and driven from their homes.  Mr. Njau was charged with subversion and then released on bail. 

Daily Nation correspondent Austin Kiguta, based in Laikipia, was interrogated by police in mid-1994 and made to record a statement after he wrote an article on property destruction on an East Laikipia farm. 

In November 1994, the local government administration in parts of Kipkabus turned back a group of displacees when they attempted to return to their farms in the Burnt Forest area.  Most of those turned back were living in the NCCK community center in Eldoret.

On November 29, 1994, eight elders were arrested in Maela camp and interrogated by the police after they questioned a screening process being conducted by UNDP and the government to distinguish genuine clash victims displaced from Enosupukia.

On November 27, 1994, twelve Kikuyu clash victims from Maela were arrested and charged for allegedly participating in an illegal meeting.

In late December 1994, UNDP and the international NGO Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) officials were denied access to Maela camp after forced government dispersals of some 2,000 displaced, despite the fact that the UNDP officer had a letter from the Office of the President allowing entry into Maela.  The displaced were transported out of the Rift Valley Province, without notification to UNDP, and left in Central Province in the middle of the night on Christmas eve.  An American priest, Fr. John Kaiser, who had been working for the Catholic diocese in Maela, was put under house arrest when he protested the action.  He was then taken to nearby Naivasha and warned that he would be deported if he attempted to enter the camp again (See section on Forced Dispersals and Expulsions).

On December 27, 1994, two Standard newspaper journalists, Amos Onyatta and photographer Hudson Wainaina, were arrested and held without charge at Maela while covering the forced dispersals.

In late December/early January 1995, the government destroyed supplies that had been provided by Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) to the displaced in Central Province who had been forcibly moved by the government from Maela camp.

In late December 1994, the government told clash victims at the Eldoret NCCK community center to move back to their farms.  The Uasin Gishu D.O., Daniel Lotoai, also made it clear that the government would only aid clash victims on their farms and not in centers and camps.  As part of this “resettlement scheme,” the D.O. immediately banned the camp’s management committee, which was made up of members of the displaced and ordered the chief (a government appointee) to draw up a list of the “genuine camp members” and their farms of origin.

On January 3, 1995, Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) staff were denied access to visit the displaced in the Burnt Forest area on the grounds that they needed permission to enter.

On January 12, 1995, D.O. Daniel Lotai forcibly evicted 179 families that had sought refuge at the Eldoret NCCK center for more than nine months.  They were left by the side of the road. 

On January 11, 1995, a Kikuyu priest, Fr. Muranga, was arrested in Nakuru and accused of inciting residents at Longonot where recent attacks by approximately 100 Maasai warriors had left some ten people dead, ten houses burned and an unknown number of livestock stolen.  No other arrests were made.

On January 15, 1995, several opposition members of parliament were detained, including Njanga Mungai, Charles Liwali Oyondi, and Francis John Wanyange.  They were arrested in Longonot as they were about to attend a church service for the victims of an ethnic clash that had occurred on January 10 at Mai Mahiu in the Rift Valley.  They were charged with promoting “warlike” activities and “uttering words with a seditious intent.”  On January 20, they were denied bail.  In mid-February, the charges were dropped. 

In the same month, five Kikuyus from Kanjoya, near Longonot, were arrested and charged for holding an illegal meeting.

In February 1995, the government barred the Naivasha Catholic parish and three opposition members of parliament from delivering food to the clash victims.  Previously, the government had confiscated checks for more than K.shs200,000 [approximately U.S.$3,600 at that time] given by the Catholic diocese of Ngong for school fees to assist the displaced children in the Maela area.

On February 25, 1995, the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, Aurelia Brazeal, was held for an hour at Kongoni police post near Naivasha on suspicion that she was accompanying opposition party leaders who wanted to visit Maela camp.

In late July-early August 1995, Judith Wakahiu, a student at the Moi University’s Centre for Refugee Studies, was arrested and held without charge for twelve days before being released.  Ms. Wakahiu, a member of the university-registered student group, the Moi University Students’ Refugee Welfare Club, had been working at Maela camp during the university vacation period assisting the displaced.  She was held in the prison at Naivasha and accused of belonging to an illegal organization.  While in custody, she was sexually harassed by a police officer.  When the director of the Centre for Refugee Studies, Professor John Okumu, made inquiries about her arrest to the police, his house was ransacked by the police, he was accused of managing an illegal organization, and was held without charge in Naivasha prison for several days before being released.

These, and other incidents, indicate that ongoing harassment and intimidation was taking place in the clash areas on a regular basis.  UNDP should have seen it as part of its responsibilities to call for government restraint toward the displaced and those working with or reporting on the displaced, and should have worked towards greater access and transparency in the clash areas.  Yet UNDP frequently remained silent about government harassment, and in some cases, made excuses for the Kenyan government by dismissing an incident as a misunderstanding or a temporary setback.  Its failure to make public pronouncements critical of government actions was matched by a failure to serve even as a back channel advocate by supporting the agencies by providing factual reporting to donor governments which might have been less constrained to make representations to the Kenyan authorities.  A worker with the international NGO Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) noted that several times during the course of the UNDP program, local government officials destroyed their equipment, arrested their staff, or denied them access to areas where the UNDP program was being administered and where they had permission to enter.  They felt that they could not rely on UNDP, either at the field or national level, to speak up on their behalf.

Fraudulent Land Transfers, Illegal Occupation, Pressured Land Sales and Exchanges

A long-term effect of the violence is the lasting alteration of land occupancy and ownership patterns in the areas where the “ethnic” clashes took place, and a significant reduction of the number of non-Kalenjin landholders, particularly in the Rift Valley Province.  The government has continued to pursue its policies of removing certain ethnic groups from the ethnic clash areas by allowing and cooperating in the illegal expropriation of land owned primarily by Kikuyus, Luhyas, and Luos.  The increased possession of land by Kalenjins and Maasai in the Rift Valley benefits the Moi government by allowing it to cater to the sentiments of ethnic nationalism among its supporters: it expects their political support by claiming to have got “their” land back and for increasing their economic wealth.  In the meantime, thousands of people with title deeds or mortgage notes have been rendered virtually destitute because of their ethnicity.

In some cases, the land has been completely occupied.  In others, the boundaries have been illegally moved to expand the farms of neighboring Kalenjins onto parts of the land of the displaced.  In other cases, those kept from their land are being offered sums significantly below market value for their farms.  Those who refuse to sell are given warnings by their Kalenjin neighbors that a time will come when they will not only have to sell, but will have to accept the price given to them by Kalenjins.  Other non-Kalenjins have exchanged land with people who are willing to take their plot in return for land in another province.  In some areas, local Kalenjin authorities have explicitly instructed clash victims to exchange their land with Kalenjins from outside the Rift Valley.  For example, in Tapsagoi, a local Kalenjin chief threatened renewed violence unless the non-Kalenjins, who had fled their land after an attack by Kalenjins, exchanged it with Kalenjins, which is in violation of the Land Control Board rules.¹⁰¹ 

Government officials have also not hesitated to misuse their legal authority to expropriate land under the guise of exercising “eminent domain,” which allows the government to take over land for the public interest under limited circumstances.  In September 1993, the minister for local government, William ole Ntimama, a Maasai who has led the majimbo calls, declared an area in his district a trust land for the Narok County Council.  His action was then reinforced by Minister for Environment and Natural Resources John Sambu, who told residents of the forty-four kilometer area that they had to move, because the land would soon be gazetted as a protected area.  Not coincidentally, the area’s 15,600 inhabitants were Kikuyu.  Most had purchased land from Maasai leaders in the 1960s.  They believed that they were being harassed for not having supported KANU in the election.

Those displaced who attempt to report the illegal occupation or transfer of their land to the government are sent futilely from one office to the next until they finally are forced to give up.  The government is well aware that many of the displaced landholders are poor and unaware of their legal rights, making it unlikely that these transactions will ever be challenged.  The government has taken no steps to address the irregularities in land ownership and sales resulting from the violence, portraying the problems as mere contract disputes that need to be dealt with among the affected individuals.

In Olenguruone, Nakuru district, in the Rift Valley Province, Kikuyu landowners are discovering that their title deeds have been transferred without their knowledge into the possession of Kalenjin owners by the Commissioner of Lands in Nakuru.  The government has also taken no steps to discipline those civil servants in the land offices who are illegally altering land title deeds to transfer land into the hands of Kalenjins.  In 1939, the colonial government settled some 4,000 Kikuyu squatters on the land, which had originally been part of Maasai land.  Olenguruone was one of the most affected areas during the clashes, and most of those driven off their land in 1992 and 1993 still remain displaced.  One Kenyan characterized Olenguruone as “Kenya’s West Bank,” referring to the contested Israeli/Palestinian area.  Few, if any, Kikuyus from the area are returning to their land because of security fears.  Increasingly, the likelihood of their return is being further diminished because of illegal land transfers that are revoking their titles.

Human Rights Watch/Africa interviewed several displaced Kikuyu who inadvertently discovered that their title deeds have been illegally altered by the Commission of Lands.  According to lawyer Mirugi Kariuki, “the Land Control Board has become an instrument of control for the government to further its discriminatory policies. The government cannot claim that it is not aware of this because such a process cannot take place without the knowledge of the D.O. in the area.”¹⁰²  One displaced Kikuyu man told Human Rights Watch/Africa:  

I owned plot number 938 in Chegamba village in Olenguruone.  I was chased off my land during the ethnic clashes and the original title deed was burnt.  In February 1996, I decided to get a copy of the deed.  I went to the Commission of Land, and there I found that the title deed had been transferred in 1994 into the name of a Kalenjin by the name of  David Kipgetich Maritim (national ID number 1646-66011/69).  I have never sold my land.  I complained at the land office and was told to look for a lawyer to help me.  I tried to report it to the Criminal Investigation Division and to the Police.  They told me to take it to the courts.  How can I?  I have no money to even get an affidavit.¹⁰³

One twenty-nine-year-old Luhya man who owns a six-acre plot in Chemundi, Western Province, spoke to Human Rights Watch/Africa about his experience.  He was attacked on April 4, 1992, and forced to flee.  For three years, he sought refuge in a number of nearby towns, until it was safe enough for him to return to his land in September 1995.  Since January 1993, a quarter of his plot has been illegally occupied by his Kalenjin (Sabaot) neighbor.  He said:

I have been trying to get my land back without any success since 1993.  I reported the illegal occupation to the assistant chief, Patrick Cherokoni, who told me to see the village headman, Elijah Tenge.  When I went to him, he told me that there was nothing that he could do and to go and see the assistant chief.  The assistant chief told me to see the D.O.  I saw the D.O. in February 1993 who sent me to the subchief.  I went back to the D.O. in March 1993 and then again in August 1993.  Finally, I gave up.  I even tried to get the village elders to help me come to a solution, but the Sabaots [Kalenjins] refused.  Nothing has happened.  I am still able to plant on the rest of my land.  But I always make sure that there are other Bukusus [Luhyas] here when I am on my land.  We still cannot risk going back alone.¹⁰⁴

Another fifty-three-year-old Luhya man who was displaced from his land in 1992 in Western Province has been staying with relatives about one hour from his land.  He tried to return to his land once in December 1994, but was attacked by his Kalenjin neighbors.  He has not attempted to reside on his land since then, and he is aware that his neighbors have illegally occupied the land:

Three acres of my land are being ploughed by my neighbor Ekonya arap Sioi and his two sons.  When I have tried to speak with them or stop them, they tell me to leave or they will have me beaten up.  I went to the Cheskaki police post, and they told me to go to the headman, Peter Matanda.  The headman came to the land with me and even saw them ploughing it.  He told me to talk to the subchief, Patrick Cherokoni.  I spoke to him, and I also told the police again.  They told me to go to the D.O.  The D.O. told me to go to the Land Registration Officer, Mr. Muhanji, in Bungoma.  I paid Kshs.1,200 [approx. U.S.$ 22] for the transportation to go to Bungoma.  The Land Registration Officer came and saw them on the land.  They even confronted my neighbor and told him that this was my land and he should not be using it.  Then, they asked me for Kshs.2,000 [approx. U.S. $36] to pay for their transportation back to Bungoma.  They wanted a bribe.  Now, there is nothing more that I can do.  I work in a dispensary here.  I have a wife and eight children to support.  I also have a title deed to land that used to support us.  Now I have nothing but that.  My house is destroyed, and my land has been taken.¹⁰⁵ 

Driven by financial desperation and a belief that the government will never allow them to return to their land, some of the displaced have sold their land at rates far below market price.  One displaced person in Western Province told Human Rights Watch/Africa: 

I sold eighteen acres at a cheap price because I never thought that I would be able to return and the land was the only thing that I had.  If I was going to start my life again elsewhere, I needed the money.  I sold it at Kshs. 30,000 [approximately U.S. $545] per acre.¹⁰⁶

The market rate in that area is Kshs. 50,000 [U.S. $909] per acre, resulting in a sizable loss of approximately U.S. $6,500 for the eighteen-acre plot.

Another forty-five-year-old displaced Luhya women with eight children told Human Rights Watch/Africa:

I came from Koborom in Mt. Elgon.  In 1991, I was chased from my land.  Our house was looted, broken, three of our neighbors were killed.  The Sabaots [Kalenjins] who attacked told us to leave because this was their land.  Twenty people tried to return there shortly afterwards, but every time they fixed their houses, things were removed.  Every time they planted things, the crops were pulled up.  They were told not to come up the mountain [Mt. Elgon].  If it was just the Sabaots, then we could resist this.  But the police also support this.  When we report these incidents, suspects are arrested and then immediately released.  Now the Sabaots want to buy the land at a cheap price.  One woman I know whose husband was killed in clashes in Kaboromo sold her six-acre plot for Kshs. 30,000 [approximately U.S. $545].  In this area, we usually sell one acre—one acre—between Kshs 45,000 to 60,000 [approximately U.S. $800 to $1,000].  What could she do?  She was lame and had nine children to support once her husband was killed.¹⁰⁷

In Olenguruone, Nakuru district, in the Rift Valley Province, land owned by Kikuyu displaced is being sold at throwaway prices.  Generally, the local government administration in this area has not been of assistance to the displaced.  One Kikuyu man told Human Rights Watch/Africa, “six acres of land in this area would usually be sold at Kshs 600,000 [approximately U.S.$ 11,000] .  But I know someone who sold six acres here for Kshs 70,000 [approximately U.S. $1,300].  Since the clashes, Kikuyus know that they cannot return to that land, so some are selling it.¹⁰⁸

In other cases, the displaced have exchanged their land for land elsewhere.  In the Mount Elgon area, those Luhyas with land on the slopes of the mountain have exchanged plots with Kalenjins who own land lower down the slopes even though the land higher up the mountain is more fertile.  A formerly displaced Luhya man who had exchanged his land for land lower down Mt. Elgon told Human Rights Watch/Africa: “I swapped land with the son of Eliah Cheriot even though the land I got was less fertile because I knew that if I took this land, at least I would be able to live in peace.”¹⁰⁹  A formerly displaced Luhya man told Human Rights Watch/Africa:

I was driven off my eight acres of land at Kamaneru on April 8, 1992.  My house was burned, my six cows and two sheep were taken.  Everything that I owned was lost.  I stayed at Kapkateny working day jobs to make some money to support my wife and six children.  I tried to go back four times.  Each time, the Kalenjins there told me that they did not want to see me back there.  Now, I have exchanged my land with a Kalenjin.  I am not happy with this exchange.  He has got a bigger plot.  But this was the best option.  If I continued doing casual labor, I would have had to work harder, and I would have had to pay rent.  This way I can at least support myself.¹¹⁰

The government is slowly, but surely, consolidating and legalizing the illegal gains from the “ethnic” violence in such a way as to reduce permanently land ownership of certain ethnic groups in the areas which it has promised to its supporters.  This constitutes a constructive forced eviction of the individuals who are coerced into relinquishing their property and their homes.  Although this process was well underway during the UNDP program, no steps were taken by UNDP to address the illegal land appropriation.  UNDP should have put pressure on the government to end these illegal land transactions and provided assistance to the displaced to challenge these transactions in court.

Forced Dispersals and Expulsions

To ensure that large gatherings of clash victims were not easily visible to visiting diplomats, the media or human rights groups, local government officials dispersed camps of the internally displaced without any consideration of where these victims could go.  One method that was frequently used was to announce to the victims, despite evidence to the contrary, that it was safe to return to their land.  In other cases, where the displaced would not leave voluntarily, local government officials, with the assistance of the police, would forcibly disperse camps of displaced people without providing adequate assistance or security to permit them to return to their land.  The result of the dispersals, which continued even in 1996, has made it virtually impossible to identify those who were displaced from their land by the “ethnic” violence today.  The violence and the ensuing government harassment has condemned a formerly self-sufficient and productive sector of the economy to permanent dispossession and poverty.  Many are renting homes or living on hired land.  Others have become part of the urban poor, either unemployed or working as day laborers who receive barely enough to survive.  Many of the displaced are farmers by occupation who did not receive much formal education or training in skills of the salaried sector.  As a result, some of the displaced have been reduced to begging or crime in order to survive.  In recent years, there has been an alarming rise in the number of street children in Kenya.  Among them are many children who were displaced and dispossessed by the clashes.¹¹¹

There were expectations that government harassment of the internally displaced would cease, particularly once the UNDP program began.  However, this proved not to be the case.  The crowning incident of government disregard for the internally displaced, UNDP and the international community took place in December 1994 at a camp called Maela when the government forcibly expelled the residents.  This lent credence to the charges that the government was clearing the Rift Valley Province of certain ethnic groups.

The predominantly Kikuyu displaced population at Maela camp had sought refuge there after being attacked on its land at Enosupukia, Narok district, by a group of Maasai in October 1993.  Since that time, they had been living at Maela camp in squalid conditions under plastic sheeting on church grounds.  The overcrowding had led to shortages of food, water, and medical supplies.  Incidents of government harassment of the displaced at this camp periodically occurred as did statements by Maasai leaders that the displaced at Maela would never be permitted to return to their land.   

In the early hours of the morning of December 24, 1994, administration police and KANU youth wingers raided the camp of Maela which housed approximately 10,000 predominantly Kikuyu people who had sought refuge after being attacked at Enosupukia in October 1993.¹¹²  Without notice, the government officials razed the camp and transported some 2,000 residents to Central Province (the area regarded as the “traditional” home of the Kikuyus), and proceeded to question them about their ethnicity and ancestral background.  Families were separated as they were herded into about twenty trucks which had been fueled from a UNDP petrol account (which was later closed after UNDP discovered this fact).  Each truck was crammed with approximately one hundred people.  Initially, the displaced were not provided with food or shelter.  The relocation was done late at night without notification or the participation of UNDP. 

The remaining residents of Maela were left without shelter, and UNDP and the international NGO Medecins sans Frontieres (Spain) were denied access to Maela, despite the fact that the UNDP officer had a letter from the office of the president allowing entry into Maela.  UNDP was informed that this resettlement was in keeping with the President’s promise to resettle the genuine victims of Maela before Christmas.  Some 200 “genuine” victims, as defined by the government, were relocated to a government-owned farm near Maela called MoiNdabi and each given two acres.  The land at MoiNdabi, which used to be part of a larger farm administered by the government Agricultural Development Cooperation (ADC), is less productive than the land the displaced were forced from in Enosupukia, and water, shelter and sanitation facilities were non-existent when they arrived.¹¹³ 

The other Maela camp residents, considered “non-genuine” displacees by the government, were dumped at three different locations in Central Province in the middle of the night and left to fend for themselves.  At Ndaragwa, the displaced were left by the side of the road with no shelter and practically no belongings.  At Ol Kalou, they were left between the railway line and the main road.  At Kiambu, they were dropped at Kirigiti Stadium.  Several days later, the makeshift camp at Kirigiti was destroyed in a police raid at 3:00 am, leaving the twice displaced once again without shelter.  The displaced were ordered to line up and were loaded on trucks without being informed of where they were to be taken.  Those who resisted were beaten and forcibly thrown into the trucks.  The government denied any harassment or beatings.  None of those forcibly displaced to Central Province were returned by the government or UNDP to the area they came from in the Rift Valley Province. Furthermore, the government officials responsible for the brutality against the displaced have never been disciplined.¹¹⁴ (See section on Abandoning the Displaced).

Although the blatant disregard by the Kenyan government of the UNDP program was obstructing reintegration efforts, UNDP continued to downplay the government’s detrimental role.  Even after the dispersal of Maela camp, UNDP insisted that this was a minor aberration rather than a symptom of a larger problem with the government.  UNDP’s handling of the affair drew condemnation from all sides.  The NGO community and the political opposition criticized UNDP for its unwillingness to stand up for the displaced throughout, noting that they had warned UNDP that the government was not committed genuinely to the return of all.  David Whaley, UNDP resident representative to Kenya at that time, did little to allay these concerns when, during a meeting of donors convened on January 4, 1995 to discuss the Maela incident, he termed the forced relocation a “hiccup” in the larger reintegration program.¹¹⁵  Even some working on the UNDP program at the time found this assessment hard to swallow.  David Round-Turner, former policy advisor with the UNDP Displaced Persons Program, recalled: “That was no hiccup.  It was a major gastric upset.  It was a slap in the face to UNDP.”¹¹⁶

The UNDP’s misportrayal of the situation appeared to be a problem throughout.  In December 1994, barely two weeks before Maela took place, UNDP wrote to Human Rights Watch/Africa in response to concerns raised by Human Rights Watch/Africa about the UNDP program.  The letter, which once again put a positive spin on the situation, without even a hint of the problems being experienced, stated: “we have also received increasingly strong support from most political parties and other parts of Kenyan society and think that our approach has been sensitive and timely in implementation.”¹¹⁷  Meanwhile, Ernest Murimi of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission based in Nakuru told Human Rights Watch/Africa “It was no surprise to us when the government cleared Maela.  We knew that the Kenyan government was trying to disperse them before this happened.  Mark Cassidy [UNDP Field Officer] knew this too.  I told Mark Cassidy that this was going to happen.  The problem with UNDP was that it trusted the government too much.”¹¹⁸

The forced dispersals at Maela brought the UNDP program to a virtual standstill, and prompted it to uncharacteristic public criticisms.  UNDP protested the dispersals in a letter to the government and publicly disassociated itself from the operation in Maela, stating that UNDP was committed to protecting those who had been relocated.¹¹⁹  UNDP’s criticism prompted President Moi to attack the agency for criticizing the “reintegration” process at Maela, accusing it of not delivering the U.S.$20 million it had pledged to raise for the project, and warning UNDP not to interfere in internal affairs.¹²⁰  On January 10, David Whaley, former resident representative to Kenya, met with President Moi and UNDP reiterated its concerns: President Moi denied involvement in the forced dispersal.  In a meeting with Human Rights Watch/Africa in February 1995, UNDP admitted that serious violations of human rights had taken place, however, they were not willing to place any conditionalities on the continuation of the UNDP program since they believed that the government was looking for a way to stop the program and UNDP did not want to give the government any excuse to do so.  David Whaley, in that meeting, also reiterated that until recently the program had been very positive.¹²¹

One diplomat said “After Maela, UNDP went into a holding pattern.  Nothing much was done.”¹²²  Eleven months after Maela, the program was ended in November 1995, with a government agreement in principle to incorporate activities in favor of displaced persons in its development program plan, the Social Dimensions of Development—which would receive UNDP support.¹²³  UNDP Resident Representative to Kenya, Frederick Lyons, announced that some 180,000 of an estimated 250,000 displaced had returned to their land.¹²⁴  Requests by Human Rights Watch/Africa for a regional breakdown of this figure were never answered by UNDP.